Critical Civic & Citizenship Education

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Editorial

The role of education in promoting civic knowledge, dispositions and skills has been at the centre of the educational debate in Europe and beyond since the late 20th century. As citizens show growing signs of political disaffection – resulting, to name just a few, in disengagement, distancing from politics, or choosing unconventional ways of protesting – and democracies are said to be experiencing a crisis, education is once again viewed as a device for reinvigorating politics and citizenship. But the “crisis” of democracy is not new and has multiple meanings. To begin with, this “crisis” is shared both by traditional and emerging democracies, as political skepticism seems to affect citizens independently of the historical institution of democracy; data from the European Social Survey (ESS), for instance, reveal that levels of political interest and trust in political institutions tend to be low across European countries. On the other hand, and as in the late sixties, citizens’ engagement and participation is experiencing “an acute crisis (...) [because] new people want to participate, in relation to new issues, and in new ways” (Verba 1967, 54) – meaning that while traditional forms of political and civic engagement and participation seem to be in recession, other contexts and types of civic engagement and participation are certainly expanding (Barnes, Kaase 1979; Norris 1999).

How is education dealing with this “crisis”? Is civic and citizenship education actively confronting these problems and assuming a critical and political perspective, or are these conflicting topics disregarded? Are children and young people recognized as political actors that should have a say (here and now, irrespectively of their age) in current debates or merely viewed as future “political spectators who vote”, who are to be prepared for fulfilling their duties after becoming “full” citizens? Does a common, European approach of critical education request an abstraction from the differences of European democracies and their different shortcomings? Are there any relevant differences between “old” and “new” democracies left at all? And if, how do they affect political thinking and acting, teaching and learning? Do historical experience and consciousness influence critical education and political discourse in the classroom?

This volume of the Journal of Social Science Education (JSSE), “Critical Civic and Citizenship Education: Is there Anything Political about it?”, aims at contributing to this discussion. The authors depart from a reflection on national experiences in six European countries (Portugal, Bulgaria, Turkey, Switzerland, Germany, Finland) to consider the tensions between educational rhetoric and actual practices, historical narratives and citizenship goals, identities and diversity, and globalization opportunities and social exclusion. In all cases, the lack (and the need) for a critical political perspective is emphasized, at the risk of turning citizenship education into a disempowering experience with no actual relationship with “real” daily life in- and out-of-school.

In “Unpolite Citizenship: The Non-Place of Conflict in Political Education”, Hugo Monteiro and Pedro Ferreira address the “contradictory realities that value citizenship at the same time undermine politics”, by discussing what they designate as “the non-place of conflict in school practices and discourses”. Hugo and Pedro argue that citizenship and political education in schools risk to be cursed by the school’s “Midas touch” as “everything that the school touches becomes school-like” – thus implying that school-based citizenship education is hardly emancipatory and empowering. In line with Derrida and Rancière, the authors claim that conflict and disensus are at the core of democracy and that educational practices and policies should be repoliticized.

“How come a generation which had not been exposed to the influence of civic education performed better in civic competences as compared with their followers a decade later?” is the basic question, intriguing educational researchers and put forward by Georg Dimitrov’s research in Bulgaria, “State-Orchestrated Civic Education versus Civic Competencies of School Students: Some Conceptual Implications from a National Case Study.” Using the data from the most recent IEA study in citizenship education, the ICCS, the paper questions whether the apparent decline in Bulgarian pupils’ civic knowledge and competencies is related to the teaching of cívics and the democratic ethos of the schools. The author argues that traditional school teaching and organization negatively interfere with the goals of promoting active and critical citizens – illustrating how the analysis of the impact of citizenship education should take into account the larger historical, cultural and political pictures.

In an analysis of citizenship education in Turkey, “Turkey’s New Citizenship and Democracy Education Course: Search for Democratic Citizenship in a Difference-Blind Polity?”, Kenan Çayır considers the recent introduction of a “citizenship and democratic education” course in grade 8 and discusses both its potentials and frailties, underlying that “unless human rights are addressed in the context of national and international politics and, in terms of the rights and the responsibilities of the citizen, human rights education courses might improve a country’s image, but they would not necessarily provide the basis for democratic citizenship” In fact, Kenan argues, in line
with Seyla Benhabib, that not acknowledging the tension between (particularistic) citizenship rights and (universalistic) human rights can result in a disempowering experience for young citizens, with no relationship to their real life experiences outside the classroom – a topic especially relevant for citizenship education practice in migration and multinational societies. The same could be said on the importance of the recognition of identity(ies) and difference(s) in the context of a multicultural society such as Turkey – and surely, this discussion and the claim for “a new pluralist imaginary” is relevant all across Europe.

Nathalie Müller Mirza discusses the results of a qualitative research that addresses cultural diversity in the school, “Civic Education and Intercultural Issues in Switzerland: Psychosocial Dimensions of an Education to ‘Otherness’”. By assuming the challenges of intercultural education at school, namely the tension between promoting autonomous and critical citizenship and “la forme scolaire”, Nathalie confronts the problems of assimilationist pedagogical conceptions for immigrants, particularly at it views “difference in terms of ‘deficit’”. But she also highlights the challenges of more recent European perspectives on intercultural education in a qualitative study in primary and secondary schools in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. The study considers actual classroom practices, teacher perspectives and intentions and students opinions, and pinpoints the difficulties of implementing intercultural education in schools that remain “largely individual-oriented, monocultural and monolingual”.

The paper by Jukka Rantalla, “The Reflection of a Warlike Historical Culture in the Attitudes of Finnish Youths”, concentrates on the historical experience and consciousness in Finland, and reflects upon the way it is disseminated in families, schools and popular media (e.g., videogames). The interesting point of this paper is that it reminds us how citizenship development occurs in multiple contexts, and narratives about “national identity” circulate in diverse ways – as it analyses how a “warlike historical culture” continues to be the prevalent heritage, especially for boys. Confronting the persistence of the issue of “national identity” in the context of an “old” democracy is essential for renewing the reflection on positioning national identities within citizenship education in all European countries, instead of considering it per se as a phenomenon of developing democracies. The paper raises several questions regarding the relationship between this glorification of war and the phenomena of violence in Finland, and expresses a particular concern with the lack of a critical appraisal of this tradition.

In “The Political Dimension of Global Education: Global Governance and Democracy”, Bettina Lösch discusses the implications of globalisation for a political education, departing from the analysis of pedagogical approaches for global education and education for sustainable development in Germany. Following Nicola Humpert, Bettina emphasizes the tendency for an “apolitical” global learning, that does not critically evaluate the global agenda and politics, recognizing not only the novel participation opportunities, but also “the exclusion mechanism of democracy and politics” that are accentuated by globalisation – and gives various examples of contemporary tendencies that menace the quality of democracy and should, therefore, be acknowledged in political education.

In his detailed review on Brigitte Geissel’s book “Kritische Bürger. Gefahr oder Ressource für die Demokratie?” (“Critical Citizens: Risk or Resource for a Democracy?”), Dominik Allenspach discusses Geissel’s attempt “to untangle the two concepts of political support and political critique.” Her conception of “political attentiveness” seems to be rather promising also in the context of citizenship and civic education. Dominik discusses from the point of view of democratic theory the sufficiency of Brigitte Geissel’s argument of the necessity to introduce the category of “political attentiveness” in order to explain the state-citizen relation.

Finally, under the rubric of a praxis report in this JSSE volume we suggest a report on “Citizenship Education and Curriculum Development in Nigeria” by Oyeleke Oluniyi. Oyeleke demonstrates the paths of development of citizenship Education in Nigeria between historical dependencies, national identities, multiculturalism and modern societal developments, while attempting to answer the question, what are the main specifics, tasks, challenges, declared and de facto occurring developments, processes and goals within the citizenship education in Nigeria. Providing the view on citizenship education specifics in Nigeria, the praxis report shows similarities of citizenship education developments and challenges in different world regions and thus offers new platform for reflection on the citizenship education developments.

This collection of papers does live to our expectations of a volume that would critically consider the role and challenges of citizenship education in Europe (and beyond). We thank the authors, the reviewers, the editors of the JSSE and the editorial office for their support during the making of this volume.

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**Unpolite Citizenship: The Non-Place of Conflict in Political Education**

This paper considers the role of conflict (its constitutive relevance or erasure) in the concepts and practices of democracy and citizenship. Critically reflecting on contexts of formal and non-formal political education, and on the observed practices and discourse of relevant educational actors, we intend to interrogate the school’s conceptions, misconceptions and/or contradictions around democracy and political participation. Focusing on the arguments surrounding the perspectives oriented towards consensus vs. those embracing dissensus in social and political theories, this article considers the implicit and explicit powers existent or generated in school relationships, which inevitably affect our ways of looking at citizenship and of educating politically.

Cet article prétend aborder le rôle du conflit (du point de vue de sa pertinence constitutive ou de son effacement) dans des conceptions et des pratiques de la démocratie ou citoyenneté. Sur la base d’une réflexion critique touchant aux concepts d’éducation politique formelle ou non-formelle, ainsi qu’aux pratiques et discours d’agents centraux de l’action éducationnelle qui ont pu être observés, nous prétendons identifier des concepts, malentendus et/ou contradictions ayant trait aux concepts de démocratie et de participation politique. En examinant les perspectives visant à atteindre un consensus opposées à l’ampleur des divergences au cœur des théories politiques et sociales, cet article se focalise sur des pouvoirs implicites ou explicites, présentifiés ou générés dans des relations scolaires, qui affectent inévitablement notre manière d’envisager la citoyenneté, ainsi que l’action d’éduquer politiquement.

**Keywords**

Unpolite citizenship, conflict, education, political, school

1. **Introduction**

In the past decades we witnessed several transformations that had profound consequences for the way in which we recuperated and interrogate concepts such as citizenship and democracy. For example, the challenges posed by an intensified economic and corporate globalization, by the fluxes of migration and by transnational integration are dislocating old interrogations into the meaning of democracy itself (Trend 1996) and therefore recurrently demanding that we rethink and reconsider how to understand and perform citizenship and the political (Águila 2000).

This paper looks at citizenship education as a work in progress that articulates the concepts of politics, political education and democracy involving concrete educational practices. Also, assuming a critical perspective on education, we see the act of educating in opposition to that of inculcation or instruction. From this point of view, to think about education is necessarily to think about education for democracy. Educating citizens capable of respecting and practice democracy which also means citizens committed to questioning what democracy is and value its problematic definition (Ruitenberg 2009). Underpinning this perspective is an understanding of democracy as a mobile structure which comprehends an ethical-political stance of constant relegitimation and distribution of power (Rancière 2006). In accordance with a politicizing approach that seems to be *lost in translation*, citizenship education is thus brought to the fore and its forms challenged. Following a path that involves ethics, anthropology and epistemology, we emphasize the implicit political dimension that cuts across education and its practices:

1. An ethical path, regarding politics as an ethical way through personal and social emancipation which radicalizes the idea of plurality. This reflects the assumption that democracy is an ethical-political frame which supposes identities to be relational and subjects and others to be “constructed at the intersection of a multiplicity of subjective positions (…) which are articulated as a result of hegemonic practices” (Mouffe 1996, 26). Plurality and conflict, thus, become a condition and beginning for the political.

2. An anthropological path, perceiving the educability of every person as one of the basic characteristics of human beings. This general assumption has also an interpersonal and societal element (Dewey 2002), because educability, in this sense, refers to the possibility of growing to society, with society and, in a way, with the right to conduct society.

3. An epistemological path, calling for the reinvention of knowledge concerning epistemological plurality. We are not referring to epistemological relativism, but both to a way of assuming diversity of knowledge and the possibilities of dialogue and confrontation. Any kind of passivity, on this matter, is a possibility of a quiet and discreet “colonization” (Santos, Meneses 2010).

Following Hannah Arendt, the political is here understood as the underlying question of “being diverse
and together” (Arendt 1997, 45), considering that political (and educational) thought comes from within lived experience, and should be attached to it (Arendt 2006). Nowadays, the experience of schools and school systems always promotes contact with ways of seeing and living citizenship that are often contradictory, and neither conceptually sound enough nor oriented to politicized behaviors reflecting democratic awareness. Reflecting on the contradictory realities that value citizenship at the same time undermine politics, we aim to conceive the non-place of conflict in school practices and discourses, underlining the role of conflict at the heart of democracy. The notion of the political adopted in this paper is implicitly tied to that of democracy, as the notion of citizenship presupposes a participated and critical involvement in society and, certainly, in school systems. When we aim to discuss notions of Democracy and the ways they are reflected in practices, we are assuming the need to repoliticize – and of course to re-conceive politics and Democracy, civility and citizenship, which leads us to assume those concepts as widely implicated.

2. The Scholarization of Politics or the Curse of Midas

Considering what is understood as political education, both implicitly (taking lived educational experiences as a whole) and explicitly (in those more formal places of decision and representation), it is useful to pay attention to how it finds particular translations in schools, in the processes and mechanisms for debate and negotiation, as in the ways decisions are made. What is questioned here is whether political education reconfigures (school) education or if, contrarily, school – or a certain understanding of the territory of schooling – domesticates the intention and the practices that constitute a political education.

Starting (if not before) in the course of the Second Cycle of Basic Education (the 5th and 6th years of school), in the case of Portuguese schools, young students are involved in electing their representatives, in electing the student in their class that will occupy the formal position of Class Delegate [Delegado de Turma], and who by virtue of such “office” can represent the class in some of the Teacher Meetings for that Class [Conselhos de Turma]. Students are also encouraged to participate, individually and collectively, “in the life of the class, the school and the community” (Decree-Law Nr. 6/01, 18th January). The political intentions are presented in the legal texts and already reproduced in a variety of official texts and discourses they are often countered by the instituted pedagogical practices. These practices, still anchored in a scholastic model, are based on the permanent “scholarization” of all spheres of life, in such a way that anything that cannot find its place in the prior arrangement of school is neglected or put under the eye of the “discipline.” This “school-centrism” is then defined as a continuous scholastic categorization done by “those who inhabit the school,” in such a way that “what escapes this cognitive universe can only be apprehended under the sign of strangeness or as epiphenomena” (Correia, Matos 2001, 101). The distribution of people in the school space, from the classroom to its outside, frequently obeys this school-centric dictate, in the invisible line between the student in the front row (and note that the organization in rows is in itself revealing) and that the one at the back of the classroom, as well as in the various statuses and symbolisms available in the outside spaces of the school.

This is a version of the curse of Midas, here transported to the context of education: everything that the school touches becomes school-like and it is not possible to add anything to the school that cannot be reduced to the school itself. School scholarizes, and in that it can prize, enrich, reduce or limit. Yet, the curse of Midas fatally limits the transformations: the school operates on its subjects as it limits its possibilities of being itself transformed. The curse of Midas blunts the school’s emancipatory abilities.

In its most common practices, and due to the effects of the afore-mentioned “curse,” political education in schools submits to a scholastic model. To truly conceive politics and Democracy, civility and citizenship implies, as we explore further in the paper, to receive (or harbor) that which the school cannot measure. A political education challenges the school, the public school in particular, to become permeable to differences, to heterogeneities, to divergences, as permeable as the distanced reality of what happens outside of the school walls.

1 Empirical evidence offered along this paper comes from a set of case studies conducted in several Public Basic Education Schools from the North, the Center and the South of Portugal on the Non-disciplinary Curricular Areas [Áreas Curriculares Não-disciplinares] and which include Civic Education. This research, conducted by a large group of researchers which included the first author of this paper, took place between 2006 and 2008 and was supported by the Portuguese Ministry of Education (Bettencourt et al. 2008).

2 With the word “scholastic” we mean all forms of “school based” relations and articulations, either personal, curricular or generally institutional. We assume in this concept the idea that institutions modulate in their own particular way relations and negotiations, with the tendency to impose its own particular rules and measures.
On the other hand, the school-centric image of the curse of Midas makes visible a series of translations apparent in pedagogical practices. To point out some of them:

1. the conflation between conflict and indiscipline. If most indiscipline translates into conflict, not all conflict translates into indiscipline. Indiscipline numbs by not allowing the contra-position or polemics. In contrast, conflict is the raw material of democracy, if converted in a politically supported attitude.

2. the confluence between debating what is happening/has happened and the mechanisms of surveilling self and other. If, in what regards citizenship, it may be convenient to “reason our humors” (dislocating Roland Barthes’s expression), that should not be mistaken with favoring practices of delation and censorship. At the level of practices, civic behavior is translated as the denunciation of uncivic behavior which brings forth issues of power and principle that challenge democracy in itself.

3. citizenship converted into politeness, or civics converted into rules of etiquette, results from an artificial neutralization of the word, as if the work of schools, teaching practices and formal and informal education were not itself political.

Beyond the conceptual issues they raise, these translations have consequences in terms of the pedagogical approaches themselves. The confusion between civics and etiquette shows rules as untouchable and unquestionable, as something that subjects have no possibility of transforming or re-converting. The distinction between civic and civil has consequences for our understandings of citizenship and democracy, although its subtleties cannot be fully explored in this paper. If civic often refers to perspectives that are more clearly political and affirmative, favoring ideas of common fate, public responsibility and solidarity, civil is commonly seen as more connected to more protective perspectives, those more centered with individual rights, liberties and an orderly conduct (Kelly 1995). These tensions also appear (even though combined and transformed) integrated in the differences between perspectives on democracy mostly concerned with the setting of rules and procedures that ensure a just management of life in common and an orderly and civil way to resolve political choices and those more concerned with the struggle for and the participation in the definition and redefinition of who we are, can be and how we can live.

These questions point to problems that go beyond the field of education. They become dimensions that convoke current debates on the understandings of democracy and of the political as well as the rich and complex history of concepts such as citizenship and civility.

Without school-centrism, but keeping the school on the horizon, we will now focus on some of these questions.

3. Society vs. School or the Debate between Citizenship and Civility

Issues around the term “citizenship” seem to be comparable to the problematization of the concept of time by Saint Augustine: I know what it is if no one asks me; I no longer know what it is in the exact moment in which I am asked. This resistance to the thought plane stretches to related terms such as civility, in particular if one verifies this term. In their use both terms —citizenship and civility—are often taken as synonyms even if as ideas or concepts they are not the same. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that citizenship and civility are related and partly overlap (Kelly 1995). Interrogating the (necessary) distinction and the (problematic) overlaps between the two terms we may ask several questions: 1) what is the civic in citizenship?; 2) is there a place for the uncivic and the uncivil in constituting democratic citizenship?; 3) what approximates civility and politeness? To address these questions, we can start with the history of a translation.

If not by other histories, civility and politeness come closer by the classic translation of the Greek “Polis” by the Latin “Civis.” Civic and civil behavior pointed to a posture of an adequate relation between the individual and the State, in particular of how the legislated individual behaved within the space of appropriateness opened by the legislator State in a desirable and exclusive harmony. In a democracy of a few, the civic was the civilized, in opposition to the barbarian who was named as such for not having rules, or State or language. The barbarian owes its name to the onomatopoeia “bar bar,” presented as the in-comprehensible; the gibberish wish has no meaning (Fialho 2006). This philological exercise is illustrative of the attitudes towards political education and its contradictions in practice can be understood. We could say that in an inclusive manner, political education exceeds the example and becomes the right to express differences and to negotiate from a diverse point of view. This is an expression of otherness and its desired influence in the welcoming society. But on the other hand, one could easily become attached to the example following the imposition and the rigidity of the rules that some individuals keep breaking by its distance from the symbolic language and meaning of institutions. In schools, this appears when the interviewed teachers kept blaming families and the contexts of origin for the lack of rules and the misbehaving of students. Pupils become “bar bar” by not understanding and not being understood; by being placed on the other side of a fence where the school is not meant to intervene.
This distinction is currently also replicated in the debate between a “school for all”, a school supposed to affirm democracy and the Universal Right to Education, and a “school for excellence”, only for some, and directly influenced by market laws and the ideals of free competition, in this globalization insinuating one way everywhere. In schools, both discourse and practices permanently reflect the duality between the “school for all” and the “school for excellence”, as if these would exclude and cancel each other out. As Sá Cristian (2005) tells us, it is as if in the idea of school there remains the modern presumption of education as liberation and the pre-modern perspective of education as discipline and selectivity, in a tensional relationship intensified by the violent invasion of Neo-liberalism.

Beyond the scission between the two, it is important here to call attention to a point of junction, a blind spot in which the practices associated with education as liberation and the cold assumptions of the school as distinction converge. All happens as if the “liberation” largely affirmed in the idea of civility, required the abandonment of each singular social and political background through the conversion of the person to the uniform status of the “student.” Assuming the phenomenological presupposition that all liberation is liberation from something, we find the other end of the modern liberation ideal – difference. Liberation is also liberation from difference, from dissimilarity or conflict. Freed from the difference that singularly defines them as people, and liberated by civility, students are given the definable comfort of the word “student.” In short, it presents a formulation of civility against a definition of citizenship.

4. Repoliticizing Citizenship

Regarding the citizenship concept and its circumscribing practices, to underline an education for consensus or a pedagogy of conflict is to assume a fundamental difference (Ruiten 2009). Responding to similar questions around the terrible 9/11 events, philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida make evident their basic disagreements, exemplary disagreements in what they possess in terms of argumentative richness and of philosophical separation. While Habermas (2002, 2007) sees conflict as originating in the failure of communication, in the broken symmetry that “all speech situations require” (Borradori 2003, 37), Derrida (2001, 2003) considers the tension of the heterogeneous to be of utmost importance and places it at the center of what is inherited under the name of democracy – an idea which is never fully presentable. The dissension between Derrida and Habermas is irremediable. According to Habermasian conceptions, “communicative action” as a route to “mutual understanding” (Habermas 2002, 9) makes the reach of autonomy dependent on a common will (Habermas 1998). Under systematic and definable conditions, communicative action is directed towards achieving understanding (Habermas 2002), in line with a “universalized reciprocity” (Habermas 2007, 197) perspective. We are here in the presence of an understanding of political action and of democracy that is based on a pacifying consensus. As for Derrida (2001), on the other hand, to answer for a democratic inheritance (deconstructing democracy as a regime of presence and stability, in the name of what he will call a démocratie à venir) demands that we recognize in democracy an inadequacy towards itself. Democracy is more a commitment, a promise than a regime (Derrida 2001). Thus, democracy is the only system that, by assuming its imperfection, opens itself to perfectibility (Borradori 2003). Dissensus and “polemos”, and conflict are constitutive of democracy and its process. The political begins precisely in the moment of an opposition without war (Derrida 2003), where a “community of citizens is one in which speech takes the place of blood, and acts of decision take the place of acts of vengeance” (Pocock 1995, 30), in the open possibilities of questioning, critique and deconstruction. And that is how, in Derrida’s thought, “there is no deconstruction without democracy” and “no democracy without deconstruction” (Derrida 2003, 117). While a fuller exploration of this close relation between deconstruction and democracy, as in the Derridian sense of a démocratie à venir, goes beyond the focus of this paper, it is important to emphasize how this affirmation of dissensus over consensus, is useful in thinking citizenship as unpoliteness.

The conflict as polemos or as a certain unpoliteness is at the core of democratic processes. Developing, constructing relationships with others and managing those relationships, learning and gaining skills at various levels always involve conflict-generated processes. There is no actual learning and development which is not at least partly conflictual. When political education is at stake, the role of conflict is stressed by the fact that disagreement and the consequences of the processes of disagreeing can become actual skills.

Considering this, interrogating the relationship between social and educational contexts, we can see that the meaning of a political education, realized in an education for democracy, by conjugating citizenship and civility, favors an attempt of institutional totalization which imposes the culture of the institution over the culture of the individual. This imposition affirmed as a process of socio-cultural fusion (erasing the cultures of “origin”) is also a process of epistemological colonization. More traditionally scholastic knowledge prevails and strategically forces itself in the name of a platform made of consensus, of avoidance of conflict and erasure of other discourses. In potentially more politicized domains, as would be...
that of citizenship education practice, this consensus-oriented pacifying strategy is ruled by the attempted inculcation of a school culture, with diversity contexts being subjected to the monologue plane we previously conceived as the curse of Midas. Schools are, of all institutions, those which are more clearly organized in their own closed lexicon (Troger 2002). The huis clos of the school tends to create community, but opposes a democratic day-to-day [quotidian] and its expression in the actual right to differ. The “polite” Citizenship depoliticizes in the name of Civility.

Let’s get back to the case studies we previously referred to. The interviews conducted with the teachers (the whole group of teachers) of a class considered to be “undisciplined” and “problematic” reveal interesting (and recurring) interpretations of the term “citizenship.” The teachers responsible for the curricular area of Citizenship Education when they were asked whether the class had class assemblies or if the class would participate in school assemblies refused, without a doubt, that those activities could be a possibility for that group. For these teachers, the inherent conflict proneness of that group of students would make any assembly impossible. As they explained, these students “were not prepared” for it.

This positioned them within an institutional approach to an assembly which tries to exclude or at least to limit conflict. Also, the pronounced sentence – the stated lack of preparation or the unreadiness of these students – points to some possible contradictions:
1. “the students are not prepared”... What teachers consider to be lack of political competence justifies, in contradiction, the exemption from an act of political education. In this manner, the non-existence of something is explained by its prior need.
2. “the students are not prepared”... Being prone to conflict (and unruled in those conflicts) absolves them from political action. To avoid a situation of possible conflict, such as argumentation situations, passes as the solution to the problem. Political education appears as “docile;” the need to rule the conflict is presented as the alibi to avoid conflict and therefore not ruling it.

5. Resignifying Democracy

Used so often, and so often abusively, as a buzzword or as an embellishment of administrative discourse, the term “democracy” has been losing its meaning, or digesting from its meanings. The discretionary use of expressions such as “education for democracy” threatens to reduce an actual political and educational matter to an ornamental expression, a reduction with dangerous consequences.

To the extent that “democracy” looses its meaning, citizenship and political education face effective risks. These risks, painless up to a point, appear when the neutralized use of the word “democracy” dismisses or contradicts the practices and standpoints related to its significance. Suddenly, in each and every context supposedly “democratic,” the scholastic dimension of democracy presents a cluster of solid justifications around what is considered “admissible,” “accepted” and “visible”. Beyond this line, behaviors, attitudes and knowledge develop far beyond the walls of “polis” – they are only seen as problematic when they directly affect its centre. Therefore, questions like cultures, identities or sexualities, just to name some examples, while they do not interfere (in a disruptive way) with the center of what is institutionally formalized, keep being unformulated or silenced. They stay outside. They stay somewhere. They are not sayable in a closed polis, subdued to a discreet surveillance. The invisibility is precisely what gives effectiveness to the whole system.

The French philosopher Jacques Rancière provocatively refers to this non-repressive but invasive force as a “police order”. It is interesting to acknowledge, on this matter, Rancière’s (2009) description of “police order” as a docilization of subjects conducted by the definition of strict boundaries between visible and non-visible behaviors or sayable and non-sayable discourses. The validity of what can be heard contrasts to what is considered “uncivic noise.” This noise is invalidated as irrelevant, as pointless concerning a consensualized order of the “police order.” The problems of exclusion or persecution never happen within this order mainly because, like classical democracy in ancient Athens, everything is presented in its right place, the issues of position and difference are resolved. Like Biesta (2011, 144) remarks on this subject: “women, children, slaves and immigrants had a clear space in the Democracy of Athens as those who were not allowed to participate in political decision-making. In precisely this respect every police order is all-inclusive.”

The distinction between police and politics imposes itself in this matter. Assuming “politics” and “democracy” as also having a role in the framing and management of conflict and right to disagreement (Rancière 1999; Mouffe 1996), a “political order,” in opposition to a “police order,” presumes that the established rules can – and in some cases should – be destabilized. In Rancière’s words, politics makes visible “what had no business being seen, and makes discourse audible where once there was only place for noise;” clearly, the political is here understood as work in process, as democracy itself defined as “whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it” (Rancière 1999, 29–30).

The rigid establishment of laws and rules, in schools as in other contexts, of any closed set of just rules and proper procedures, does not create space for citizenship. On the contrary, this rigidity opposes citizenship. Citizenship education must open the possibility of...
speaking and taking stances beyond fixed models of belonging, beyond crystallized places of positioning and beyond resolved notions of what can be. This means that the political presupposes the voice of someone, despite its established role or origin. To sum up in Rancière’s words: “There is politics in the moment where we are no matter who” (Rancière 2009, 93).

Analyzing this depoliticization by conceptual impoverishment, Jean-Luc Nancy (2009) assumes the duality of the concept. On the one hand, democracy refers to procedures of government that have no prior or transcendent foundation. On the other hand, democracy presupposes the human ability to “develop an integral autonomy” (Nancy 2009, 78). Between one and the other, what we have is a conception of democracy that is visibly critical of the ways in which political education is at the same time promoted and surrendered.

Unlike democracy, power is everywhere (Nancy 2009). We need, therefore, to repoliticize (educational) practices, bringing critical tools and rationality to the instituted school. Politics is to unjustified forms of power what logos was to myth (Nancy 2009) by stripping illegitimate forms of authority of reason and justification. Here, the views of Nancy (2009) and Rancière (2006) draw closer together. For Rancière (2006), the political starts in the separation between government and the principle of kinship, when belonging to a family, an ethnos or a religion, is not associated to the legitimation of any form of government. For Nancy (2009), politics (democracy as a political concept) is the impossibility of foundation or justification from a transcendent point of view; the political arises from the absence of a human nature.

Taken together, the refusal of a heteronomous grounding of democracy and the understanding that regarding the political processes that place people and groups, power and rule, there is no outside, immediately places conflict at the center of politics, democracy, citizenship and... education. To construct inclusive schools and a democratic education is primarily to overcome “police orders,” to open the institutions to the voices of others. The knowledge that these voices can be disruptive, destabilizing and even unfair only assures us about the permeability, reflexivity and openness that allow for the experience of democracy, and where people can stand for democracy as the right to difference and the possibility of change. To face the challenge of citizenship is to regard the place of conflict as a negotiated way of constructing a political order from educational grounds between adversaries who are not enemies.

6. Conclusion
Exposed to the instability and the fluidity of time, the contemporary school faces particular challenges. Admitting that “liquid modernity,” using Bauman’s (2006) concept, is characterized by uncertainty and instability in structuring instances such as family, culture, labor and values, (political) education is dealing with a reconfiguration of responsibilities which is particularly visible in public schools. Like social and cultural elements, schools have special responsibilities towards diversity. To affirm the richness of this diversity transcendent to the apparent unity of the whole becomes a particular task in public schools. There the “right to education” established in the Declaration of Human Rights becomes a particular challenge in the response to each singularity that actually composes universality. This is one of the political/educative roles of an education that does not deny or avoid conflict but actually underlines its presence as a particular and manageable value.

As we understand it, political education is one of the important issues faced by contemporary schools, also because its assumption of conflict helps to insure a plural and participatory democracy. This implies a democracy that challenges and interrogates, interferes with borders and repositions and is able to carry on the counter-hegemonical mechanisms we need in order to face (and conflict with) the surviving ghosts of totalitarian powers.

The interrogations and reflections advanced in this article have implications for school organization and teaching practices at both policy and practice levels. A lot more could have been said about the topic how school finds its order(s) and the educational role conflict can have in the everyday life of schools. Responses to these matters, however, need to be found at each specific level and context, without faith in magic or general solutions. Finding better practices and ever disputed solutions is always an urgent second step.
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Georgi Dimitrov

State-Orchestrated Civic Education versus Civic Competences of School Students: Some Conceptual Implications from a National Case Study

“School has always been a major factor in preparing young people for citizenship and active participation in social life. This role is especially important in societies undergoing major social transformation, such as the transition from a totalitarian to a democratic system in Bulgaria. The status, goal and scope of civic education cannot be understood without taking into account the social and historical context within which ideas of democracy and citizenship were developed.” (Balkansky, Zahariev, Stoyanov, Stoyanova 1999, 90)

Imagine a situation in which civic education has been enforced and practiced for nearly a decade and, as a result, the civic competences of the young people have dramatically decreased as compared with the previous national level. This situation is not a fictional one. It depicts the findings of a cross-national longitudinal survey. How come a generation which had not been exposed to the influence of civic education performed better in civic competences as compared with their followers a decade later? Who is to blame? The school teachers – for not having fulfilled their obligations? The school system – for failing to accomplish its socialization task? Or the particular civic education program – for being fake or ill-designed? Or may be we, the social scientists, have been unduly naïve about our expectations of civic education and its implementation in schools?

The more important question is: to what extent does civic education fit in naturally with school life without clashing with it? Or put in another way, isn’t the classical tradition in the modern school essentially in contradiction with civic education? This problem takes the particular (Bulgarian) case beyond the boundaries of its national specificity and situates it at the level of a much more general question of the limits and preconditions of applicability of civic education, especially in regard to the expectation that it will form active citizens, capable of improving the democratic self-regulation of modern societies.

The paper argues that the results of civic education should not be assessed in abstract form apart from the major factors concerning the socio-cultural, institutional and educational context. They are significantly dependent on the character of the national curriculum and the socialization programme specific for each country. Furthermore, schools, in their turn, are highly dependent on the role of civil society in the respective national societies, which feature vastly varying political cultures. The large portion of very low education achievements cannot be adduced to civic education per se, but to the wider alienation of young people from school life.

Keywords:
civic education; cross-country comparative studies; education reform

1. The Cognitive Puzzle

Usually social scientists and civic education activists believe that through education we can improve the civic potential of any single national society and thus can strengthen the democratic consolidation, the stability and social fairness of public life. It seems we only need to enforce civic education in our schools and then civic competences will inevitably flourish. Measuring the outcome by cross-national surveys could be the only concern we might have.

If this basic assumption about the transformative role of civic education is correct we would encounter a paradox: it would be unthinkable to have a situation in which civic education is introduced in public schools as an obligatory component of the curriculum and has been practiced for nearly a decade. And, as a result, the civic competences of the young people who had gone through the respective education have ... dramatically decreased as compared with the previous national level.

Yet, life is tricky. The situation described above is not an imaginary one. It depicts the findings about Bulgaria in a cross-national longitudinal survey. How come a generation which had not been exposed to the influence of civic education performed better in civic competences as compared with their followers a decade later? Who is to blame? The school teachers – for not having fulfilled their duties? The school system – for failing to accomplish its socialization task? Or the particular civic education program – for being fake or ill-designed? Or may be we, the social scientists have been unduly naïve about our expectations of civic education and its implementation in schools?

Obviously the answers to these questions are not mutually exclusive and, hence, there is a need for some more careful consideration of the three major concerns – what is civil education; how can it be successfully implemented; how is it possible to measure its results cross-nationally as if it is universal (neutral to the country-specific cultural context)? We might get agreeable answers to these questions by ca-

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refully examining the context of the above-mentioned drastic failure of the national civic education program (and its supplementing school practices) in search for any long-range/depth rooted factors determining the scope and effects of civic education reforms.\(^2\)

2. **The Civilizing Mission of Civic Education as a Standard of its Quality**

Civic activeness is a **conditio sine qua non** for modern societies, but it is also a condition that is not guaranteed by the nature of public life. It has to be deliberately cultivated. Hence, the escalating need for civic education, due both to the **fatigue** caused by the burden of our contemporary civilization (Mamardashvili 2004) and to the **growing alienation** from representative democracy, alienation that, in Europe, is enhanced by the “democratic deficit” of EU’s political mechanisms (Hix 2008). Civic education is the policy and everyday practice – in school and beyond-school – of the formation of civic attitudes, skills, and competencies without which the self-regulation of complex modern societies would be ineffective and eventually end in incapacity for socio-economic development.

This is precisely why **particularly high hopes** are set on civic education in the societies where authoritarian or totalitarian political regimes have prevailed for decades (for instance, Turkey or Portugal and the post-totalitarian societies, of course). It is the mission of such education to change the current political culture and behavioral models of general subordination to the state, towards a new type of self-awareness leading to **active participation in the self-governance and development of society**. But this is where the main problem lies: will civic education fulfill its assigned task of serving as a basic instrument of civilizational change or, conversely, will the social environment transform this specific education in its own fashion, tame it so that it might fit in with the current institutional practices and value models? The answer is not self-obvious and needs some empirical justification.

In fact, the essence of civic education assumed here is not much different from that generally held in present-day specialized literature (Delanty 2003; Crick 2000; Heater 1990; Holford and Edrisingha 2000; Jones, Gaventa 2002; Leach, Scoones 2003). Yet, it complies with the standards of the international comparative study on the performance of school students in civic education, on which the discussion below will be based.\(^3\)

The definition used is quite comprehensive, taking citizenship and civic education as referring to knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of civic activeness. A key feature of this perspective is that the individual student is given a central place; more importantly, citizenship is interpreted in terms of affiliation with networks of **horizontal social communities**.\(^4\) The specificities of this perspective are highly significant. On one hand, to be a citizen means **to take an active part in communities**, and this entails assuming roles (a stable set of public activities), rights, responsibilities, and having capacities, i.e., these are the attributes of a social subject. Communities, in their turn, are defined by their autonomy and self-management on a **contractual basis**. On the other hand, citizenship involves commitment to supporting **social development**.

In this definition of citizenship, the state is entirely missing, even though **statehood is a component of the interpretation of the systems of a modern socio-political system**, of a “polity” – something for which there is **not even a designating word** in the Bulgarian language. But a very notable feature of this interpretation is that “state” is not meant as an indivisible whole; instead, the reference is to **many and different “state institutions”**, specified according to the rank and scope of their competencies (moreover, they are juxtaposed in a system of citizenship comporting a multiplicity of **equal in value non-governmental institutions**).

None of these key characteristics is relevant to any post-totalitarian or post-authoritarian society where the prioritized loyalty to Fatherland is supposed to equal total, **unconditional obedience to the nation state**.\(^5\) Nevertheless, all these societies would claim that they have pertinent civic education.\(^6\)

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2. „It is necessary to go beyond static, universalised and essentialised notions of citizenship and a singular notion of the state, to embrace a more fluid, de-centred, and experience-based notion of both citizenship and expertise, but without losing sight of the historical, political and institutional structures which shape often highly contrasting forms of engagement.” (Leach and Scooner 2001, 4).


4. Ibid., 16.

5. For example, on the eve of implementing civic education in Bulgarian schools a local Expert Panel comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Education and Science, universities, non-governmental organizations, teachers, school principals, politicians and school administrators sat to define the meaning of that educational novelty (Balkansky et al. 1999, 94-95). In ranking the value and logical emphases of the meanings of civic education, the Bulgarian experts have placed the State in first place. Given the history of the country, it is understandable that “civil society”, or the least “community”, do not appear at all as referring to the horizontal interaction between citizens. What is given high priority are the **national identity and national loyalty**... Elections appear at the lowest rank of importance on the list of objectives of civic education in Bulgaria, and they only figure as an element of knowledge about the legal order of the country... .

6. “In the past, within the framework of communist propaganda, the concept of citizenship was related to the notion of true inhabitants, that is, those who are loyal to the State, have a high level of patriotism and acknowledge their dependence on the national state. Nowadays, there is widespread agreement that citizenship is related not only to the State but also to membership in a civic society and to humankind as a whole.” (Balkansky et al 1999, 91).
Seeing this, the reader is attuned to realize the basic conflict that is the object of the current study. “Citizenship” is an idea and practice, whose dimensions are diametrically opposite in a liberal-democratic and in a post-totalitarian society. Therefore, it is logical, viewed by the standards of a totalitarian interpretation of the term, for democratic practices to seem incomplete or “deficient” in relation to the ideal of an individual dissolved in the national mystic and quasi-organic unity of the state (Karpenko 2007). The opposite is also true: seen through the prism of liberal democracy, the totalitarian practice of citizenship and civic education would appear highly “malfunctioning.” In this sense, one and the same achievements in civic education, measured on the scale of the two types of citizenship, might show opposite results. “Bad” results according to one of them could be interpreted as “good” according to the other.

3. National Achievements in an International Comparative Perspective – a Case Study

Bulgaria is a country which has smoothly gone through its phase of post-communist transition to become an EU member state in 2007 (together with Romania under the conditionality of a constant monitoring and verification mechanism). Though it is the poorest country in terms of GDP or purchase power per capita, it is a typical Southeastern European country in terms of institutional arrangements, public mentalities, cultural patterns, under-development of civil society and active nationalistic legacies. A process of de-ideologization of education has begun as early as 1991 and a kind of civil education at all school levels was officially enforced in 2000.

In general, at a glimpse, the data for Bulgaria in the field of civic education, obtained from the Ministry of Education or institutions related to it, show that the national results appear to be among the highest in Europe, and, for certain parameters, it has even surpassed West European countries (Kolarova 2002; Balkansky et al. 1999). But looking more carefully at the data, one would find that they refer to state activities and to successes in the normative legalization of civic education as a component of the national curriculum [enacting of a specific law enforcing civic education and even a mature exam in this subject, provision of State requirements that guide the textbook writing and the expected outcomes of the teaching process, etc.]. Yet, these are not results referring to the degree of civic culture assimilated by school students or civic competences, which are precisely the purpose of civic education.7

In this connection, the latest data, obtained in the comparative study cited above and published in July 2010, are exceptionally important, as they focus exactly on the effectiveness of civic education. The empirical data for Bulgaria, especially viewed against the backdrop of optimistic government reports, might seem frankly shocking:

Bulgaria stands in one of the last places in Europe (only Cyprus is behind it) and, generally, at the bottom of the ranking of all 38 countries. The total result for Bulgaria is 466 points, whereas the average score for all countries is 500 points. Bulgaria is in the company of countries like Cyprus, Greece, Guatemala, Luxembourg, and Mexico. But for them the general report states: “a substantially large share of the students attend schools the directors of which report that civic education is not part of the school curriculum for the surveyed target group [of 14-year old eight-graders].”8 But in Bulgaria it is part of the curriculum, and, judging by the answers of teachers in that survey, civic education is taught intensively as a routine element of the general education process and extra-class activities.

Bulgaria holds a record for the greatest decline in the performance of students in the target group when compared against the performance of students of the same age in 1999.

These findings give sufficient reasons to carefully scrutinize the details of the empirically registered picture. The data contain telling elements that point to an explanation of the dismal results of civic education in Bulgarian schools.

Looking closer at the structure of the distribution of school students’ responses, it appears that at the mid-levels of assimilation of civic education, Bulgarian students do not differ much from those in other countries: the share of students covering first educational level is 26 percent, as much as the average value in the entire surveyed population for all countries. At second level the Bulgarian result is 27 percent, whereas the average value at this level for all countries is 31 percent: here the deviation is still tolerable.

The great problem is that only a small portion of students have assimilated civic education at the third and highest level: whereas the general average for all countries is 28 percent, for Bulgaria it is only 20 percent. The main difference is that a significant portion of students remains below the first level: in our country they are 27 percent, while the average value for the other countries is 16 percent. The general tendency registered is crystal clear – the higher the level the poorer the educational outcome....In brief, the Bulgarian problem is that, on one hand, too few students achieve...

7 It is only fair to point out that the further back we look in time, the more normal it was to emphasize de-communization in school education and institutional-normative innovations in civic education. It was still too early then to assess the results of the reforms.
ve the high goals of civic education, those manifested in an active civic standpoint, while on the other hand, too many students do not attain even the basics from this education process. This conclusion raises the question as to whether the civic education formally conducted fails to achieve its aims or, on the contrary, it does achieve them, but, those aims are specific to the local conditions (thus their results, measured on the scale of liberal democratic culture, seem “unsatisfactory”)? Of course, the indicated alternative hypotheses are far from being mutually exclusive, and this is why it is reasonable to continue the detailed examination of the empirical data.

First of all, we should specify the contents of the highest level of assimilation of civic education, which proves to be beyond the capacity of 80 percent of Bulgarian eighth-graders. Its specific contents include skills of understanding and analyzing civic issues leading to the formation of a personal standpoint. The high level of assimilation of civic education involves the capacity for exceptionally complex intellectual activities, in which a young person independently builds his/her standpoint of interpretation and evaluation, of explanation and defense, regarding the problems of civil society and civic engagement.

Thus, there are in fact two essential problems involved:

1) whether the teaching process consistently envisages these competencies as goals of civic education?

2) whether in the course of school life, and not only in the classes devoted to civic education, there are conditions conducive to alienation of students from civic issues and from school life in general (which would answer the question as to the excessively large share of students who have not attained even the first level of civic education)?

The problem is whether the intellectual activities in question are actually practiced in the course of the routine teaching process in schools. This can be judged by the answers of teachers regarding the four basic elements of their teaching practice: how they teach, how they evaluate students, how they see the aims of civic education, and, most importantly, how the performance of students in the classroom stimulates lasting assimilation and practice of the above-mentioned intellectual skills. The data obtained from the international comparative study are very symptomatic.

Keeping in mind this picture of the way of teaching, it is hardly surprising that the methods of evaluation also correspond to the traditional school practices and clash with the values and methodological imperatives of civic education.

Consequently, it is imperative to ask – how do Bulgarian teachers generally see the value priorities and aims of civic education per se? The empirical picture unveils a complete inversion: the traditional educational goal of supplying ready-made knowledge is the most strongly accentuated one, while the goal specific to civic education – forming civic activeness – is
practically absent from the practices of Bulgarian schools."

This is also the reason for the focused curiosity about the data on the degree of openness of the school environment to students’ free expression of opinion in the course of the teaching process. It would hardly be surprising for the reader that there are simply no data on this problem in the report on Bulgaria. But a very indicative fact is that the summary report for the entire comparative study is extremely vague.13 This is a very important issue and it needs re-examination below. It is worth noting that teachers encourage, to the highest degree, their students to express opinions: they do this in 50 percent of the cases, but inasmuch as current political problems are generally not discussed in class – in 60 percent of the cases.

The question here is: to what extent does civic education fit in naturally with school life without conflicting with it, or is the classical tradition in the modern school essentially in contradiction with civic education, and hence obstructive to teaching it in school?

Put in this way, the question takes the Bulgarian case beyond the boundaries of its national specificity and situates it at the level of the much more general question as to the limits and conditions of applicability of civic education, especially as regards the expectation that it will form active citizens, competent to improve the democratic self-regulation of modern societies.

The central thesis here argued is that civic education manages to ‘fit in’ only at the cost of a great compromise: it is given room within the system only insofar as it suits the system by changes in character. From being a tool for social transformation (or for the stabilization of democracy), it turns into a channel for conveying values, principles and practices of the status quo of the national political system and of the educational system imbedded in it.

In fact the big problem is that this transformation of values and methodology occurs almost imperceptibly and, in any case, tacitly. That is precisely why the mechanisms for its occurrence must be investigated care-fully, especially in the light of the circumstance that civic education is not something given as self-evident but involves a struggle between various stakes and jealous stakeholders (Dimitrov, Boyadjieva 2009).

The entire national education system must change beforehand with respect to contents, values, and especially procedures and methods, enabling and guaranteeing the development of students as personalities; only then the novelty of civic education will be able to enter the mainstream practice. And this immediately opens the floor for a discussion of the causes that would explain why it has not been possible so far, if this noble goal is accessible at all.14


Stated most generally, in a country that is parting with its totalitarian past with difficulty and in an inconsistent manner [registered by many local surveys and studies], its many hot social issues and the series of crises it has undergone seem to naturally marginalize the educational reform [making it a task for which the time is not yet ripe, even though changes have been made unceasingly in the educational system over the last 20 years]. In such a country there is no political agent that looks upon the educational reform as a real policy priority, even though it is not rare for political parties to pay lip service to the importance of education. However, practice has shown that when they come to power, these parties do not fulfill their declared intentions. Even more importantly, civic education is not emphasized in any of the party programmes. As it has often been noted recently, the big problem for effective introduction of the kind of civic education that will form active and responsible citizens does not lie in the open resistance it encounters, but in the lack of influential stakeholders interested in its realization...

That is precisely why, for example, the Bulgarian ministry of education tends to introduce civic education mostly under external pressure rather than because it holds it as an element of its strategy for

12 “We presented the teachers with a list of possible objectives of civic education in school, from which they had to choose three that they felt were the most important. This is how teachers in Bulgaria ranked the objectives of civic education in school: 61% of the teachers indicated as the most important objective of this discipline that it must develop knowledge about the rules and responsibilities applying to citizens. 56% – that is should develop knowledge about the historical and cultural heritage of the country. 43% – it should promote attention regarding the environment and its protection. The smallest percentage of teachers indicated as important objectives of civic education that it should assist the development of effective strategies for fighting racism and xenophobia (4%) and promote active political participation (3%).” (Ibid., 34).

13 The resulting six-item scale measuring student perceptions of openness in classroom discussions had a satisfactory reliability of 0.76 for the international ICSS database with equally weighted national samples. Figure 6 in Appendix D presents an item-by-score map for students’ perceptions of openness in classroom discussions. It shows that, on average across countries, students reported that most of these events occurred at least “sometimes”. The percentages of students who “often” observed these events ranged from 52 (“encouraged to express opinions”) to 11 percent (“students bringing up current events in class”). Initial Findings from the IEA ICSS 2010, 72–73., (http://iccs.acer.edu.au/index.php?page=initial-findings).

14 The answers to these questions will also lead, as a by-product, to an understanding of the essential local fact of some international relevance: Bulgarian teachers in their vast numbers say they are not sufficiently prepared and do not have appropriate resources to teach civic education, even though the latter is set as an educational requirement by the state (Petrova 2010, 36-37).
educational reform. External pressure is primarily coming from abroad in connection with long-term programmes of influential international organizations – UN, Council of Europe, the World Bank, etc., and in second place – from local NGOs who benefit from donations from foreign or international institutions (Dimitrov, Boyadjieva 2009). The lack of enduring public and political interest in the success of the educational reform leads to a situation where, even when such a reform is started under external pressure (in the Bulgarian case, under pressure coming from the World Bank), the end result is a devastating failure of the reform.15

Under these preconditions it is simply inevitable that the concrete project for civic education will mostly reflect the underdevelopment of the national civil society rather than be a long-term resource for the sustainable construction and development of that society. An exceptionally important point is that this underdevelopment of civil society is evident at a number of levels and under different forms. Its most important aspect, of course, is the lack of a governance policy that would express the social consensus for minimizing the role of the state in public life, all-powerful and without alternative. From this point onwards, educational innovations will inevitably be a result – varying and depending on the circumstances – of the total, integrated impact of a number of factors:

1. In such a society there is no tradition for ministries to develop their policies through dialogue with the addressees of the public policies. The ministry of education makes no exception. The most important result of the lack of good governance is the national school curriculum which is devised by certain anonymous persons in an utterly non-transparent way. The projects of this curriculum and changes made in it have never been a topic of public debate between education experts and public stake-holders. The staff of the Council for Curriculum Planning is selected by the minister alone, and the arbitrary way in which this institution is constructed precludes, as a rule, the possibility that it will bear responsibility before the public.

2. In these circumstances it is perfectly normal that the contents – and even more the structure – of the national curriculum proves to be a compromise at the given moment between the corporatist interests of stake-holding professional categories/guilds that enter into very complicated schemes and internal opposition (Dimitrov, Stoykova 2009). In particular, the question of the status of civic education in Bulgaria turns out to be resolved by:

2.1 the opposed ambitions of different teachers’ guilds (backed by their textbook publishers) of geography, history, literature, philosophy who succeeded to dissolve civic education as contents of their traditional subjects;

2.2 the lack of interest of the teachers’ professional community (pedagogical experts), which meanwhile has a strong position in the universities training future teachers (this disinterest is basically due to the small chances they have of obtaining a monopoly influence over the new discipline of civic education); and

2.3 the inertness of the sociological and politological communities as guilds: they do not identify any strategic interest of their own in the strengthening of civil society, nor, respectively, their professional stake in the development of civic education.

3. It might seem, at first glance, that the lack of a premeditated state policy for civic education is a favorable precondition for NGOs playing a decisive role in the formation of a general conception regarding this education and for the practical steps to be taken in introducing it in school. This is true to some degree, as evidenced by the examples of countries like Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia (Dimitrov, Boyadjieva 2009). But the problem here is that:

3.1 On one hand, the room for influence of NGOs is strongly dependent on the characteristics of the concrete state: for instance, in Croatia, where there is a tradition going back decades, of decentralization and local self-government, the achievements of a good number of NGOs are particularly significant, unlike countries like Bulgaria and Romania, where the achievements are both more modest and less enduring.

3.2 On the other hand, it is even more important that the specific nature of NGOs is strongly influenced by the type of state in which they exist. As the research results indicate, the weakness of civil society in Bulgaria is evident likewise in the fact that the non-governmental sector, instead of expressing consolidated public interests as a corrective for government policies, works mostly as a supplier of professional expertise for the governmental institutions (Toneva 2011). In such an environment it is not hard to imagine that NGO experts are, mildly speaking, serviceable towards the already established stakes of the state (more precisely, towards the interests of coteries speaking for the state). Hence, it is no wonder that precisely the NGO representatives actively cooperate

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15 The grounds and details of argumentation supporting this thesis are presented in the collection “The State Against the Reforms” (Dimitrov 2004).
for the realization of civic education in the framework of ‘inter-subject links’ and in the form of an abstract-theoretical introduction to the idea of “civil society” only.

3.3 This, however, does not invalidate the actual truth in the NGO representatives’ assertion that the underdevelopment of the nation’s civil society is a serious obstacle for society to become a reference source, a framework, and a partner in the actual teaching process.

4. The trouble described so far has a continuation. Given that civic education is dispersed in the interdisciplinary connections between traditional school subjects, a very strong possibility appears that its objectives will be substituted: Instead of the spirit of civic education reforming the school environment, it is the long tradition of “classical school disciplines” (“the narrative subjects”) that practically stifle the innovativeness of civic education. When inserted into the textual body of subjects like history, geography, Bulgarian language and literature, civic education has fallen victim to the biased nationalist-patriotic discourse,16 instead of forming a civic discourse. Thus it falls prey to the traditional narrative stylistics and the old uncritical mentality of these subjects. By dissolving civic education into the traditional disciplines, the possibility emerges for the “long arm” of cultural pattern (i.e. of the state that has taken the place of the missing citizenship) to model and crush civil issues, including civil meanings, values, principles, and problems. In a most convenient and smooth way, memorizing substitutes critical thinking as if by the logic of the subject-matter itself.

5. But the situation is considerably more complicated. The importance of the state as a basic agent of modernization in all national societies where modernization began at a considerably later period in history should be strongly emphasized.

5.1 On one hand, a necessarily privileged value is attributed to the state as a center of the picture of the world depicted as a ‘natural order of things’ by school education, and, hence, including a supreme place for Nature in the notion of the Fatherland, and giving primacy to a past that artificially glorifies the state, etc. Hence, the natural order of things and the historical past seem to justify the lack of personal opinion and of taking a stance among students.

5.2 On the other hand, this does not mean that one may remain blind to the intrusive supremacy of the state at present, i.e. to the refusal of totalitarian power to shrink to dimensions that would be more productive and more efficient for social development.

5.3 But, in a third aspect, it is essential to consider what specific kind of national state we are talking about. There can be no doubt that the French national society is characterized by a strong tradition of statism, and, hence, statism marks, to a great degree, the contemporary social life in France, in sharp contrast with the countries of the Anglo-Saxon world. The specific German reverence for statehood is also well known, but with one very important difference: the long tradition there of decentralized state authority. It is not without importance what kind of state is referred to in school education. For instance, it is well known that, even today, the Bulgarian state is super-centralized; in fact, it is the most centralized in EU.17 Moreover, unlike some other post-communist countries, it is marked by a notable lack of publicity in the principles of legal institutional order (Dimitrova-Kovacheva 2010). It should also be pointed out that a “softened state” in a post-communist society refers to a state that has fallen victim to corporativist interests and, hence, is weak and ineffective in implementing its policies (Hausner 2006). It is precisely this particular kind of state that is being legitimized by the picture of the world drawn by civic education, emphasizing the grandeur of the past and the country’s natural beauties, and excluding the critical examination of the role of the state in contemporary public life.18 A question entirely excluded is the right of the citizen to resist an unjust and ineffective state government.

6. Last but not least, it is understandable that the role of the teacher will be particularly significant where there is a lack of active state policy for developing civic education, and where NGOs show considerable servility towards the state. Seemingly, a teacher who really wanted to introduce an authentic civic education would not meet with particularly active resistance. But the question is: where may the average teacher draw the motivation and the resources for adequate civic education? In this connection a long series of decisive factors should be recalled:

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16 It is quite easy to identify the persistence of a century long strong nationalistic discourse in school teaching of history and geography (Hranova 2011) or in the local tradition of the very historical knowledge itself (Daskalov 2002; Mishkova et al. 2006).


18 It must also be remembered that this is a state which, even though not the owner of the “means of production” any more, is still a key redistributor of the public wealth and a major consumer/assigner of public activities and services. Private business proves to be, to a great degree, dependent on the state even today – more than 20 years after the fall of communism.
6.1 The schoolbooks with which a teacher has to work are generally useless, since they embody the statist State Requirements and, hence, the results quoted in the national report for the international comparative study are completely logical – Bulgarian teachers, as a rule, avoid using these schoolbooks (Petrova 2010, 35).

6.2 One should not forget that the authentic values and principles of civic education clash with the socialization programme of the other (old) school subjects that these teachers basically teach. The problem is, how these two different socialization projects can “unconflictingly” come in conjunction in the work of one and the same teacher, especially if the expected result of civic education is the formation of young people with the capacity for critical thinking and for being active citizens. (And this is far from being only a Bulgarian problem: remember the authors of the summary report for the international comparative study preferred to be vague about the degree of actual freedom in the classroom activity ...)

6.3 This would not in itself be an obstacle for a teacher who was exceptionally motivated and unsparingly devoted to the cause of civic education. But specifically in the Bulgarian case (yet not so different from the Romanian or Ukrainian ones, for example), the crisis of the school system, which has been going on for decades now, has systematically kept in schools mostly the teachers who have difficulties making ends meet. So the fight for authentic civic education is simply beyond their reach.

School life itself is in a systematic crisis and repulses students and teachers alike, hence it is conducted in a purely formal way. The drastic deterioration of the performance of Bulgarian school students, as established recently by the consecutive TIMSS and PISA studies, indicates the incapacity of present-day schools to achieve their basic goal – to educate.

To sum up, seen through the prism of the circumstances discussed above, students’ results in civic competence registered by the international comparative study are actually not that bad. They can be assessed even as surprisingly good. The large portion of very low education achievements cannot be ascribed to civic education per se, but to the wider alienation of young people from school life, something for which civic education, as practiced in the described manner, could not possibly compensate.

5. Conclusion

The main thesis is that the results of civic education taught in schools should not be assessed abstractly omitting the major factors concerning the socio-cultural, institutional and educational context. They are significantly dependent on the character of the national curriculum and the socialization programme specific for each country and embodied in the schoolbooks. But in addition to this, the results of poor civil competences are also explained by the practices of school life: schools today in general prove to be predominantly conservative. They do not create an open classroom environment conducive to the practices of active citizenship. Furthermore, schools are too dependent, alas, on the role of civil society in the respective national societies with their vastly varying democratic political cultures.

Hence, an effective reform of civic education that would stabilize and encourage civic activeness and lead to social development, cannot be carried out apart from the reform of the education system and the democratization of public policies. Authentic civic education as an education in democratic citizenship is a main path to the humanization of the educational system; it should thereby serve as a solution to the long structural and value crisis of that system. Moreover, the likelihood of substantial progress in civic education would only grow if it is perceived not as an aim in itself but as a tool for educational and social reform; in that case, civic education would become a real political priority.
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Turkey’s New Citizenship and Democracy Education Course: Search for Democratic Citizenship in a Difference-Blind Polity?

The paper introduces and critically evaluates the new Citizenship and Democracy Education course in the Turkish curriculum. This course has been introduced as a mandatory subject in grade 8 per one hour a week in the 2011-2012 academic year. Following the comprehensive 2005 curriculum reform, Citizenship and Human Rights Education courses had been abolished and these themes had been distributed to the curriculum of different courses. However, recommendations of academics and international bodies such as the Council of Europe on the advantages of having a distinct course on citizenship and human rights have led the Ministry of National Education to reintroduce a compulsory course covering these themes. The new course seems to be a human rights education course with its emphasis on rights and responsibilities. It could be considered a progressive step in this regard. However, the implication that educating people about their rights could be a basis of democratic citizenship might not be realized in present Turkey where internal conflicts based on religious, ethnic and language-based differences are becoming salient. The paper argues that democratization of citizenship in Turkey requires not only an education about rights but also the questioning of the current difference-blind civic republican notion of citizenship. It draws attention to the necessity of the development of a new political framework and a related citizenship course that would allow for peaceful coexistence of cultural differences.

Keywords:
Turkey, citizenship, human rights education, democracy education, multicultural education

1. Introduction
Citizenship and human rights are becoming explicit themes in formal education in many countries. They have been made an integral part of the curriculum of several countries ranging from Europe to Eastern Europe and Latin America in an effort to counter the increasing disinterest in politics and to promote the culture of democracy and human rights (Osler, Starkey 2005; Tibbitts 1994). Turkey became a part of this international development during the mid-1990s: it formed its National Committee on the Decade for Human Rights Education in 1998 in response to the appeal by the United Nations for the implementation of human rights education at the national level. Alongside several other reforms intended to bring Turkey’s legal and educational structure in conformity with international standards, human rights themes were incorporated into citizenship education. In 1998, a course hitherto called Civics was renamed as Citizenship and Human Rights Education and started to be taught in grades 7 and 8 for one hour a week ( Çaýr, Gürkaynak 2008).

Civics has traditionally been at the very center of national education in Turkey, mainly serving the purpose of creating a nation of unity (Üstel 2005). In all textbooks, Turkish citizenship was defined as a membership in the State on the basis of a single religion (State-monitored version of a Sunni Islam) and a single language (Turkish). Textbooks promoted an organic vision of society and duty-based citizenship along with a denial of the recognition of ethnic, religious and language-based minorities. The incorporation of human rights into citizenship education, in this regard, was an important step in transforming the dominant notion of citizenship in Turkey towards a more pluralistic and inclusive form. In other words, these Citizenship and Human Rights Education courses could have served to expand citizenship to include cultural rights, identity rights and human rights. However, as research on the textbooks of these courses demonstrated, their eclectic content blended human rights themes with a nationalistic and militaristic perspective. Some chapters involved extensive references to human rights such as “the development of the notion of human rights,” “basic rights and freedoms” or “the protection of human rights at national and international level.” Other chapters of the same book mentioned “our internal and external enemies” and promoted a militaristic conception of citizenship ( Çaýr, Gürkaynak 2008). These Citizenship and Human Rights Education courses also suffered from other shortcomings including lack of teacher training, and teaching the course being taught for only one hour per week.

These courses have been abolished as a result of the 2005 curriculum reform. This reform is one of the most comprehensive reforms in the Turkish education history that aimed to redesign the whole curriculum on the basis of constructivism and student-centered learning. New programmes have been developed at all grades, and new textbooks (and, for the first time, teacher’s guides and students’ workbooks) have been introduced in primary and secondary levels. As part of this reform, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) decided to teach citizenship and human rights not as a distinct subject but distribute these themes over the curriculum of other courses in different grades.

Recently, however, the MoNE has announced the reintroduction of a distinct Citizenship education
course as part of a new project. This project, titled “Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education” (DC/HRE), has been launched in 2009 to be conducted in collaboration with the Council of Europe. This 3-year project aims at revising educational regulations and developing new materials for DC/HRE principles. The project also involved development of a new, distinct course covering citizenship and human rights themes. The programme of the new course, named “Citizenship and Democracy Education,” has been developed and piloted during the 2010-2011 academic year. A new textbook (Özpolat 2011), student’s workbook and teacher’s guide have been developed to be taught as mandatory in grade 8 (13-14 years old pupils) in the 2011-2012 academic year.

This paper critically evaluates the program and textbook of this course by mainly problematizing its difference-blind content in the context of Turkey’s contemporary political and social scene. I analyze the textbook with a qualitative methodology, specifically with a discourse analysis to identify the content, groups, information underlined or omitted by the author(s) (Pingel 1999). I deconstruct the textbook, first, to problematize the relationship between human rights and citizenship education. The new Citizenship and Democracy Education course assumes that educating students in human rights will lead to the development of democratic citizenship. I argue that this might not be realized unless students are made to acquire skills that enable them to critically reflect upon the current social, cultural and political problems of Turkey. Thus, second, I explore the notion of civic culture that the textbook promotes. I then relate this discussion to problems concerning citizenship which are becoming much more salient in contemporary Turkey with increasing voices of non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities about formal and informal barriers in front of their full citizenship. I argue that the new course, mainly due to the present legal structure and dominant nationalist political culture, is still based on a single social imaginary, which does not allow for the representation of different identities and interests. However, this course provides us with a ground to discuss several crucial points such as the need to develop a new notion of citizenship in order to equally include differences and the need to revise the link between citizens and the nation-state. This is crucial in Turkey given its lively debate about the forming of a new civil constitution after the general elections of June 2011, a constitution that could lay the foundations for the denationalization and the democratization of the citizenship regime.

2. The content of the Citizenship and Democracy Education Course
The rationale behind introducing a distinct subject covering citizenship and human rights is presented by the MoNE as follows: The age we are living in, as the MoNE states, is “the age of human rights” (MEB 2010). The MoNE takes this to mean that “adopting, protecting, and enjoying human rights have been a necessity for people. Human rights have been an important measure of a country’s level of development” (MEB 2010). Therefore, raising citizens who respect and protect human rights requires the inclusion of human rights in the educational processes. This course is the result of an attempt to revise and renew the educational programmes in order to raise “conscious citizens who make sense of the changing world” (MEB 2010).

Another reason for introducing a distinct course, according to the MoNE, was the criticisms it has taken from teachers, principals and several NGOs for making citizenship and human rights themes cross-curricular after the 2005 curricular reform and on the importance of having a separate mandatory course on citizenship. Title of the former course in pre-2005 period was Citizenship and Human Rights Education. The MoNE, this time, named the course as ‘Citizenship and Democracy Education’ by underlining the importance of “democratic citizenship” and pointing out that “democracy education includes human rights education” (MEB 2010).

In Turkey’s highly centralized education system, the Board of Education prepares the curricula for all subjects and its approval is required for the adoption of a textbook in formal education. The MoNE itself develops a textbook for all subjects and allows private publishing houses to prepare textbooks to be used after the Board of Education’s approval. For the Citizenship and Democracy Education course, there is yet one textbook published by the MoNE (Özpolat 2011).

The content of the course is composed of four main chapters. Their titles are as follows:
I. Every human being is valuable
II. The culture of democracy
III. Our rights and freedoms
IV. Our duties and responsibilities
Under each title there are subtitles with one-page readings about specific themes. The first chapter involves themes underlining the importance of concepts such as “human dignity,” “humanitarian values” in relation to human rights agreements. The second chapter presents a “definition of democracy,” “characteristics of a democratic citizen” and the importance of “tolerating different views” in a democratic society.” The third chapter focuses on human rights along with subtitles on “the universality of human rights,” “non-governmental organizations” and “democratic solutions to problems.” The last chapter informs students about responsibilities. These involve citizenship responsibilities of paying taxes, voting, and performing duties to protect “national unity and indivisibility.”
3. Evaluation: Can Human Rights Education Be a Basis for Democratic Citizenship?

Citizenship and Democracy Education course has some progressive elements as well as some major shortcomings. Compared to the former Citizenship and Human Rights Education course of the 8th grade, one positive step is the removal of chapters such as “the elements of national security and national power” which handled internal and external politics with a militaristic perspective and language. Another progressive element is the inclusion of several new objectives such as “acquiring skills to identify discrimination and not to discriminate against anyone,” “developing skills to take responsibility for gender equality” or “developing awareness on the importance of dialogue and communication for living together” (MEB 2010).

The textbook starts with a liberal abstract notion of the dignity of the human and continues with several references to the concept of human rights and international human rights agreements. There are, on the other hand, very few references to the concept of citizenship. Of 32 learning objectives, only three specifically mention the concept of citizenship. Therefore, although the course has been named Citizenship and Democracy Education, it seems to provide basic human rights education rather than a ‘classical’ citizenship education. To put it differently, the new course makes very few references to the political institutions, constitutional principles and country-specific norms and regulations of Turkey. Rather, it aims at strengthening skills for human rights. In this sense, the new programme reflects the approach of the Council of Europe which, as Audrey Osler notes, does not distinguish between education for democratic citizenship and human rights education. These two fields, according to the Council of Europe cover the same core ground and aim at strengthening democracy and human rights (2009, 61). Similarly the programme of Citizenship and Democracy Education is based on an assumption that many concepts around human rights inherently relate to citizenship and that human rights education can be a basis of democratic citizenship.

It is true that the concept of citizenship in a democratic polity requires understanding and acceptance of human rights which provide the framework for equal participation of all citizens in public life (Osler, Starkey 2000). One could also argue that citizenship education, when taught on the grounds of human rights can prepare students to be active participants in the civil and political life of their local, national and international community. This line of thought requires us to formulate and explore the question, “can the emphasis put on human rights themes in the new course provide a basis for the notion of democratic citizenship in Turkey?” My response would be both “yes” and “no” depending on the way human rights themes are related to problems about citizenship in textbooks and classrooms.

I would argue that studying human rights does not necessarily provide a framework for the development of skills regarding democratic citizenship. I draw my argument on a recent study in which a colleague and I interviewed 7th and 8th grade students (13 and 14 years old) taking the former Citizenship and Human Rights Education course, to understand their views on the course and their perceptions of human rights (Çayır, Bağh 2011). As mentioned above, these courses were mandatory before 2005 and involved, as their title says, many topics related to human rights. Particularly the 7th grade curriculum included several progressive elements regarding human rights education. Nevertheless, for the students, the courses were “boring, unnecessary, unimportant and easy.” One reason for this, according to the students, was textbooks, which did not touch upon “real problems.” Another factor was inappropriate teaching methods. Despite the negative attitudes of the students, the findings show that they acquired some human rights knowledge, particularly those directly attracting their interests (such as “nobody can enter into my house without permission.”) However, the knowledge of human rights they acquired in school did not empower them in their daily lives. They repeatedly noted that “the real life was outside [not in textbooks].” And what they saw in real life, mainly through the media, was a world where nobody “respects human rights.” Students were well aware of internal problems such as the Kurdish issue (“Eastern issue” in their language) and international problems like “the invasion of Iraq by the United States.” The study demonstrated that “being educated” on human rights did not make them feel empowered. Rather what the children told us was that they felt weak, powerless and vulnerable: “Many people around us are not observing human rights. Since there are such people, our compliance with [human rights] might cause us to be oppressed” (Çayır, Bağh 2011, 11). Knowing their rights, in this context, was important in so far as that helped them “not to be crushed” (ibid., 11) rather than helping them to develop democratic citizenship skills.

This experience should be reexamined while reviewing the programme of the new Citizenship and Democracy Education course, the core of which is, once again, constituted by human rights topics. The main problem of the former programme was that human rights were handled in a very “sterile” way in both textbooks and classrooms. This means that human rights were taught without recognizing their relevance to past, present and future local and global problems. Taken this way, human rights could easily be incorporated into the curricula of any country, no
matter how undemocratic it is. However, unless human rights are addressed in the context of national and international politics and, in terms of the rights and the responsibilities of the citizen, human rights education courses might improve a country’s image, but they would not necessarily provide the basis for democratic citizenship.

Related to such a frame, another key requisite for human rights education to be the basis for democratic citizenship is the recognition of the tension between the particularity of the concept of citizenship and the universality of human rights. Citizenship today is bounded with a particular community, nation-state and culture. Human rights, on the other hand, derive from universal principles that precede the citizenship of any nation-state. The Council of Europe’s approach and the programme of Turkey’s new course that consider human rights education and citizenship education on the same ground disregard this tension. I do not mean that an ideal citizenship and human rights education course should resolve this tension. The tension between universal human rights claims and particularistic national identities, as political philosopher Seyla Benhabib points out, is “constitutive of democratic legitimacy. Modern democracies act in the name of universal principles which are then circumscribed within a particular civic community” (2004, 44). The tension between citizenship and human rights, therefore, is an inescapable face of the modern nation-state. This tension, then, requires the problematization of the relation between citizenship and human rights education. Rather than assuming that democratic citizenship could be developed on the basis of human rights education, one should be aware of the limits and challenges of citizenship education and ask “what kind of civic culture does the textbook promote?” Does it strengthen particularistic ties of the citizen or empower students to turn into active national and global citizens? These questions around civic culture and citizenship also provide us a ground to explore the programme and the textbook of the new Citizenship and Democracy Education course.

4. Problematising the Notion of Civic Culture to Make Sense of Citizenship Education

A viable and stable democratic society requires not only respect for human rights but also its citizens’ skillful and active involvement in politics to contribute to the solution of problems on the basis of human rights and democracy. In order for children to be transformed into democratic citizens, it is crucial that they are encultured into a civil identity and civic engagement. Civil culture, according to Baumann, combines three elements: “Competence in relation to the workings of a country’s civil society; competence with regard to its nationally specific conventions of civic culture and norms of civility; some familiarity, conformist or hopefully critical, with its dominant national self-representation” (Baumann 2004, 4). Competence, for Baumann, does not mean compliance with something; it is rather “a capacity to conform to or reject, play along with or undermine dominant representations, all in a socially sharable way” (2004, 4). Citizenship and human rights education programmes can be thought of as a means of acquiring a capacity to unpack and critically evaluate the dominant national codes in a democratic way.

Citizenship and Democracy Education coursebook, in this regard, includes several progressive elements. In a separate subtitle, it summarizes legal ways to defend one’s rights in courts of Turkey (Ozpolat 2011, 38). The textbook also provides students few cases of discriminations experienced by women, disabled people or migrants. However, these cases have not been contextualized. For instance, women are said to be stereotyped and discriminated against. Yet, the textbook does not present any facts and figures about women’s problems in Turkey. Likewise, the textbook involves some exemplary cases of discrimination towards disabled people, yet it gives no reference to facts and figures regarding Turkish context. Such an approach might make students discuss some hypothetical cases, but might not empower them to critically evaluate the Turkish context.

Lack of a sociological and political context in the textbook might lead students to perceive human rights knowledge as snapshots. For instance, students might acquire the knowledge that “women’s right to vote was recognized in 1934 in Turkey” (Ozpolat 2011, 26). However, students do not learn about historical conflicts and processes leading to the development of women’s rights in both Turkish and the world context. Therefore, the current textbook seems to make students acquire a competence in learning about their rights, but this “competence” remains at an abstract level when human rights themes are presented as if they occur in a political vacuum. As our study (Çayır, Bağh 2011) demonstrated, students, after studying a human rights education course might feel vulnerable in the face of problems surrounding them.

Among course activities proposed by the MoNE, few suggest teachers to use short films to bring human rights violations into the classroom. For instance, one activity includes a worksheet that asks students “which right is violated in the film?,” “what could be the reasons for this violation?,” “what do you suggest to prevent this human rights violation?” One could argue that such an activity might serve to make students become aware of human rights problems in Turkey. However, those who are familiar to the dominant national codes already know that it is still difficult for teachers to make use of materials to draw
students’ attention to the need to hold governments to be accountable for their actions. I do not here imagine an idealized context where students are freely encouraged to be critical of the state. It is a fact that citizenship education programmes in many national contexts aim at strengthening the allegiance to nation and state. However, a comparison of civics courses in France might help us to make sense of the Turkish case. In France, civics involves a critical assessment of certain aspects of national policy; for example, civics textbooks point out the rights of workers to strike (Osler 2009). Inclusion of a strike from Turkish history in a textbook or discussing, with a film, the right to strike, for instance, are still problematic in the Turkish context.

The last chapter of the Citizenship and Democracy Education textbook which reminds students about their “duties and responsibilities” makes the dominant national civic codes explicit. This chapter includes passages about “our culture,” “cultural values” or “social rules and social order.” The term culture is always referred to as a singular in the Turkish context. There are no references to non-Turkish and non-Muslim groups living in Turkey. The textbook refers to prophet Mohammad as “our prophet” (Özpolat 2011, 52) implying that it promotes a notion of culture disregarding non-believers and non-Muslims. If citizenship education is not simply a matter of knowledge of human rights but also a matter of “how we think about and behave towards others, particularly those who differ from us in their race, religion, class etc.” (Kymlicka 2001, 304), the current citizenship course is far from providing such a perspective to pupils. Given the strong state tradition, difference-blind civic republicanism and many ethno-nationalist practices in Turkey’s history, the last chapter of the textbook endorses a civic culture which asks for a complete compliance with the dominant national representations. Therefore, the new course, if I employ Baumann’s terminology, does not lead students to develop a capacity to take a critical stance either to reject or to conform to dominant representations, but rather asks for an “unreflective patriotism” (Kymlicka 2001, 310) based on a one-dimensional reading of national history. This is not, however, possible in Turkey any longer in the face of increasing demands of non-Turkish and non-Muslim groups for their rights to equal citizenship. Recent developments in Turkey demonstrate that there is a huge discrepancy between the current social/political developments and the programme of the new Citizenship course.

5. Tension between New Identity-Claims and Democratic Citizenship

The new Citizenship and Democracy Education course, with its focus on human rights, implies that educating people about their rights could be a basis of democratic citizenship. I have been arguing that without problematizing the link between human rights, the notion of citizenship and the state, educating people about their rights might remain at an abstract level and does not empower students in increasingly diversifying societies. A democratic society’s functioning requires the citizens to have not only theoretical knowledge of rights but also a capacity to critically address current problems regarding nation-state, democracy and citizenship. Any progressive course today should situate the notion of citizenship on local and international developments and make students aware of opportunities of and challenges to classical nation-state structures and institutions.

The Turkish case constitutes a good example for discussing the limits and the future of citizenship as an allegiance to the civic republican nation-state. The social scientific literature on the notion of citizenship in Turkey bears a controversy over whether it is based on a political or ethnicist logic. Some scholars argue that Turkish citizenship involves both of them, and it is possible to observe this double character of Turkish citizenship in textbooks which include many references emphasizing sometimes territoriality, sometimes ethnicity (Keyman, Kanc 2011). Some experts argue that constitutional texts design Turkishness in terms of political and legal status. Following the French model, “Turkishness designed by Turkish citizenship is assumed to have nothing to do with being from a real or an assumed ethnic origin” (Yeğen 2004, 55). Mesut Yeğen, on the other hand, contends that the constitutional article noting: “Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is Turkish” could also be read as an ethnic reference promoting exclusionary historical practices in the name of Turkishness (2004). A close analysis of the Republican history indeed shows that practices do not accord with the abstract and political definition of citizenship (Aktar 2000; Yıldız 2001). The process of creating a nation-state and national citizenship in Turkey involved several exclusionary and assimilatory practices towards Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Kurds, Alevis, Arabs, Circassians, Lazes etc. The history reveals that Turkish citizenship emerged as a membership to a Turkish state defined on the basis of a single state-controlled (SUNNI) Islam and a single (Turkish) language (Kadıoğlu 2007).

Not surprisingly, formal schooling was and still is the key mechanism to produce citizens out of students coming from diverse ethnic, language-based and religious differences. Recent developments in Turkey, however, indicate that schooling processes have not totally succeeded in erasing cultural differences and different memories. Although the present curriculum and the new course on Citizenship are still based on a monocultural vision, ethnic and religious
minorities today are gaining public visibility and demanding their rights to full citizenship in Turkey. As a result of global developments and Turkey’s accession process to the European Union, non-Turkish and non-Muslim citizens raise their voices for their equal inclusion into public life. Kurdish groups, for instance, are demanding their right to education in their mother-tongue; Alevi groups (non-Orthodox Islamic groups) object to compulsory Religious Education courses on the basis that it disregards their faith and aims at assimilating them into the Sunni sect; non-Muslim minorities raise their demands regarding their freedom of religion; recently Circassians have also claimed their right to education and broadcasting in their mother-tongue.

These differences, the existence of which has long been denied at the official level, have for the first time begun to be discussed in political life with the current Justice and Development Party government’s recent initiatives titled as “Kurdish expansion,” “Alevi expansion” or “Roma expansion.” The government convenes various workshops with the participation of minorities in order to set a reform agenda for the recognition of rights of these minorities. Although some groups are suspicious about the intent of the government, transcending the “denial policy” towards cultural differences at political level can be considered a progressive step in Turkey. It should also be noted that liberal Turkish intellectuals also challenge the official history, and they publicly campaign to recognize that Armenian and Kurdish massacres occurred before and during the Republican era. They, in other words, have brought the unrecognized memory of non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities into the public agenda.

The increasing visibility of minorities and the public debate on identities and differences involve two counter tendencies in tension with each other. It can, on the one hand, help solve Turkey’s historical problems and thus deepen democracy, and the notion of democratic citizenship. This is because Turkey, for the first time, names its problems in explicit terms that refer to minorities (‘the Kurdish issue,’) after a long history of denial of their existence. It was a fact that until 1990s using the word ‘Kurd’ publicly to denote an ethnic group was a taboo (Dixon and Ergin 2010). However, at the same time, the tension between the majority and minority groups is increasing. The demands of Kurds or the debates concerning controversial segments of Turkey’s history lead some dominant Turkish groups to take an aggressive stance towards minorities. In the summer of 2010, there were lynching attempts towards Kurdish groups in some Anatolian cities. These are examples of the danger of ethnic conflict in Turkey. A recent study on the hate speech in the Turkish media has shown that the hate speech against Armenians increases before every April 24 (the date representing the genocide), and the hate speech has also amplified towards Kurds after “the Kurdish expansion” (Algan, Şensever 2010).

Another recent study demonstrates that these debates on identity claims also show up in the classroom (Firat 2010). In this study, students and teachers were interviewed about their experiences and perceptions on identity, peace, and conflict, especially regarding the Kurdish issue. It reveals that a great majority of Kurds argue that they have been and are being subjected to unpleasant and discriminatory practices in their schooling period. They point out that they are stigmatized as “terrorists,” and that, just after the PKK (the Kurdistan Worker’s Party) attacks teachers and classmates treated them as if “(they) killed Turkish soldiers” (Firat 2010, 25). Kurdish informants argue that they start life and school some steps behind Turks, since many of them speak Kurdish at home and are introduced into Turkish for the first time in school. And what bothers many Kurdish citizens most is their non-recognition in textbooks. They note that Kurds have no presence in the textbooks although they have fought together with Turks in the War of Independence and contributed to the formation of the Turkish Republic. The study also demonstrates that teachers find themselves incompetent to respond to students’ queries about differences or to handle their discriminatory utterances towards minority groups.

All these findings indicate that it is no longer possible to inculcate in students a supposedly monolithic national culture. Nevertheless, the new Citizenship and Democracy Education course is still based on Turkishness with a single language and a single culture. Ethnic and cultural differences still receive no mention in the new course. There is an apparent reference to the “differences” in the programme. Among the values the course aims to instill in students are “respect for differences” or “awareness of discrimination.” However, the textbook, under the subtitle “What is the use of our individual differences for our society?” presents only physical differences between people or occupational differences leading to the functioning of society (Özpolat 2011, 13). An activity proposed by the MoNE suggests students to imagine themselves in an island and think of their “individual differences” to contribute to collective life (MEB 2010). The term “difference” throughout the textbook is used to refer to different individual skills or capabilities. As these passages and activities suggest, within the current curriculum, it is still unimaginable for the textbooks to refer to ethnic differences or other social cleavages in Turkey.

Arguably, it is not easy in Turkey to refer to ethnic or religious differences in formal education because of the current legal structure and the dominant political culture. It is true that the Constitution and the Basic Law on Education are very restrictive regarding the re-
presentation of cultural differences. The Basic Law promotes that education should be based on “the Atatürk nationalism” in order to protect “the spiritual and moral values of the Turkish nation.” However, the rising politics of recognition of non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities indicate the need of a new political framework and a new notion of citizenship that Turkey should develop in order to equally include different groups and interests. Clearly, the current model which puts an emphasis on the unity and indivisibility of the nation along with the non-recognition of ethnic differences is no longer effective in Turkey.

There are several studies demonstrating that difference-blind and liberal assimilationist notion of citizenship does not provide a framework in many national contexts. As Banks notes global immigration and the increasing diversity in nation-states challenge liberal assimilationist model of citizenship which asks people to give up their languages and home cultures to fully participate into public life (Banks 2008, 129-130). It is a fact that European states and schools of major cities today have become multi-ethnic as a result of international migration. Therefore it is now impossible to teach these pupils “to feel German” or “to be proud of being Dutch” (Baumann 2004, 3). Similarly, Turkey can no longer maintain an assimilationist, difference-blind and nationalist education.

There are, on the other hand, some suggestions for a notion of multicultural citizenship that involves the recognition of group rights and cultural rights within a democratic platform (Kymlicka 2001; Banks 2008). It should be noted that the recognition of group rights and identities is not an entirely unproblematic process. Experiences of countries where educational processes are based on a multicultural understanding show that free expression of identities might also involve several problems. Research shows that without an equal status and equal perception of identities, ethnic minorities who are always reminded of their ethnic identities may feel that there is a distance between themselves and dominant identities. A Turkish boy in an English school, for instance, points out that “you can not overcome ethnic descriptions and ethnic belonging” (Mannitz 2004, 277). Thus, identities might turn into iron cages for minority groups.

There are also other suggestions to develop new notions of citizenship. Some scholars today draw attention to the necessity to dissociating civic engagement from national status. They point out to the necessity of transcending (not necessarily removing) the nation-state citizenship. Soysal, for instance, proposes a post-national citizenship since “nation” is not anymore “a meaningful definer of the contemporary state, given the intensification and interconnectedness of the global system and the penetration of national dominions by supranational discourses” (1994, 165) Osler and Starkey, on the other hand, contend that education should promote a “cosmopolitan citizenship that helps young citizens to recognize their common humanity, make connections between their own lives and those of others and operate effectively in contexts of cultural diversity and change” (2005, 78).

Debate on different notions of citizenship provides a ground to reflect upon the Turkish case. Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that the picture is not clear for Turkey. This is because identifying the overarching values and concepts that might hold Turkish society together while incorporating the diversity of its citizens require further information from the field. In other words, we need further field research in order to be able to build up a democratic framework and an education for democratic citizenship. This research needs to be conducted in an interdisciplinary way that links the field of education to wider social science literature. The current heated debates over the development of a civil constitution in Turkey might open up opportunity space for the development of a new notion of citizenship and citizenship education.

6. Conclusion

Contemporary Turkey has been undergoing a major social and political transformation regarding its political, social and educational structure. It is questioning the boundaries of democracy and difference-blind citizenship regime as a result of rising demands of its non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities for equal citizenship. In order to remove formal and informal barriers to full citizenship for different groups, Turkey needs to develop a new legal constitutional framework and a new pluralist imaginary. This is not an easy process since it requires questioning established identities and the official history. Education can play a crucial role in developing a new imaginary that would allow peaceful coexistence of different identities and interests.

The introduction of the new Citizenship and Democracy Education course could be an important intervention to promote democracy and democratic citizenship. A distinct course can draw teachers’ and students’ attention to the necessity of educating

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1 Article 1 of the Basic Law on Education defines the general goal of the national education system as follows: To raise all individuals as citizens who are committed to the principles and reforms of Atatürk and to the nationalism of Atatürk as expressed in the Constitution, who adopt, protect and promote the national, moral, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish Nation, who love and always seek to exalt their family, country and nation, who know their duties and responsibilities towards the Republic of Turkey (MEB 2001).

2 It is called “civil” because, so far, constitutions in Turkey have been introduced after military coups.
youth on both the practice and the underlying values of democracy and human rights in a rapidly changing world. This course has several new progressive objectives compared to the former programmes. Regarding its content, this course focuses on human rights themes and seems to be based on the assumption that human rights education all by itself and necessarily promotes civic engagement and democratic citizenship. However, this may not be achieved since the course includes various human rights themes without making any connections to the problems of the notion of citizenship in Turkey. Human rights, in other words, are inevitably contextualized into a difference-blind Turkish nation-state citizenship. Its programme has not been developed on a new ground and a rationale addressing the necessities of present Turkey. It may not, then, empower students who are aware of conflicts around politics of recognition. For such an empowerment, the notion of citizenship needs to be problematized in relation to relevant national and international contexts and a universal human rights perspective is to be employed to expand the scope of nation-state citizenship.

There are, of course, many theoretical and practical problems in terms of transforming the dominant national representations, and achieving equal inclusion of cultural differences. However, Turkey needs to look for ways to denationalize citizenship, recognize differences and devise an educational structure to promote the culture of democracy and human rights. The new Citizenship and Democracy Education course begs the question of “how can we teach students to respect the rights of others when those ‘others’ do not exist in textbooks?”
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Nathalie Muller Mirza

Civic Education and Intercultural Issues in Switzerland: Psychosocial Dimensions of an Education to “Otherness”

In contemporary democratic societies that deal with cultural and linguistic diversity, education faces new challenges such as how to promote a shared knowledge and competence framework about “citizenship,” how to prepare the young generation to enter a complex world, and how to help immigrant students to integrate into the school system. Some of the European recommendations focus on the importance of promoting “intercultural education”. However, so far little is known about concrete practices and their outcomes. This paper aims at documenting and providing elements of reflections about the difficulties and contradictions faced by both teachers and students involved in pedagogical intercultural activities in Switzerland. From the results of a qualitative research based on a sociocultural perspective, identity and institutional issues of addressing “otherness” in school are discussed. It stresses the importance of a frame in order to allow elaboration and transformation of personal and emotional experiences into thinking and reflexive processes.

Keywords:
intercultural education, citizenship education, identity, learning, qualitative research

1. Citizenship Education and (Inter)Cultural Issues

Democracy is affected by new challenges. One of these is to provide new definitions to the notion of citizenship in complex societies dealing with cultural and linguistic diversity. The question of social cohesion is addressed: how might members of a multicultural society develop shared representations, goals and values? How might they address differences and contradictory points of view in a constructive way? How might they face differences? School is traditionally expected to provide a frame for the integration of diversity. In the European context, each country develops its own way of promoting civic knowledge and the “ability to engage effectively with others in the public domain, and to display solidarity and interest in solving problems” (as it is stipulated in the “key competences for lifelong learning” published by the European Community, 2007). In this perspective, education is expected to reach a double objective: not only to help immigrant students to better understand the school and social system of the host country, but also to promote in all students – whatever their cultural, religious, and national backgrounds – social and cognitive instruments that allow them to enter a complex multicultural society.

However, this attempt of promoting what is called an “intercultural education” faces questions and tensions that might have consequences on the way teachers and students conceive it. One of these questions refers to the contents – the objects that are meant to be taught – that are not well defined in official documents and are particularly heterogeneous: they belong to social sciences (the reasons of international migration, North-South economic and social exchanges, etc.), but they also relate to personal and social experiences (migration experiences in the family, interpersonal relationships, stereotypes and discrimination processes, etc.), are close to know-how, and to ethical and moral values. As they are based on personal and social knowledge, they are tightly related to identity issues for both teachers and students (Grossen, Muller Mirza 2010). The question is thus: are these objects teachable in school? Do they not belong instead to the family sphere? How is it possible – if so – to develop a process of “decontextualisation and re-contextualisation” of the personal experiences, which is the main characteristic of reflexive thinking in school? Moreover, is there not a risk to maintain and even construct “cultural” problems that do not exist in the classroom? Another paradox can be highlighted. On one hand one observes political initiatives which seek to promote a “critical citizen” ready to participate to the society in which she lives, to demonstrate autonomy, to be able to cooperate and resolve conflicts amicably in the frame of the legislation (Audigier 2006); on the other hand, the school institution provides what can be called a “school form” (la forme scolaire, in French), involving a separation between the “student” and the “child”, a strong “discipline”, directive and knowledge-focused pedagogical methods, the subordination to rules and authority that are not objects of negotiation (Vincent 2008). An important gap between policy statements and the school practices appears that some authors describe as an “organizing hypocrisy” (Rus 2008). In this context, it seems important to provide information related to actual teaching practices and the challenges faced by both teachers and students when intercultural education lessons are set up in classrooms.

The overall aim of the study to be reported in this paper is therefore to provide elements of discussion about the way teachers and students give meanings to this education and the psychosocial processes that are at stake. It is claimed here that teaching and learning “intercultural” topics is certainly not usual and mundane at all. What do the teachers choose as objects of knowledge? How do they design their lea-
The study described in this paper is a collective work as it involved junior researchers and colleagues (see “Acknowledgments”) but I report on the results alone here.

1. Intercultural Education and Its Historical Framework

In September 2007, the Arizona State Board of Education adopted the 4-hour block Structured English Immersion (SEI) model, requiring all school districts to implement the model from Kindergarten through 12th grade. Consequently, it meant that young immigrants or students who were not fluent in English had to spend 4 hours of English lessons per day, and these lessons focused mainly on English language. The proclaimed goal was to enable students to become fluent or proficient in one year. However, as a research carried out by the University of Arizona showed (Gandera, Orfield 2011; Rios-Aguillar, Gonzalez-Canche, Moll 2010), this instructional program reached results that were different from those expected. It seems that the students experienced a kind of segregation and that the separation from English speaking peers was not only harmful to their learning (the majority of them were not meeting grade level standards) but also to their self-esteem as they were stereotyped as slow learners. This anecdote is interesting as it sheds light on the paradoxical effect of education focusing on minorities or immigrant populations. The pedagogy chosen is a good example of what Michael Cole calls the “make the diversity go away” perspective: “For many, the ‘English-only’ ‘throw them in the water’ perspective is based on a straightforward assimilationist model of education designed to create a common, American culture, generally one that is Anglo-Saxon in origin, and Christian” (Cole 1998, 293).

This perspective on minority education is also in force in Europe. It originated in the period just after the 1950s when many European countries faced a high immigration flow. Teachers and politicians focused their attention on overcoming linguistic problems in school: instructional measures for learning the host countries’ languages were set up. An emphasis was also placed on the opportunity to “preserve” students’ languages and cultures of origin so that a return to their native country could be possible. Over time, however, this concept has been criticized “as the risks of a ‘compensatory’ and ‘assimilatory’ pedagogy became increasingly visible” (Portera 2008, 482). No consideration was given to the relationship between the immigrant students and the other students, nor to the connections between first and second language learning or to the role of the teaching of a second language in enabling or disabling access to the school curriculum (Perregaux, Ogay, Leanza, Dasen 2001).

The double-edged sword of this approach became perceptible: “This led to the deepening of the racism of the dominant and majority populations who defined ‘the others’ by their ‘ethnicity’” (Gundera, Portera 2008, 464). The students were labeled as being disadvantaged and it constructed issues of difference in terms of “deficit.”

Since the 90s (for making short!), new terms, definitions and approaches have developed (Abdalalah-Preitcelle 2004; César, Kumpulainen 2009; De Haan, Elbers 2009; Kumpulainen, Renshaw 2007). In Europe, the perspective of an “intercultural approach” grew up and tried to take into account the main criticisms that were addressed to the original form of this approach (mainly an epistemological and theoretical weakness, and a risk of reinforcing the stereotypes towards the immigrant populations). The Council of Europe defined intercultural education in terms of reciprocity based on the idea that interactions contribute to the development of co-operation and solidarity rather than to relations of domination, conflict, rejection, and exclusion (Rey 2006). In this perspective, a main concern is to regard children of immigrants no longer as a “problem” or “risk” but as “resources.” The education of minorities is undertaken with consideration of the dynamic character of individuals’ cultures and their identities. Moreover, this education is not merely addressed to immigrant or “foreigners” students but to all the children in an “inclusive” perspective (Unesco 2006). Indeed, if intercultural education is seen as empowering immigrant students and facilitating their integration processes in the school system, it is also expected to provide all students with communicative skills and intellectual tools in order to make them better able to integrate into a multicultural and multi-linguistic society. Another main objective is to elaborate a “space of sociability,” that means the development of dialogue and argumentation competencies leading to the acquisition of shared rules and practices.

The shift is important. Some authors call it a change of paradigm (Allemann-Ghionda 2002). However, this shift also opens new questions and debates. If the issue is no longer only the integration of immigrants into the social and school systems, how do topics like cultures, otherness and migration become “objects of knowledge” in the frame of the classrooms? Such topics involve identity issues (“who I am in relation with the others”) that are socially and emotionally loaded. How are these topics introduced into the classrooms and understood by both teachers and students?
3. Observing Actual Practices in Intercultural Education

3.1 Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in Switzerland

Before presenting the general scope of the study, it might be helpful to understand the specifics of the national context in which the research questions have been raised. Concerning (inter)cultural issues, Switzerland certainly provides interesting features, but also some contradictory dimensions. Switzerland is often seen as the paradigm of a multi-linguistic and multiethnic country since it is composed of “Cantons” which are respectively German, French, Italian and/or Romance speaking (German, French and Italian are official languages at the national level within the Federal administration of the Swiss Confederation). However, each region tends to manage the linguistic issue within the borders of its territory: Swiss Cantons are in this perspective relatively mono-linguistic. Furthermore, related to diversity, Switzerland has a high level of foreign residents compared to other European countries. At the end of 2010, the number of foreign residents amounted to 1.7 million persons, corresponding to 22.4% of the total permanent resident population. The majority of them originate in EU/EFTA member states. This rate can be explained by two main factors: by the fact that the calculation includes persons born in Switzerland to foreign-national parents (native-born foreigners — also known as the second generation — made up 22.3 percent of the foreign-resident population at the end of 2007), and also since Switzerland has a low naturalization rate, with just 2.9 percent of foreigners naturalizing in 2007. However, in this country known for its neutrality and its active role in diplomatic peace processes at the international level, the media and political rhetoric over immigration has been heated in recent years. The right-wing Swiss People’s Party (UDC – Union Démocratique du Centre) takes a significant place among the four parties represented in the Federal Council.

At the level of compulsory education, cultural and linguistic heterogeneity is significant. More than 85% of the classrooms are heterogeneous in terms of students’ cultural and linguistic backgrounds. However, the school system remains mono-linguistic and mono-cultural: the privileged instrument used to respond to this reality is to set up compensatory settings which do not take into account knowledge and contributions from foreign students (Lanfranchi, Perregaux, Thommen 2000). In the last few years, however, teachers have become more sensitive to an “intercultural approach” during their initial training, but in very diverse ways as assessed by a national report published in 2007 (Sieber, Bishof 2007).

3.2 Aims and Conceptual Frame of the Study

The study reported here aimed at describing and analyzing teaching-learning situations related to intercultural education issues. It mainly focused on the following questions: what are the meanings the teachers give to this education? What do they identify as “objects to be taught” when they teach “intercultural education”? What difficulties do they face? How do the students understand what they are supposed to learn? What misunderstandings are liable to emerge from these situations? The main focus of the study was on the meaning-making processes of both teachers and students in their way of interacting and defining “cultural” issues. It therefore adopted a socio-cultural framework in psychology (Bruner 1990; Cole 1996; Hanano, Wertsch 2001; Wertsch 1991) which assumes that “it is by analyzing what people do in culturally organized activity, people-acting through mediational means in a context, that one comes to understand the process of being human” (Cole 1998, 292).

3.3 Research Design

From this theoretical framework, we designed a qualitative research and focused on the following dimensions: on discourses and actual practices teachers developed in their attempt to “do” intercultural education, and on interactions between teachers, students and their use of pedagogical materials. The study had a three-step structure: we first conducted an interview with the teacher before the pedagogical activity itself in order to get a picture about his/her pedagogical intentions, representations and experiences about intercultural issues, and how s/he would concretely design the activity; the second step was to record the whole activity (which could last from 1 lesson of 45 minutes to 5 lessons). In the third step, we conducted a second interview with the teacher and focused on his/her feelings about what happened during the activity and his/her satisfaction or surprises about the way the students reacted and worked. We also had discussions with some of the students.

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2 Among the most represented nationalities in 2010 were Italians (16.3%) and Germans (14.9%), followed by Portuguese (12.0%) and Serbs (6.9%), according to official government statistics (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/bevoelkerungsstand/02.html, retrieved November 20, 2011).

The study was carried out in six classrooms of primary and secondary schools in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Four teachers participated on a volunteer basis to the research during the years 2009 and 2010. They were asked to use one of the pedagogical materials that are at their disposal in a center for Global Education specialized in intercultural education and sustainable development (FED4) such as books, pictures and movies. All the materials concern the relationship with “otherness” and/or migration. In total, there were 105 students (39 in primary school and 66 in secondary school) aged from 4 to 16. We videotaped the lessons and audio-recorded the interviews. The following table provides some information about the contexts of the observations:

### Table 1. General Information about the Contexts of the Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Type and name of the document chosen by the teacher</th>
<th>School level</th>
<th>Number of the students and nationalities in the classroom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karoline*</td>
<td>Child’s book (“This place is mine” [Ici c’est chez moi])**</td>
<td>Primary school (4–6 y.o.)</td>
<td>18 students, 5 nationalities (other than Swiss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>Set of pictures (“Humanity on the move” [L’Humanité en mouvement])5</td>
<td>Primary school (8–10 y.o.)</td>
<td>9 students, all are first or second generation of immigration students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>Short film (“Border” [Frontière]) 5</td>
<td>Primary school (8–10 y.o.)</td>
<td>12 students, 8 nationalities (other than Swiss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tick</td>
<td>Set of pictures (“Humanity on the move” [L’Humanité en mouvement])</td>
<td>Secondary school (10–12 y.o.)</td>
<td>20 students, 5 nationalities (other than Swiss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emy</td>
<td>Book of novels (“A camel in the snow” [Un chameau dans la neige])5</td>
<td>Secondary school (12–13 y.o.)</td>
<td>22 students, 8 nationalities (other than Swiss)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emy</td>
<td>Book of novels (“A camel in the snow” [Un chameau dans la neige])</td>
<td>Secondary school (15–16 y.o.)</td>
<td>24 students, 15 nationalities (other than Swiss)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All the names have been modified.
**The documents:
· Ici c’est chez moi [This place is mine], 2007, J. Ruillier. Paris : Autrement
· L’humanité en mouvement [Humanity on the move]. 2005. Berne: Alliance Sud

In the Canton de Vaud in which the research was carried out, the proportion of foreign students (all nationalities combined) exceeds 30%. When we asked the students about their origins, many responded by mentioning two nationalities. In some classrooms, for instance Charles’s, the proportion of second or first generation immigration students reaches 80%.

4. The Teachers’ Point of View

In the following section, I present the perspective of the teachers on intercultural education: what are their professional backgrounds? What are the origins of their interest for intercultural issues? How did they design lessons?

#### 4.1 Teachers’ Perception about (Inter)Cultural Issues

The four teachers who participated to the study all have specific professional and personal backgrounds that diversely orientate their interests in intercultural education.

Karoline is a primary teacher who has more than 25 years experience teaching. She is interested in intercultural education for many years and has collaborated with the center for Global Education (FED) on the Rights of the Child. She tries to take advantage of the cultural and linguistic backgrounds of her students as much as possible, but she is also aware of the risk as she thinks that they also can be used as instruments for discrimination.

Charles has taught for seven years in “development classes” which are for students who
need an individualized program. In these classrooms, learning objectives are similar to those provided by the curriculum of regular classes but tailored to each student’s abilities. Charles’ pedagogical concern is to facilitate a mutual respect among his students and to promote conditions for “leaving together.” He claims that students’ differences might be used as a cross-fertilization tool within the group.

Tick is a secondary school teacher and teaches geography. He is also professor in a University of teacher education. The issues of “otherness” and the perception of other groups are often raised in his lessons, for instance when he teaches about the topic of tourism.

Emy has taught French in a secondary school for more than 20 years. Multiculturality is an important dimension of his school and classroom reality, but he is not used to setting up specific pedagogical activities about intercultural communication. When we asked the teachers about their understanding of “cultural issues” at school, the majority of them responded that they did not face any problem of that kind in their own class (racism or intergroup violence) even though the majority of their students do not have a Swiss passport. The teachers considered cultural heterogeneity as a reality. The only problem that was perceived concerned linguistic difficulties (some students did not speak French at home and their parents sometimes faced difficulties to understand what is expected by the school). In their opinion, this might explain the lower level of some students in terms of school achievement. All teachers said they had a personal concern about this domain. They generally showed a positive attitude towards diversity considered as a resource rather than as a problem.

Concerning the concrete “intercultural” actions the teachers are used to setting up, we can note three different ways of dealing with these issues (these perspectives were sometimes combined within a single person):

1. A reluctance to teach these topics and to organize specific activities as they fear creating a problem that does not exist as such and which might contribute to creating and maintaining stereotypes (Emy, for instance, wondered if the “problem” did not come more from the adults rather than the children themselves);

2. Cultural diversity occasionally becomes a topic of discussion when the teachers take the opportunity, for example the holy days in different countries or religions or the nationalities and languages of the students;

3. An integrated perspective in which intercultural dimensions are part of education as a whole: teaching focuses on communication skills, for instance, in order to make the students able to interact with each other and understand various points of view. For instance, Charles said: “integrating intercultural topics like migration and diversity in school is very important as it should allow us to shed light on contributions from each member of the group and stimulate the exchanges of points of view.” The teachers thus showed not only their interest for cultural dimensions but also their awareness of some of the “traps” of these topics: how to take into account important issues like “cultural diversity” without constructing them in terms of “problems”? They also demonstrated a willingness to focus attention towards the “interactional” aspects of this education. How did they make this awareness concrete in the pedagogical activities?

### 4.2 The Pedagogical Activities

It is interesting to observe that to some extent all teachers set up activities in which the dimensions of students’ emotions and communicative competences were called upon. Here are some examples of the way they designed the lessons and the topics they choose.

#### Example 1

A teacher, Charles, used a pedagogical material called “Humanity on the move” that consists of pictures which evocates migration and demography issues. In a first step, he invited each of his students to choose one picture among about twenty that were laid on a table and asked them to write down one word they associated with the picture. One after another they had then to tell to the group the reasons why they chose the picture and then the word they wrote. The teacher explicitly tried to allow students to express their “internal state”, like in this extract:

**Extract 1**

The teacher: I asked you the question, you said: “it [the picture] made me think to my cousin”, ok, and when you think to your cousin how do you feel [“ça te met dans quel état?”]?

#### Example 2

With her young students of 4–6 years old, Karoline chose a child’s book called “This place is mine” [C’ic’est chez moi], telling the story of a boy who draws a circle on the floor all around him: he looks angry when a cloud, a rabbit or a leaf enter his circle. But when another little boy is approaching, sees the line and turns away, he feels sad and finally he invites the newcomer to enter into his “place.” This story is meant by the teacher to be an opportunity to discuss borders and their functions. Karoline started the activity by asking her students to experiment “bodily” what a border means: in the gymnastic hall the children had to run around and to enter hoops as faster as they can when music stopped, in order to “be protected from the storm”; she then helped students who did not find their “home” to negotiate a space in
their mates’ hoops. The following activities focused on discussions about the feelings they had when they played with the hoops, and about the feeling of the little boy of the story. In the following extract, Karoline tries to allow her students to explicitly show their feelings when they were not able to enter a hoop:

**Extract 2**
The teacher: So, you stayed alone out of the hoop? (...) And how was it? Did you feel at ease or not?

Later on, as she read the child’s book and showed the drawings in the book, she asked the students’ group about the boy’s feelings on several occasions:

**Extract 3**
The teacher: does he look happy?
One child: no
The teacher: how does he look?
The child: angry
The teacher: let’s all do the same like him, let’s find the same position like him.

**Example 3**
With his 10–12 years old students, Emy reads a book of novels, The Camel in the snow, written by men and women active in the political and cultural life in Switzerland who describe their own experience of immigration. In this book, the authors explain the reasons why they had to leave their country or region, the feelings they had, and the challenges they faced in the process of integrating in a new world. Some of the stories are funny, others sad. All are about the way immigration affects a person. The novels show not only the process of acculturation but also the resources the authors found to go through the difficulties of this experience. Emy asked the students to read and sum up some of the novels and invited them to interview a teacher who used to work in their school about her own experience when she arrived in Switzerland from Poland a few years ago.

The above examples show that the teachers set up intercultural activities as opportunities to work on “relational issues” where feelings (their expression and their recognition) took a significant place: migration, for instance, became an object of study as a subjective experience with its difficulties, surprises and joys. The students’ attention was focused on the characters’ point of view to which they might connect their own personal experiences. When the issue of “crossing borders,” for example, was discussed with the children it was from the perspective of the various actors of the situation, those who were “inside,” the others who stayed “outside” of the borders, and the feelings it generated. Teachers’ hypothesis (which was more or less explicit in the interviews) was that making their students able to recognize the others’ feelings and allowing them to express their emotions are all powerful tools that might facilitate (intercultural) communication.

5. The Students’ Point of View
5.1 Meaning-Making Processes
Up to this point the pedagogical representations and intentions of the teachers when they designed intercultural activities were examined. We can guess how unusual these kinds of practices may be for the students who are used to focusing on objects of learning which are well defined through textbooks. In such a context, how do they interpret these activities? How do they enter this specific game? In this section, let us examine the students’ meaning-making processes and show some examples from interviews and observations.

When we asked Emy’s 24 students about what they think they learned by engaging in the activity about the novels, 17 responded that they learned a lot: “it allows us to better understand people who leave their countries and have to move here;” “it is useful to know these things in order to behave more respectfully towards immigrants;” “we’ll be more open minded and kind towards foreigners because it is really hard.” The teacher’s intention seems to be properly reached: students are able to take into account another point of view and experience. However, we have to be aware that these responses may also be consensual and normative responses, as no other data have been gathered about the possible attitude changes of the children. At the question about how familiar they were with these kinds of topics at school, only 5 among 24 said that intercultural topics have been discussed in school yet. We were also interested in how comfortable the students felt about a discussion about “private” topics in the public space of the classroom. Only 2 students responded they were used to talking about personal topics at school (“to talk about my life, my family, my personal experiences.”) A result which is even more appealing: only 7 responded that they liked it. Some of the students said that they prefer learning the names of country’s capitals “because it is more useful.” And others said they liked the activities, as it was “something different,” and they could go out of the classroom or avoid the usual lesson.

5.2 Difficulty to Share a Definition of the Situation
Some observations show another interesting aspect of the students’ perspective: the difficulty they felt to understand what exactly was expected from them.

**Example 4**
During the activity about the borders with the hoops for instance, it seemed to be difficult for the young children to understand that Karoline was trying to let them express “what they felt”:
Extract 4
Karoline: You had to be 5, 6, 7 maybe 8 in the same hoop, and what was difficult?
A child: When, when we are in the hoop a lot

Or later during the same activity:

Extract 5
A child (Jane): I wanted to go inside a red hoop but Mary did not let me in
Karo: so what did it make you feel? [“qu’est-ce que ça t’a fait ?” – a question that usually leads to an answer in terms of emotion, like for example: “I felt sad” or “angry”, etc.]
Jane: and there were no room
Karo: so what did it make you feel when there is no room?
Jane: err one has to go in another hoop...

Example 5
In a class with older children, a funny interaction occurred which shows that the school “routine” frames the interpretation and leads the students to provide answers that are not relevant, in the eyes of the teacher at least. Tick, who chose the material “Humanity on the move,” decided to initiate his 10-12 year old students to analysis of the pictures. He explained that the photographer has intentions that might explain the choice of the topic, the framing and the structure of the picture: to some extent, the reality is “constructed.” He also sought to make his students aware of the feelings an image can produce. At a point of the lesson, he asked a student about what she thought when she looked at a picture showing a group of African children. She responded: “they are cute.” At his question about what she meant by “they are cute” she responded: by spelling the word, interpreting the question, as focused on a grammatical problem.

6. Discussion
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, the Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs made a “Declaration on cultural diversity.” They claimed the relevance of promoting an “intercultural dialogue” which should straddle all aspects of the society, including education. In this line, the Council of Europe published a White Paper in 2008 that argues: “Intercultural dialogue can only thrive if certain preconditions are met. To advance intercultural dialogue (…), the democratic governance of cultural diversity should be adapted in many aspects; democratic citizenship and participation should be strengthened; intercultural competences should be taught and learned; spaces for intercultural dialogue should be created and widened; and intercultural dialogue should be taken to the international level” (Council of Europe 2008). In Switzerland, like in many European countries, school authorities have introduced “inclusive” intercultural education in the teachers’ training and in the curricula in order to prepare the young generation for the challenges of societies becoming more and more multicultural and multi-linguistic and to prevent violence and contribute to social equity. To a certain extent, the teachers who participated with the study echo these concerns by their choice to implement intercultural lessons in their own classrooms.

The research I have presented above aimed at documenting existing pedagogical activities teachers set up with their students. It focused on the psychosocial issues of these “new” topics when they enter classrooms, in particular when otherness becomes an object of study from the point of view of both teachers and students.

Let us discuss some points that highlight what can be called the “tensions” of intercultural education: tensions between, on the one hand, the official discourse - the idealized project of an intercultural education which would promote equality and peace - and on the other, the intercultural education as it is actualized and interpreted by its main actors.

When they design intercultural education lessons, the teachers seem sensitive and aware of the risk of contributing to a “culturalization” of the interpersonal relations and the reinforcement of stereotypes and prejudices. In their eyes, it is as if to speak about them could make them exist. This “paradoxical effect” of intercultural education has also been reported in other studies and addressed in theoretical works (Grossen, Muller Mirza 2010; Ogay, Edelmann 2011). In order to avoid this possible effect, the teachers choose not to teach about “cultures” as if they were pre-existing entities, but merely to address the inter- actional dimension of culture, i.e., the relationship one might construct toward “the others.” This ethical and epistemological perspective has two important practical consequences: teachers set up activities that focus either on the processes of “producing otherness” (for example, the activity about the functions of the borders), of “constructing reality” (for example, the activity about the way a picture re-presents the world), or on the subjective and emotional experience of the students themselves or of other characters (the activities focusing on the expression of emotions felt by the students related to pictures for instance, or about the feeling immigrants might have when they leave their country and move in a new environment).

This shift is interesting and echoes what is meant by an “intercultural approach” from the Council of Europe, for example (Rey 2006). However other questions are raised, and the way some students react to these lessons might lead us to open new reflections.

Students’ reluctance towards evocation of personal experiences at school is an interesting aspect to take into consideration. It poses the question of the rela-
tionship between private and public spheres at school: is school the place in which raising topics that might perhaps belong in the family and the private individual sphere? What could the psychological cost of crossing the borders be? It can be interesting to listen to the students and their own expectations. For example, in another study a girl responded to a researcher and said: “hopefully school exists!” (Rochex, Kherroubi 2004), as if she could find a refuge there where nobody asks her for any explanation about what life she lives out of school, her cultural or national backgrounds. The question raised does not suppose normative or simple answers. Instead, it leads us to pay attention to the way the students experience the relationships between the different contexts, inside and outside school, and the meaning they attribute to a given object of knowledge within these contexts (César, Kumpulainen 2009; Grossen, Zittoun, Ros 2011; Zittoun 2007).

Another issue concerns the relationship between emotions and cognition or consciousness. Following a sociocultural perspective, emotion and cognition are not separated entities (Audigier 2005; Muller Mirza forthcoming), and should be understood as deeply embedded within the “dynamic of human life” (Vygotsky 1987, 333). In his theory of development, Lev Vygotsky claims that, like other psychological functions, emotions develop in an interpersonal and social level first and then move towards an intrapersonal level. He stressed the idea of a process of “socialization of emotions” and wrote: “the knowledge of an emotion changes this emotion and changes it from a passive into an active state. That I think about things outside of myself does not change anything in them, but that I think about emotions, that I place them in other relationships to my intellect and other instances will change much in my psychological life. To say it more simply, our emotions act in a complex system with our concepts” (Vygotski 1987, 125). In this perspective, emotions are dynamic psychological and social processes that are connected to thinking and learning. Vygotsky highlights the reflexive move of the emotion when it becomes an object of attention which affects and changes the “psychological life.” This perspective can be related to the notion of “secondarisation,” this dialectical process of reconfiguration of everyday experience into a form of conceptualized knowledge that places it within a broader framework and takes it as an object of reflection (Grossen 2009; Jaubert, RebieRebière 2001; Rochex 1995, Valsiner 2002, Zittoun 2007). We can therefore easily understand that engaging the students to express their personal emotions is not enough and that a specific interactive work that leads to secondarisation would be important, but maybe particularly difficult due to the nature of the topics at stake (Muller Mirza, Grossen, Grand 2011). It seems also that the elaboration of a “frame” is important, in which rules, finalities and actors’ positions are well defined. In the observations of intercultural activities, it was fascinating for example to see how a teacher, Charles, introduced the activity about the pictures to his students. He took five minutes at the beginning of the lesson and explained the instructions, the communication rules, the attitudes he expected. He showed a strong awareness of the difficulty of the activity in which the students were invited to express personal experiences and affects: it was important to him that all of them might speak if they wanted, listen to the others and did not make jokes or personal judgments. In such a “thinking space” (Perret-Clermont 2004, 2009), the students had been able to not only share personal narratives and emotions to the group but also construct knowledge that had a collective relevance. This observation sheds light on the importance of mediational resources that allow personal experiences and emotions to be reconfigured in a way that can be elaborated as shared knowledge.

The observations in classrooms show another tension. It is interesting to observe that the students are so familiar with the usual “school form” that they look surprised when teachers’ expectations are not oriented toward the body of knowledge of a discipline. The didactic and communicative contracts that usually affect the relationship between teachers and students and define their status and roles might be challenged in the pedagogical settings of intercultural lessons. However, these new objects and the interpersonal reconfiguration that entail might face the traditional school form which stays largely “monological” and discipline-oriented (Chronaki, 2009).

All these points have to be discussed and examined in the light of other observations. Accounting, describing and analyzing teachers’ practices (in a close collaboration between teachers and researchers) are necessary in order to think together about the psychosocial and institutional issues of educating for diversitiy. Providing children with such tools that allow them to create reflexive and dialogical identities are part of the school agenda and this effort has to be supported.

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The Reflection of a Warlike Historical Culture in the Attitudes of Finnish Youths

Two school shootings took place in Finland in 2007–2008, in which 20 people lost their lives. After the shootings, foreign journalists used the violent culture of Finnish men as an explanation for the tragedies. Of the old EU countries, the highest rate of capital crimes is found in Finland. The country has for a long time debated where the violence comes from. One explanation is that the historical culture in Finland glorifies war. The wars that were fought against the Soviet Union (1939–1944) have been elevated in Finland to become key elements of the national psyche, manifested in celebrations, anniversaries and through family narratives. According to this explanation, a Finn already learns as a child to accept violence which is considered to be legitimate and to behave in accordance with warlike ideals. This article examines the warlike historical culture in Finland and clarifies why war has remained a popular theme of Finnish historical culture. Further, it discusses the impact that a warlike historical culture has on the attitudes of young people.

Keywords:
Historical culture, historical consciousness, warlike heritage, reminiscence narratives, Finnish adolescents

1. Wars as Significant Events in History
Although Finland is a country with a low level of crime, the number of violent crimes committed in the country is the equivalent of the European average. Concerning capital crimes, Finland was the leading country in the early 2000s prior to the EU’s inclusion of new member states in. For Finnish men, violence is not necessarily unacceptable. Marjut Jyrkinen and Leena Ruusuvuori, who have researched violent behaviour, state that violence has almost always been the way in which a Finnish man has resolved his issues. Physical restraint is not valued in the same way as in other cultures. Late night fights at fast food takeaways are considered to be an integral part of Finnish male culture (Jyrkinen, Ruusuvuori 2002, 408).

It has been suggested that Finnish men cherish the honour of the warrior ideal, in which the legitimacy of the use of violence is connected to the right to defend dearly held values. According to this way of thinking, a Finnish man has always been able to fight fire with fire. To retreat from a challenge is considered to be dishonourable. Some say that Finns grow up with this attitude from childhood and that violent behaviour has been normalised in Finnish culture (Sarkamo 2007; Vuorikuru 2011; see also Kilakoski 2009, 43). This attitude can be partly attributed to exceptionally strong respect, verging on worship, for warlike traditions, by international standards. Young people also grow up with an acceptance of violence through popular entertainment. War films, books, comics, and, especially in recent years, war games have strengthened the principle of respect for legitimate violence emanating from elsewhere in society.

The positive attitude of Finnish men towards the use of violence has been explained in several ways. Some have linked the use of violence to the traumas experienced by Finnish men in World War II and the passing on of this to the following generations. Historian Henrik Meinander attempts to refute this claim by showing that violent crime was actually more common in Finland than in the other Nordic countries from the 1700s onwards. Meinander also blames the high rates of violence on Finns’ excessive use of alcohol. (Meinander 2009, 359.) Other historians have also considered the reasons to lie elsewhere than in the historical culture (e.g. Lappalainen 2010).

There is clear evidence of the violent behaviour of Finnish men, but there is no consensus as to its reason. War is, however, strongly visible in Finnish historical culture. American historian Gordon F. Sander told about how on his first visit to Finland, he was amazed how the Finns spoke of the 1939–1940 Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union as if it had only concluded the day before. Sander regards the Winter War as a myth, similar to Finland’s national epic, The Kalevala, which needs to be read to be able to understand the Finnish people and the state of being Finnish (Oksanen 2010; Sander 2010).

In the great national narratives the Winter War has been regarded as the young republic’s test of manhood (Meinander 2009, 393). Henrik Meinander (2009, 395) has drawn attention to the fact that Finland’s Independence Day celebration is linked more to the Second World War than to events connected to Finland’s actual independence in 1917. For decades, on every Independence Day TV has broadcasted the Unknown Soldier film, which takes place during the Continuation War (1941–1944) against the Soviet Union. In addition, the heroes of this war are traditionally the first to step forward and meet the president at the president’s Independence Day reception. Almost half of

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1 Suomen ulkoasiainministeriön mediakatsaus 1.10.2008.

2 The Independence Day celebration at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki is the most watched television programme in Finland. During the 2000s, the viewing figures have almost always exceeded two million (Finland has a population of approx. 5.3 million).
the Finnish population follows the event live on TV, so this enhances the significance of the warriors as the custodians of Finland’s independence. On Independence Day, the other television schedules largely consist of programmes which are related to the Winter and Continuation Wars.

The significance of war also appears strongly in research. The historical consciousness of young Finns was clarified during the 1990s in the Youth and History Project and its associated national interview research. Young Finns were found to have a nationally biased view of history, and seemed to have a particularly thorough knowledge of the wars against the Soviet Union (Ahonen 1997, A259–A261; Ahonen 1998). The great national narrative, which is built around war, has not even in the most recent research been found to have deteriorated: data collected during the 2000s indicate that the wars have remained in the minds of young people as some of the most significant events in history.

War seems to interest young people of all ages. Their views of wars constituting the most significant events in history can be explained by the strong focus on war in school teaching and popular culture. However, in Finland, an appreciation of war is developed at an early age through the reminiscing of parents and grandparents. Tragic accounts have been the driving forces for family and ancestral narratives, and thus far these have been built on the basis of war stories (Meinander 2009, 397–398).

2. War as a Core Theme of Reminiscence Narratives
Children in Finland already become engaged with a warlike heritage when they are small, as revealed in recent research. According to Rantala (2011), children aged 7–10 years have not yet read war-related books or watched war-related television programmes, but war has still been mediated to them through the narratives of their parents and grandparents. The power of the stories heard at home is based on their subjectivity – through which the child can be connected to the ancestral heritage experience. The narrative situations are emotionally effective events, as the child is then able to become part of the world of the adults. Over the years, the child will hear the same story many times, so the power of the story is also based upon its many repetitions.

Why, then, do parents and grandparents talk to their descendants about war? One explanation is that war stories are considered to be more exciting than those concerning everyday life. In researching the historical consciousness of 16–18-year-old Finns, Sirkka Ahonen (1998) found that parents and grandparents avoid such subjects, which they suspect young people will find boring. When young people are told about past events, even briefly, only the most impressive pass through the self-censorship of parents and grandparents. The narrative storytelling of the previous generations is connected to war, as they believe this to be of greatest interest to the young. The question therefore appears to concern the attitudes of the parents and grandparents. It also concerns the connection of the individual’s own family to the great national narrative. Wars have also been highly visible in school education, and, as mentioned, in cultural context in general. As previously highlighted, the media reporting surrounding the anniversaries of the Finnish-Soviet wars, along with popular entertainment, have raised the wars to be the key issue in the national history. The act of being Finnish can be determined through the wars. For example, the leading politicians in Finland use war-related concepts in their speeches. They speak of “the spirit of the Winter War” in attempting to motivate the population to pull together to achieve common goals. All Finns are supposed to understand the meaning of the concept. When the wars are displayed in public as constituting the core of discussions on being Finnish, parents and grandparents also consider it to be important to tell their descendants about their own family’s links to them.

Sakari Suutarinen has expressed concern about the transmission, through the teaching of history, of the image of Russia as an enemy of Finland. According to Suutarinen (2000, 118), the state of being Finnish has been constructed along with the image of Russia as a threat or enemy, and history textbooks ha-

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3 During Independence Day in 2010, the channels of the national broadcasting company, YLE, broadcast 7 hours and 45 minutes of programmes which were related to the Winter and Continuation Wars.

4 Hakkari 2005, 74; Virta 2009; A warlike history is not only a Finnish phenomenon. Emphase on war have also been found elsewhere. War appears on the list of the most memorable and relevant topics in the teaching of history all over the world; see Barton, Levstik 2008; Yeager et al. 2002; Brophy, VanSledright 1997, 81–82; Lee 2002; Barca et al. 2004, 39, 41.

5 The Winter War spirit means national unity, which is regarded to have made it possible for Finland to preserve its independence. The Finns fought together as one and prevented the conquest of the country by the Soviet Union. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirit_of_the_Winter_War.

6 Earlier, textbooks were seen as dominant in the teaching. In Finland, the national Board of Education revised textbooks up to the 1990s. However, many recent studies claim that textbooks no longer play as big a role in the development of historical understanding among youth (f. ex. Haydn 2011; Wineburg et al. 2007, 69–70).
ve played a significant role in forming this image.\textsuperscript{6} These attitudes, however, seem to have also been passed on to children, even before entering school. A study concerning Finnish children aged 7–10 years, showed that almost all of the children were already aware of the wars between Finland and the Soviet Union before learning about them at school. Suutarinen is concerned that the enemy image mediated by historical culture can also be identified today. The historical culture built around the Russian/Soviet threat may be reflected in the negative attitudes of young Finns towards Russia as well as Finland’s largest immigrant group, Russians.

In addition to the historical enemy images reflected at the present time, the adverse effect resulting from war stories, is also linked to the children’s and young people’s expectations for the future. Along with environmental pollution, one of young Finns’ greatest fears is an increase in violence (Seppanen 2008; Rubin 1998). In the world of a child, talking about war could also mean an increase in the threat of violence. When children are told a great deal about wars, they may form an understanding of these kinds of events which are beyond peoples’ control. Finnish children may also begin to think that the country’s independence had to be reclaimed through a war which may need to be repeated in the future.

As young people approach their teenage years, the role of their parents weakens while the importance of their sphere of friends increases. During their teenage years, young people are also able to freely access other topics of historical culture and are no longer tightly bound to the storytelling of their families. Further, their images of history begin to be influenced by the popular entertainment culture, where war also features prominently.

The existence of a culture of violence is not necessarily a reason for violent behaviour. According to researchers who have studied school shootings, ‘cultural scripts’ are just one of the five necessary conditions for school shootings.\textsuperscript{7} However, Tomi Kilakoski, who has studied the subject in Finland, pays special attention to the Finnish culture of violence as an explanation of the Finnish shootings. We should do so as well.

What is it about war that attracts young Finns? In part, the answer lies in national great narrative as a major unifying factor and a matter of pride. Finland lost both wars with the Soviet Union. However, according to a recent survey, Finns view the wars particularly as ‘preventive’ victories, whereby Soviet Union was prevented from occupying the whole country (Torsti 2011). Young people are proud of the fact that the Finns managed against a numerically superior enemy. Comparing the attitudes of youth in the United States, for example, you will find the lack of a personal approach to war that Finns have (see Barton & Levestik 2008, 250–251).

Warlike historical culture is a universal phenomenon. To a great extent, the attitude of the Finns dates back to the strong culture of reminiscence which belongs to the ‘unofficial’ vernacular history (Rantala 2011). Finnish ‘official’ history also has very unique features, for example the way Finns celebrate their Independence Days, how politicians refer to the attitude of Finns during the Winter War (1939–40), and the popularity of war literature. The presence of a historical collective memory is an important factor in shaping youth’s narratives about the past, as Jocelyn Létourneau (2006, 80) has presented.

Although young Finns are especially interested in the Second World War, other wars are also of interest. Wars are dealt with a great deal in the teaching of history, but this does not explain why the young people consider war to be more interesting than other historical topics. Young peoples’ interest in war can be explained by the interaction of a great many factors, and commercial historical culture plays an important role.

3. The Forms of Warlike Historical Culture
For many centuries, war has been an enduring subject in Finnish narrative culture. Wars were previously discussed in poems, plays and novels. However, the situation changed during the 1960s and 1970s when comic strips surpassed other cultural products in popularity, so much so that teachers became concerned: they were afraid that intellectually lightweight comics would pull boys away from more serious reading. Such comic strips as Commando, Air Ace, War at Sea and Action War Picture Library – translated from English and emphasising bravery and sacrifice – achieved great popularity in Finland, particularly among boys.

During the 1960s and 1970s, comics were collected by those whose fathers had lived during wartime. The war comics perhaps in some cases acted as a kind of compensation for the children whose relatives did not

\textsuperscript{7} Katherine Newman and her colleagues (2004, 229–230) propose five factors which together explain violent rampages: 1) a shooter’s perception of himself as extremely marginal in the social worlds that matter to him; 2) school shooters suffer from psychosocial problems; 3) the failure of surveillance systems that are intended to identify troubled teens before their problems become extreme; 4) gun availability; and 5) ‘cultural scripts’ that provide models for problem solving and that link manhood and public respect with violence. Newman et al. (2004, 246, 252–253) profess that school shootings are the consequence of cultural scripts that are visible in popular culture. Violent media is not solely to blame for rampant school shootings. However, books, television, movies, etc. provide school shooters justification for random attacks.
want to tell them about their own war experiences. Above all, the war comics, were marketed in better conditions in which young people had more money to spend than previously and other forms of entertainment were still limited.

Boys in Finland read war comics, but switched to war novels as they grew older. Nationalist popular entertainment did not suit official Finnish foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s, which sought to emphasise good relations with the former enemy, the Soviet Union. According to Juhani Niemi (1988, 195), who has researched the status of war literature in Finland, the war books acted as a kind of therapy for the nation. Young people read them as fascinating accounts of war, but the generation who had experienced the war also experienced them as a counterweight to Finland’s accommodative foreign policy with respect to the Soviet Union. War books remained on the best-seller lists until the 1980s. Sales of war books were expected to begin falling along with the passing of the generation who had experienced the war. However, the opposite occurred. In Finland, the subject of war became a permanent feature of fictional and non-fictional literature. War books have remained on the best-seller lists from one year to the next.8

On average, one in five Finns actively reads war-themed books (Niemi 1988, 202). Contrary to popular belief, the readership of war books does not consist of older readers. War books are mainly read by the young and middle-aged. There is a clear over-representation of men in the readership. To this day, war books have retained their place at the top of boys’ reading lists. Girls, however, have always placed war books at the bottom.9

During the golden era of war comics, the 1960s and 1970s, a second form of historical culture emerged, which reinforced boys’ interest in war – self-assembly model kits. Even nowadays, the brands – Airfix, Revell, Heller, Tamiya, and Monogram – raise fond memories of history. Brian Cowlishaw (2005) has referred to the historical games have on the players’ perceptions of history. It is even possible to rewrite the history (Halter 2002, 2). The kits developed boys’ fine motor skills and patience, although they were provided guidance with clear examples. The assembly of the plastic models required an almost total focus on the construction process; it is no wonder that those who built these miniature models in their childhoods can still recognise the examples of their models many years later. In itself, the monotonous assembly work also provided the opportunity to exercise the imagination; while gluing together the parts, the features of the miniatures could be pondered in a historical context. It is precisely this dimension of a historical imagination which separates the building of plastic models from the playing of modern computer games.

Nowadays, miniature model builders are served by a vast number of different web sites and magazines, some of which focus on the technical side of the assembly and some on the history of the models. Young people are no longer so enthusiastic about models – they would rather play computer and console games. Over a number of decades, virtual games have achieved a strong position in the entertainment culture. Although girls nowadays play games in the same way as boys, war games remain the domain of boys (Bryce, Rutter 2006; Siitonen 2007, 23–24; Elkus 2006). War games have a long history, but along with computers, war simulations have particularly grown in popularity. Simulations can involve the position of an individual soldier in first person shooter games. With these, a player is able to assume the role of an individual soldier in historic battles, such as the landing at Normandy, or current wars, such as U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. Playing can even be compared to acting in movies (Cowlishaw 2005). In strategy games, the player can take the role of a leader of an combat group or of a government. Such simulations are often based on history, whereupon the appeal of the game is that it is even possible to rewrite the history (Halter 2002, 2).

The impact of war games has been the subject of debate for a long time. According to some researchers, war games increase the tendency of the players to act aggressively (e.g. Gentile et al. 2004; Anderson, Bushman 2001). Other researchers claim that players understand that the violence in the games is just a part of the play, as a means of progressing and advancing in the games (e.g. Kutner, Olson 2008; Olson et al. 2008; Cragg et al. 2007, 59–61). Games have been defended in a number of studies. For example, the speed of the decision making of the players involved in first person shooter games has been shown to have increased due to playing these games (Stephen 2010).

The psychological effects of playing games are difficult to study, and it is difficult to clarify what effects the historical games have on the players’ perceptions of history. Brian Cowlishaw (2005) has referred to players who, in their gaming, replay past wars whilst at the same time determining different results. For
example, young Americans may even perceive their country’s Vietnam War as a victory.

4. The Impact of a Warlike Entertainment Culture on Attitudes

Evidence has been presented, according to which, war has generally lost its allure (Roach 2007, 14). This has not been found to be true in Finland. Unlike in Britain, war comics can still be found on shelves, in both smaller stores and supermarkets. This illustrates the fact that new generations have discovered the reading material. However, nowadays, for children and young people, war is presented primarily through new technological means. Computer and console games involving war are the most popular games in Finland.10

War games assist in shaping the attitudes of young people. Otherwise, it would have been unlikely that the U.S. Army would have developed its America’s Army computer game for the benefit of its recruitment process (Cowlishaw 2005). While young people earlier were inspired by slow-pace plastic model kits, or comic books, the young people of today indulge in the reality of war through more expressive means. However, warlike historical culture products provide only a rather simplistic image of war.

What kinds of impressions have these products left? Some claim that war comics, for example, have not biased their perception of the former enemies, even though by the standards of today many of them were anything but politically correct. The comics portrayed the fight of good against evil and the victory of justice, and even if the Allied soldiers in them call the Germans Krauts and Jerries, and the Japanese Japs and Nips, those who read them when they were young generally do not believe that the comics gave rise to negative attitudes towards these nationalities (May 2007, 6; Roach 2007, 9).

Jerome de Groot has a different view. In his opinion, the vocabulary of war comics, together with an aggressive sense of nationality, can be seen from time to time in English tabloid culture, such as when the German’s were labelled Fritzes during the 1996 European Football Championships (de Groot 2009, 6). Such comics as Commando primarily feature fights against cruel Germans and Japanese. In these, the vast majority of Germans are evil Nazis and the Japanese are cruel war criminals. Occasionally, Germans of integrity may come up against the Allied soldiers, but they are exceptions. To be able to counter the risk of generalisation, the reader should be able to read the comics critically.

Entertainment products which depict war have transmitted an attitudinal image of certain nationalities or categories of people. This, one could imagine, may be reflected in the attitudes of the consumers of these products. A critical citizen would be able to identify attitudinal elements and assign their own values to these. An essential question here is whether a hidden influence in the entertainment-related products would be noticed? Is our historical culture teaching us to glorify war, as has been claimed? Since war has been continually present, especially in the historical culture of boys, the next question then arises: how has it affected their attitudes, for example towards the legitimacy of actions as a tool of international politics? There is also good reason to explore whether attitudes which influence us when we are children still have an impact on us as adults, and whether our nostalgic cultural heritage concerning war is transferred to our children.

The current study is mere tentative attempt to answer these questions; the need exists for a large multi-disciplinary study to be carried out in different countries to answer them properly. Yet certain earlier studies have been of interest. Some, for example, have suggested that boys’ socialisation through the traditional ideology of masculinity might be a potential risk factor for violence among youths (see Feder et al. 2007, 386–387).

Popular culture has a wide range of effects, of which some are difficult to see. Jeremy de Groot suspects that historical culture has helped to strengthen the anti-Gallic attitudes of the British (de Grot 2009, 197–198). Books and television series set during the Napoleonic wars have for years provided the British with images of the French as their enemies. It is not insignificant how historical culture depicts the past. On the other hand, there is also no reason to underestimate the critical facilities of young people. They seem to be able to recognise latent influences. However, the most vulnerable group of all is young children, whose critical abilities are undeveloped.

5. War as a Permanent Theme of Historical Culture

As has been shown beforehand, a warlike historical culture continues to flourish, especially among boys. The channels mediating history have, of course, partly changed. In place of comics and books, movies and computer games are now the medium. The power of war seemed to already be waning in the 1980s, when war toys encountered resistance, for example from the kindergartens and from department stores

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10 For example, the best-selling games in February 2011 were Killzone 3 and Call of Duty Black Ops. Counter-Strike was, in turn, the third best-selling game in Finland in 2010. Finnish Games and Multimedia Association FIGMA.
who refused to stock them. War comics were losing their readership as well. Over the next decade, however, war was again pushed into the world of children and young people through computer and console games. Moreover, in television programmes war has maintained a strong presence for many decades in both Finland and the rest of the world.\footnote{For example, in the UK, almost a third of history programmes since the 1960s have dealt with wars. (Hunt 2006, 847–848). About the significance of movies in the formation of historical consciousness see Wineburg et al. 2007, 67.}

A consensus concerning the impact of a violent culture has not been found among researchers. According to some, the harmful effects of such a culture have been exaggerated. They claim that people consider games and movies to be fiction: in war games, the killing of the enemy is part of the process of clearing a game field (Kutner, Olson 2008; Olson et al. 2008; Cragg et al. 2007, 59–61; Ermi et al. 2004, 17–18). According to them, war films provide viewers with the possibility of handling troubling feelings in a safe context. This may be true with adults. For children, however, the problem is, viewing age recommendations not being followed, meaning that children at too young an age must deal with matters too frightening for them. (Cf. Newman et al. 2004, 70.)

The most harmful are historical culture products which indoctrinate viewers, readers or players. The younger the users are, the more difficult it is for them to notice that the products contain hidden influences. For example, some computer simulations are structured in such a way that the player learns to solve problems through the use of war. Negotiations and the pursuit of peace lead the player, in such simulations, to defeat (Schut 2007, 221–222), which begs the question: does this also teach the players to more easily accept war in real life. Examinations of these cases are difficult, and as a result, the subject has not been researched a great deal.

The studies concerning the perceptions of Finnish children and young people have revealed that they consider wars to be significant events in history. Wars also inspire them. This is reflected in, among other things, findings concerning the content of history teaching, in which young people elevate wars as the most interesting content of the teaching. Older youths, 16 to 18 years old, have adopted their views on war from the entertainment industry and not from school teaching. According to Sirkka Ahonen, in her interview studies young people told her that they thought of Corporal Antti Rokka, the fictional movie hero from the film Unknown Soldier, as if he was actually a comrade of their own grandfathers. According to Ahonen (2002, 70), the historical knowledge of young people is a mix of both truth and fiction. Those under 10 years of age and living in a compact family environment, however, form their perceptions of the past from the narratives of their parents and grandparents rather than from popular entertainment.

What impact will warlike narratives of remembrance have on the children? Remembrance narratives concerning the Winter and Continuation Wars introduce children to the essential building blocks of Finnish identity. In addition to their own family and relatives, the stories connect the children to the great national narratives. In interviews with children aged 7–10 years, the interviewees invariably refer to Russia as having been the enemy of Finland; they do not talk of the Soviet Union. This is despite fact that Russia today does not for them seem to be an enemy. The question arises of whether the anti-Russia sentiment in Finland, which increases with age, is engendered by the entertainment culture. Researchers have warned of an increase in anti-Russian sentiments in a warlike historical culture, although this issue has also been difficult to study.

The strong presence of war in historical culture may also have other side effects. It may negatively affect the future orientation of young people, for example. According to several studies, young Finns have adopted pessimistic attitudes towards the future. They are worried about increases in violence, and the threat of war was particularly evident in the responses of boys (Seppänen 2008, 34; Rubin 1998). The visible presence of war in Finnish historical culture may give young people the impression that, from time to time, nations must ensure their independence through war. Older adolescents are able to relate to wars which are taking place around the world and their potential impact on Finland, but the understanding of younger children to such events is still not very structured (cf. Toivonen 1991; Puhakainen 1992). They may, for example, consider bomb attacks in the Middle East to be a threat. Further, as a result of their undeveloped understanding of time, children have difficulty in relating to the time of what they hear and see. Therefore historical wars, for example Finland’s wars against the Soviet Union, may thus seem frightening merely by their close proximity.

In the public treatment of wars there also seem to be positive effects. The survival of Finland in the wars which were fought against the Soviet Union has increased young people’s faith in their own and their nation’s future survival (Ahonen 1998). The wars against the Soviet Union are intrinsic to the great national narratives, and these are used in building the Finnish identity. The passing of the generation that had experienced war has not reduced the prominence of an increase in anti-Russian sentiments in a warlike historical culture, although this issue has also been difficult to study.

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of the wars in narratives, on the contrary. The traumatic wartime experiences of the previous generation, which was unable to participate in narratives about the war, are no longer repressed in that way. War is openly talked about within family circles, along with the connection of families to the great national narratives specifically through the Winter and Continuation Wars (Rantala 2011). In addition, recent studies show that war is more strongly present in the world of young people today than in that of their own parents or grandparents during their adolescences. It remains to be seen whether this will have an impact on Finland’s statistics concerning violence.

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The Political Dimension of Global Education: Global Governance and Democracy

Political and economic global transformation processes are encompassing the field of political education. The subject matter of political education, namely the political, has itself undergone a radical transformation. The changes have had a particular effect on democratic structures and opportunities for participation in the political process. Focusing on a conception of critical education for democracy, this article will highlight the democratic deficits of the globalisation process, and shed light on political-theoretical conceptions of global governance. As opposed to the paradigmatic reorientation of political education into democratic and (European) citizenship education, which has taken place in Germany, the case will be put forward for political education for global democracy which goes beyond Eurocentric thinking and the concept of the nation state. Global political education involves a broad conception of politics and incorporates the new democratisation processes as well as the accompanying expanded forms of participation.


Keywords:
Global Education, political education, citizenship education, critical education for democracy, globalisation, global governance, democracy, participation

The dramatic upheavals and crises of our age, which are commonly denoted by the term globalisation, are affecting both the institutional framework and the content of education in general, as well as political education in particular. Both education and political education are tasked with shedding light on global transformation processes. At the same time, educational processes and political education itself are being affected not only by global political and economic changes, but also the accompanying erosion of democracy (Butterwegge, Hentges 2002, 8; Lösch 2011a). Political education in Germany, which is the subject of this article, has not only been affected by drastic public spending cuts – its own field of knowledge is also changing the processes of the formation of political opinions and consensus, political participation and political decision making. Through the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation, politics is being shifted onto more and more levels – new political actors are appearing, and in general an acceleration of political processes can be observed (Lösch 2011a).

In the field of political pedagogy and political education in Germany, up until now there have been only a few conceptual and theoretical studies which deal with the topic of globalisation (see Steffens 2010; e.g. Overwien, Rathenow 2009a; Steffens 2007). There was a similar problem for business pedagogy and economic education, especially in the late 1990s (see Hedtke 2002). By contrast, there have been important contributions in pedagogical approaches to global learning (see e.g. Adick 2002; Scheunpflug, Hirsch 2000; Scheunpflug, Schröck 2000; Seitz 2002a, 2002b; Selby 2000; Selby, Rathenow 2003; Steffens, Weiß 2004). Political didactics and political education are currently opening themselves up to a European and global perspective by means of a conceptual reorientation (For a critique of European citizenship education see Lösch 2009; for the English debate see e.g. Davies, Evans, Reid 2005). With regard to pedagogical approaches to global learning and the current conceptions of European citizenship education, not only should the individual and pedagogical dimensions of the subjects be focused on, but the political dimension of the structural context of the globalisation process should also be included.

The global political and socio-economic changes are mainly affecting the long-established, and hard-won democratic structures and opportunities for participation in the political process. For a long ti-
me the nation state was the framework for the democratic structures and procedures. With all its accompanying difficulties and exclusion mechanisms (Lösch 2011b), the concept of citizenship ought to nevertheless enable democratic participation. By means of the transformation of the nation state and the development of national sovereignty to supranational entities such as the European Union, the structural and social conditions of democracy are changing. Political education is thereby also losing its framework of reference of the nation state. Conceptions of global governance aim to analyse these shifts in the structures of government, power, and representative participation.

This article will, on the one hand, elucidate the pedagogical concepts of global education with regard to the political and democratic aspects. On the other hand, it will elaborate on the challenges for democracy in the process of globalisation. The paper argues that the pedagogical concepts should take these challenges into account in a more profound way. For this purpose it suggests a concept of critical education for democracy. The first section expounds on the pedagogical approaches to global learning (1.). Then the political dimension of global learning will be examined, and the question as to what role a critical education for democracy could play in global education will be assessed (2.). Sections (3.) and (4.) give a brief overview of the theoretical debate about globalisation, global governance and democracy and highlight some of the democratic deficits of global governance that political education should reflect upon. In the final summary, a political education for global democracy and participation (5.) will be advocated that builds on concepts of global education and combines them with a more thorough analysis of the global political transformations and their democratic impacts.

1. Pedagogical Approaches: Global Education and Education for Sustainable Development

In educational science in Germany there are currently two concepts dealing with the theme of globalisation which have become incorporated into education, school and teaching: on the one hand, the concept of education for sustainable development (ESD) (see e.g. de Haan 2004; Brodowski et al. 2009; Overwien, Rathenow 2009a; Riss, Overwien 2010); and, on the other hand, global learning (see e.g. Adick 2002; Scheunpflug, Hirsch 2000; Scheunpflug, Schröck 2000; Seitz 2002a, 2002b; Selby 2000; Selby, Rathenow 2003; Overwien, Rathenow 2009b). Following the publication of the Orientierungsrahmen für den Lernbereich Globale Entwicklung (Framework for the Teaching of Global Development) (BMZ, KMK 2007), both concepts have been incorporated into syllabuses, teacher training, and text books.

The first concept goes back to the UNESCO initiative which called for a UN decade of Education for Sustainable Development in 2004. The nation states have been given the opportunity to introduce educational measures which result in the integration of the topic of sustainability into schools and teaching by 2014. The countries have been requested to ensure that these measures are brought to life. However, due to the federal structure in Germany, these measures have been implemented in very different ways in the German federal states (Overwien, Rathenow 2009a, 14f.).

Important events in the international debate on environmental issues and the concept of sustainability include the UN Environment and Development summits of the 1990s and the Agenda 21 process which began in Rio de Janeiro (the UN Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro; the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002 in Johannesburg). The issue of sustainability is currently debated against the backdrop of climate change and the scarcity of resources. As early as the 1970s, the Club of Rome drew attention to the issue of limited raw materials – however, it was not until the 1990s that world-wide measures were introduced with the Agenda 21 process. The current situation is rather sobering. The UN summit in Copenhagen in December 2009 (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – UNFCCC) revealed for example how international agreements collapse due to the politics of national interest (Wissen 2010). Thus, education for sustainable development has the difficult task of not only identifying the progressive trends and the actors in the politics of the environment, but also tackling the issue of set-backs and areas of conflict.

The concept of global learning emerged from the tradition of political education for development, and includes issues such as environmental and peace education, and human rights and intercultural education. While earlier conceptions of political education for development focused on the living conditions of the countries in the global south, current conceptions of global learning try to illustrate and analyse the relationships and dependencies between the global north and south, and thereby overcome a Eurocentric world perspective (Humpert 2009, 244). Thus, global learning not only provides an umbrella for different educational sub-disciplines, but also undertakes a different perspective in terms of content.

Initially the pedagogical practice of global learning developed outside schools – it was linked to the activities of churches, non-governmental organisations, organisations for development cooperation, and solidarity initiatives (Overwien, Rathenow 2009a, 16). Many different types of learning materials were developed for both youth and adult education. Increasingly global learning is finding its way into schools (see the survey by VENRO 2010); however, this is taking
place in a rather haphazard manner. It is mainly motivated teachers who are introducing this topic into the classroom, or are effecting a globally aware and ecologically sustainable organisation of the school. The recommendation by the KMK (Standing Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Regions of the Federal Republic of Germany) in 1997 (Eine Welt/Dritte Welt in Unterricht und Schule: One World/The Third World in Teaching and School) led to a systematic positioning of the topics into the curricula of individual regions. As has already been mentioned, the publication of the Framework for the Teaching of Global Development (BMZ, KMK 2007) was a further important step towards integrating a global perspective into daily school life and teaching.

2. The Political Dimension of Global Education and Critical Education for Democracy

In Germany it is thanks to the pedagogical concepts of global learning and education for sustainable development that the theme of globalisation has been incorporated into the education system, schools, and teaching practices, albeit in a rudimentary way. However, the pedagogical concepts often lack a political dimension, as the political scientist Nicola Humpert asserts: “Although global learning confronts highly political questions, it still remains apolitical in that it describes phenomena instead of analysing them” (Humpert 2009, 245; translation by the author BL). Humpert argues, for example, that it does not suffice to discuss the topic of fair trade in the classroom from a viewpoint of personal responsibility of individuals and their consumer sovereignty. Much more exciting and urgent would be, for example, the question “what needs to be done in order for fair trade to no longer be necessary” (ibid.).

If one accepts Humpert’s assessment with respect to the political dimension of global learning, then first of all it is necessary to engender an understanding of global political processes, “how and why decisions are made at an international level, and secondly what opportunities there are to influence these decisions” (Humpert 2009, 247; translation by the author BL). Issues such as global trade, human rights or climate change should be linked to questions of political procedure, political decision-making, and the exercising of political influence. Global learning should “examine topics such as the national, bilateral and multilateral power and decision-making processes in formal and informal types of organisations, thereby making these processes clear and comprehensible” (ibid.).

Analysing socio-political structures is the task of the social sciences, which examine the political, sociological, economic and cultural dimensions of globalisation in an interdisciplinary way. Incorporating a global perspective promotes interdisciplinary thinking more than ever before. With regard to this, one could follow the suggestion by Reinhold Hedtke to form political education into an interdisciplinary subject within the social sciences (Hedtke 2006, 2007). On the one hand, the individual sub-disciplines of global learning would be brought together, since, for example, not every project which is aimed at protecting the environment is also socially responsible. In particular, the connections and contradictions between ecology and economics must be assessed. On the other hand, it is important to prevent the current competition between political and economic education, and their tendency to drift apart (Steffens, Widmaier 2008), and also to strengthen other related disciplines such as sociology, philosophy and geography.

The pedagogical conceptions of global learning are not, however, lacking a socio-theoretical basis. Above all, Klaus Seitz’s theory can lay claim to providing a socio-theoretical basis of global learning (Seitz 2002a). Indeed, the analysis of causes and paradigms of globalisation which are discussed within the mainstream of the social sciences are often drawn upon. From the viewpoint of political education, however, the principle of controversy is not always appropriately taken into account. The principle of controversy indicates that theories and approaches which are discussed within academia should also be incorporated into teaching. However, if only theories within the academic mainstream are drawn upon, i.e. those which attract the most attention, and which may well reach the feuilleton sections of the serious press publications, then other analyses which have not achieved great popularity, but which nevertheless may aptly describe societal development, will be lacking.

In the conceptions of global learning the new political rules of global governance, for example, or the normative demand of good governance have been affirmatively adopted, even though within political science there is disagreement about the democratic deficits of these approaches to new types of governance. The assumptions about the role and influence of national government policy are also problematic. In global learning, as well as in some political didactical approaches, the analysis of the ‘post-national constellation’ (1998) which was put forward by Jürgen Habermas in the 1990s is often drawn upon. Within the social sciences, the transformation of the nation state and democracy is interpreted and analysed in very different ways.

While Habermas assumed the loss of importance of national governments, and underestimated the politics of national interest and the exertion of influence in global and European political conflicts, other analyses from the field of political science now credit the (nation) state with a more active and endu-
ring political role in international processes (see e.g. Brand 2007).

This is where the conception of critical education for democracy can be applied within a global context (Lösch 2010). In contrast to the established conceptions of democratic pedagogy in Germany, which are based on a normative concept of democracy, and describe democracy as an ideal, a critical education for democracy also analyses the processes of de-democratisation and the deconstruction of democracy. Alongside a critical analysis of and a reflection on the global political and economic transformation processes, a critical education for democracy also examines the opportunities for intervention and action of the subjects. A critical education for democracy seeks to deal with the issue of the opportunities for participation as well as the exclusion mechanisms of democracy and politics.

Such a critical approach should bring in the controversial debates of the socio-political sciences, especially with regard to the transformation of democracy and the welfare state, in order to stimulate the discussion about global education. It can extend the pedagogical approaches of global learning using aspects of the theory of democracy and put forward questions such as: how are democratic structures, procedures and institutions changing within the global transformation process? What forms of de-democratisation can be observed, what demands for democratisation are made, and what democratic practices are becoming accepted?

Therefore, the next section will reflect on the socio-political discussion with regard to globalisation and global governance. Above all, attention will be given to the democratic deficits of global political and economic transformation processes, since this is central to democratic education within a global perspective.

3. Globalisation, Global Governance and Democracy

In the 1990s there was widespread discussion about a new world order after the tearing down of the Berlin wall and the fall of the communist states. Whereas in the mid 1970s over two-thirds of all states could reasonably be described as authoritarian (Held 1997, 1), this percentage has fallen dramatically. The number of democracies is now growing steadily – if we understand democracy as a formal organisation of a political community where free elections can be held and where a minimum standard of political rights is respected. Some neo-conservative political advisers, such as Francis Fukuyama, even proclaimed after the crisis of 1989/90, the “triumph of liberal democracy,” and along with this the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992).

The 1990s can also be seen as the era of important United Nations (UN) Conferences, where many people – not only members of government – came together to deliberate about ecological problems, world-wide poverty or questions of gender and human rights. New actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) participated in this world-wide process. Politics was perceived not only as a governmental issue but also as the concern of civil society. The United Nations emerged as a workshop for new forms of global governance – global governance meaning politics which deals with global problems that go beyond the borders of nation states and affect people all over the world. The process of globalisation has led to a transformation of the state. This process is based above all on the globalisation of trade and financial transactions as well as the new phenomena of modern communication networks and information technology. For a while in the 1990s, commentators were talking about the end of the nation state or a “post-national constellation” (Habermas 1998). Others have analysed the new function or role of the state: thus the concept of global governance emerged (Messner, Nuscheler 1996; Brand et al 2000; Brunnenegräber et al. 2004; Brand, Scherrer 2005; Behrens 2005).

Governance means turning away from dirigist forms of policy-making and traditional top-down approaches (Benz 2004; Blumenthal 2005). Theorists such as James Rosenau have used the term global governance to denote the regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of an overarching political authority or world government (Rosenau, Czempiel 1992). Global governance is used to signify the transformation of politics from a hierarchical, state-based order to dynamic, multi-level networks. The term points towards the emerging structure of an international system beyond Westphalia. (The term Westphalian order refers to the establishing of nation states in Europe. It characterises a system of sovereignty of states, legal equality of states and non-intervention in the international affairs of one state by another, as originally embodied in the Peace of Westphalia, 1648). The new architecture of institutions, rules and procedures as well as the cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors on an international level indicates a new mode of political and social order.

In an increasingly globalised and interconnected world nation states depend more and more on the decisions of international organisations and agreements. New forms of political organisation and
regulation have emerged as a result of the growing interaction of foreign and domestic policy and the desire of most states for forms of international governance and regulation to deal with collective policy problems. This development can be illustrated by the following:

1. New forms of multilateral and multinational politics have been established, and with them different styles and processes of collective decision-making. Alongside the UN, which is weak in many respects, other international governmental organisations (IGOs) are very powerful. There are organisations which at first glance mainly have an economic function, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In fact they are political actors, which strongly influence international politics.

2. Apart from the national governments, new political and private actors are participating in this new process of decision-making: for example, not only international governmental and non-governmental organisations but also wide varieties of transnational pressure and lobby groups like the International Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of International Finance, or the European Roundtable of Industrialists.

3. A further important point is that the relation between political and economic power is shifting. Economic power is no longer regulated within the context of a nation state. For example: Multinational corporations (MNCs) can respond to variations in interest rates by raising finance in whichever capital market is most favourable; they can shift their demand for employment to countries with much lower employment costs; they can move their activities to where the maximum benefits accrue. As a result, the autonomy and the decision making power of democratically elected governments has been constrained by sources of unelected and unrepresentative economic power (Held 1997, 7). The increase in economic power of the Multinationals has also caused fundamental changes in our value systems. Instead of democratic values or principles such as participation, emancipation and so on, economic criteria such as effectiveness and efficiency have greater dominance.

4. Finally, new military conflicts and new geopolitical politics contribute to global instability and have motivated calls for a new era of world order.

In contrast to what had been hoped in the 1990s, world politics did not undergo a change that resulted in greater democracy and peace. Aims of the global civil society such as finding solutions for ecological problems, supporting sustainable development and reducing or abolishing poverty seem even less attainable than in past years. While the decade of the 1990s was marked by enthusiasm generated by the UN World Conferences, the perception that significant progress was being achieved has today been replaced by a sense of disappointment.

4. The Democratic Deficits of Global Governance

In the context of globalisation, democracies have to deal with various problems even at a national level (Schmalz-Bruns 2005). Some academics are already speaking about a crisis of representative democracy or a period of “post-democracy” (Crouch 2004). This relates to a political community in which elections are held, but where election campaigns have become nothing more than huge spectacles where competing PR teams control the public debate and influence it by means of their campaigns. We can also observe a certain loss of confidence in political representatives. No one really knows who is responsible for specific political decisions and where the centre of power really lies. It is not clear what role the national parliaments still have. Are they a place of proper political debate and deliberation or just a place where decisions are rubber stamped? Democracy seems to be located nowhere. As a result we are faced with problems of how to politically organise our society.

The global transformation of politics indicates a loss of democracy not only on a domestic but also on a global level (Benz, Papadopoulos 2006). These challenges for democracy in a globalised world could be summarised as follows: (1) The Internationalisation of Politics: With the internationalisation of politics and the accompanying transformation of the state, democratic institutions and the democratic process are fundamentally changing. Democracy is no longer located within the boundaries of a single nation state. In a complex interconnected world the idea of democracy can no longer be simply defended as an idea attributable to a particular closed political community or nation state. Deliberative and decision making centres go beyond national territories. The internationalisation of politics has seen a shift in decision making onto an international level, and the associated loss of democratic control in the traditional democratic institutions such as parliaments. (2) The Informalisation of Politics: As a result, the new types of policy making are mostly informal and opaque. New networks and actors are often uncoupled from the official representative bodies. Policy making is increasingly influenced by private interests and has lost its public character. The decision making process is not transparent and lacks legitimacy.

Some people still think of global governance as global government, because the domestic analogy is so familiar. However, on a global level there exists nei-
ther a monopoly of power, nor democratic institutions which would be able to control a world government. Even the European Union, which is based on the institutionalisation of a specific political system, cannot be compared with the structures of a nation state. Whether the particular political system of the EU can be seen as a system of governance is a controversial subject. Some say the institutional framework of the EU is closer to the model of network governance than to the classical model of government (Benz 2004, 125ff.).

Democracy requires a demos which does not exist on an international level – a demos in whose name governance could take place. Therefore, democratic governance beyond the nation state faces serious problems. In order to solve these problems, theorists of global governance look for new actors within a global civil society. But, who are these new actors? Are they able to constitute a transnational public sphere where policy-makers are induced to give reasons for their options and where deliberation can take place? Are they a source of legitimacy and counteractive power? Over and above that, if all the actors participate in the political process who holds the political power, and who is holding this power to account? The main problem of transnational or global governance concerns the lack of congruence between those who are being governed and those to whom the governing bodies are accountable. Mechanisms to enhance democratic legitimacy cannot simply be transposed from the domestic level onto the international level (Risse 2006, 180).

A brief overview of the function of these new political actors will illustrate some problems of democracy on a global level:

1. States: States continue to be key actors in world politics, although it is no longer reasonable to think of world politics simply as politics among states. A large variety of other organisations exercise authority and engage in political decision making all over the world. However, states create IGOs and determine what actions they can or cannot take (Karns, Mingst 2004, 16). Many states have a privileged position in IGOs such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO, because they founded them, constitute their membership, monopolise voting rights, and provide financial support. Of course, states cannot monopolise all the institutions of global governance, but certain states are very powerful. For example: although Article 1 of the UN Charter says that the people of the world should hold the democratic sovereignty, the national states and governments control the agreements and make the important decisions. Much worse than the UN voting system is the distribution of power in IGOs such as the WTO or the IMF. These IGOs depend on the power of the highly industrialised countries of the global north which have the majority of votes.

2. IGOs: Although international governmental organisations are based on national governments, they have developed their own administrative systems and therefore a life of their own. As well as the nation states they serve as key actors or agents in global governance, and they have the power to induce states to act. Some individuals such as the president of the World Bank and the executive director of the IMF form a powerful global elite.

3. NGOs: NGOs come in such a variety of forms, with such a variety of emphases that it is difficult to generalise about them. The growth of NGOs and NGO networks in the 1990s has been a major factor in their increasing involvement in governance at all levels. The majority are not part of formal networks, but may have informal links, for example, to large international human rights or environmental organisations (Karns, Mingst 2004, 17). Most of the NGOs – in particular those which are small and not well organised – have little voice in global politics. NGOs tend to become involved when it is a question of avoiding conflict or acquiring information. They are mainly seen as a source of legitimacy although it is sometimes unclear whom they represent, and some are very single issue orientated.

4. MNCs: In contrast to NGOs, the Multinationals are profit-orientated and their huge financial capital is one of the reasons why they are more powerful than other actors, and why they are able to influence world politics to their advantage. Since the 1970s, MNCs have been increasingly recognised as significant international actors, controlling resources far greater than those of many states. As actors in global governance, MNCs have profoundly altered the structure of the global economy and how it functions. By choosing where to invest or not to invest, MNCs shape the economic development opportunities of countries and entire regions.

Concepts of global governance sometimes neglect the differences between the new political actors, as has been highlighted above. For example, some actors are more powerful than others and they have different opportunities to exercise power or to participate in the political process. The underlying reason could be that theorists of global governance focus mainly on the transformation or the new functions of the state, and not on the democratic modifications within the process of globalisation. This leads to the disregarding of the inequality between the actors as well as the necessity of the public character of politics. The new forms of decision making within global governance are often located in non-public forums and the actors, such as public-private partner-
ships, are not elected or legitimated by a public. The informalisation of politics has been accompanied by the privatisation of politics and a loss of a public sphere. Theorists of global governance tend to think about democracy in categories of input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; Risse 2006, 191). If there is a problem with input legitimacy, that is the possibility of participation within politics, they think it is necessary to focus on the output legitimacy, which is to improve the communication of political decisions made by political actors to the people. The main criterion for output legitimacy is not participation or the equality of participation, but the efficiency of problem solving (Scharpf 1999, 16ff.). Therefore, global governance often goes along with a concept of weak democracy – and not that of a more demanding participatory democracy, such as that which advocates of deliberative democracy have put forward (Lösch 2005). It is clear that global democracy cannot be organised in the same way as representative democracy within the nation state. However, given that democracy depends on the participation of people, it needs to be located not in informal arrangements among various actors but in public forums which guarantee transparency, legitimacy and a process of deliberation.

5. Summary

From these observations on democratic theory and global governance, central aspects for global learning and political education can be ascertained: on the one hand, the fields of global learning such as development and peace education, as well as intercultural and human rights education should be supplemented by the political dimension and the aspect of democratic questioning. This relates to an area of political education which I have termed critical education for democracy. A critical education for democracy examines problem-oriented structural, global, political, and socio-economic relationships, i.e. new political actors, forms of politics, participation and decision-making procedures, as well as the processes of the de-democratisation and democratisation.

On the other hand, global learning opens up a socio-global perspective for political education. This change in perspective makes it possible to go beyond the concepts of nationalism and Eurocentric thinking which are still widespread within political education today. Political education for global democracy and participation also reach beyond theories of identity which are based on European citizenship education (Lösch 2009). This change in political education, which is distanced from a narrow political understanding as well as a nation-state oriented approach, will possibly contribute to efforts for global democratisation.
A critical education therefore builds on concepts of global learning and combines them with a more thorough analysis of the global political transformations and their democratic impact.

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Reviewer: Dominik Allenspach

Review of the Book:
"Kritische Bürger. Gefahr oder Ressource für die Demokratie?" ("Critical Citizens: Risk or Resource for a Democracy?")

written by Brigitte Geissel

According to the theory of political system support, a political system and a democracy need the support of its members to persist. Critique towards the political system (political critique) is, therefore, seen as a threat to democracies. However, in the nineteen-nineties many scholars have abandoned this paradigm and have adopted the idea that political critique is a resource for democracies since critique can help to refine the political system. In summary, democracies need political support as well as political critique. Is this a contradiction? In her book “Kritische Bürger. Gefahr oder Ressource für die Demokratie?,” Brigitte Geissel intends to untangle the two concepts: the concept of political support and the concept of political critique.

In the first chapter, the author rightly criticizes that political dissatisfaction has been used as an ambiguous proxy variable for political critique. Political dissatisfaction could be understood as a healthy inclination to question the political system, but also as a depressed withdrawal from the political system. Geissel suggests that in addition to the concept of political dissatisfaction the concept of political attentiveness should be included into the concept of political critique. According to Geissel, political attentiveness consists of the willingness to monitor the political process and of the willingness to intervene into the political process when considered necessary by the citizens. Unfortunately, she does not show how these two civic duties are correlated, although she merges them into the concept of political attentiveness.

By crossing the two concepts – political dissatisfaction and political attentiveness, Geissel classifies four types of critical citizens: 1) attentive-satisfied, 2) attentive-dissatisfied, 3) inattentive-satisfied, and 4) inattentive-dissatisfied. Although she develops this typology, she does not describe explicitly how the two dimensions are related on a theoretical basis. At the implicit level, however, Geissel hypothesizes that citizens get involved in the political process as long as they are politically attentive, regardless of their degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. In contrast, politically inattentive citizens withdraw from the political process, regardless of their degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

In the second chapter, Geissel examines the causes of political dissatisfaction and political attentiveness. Whereas political satisfaction is explained by the economic and democratic performance of the political system, political attentiveness is not explained by socio-demographic or by contextual variables. She concludes that political attentiveness is an independent core belief. Does this mean that individuals are born either as politically attentive or inattentive citizens? From the perspective of political sociology, this may be doubted. Considering Geissel’s estimations, one must rather conclude that her models are insufficiently specified to explain political attentiveness.

In the third chapter, Geissel uses three steps to examine which of the four types of citizens can be considered “resources” or “threats” for democracies. First, after reviewing the literature, she summarizes the attributes which are considered as resources for democracies (such as political participation, political interest, etc.). Second, to examine whether there exist interaction effects, she correlates the four types of critical citizens with these democracy attributes. Third, using multivariate regression models, she examines whether the effects of political attentiveness and political dissatisfaction on these democracy attributes remain stable taking into account several control variables. Geissel reveals that politically attentive citizens have attributes that are beneficial for democracies, independently of their degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. In contrast, the politically inattentive citizens seldom have beneficial attributes. Furthermore, Geissel demonstrates that the effect of political attentiveness on democracy attributes remains stable taking into account several control variables. From a methodological viewpoint, this three-step approach, especially the construction of a typology to examine interaction effects, is interesting. However, if traditional interaction effects had been estimated more in depth results could have been generated.

In the fourth chapter, Geissel examines whether an entity with many critical citizens is more democratic than an entity with few critical citizens. The author reveals that there is a positive relation between an entity with many critical citizens and the democratic level of the entity.

Based on these results, Geissel concludes in her fifth and sixth chapter that politically attentive citizens are a resource for democracies and she suggests...
that political attentiveness should be introduced into civic education.

Brigitte Geissel is one of the first researchers who intend to untangle the relation between political dissatisfaction and political critique by introducing the concept of political attentiveness. Even though her attempt to examine every aspect of political critique is commendable it also entails some inaccuracies. She gains, however, some new and interesting insights which advance the research on political critique.

Country Report:
Citizenship Education and Curriculum Development in Nigeria

The article highlights the evolutionary trends of citizenship education in Nigeria. The 1914 British amalgamation of erstwhile Northern and Southern Protectorates gave birth to Nigeria as a state. The disparate ethnic composition of the new state, especially after independence, necessitated finding a common ground to promote committed citizens, against primordial ethnic cleavages and indigenization. It is not therefore surprising that the role of education in fostering national citizenship and consciousness was emphasized.

Initially, social studies was used as a curriculum framework, until lately when a new subject, civics, was created in primary and junior secondary schools. The author considers the historical, cultural and political context underlining these curricular changes and identifies the current and future challenges face by the implementation of Civics curricular in Nigerian schools.

Keywords:
curriculum, citizenship, civics, social studies

Introduction
The conception of democracy in the ancient Greek city state of Athens and the manner it was practiced, with exclusion of certain segment of society namely women, slaves, aliens and peasants -has inspired the notion of citizenship may be far beyond the intention of the ancient Athenians. Historically, Athens left a legacy of democracy and citizenship to the modern world. With the decline of ancient Athens and the rise of Roman Empire, the concept of citizenship assumed wider focus and state decline was attributed to bad citizenship. In the modern age, the complexities of interests within nation-state, high crime rate, civilization, terrorism and failed state phenomenon, make citizenship education an imperative. Without any sense of contradiction, citizens need to be educated and be informed about the governing process, the rights they are to demand from the state and the responsibility required of them. Both the state and the citizens should fulfill their part of the social contract. Dustin (1999) put it clearly while articulating the works of J. J Rousseau on the imperative of citizenship education. He affirmed that:

"there can be no patriotism without liberty, no liberty without virtue, no virtue without citizens; create citizens, and you have everything you need; without them you have nothing but debased slaves, from the rulers of the state downwards. To form citizens is not the work of a day, and in order to have men (sic!) it is necessary to educate them when they are children.” (Dustin, 1999, 7).

The wave of democratization across the globe contributed to the spreading of citizenship especially in Africa, where such idea was termed foreign and exotic. African lived pure communal life, and as such the concept of indigenization was widely embraced. Citizenship, like capitalism and liberalization was a by product of democracy. With Nigeria obtaining political independence from Britain in 1960, the drive towards attainment of nationhood and democratization, the notion of citizenship rights became more pronounced. The awareness of being a separate sovereign nation as opposed to being a British colony stimulated defining a new identity. In this article, I attempt to trace the challenge of the Nigeria nation and the official response to use school and its curriculum to achieve the educational goals which, undoubtedly, derived from national goals. What are the views of the Nigerian scholars on the concept of citizenship education?

Ozumba and Eteng (1999, 25) explained citizenship education as the “totality of learning, instruction, equipping, which citizens need to be able to play his/her role, discharge his/her responsibilities, know his/her rights, understand his/her country-the constitution, the polities, the ethics, the religious, the ethos and the ideals that make the national geo-political entity”. Fadeyi (1995) opines that citizenship education is the kind of education given to the citizens of a country with a view to making them responsible people, capable of contributing meaningfully, to the overall development of their country. Citizenship education is then designed to make learners identify and exercise their civic and political rights and also willingly accept to perform their civic and political responsibilities. But these assumptions must take into account the specificities of Nigeria’s historical, cultural and political context.

1. The Institution of Nigeria and the Goals of Citizenship Education
Nigeria is made up of disparate ethnic nationalities with diverse values and cultural inclination. There are about 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria. Before the advent of colonialism, these groups were administered under a differing administrative system: in the North, the predominant Hausa/Fulani operated a centralized Emirate system headed by Emir; in the Yoruba dominated Western region, the monarchical system of government combined with some elements of liberal republicanism was being operated - Oba had no ab-
solute power, but customarily checked by kingmakers who are replica of modern legislators. In the Eastern region, the administrative system was acephalous, there were no visible traditional rulers but a variation of republicanism. The concept of indigenization was a dominant force as against citizenship. The resultant effect was primordial cleavages to ethnic cause and aspirations even after 1914 amalgamation of erstwhile Northern and Southern protectorates, and even till post independent Nigeria. The historical events had a profound influence on nationalism and attainment of real nationhood and citizenship. A Yoruba man, for instance, most likely primarily own allegiance to Yoruba cause before national consideration. The same attitude manifests among other ethnic groups. This makes the concept of citizenship blurred, fluid imagined rather reality.

British policy did not help the situation either. The policy of divide and rule perpetually created a division between the north and south. The Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1910 promoted segregation and threat to nationhood. The Ordinance discouraged free migration of southerners to the north. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2000, 57) observed that, “those citizens who are indigenous of other state are less favoured. The least privileged are those citizens who are unable to prove that they belong to a community indigenous to any state in Nigeria, and women who married to men from states other than their own. Such multiple system of citizenship inevitably endangers discrimination in jobs, land purchases, housing, admission to education institutions, marriages, business transactions and the distribution of social welfare”.

Many scholars have adduced ideal focal point of citizenship education in Nigeria. The nature of curriculum content vis a vis the recipients was a major concern shortly after independence in October 1st 1960. The initial school curriculum was heavily dominated by the influence of the colonial master-Britain and largely tailored towards Western aspirations. In Nigeria, it was a prominent feature for a child to be well acquainted with events outside the shore of Nigeria, while extremely novice about what obtains in his/her immediate environment. This is partly due to enormous British influence on Nigeria education system (Fafunwa, 1974; Makinde, 1979). It is logical that a child that is deficient in the knowledge of events in his/her surroundings has an uphill task of learning to be good citizen of that society. Fafunwa (1974) describe the products of colonial education as though African in colour, but British in intellect and outlook. To restructure the curriculum towards underlining Nigerian cultural values and aspirations, irrespective of the curriculum framework and definite career subject was a major focus after the independence. The belief among some scholars is that such an educational design aim at serving national interest is perceived as a form of citizenship education (Fafunwa, 1974; Yusuf, 1985).

Additionally, multiculturalism is a prominent feature of Nigerian society and it is sad to note that it has resulted into a perennial problem of sort. Centrifugal nationalism is a prominent feature of political actors. As earlier stated, Nigeria is made up of about 250 ethnic groups with diverse culture, religion and values system. The rate of religious and ethnic conflict is alarming. The political crises of 1960s has ethnic and religious undertone. The crises culminated into a civil war between 1967 and 1970. Other examples of ethno-religious conflict include Kasuwan Magani conflicts in 1980, Kafanchan crisis of 1987, Zango Kataf in 1984 and 1992, Tafawa Balewa crisis in 1991, etc. Political rivalry among ethnic groups has also led to the series of crises such as Kano riots in 1953, Tivs uprising in 1964, Western crisis in 1952, Ogoni rights movements in 1990s, etc. In response to this, some scholars have argued that school curriculum must be redesigned to promote national unity, religious tolerance, socio-political and cultural integration (Awosolu, 1993; Metziebi, Domite, Osakwe, 1996). They argued that citizenship should not “define nationality in terms of ethnic, religious and cultural identity.” The argument goes further that the teaching of citizenship education should foster the spirit of nationalism rather than ethnocentrism and individualistic tendencies. In reference to Daverger, Agi (1999) declared that the potentials to making citizens aware of the need to diminish divisive antagonism and promote material links that unite people, and the development of a sense of community among ethnic nationalism that constitute a state are two major functions of citizenship education.

Another area of concern is values orientation and inculcation. This aspect is clearly reflected in the new Civics curriculum for primary and junior secondary schools. Baike (2000) observed that, for curriculum to promote the ideal of democracy, the focus should not be limited to the development of intellect but also “development of character and respect for constituted authority.” This school of thought argued for the inculcation of African traditional values such as honesty, communalism which is a core aspect of active citizenship, togetherness, integrated family system, mutual and cooperative efforts, respect for elder and constituted authority, and loyalty to a collective cause. Obike (1993) stressed that citizenship education should teach attitude and values that will foster the ideal of democratic practices, national consciousness and patriotism. He submitted that, people’s values orientation explains their attitude and action, and determines services rendered to fellow citizens. Yusuf (2005) noted that value education is an integral part of citizenship education. Bearing in mind that values
system determines actions and shapes individual direction, the promotion of values in the citizens will inspire nation-building. Conversely, citizenship education which trains ‘good’ citizens (i.e., citizens who are aware of the human and political issues at stake in their society or nation) requires from each citizen ethical and moral qualities. According to this perspective, all forms of citizenship education should promote respect for others and recognition of the quality of all human beings, and aim at combating all forms of discrimination (racist, gender-based, religious, ethnic, education etc.) by fostering the spirit of tolerance and peace among human beings.

Human rights orientation also enjoys a wider focus among Nigerian writers especially among the texts used in secondary schools. Okom (1999) emphasized how citizenship status involves conferment of rights on some individuals while others who are denied their rights in the society and access to resources is scarce - such as the peasants, aliens, women and slaves in Ancient Greek city states. For Nigerian citizens, understanding of his/her rights and duties should be a vital part of civic education curriculum. Thus, we when speak of purposes to be ascribed to citizenship education (comprising knowledge of the social and political rights of all human beings and their recognition), we inevitably end up with the complementarities between citizenship and human rights. Bearing in mind these complementarities, citizenship education means not only ‘educating citizens’, but also educating children for adulthood and citizenship, citizens who are not ignorant of their rights and are willing to perform their civic obligations. Moreover, human right includes civil, social and political rights, the later obviously relating to the rights and obligations of citizens. Thus a comprehensive human rights education takes citizenship into account, and considers that good citizenship is concerned with human rights as a whole.

2. The Curriculum Framework and Citizenship Education

The focus on curriculum development on citizenship education in Nigeria was comparatively low compared to literacy, arts, science and even technology. Even though, it was implicitly addressed in the recommendation of 1969 National Curriculum Conference, the objective of good citizenship was lumped among other objectives in Social Studies Education.

The National Curriculum Conference took place November in 1969 at the National Assembly, Hall Lagos. As a follow-up to this conference was a National Seminar took place in 1973, where the recommendations of the 1969 National Conference were discussed and eventually crystallized into the adoption of a National Policy on Education. The policy was first published in 1977 and subsequent editions were published in 1981 and 2004. Some of the core recommendation of 1969 National Conference was the basis of discussion in 1973 seminar. Some of the core recommendations that form the foundation for citizenship education are recommendations 3 and 7. Recommendation 3 states that “Nigeria education should be geared towards self-realization, better human relationships; self and national economic efficiency, effective citizenship, national consciousness, national unity” and recommendation 7 emphasizes that primary education should serve to help the child towards self-realization and to relate to others through mutual understanding, effective citizenship through civil responsibility, social and political awakening (Adaralegbe 1972). Apart from these recommendations the goals of the Second National Development Plan which was later adopted as the National goals gave credence and impetus to incorporation of citizenship education into curriculum. The National goals are:

- a. a free and democratic society
- b. a just and egalitarian society
- c. a united, strong and self-reliant nation
- d. a great and dynamic economy; and
- e. a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens (NPE,2004).

The two recommendations and the national goals formed the basis of citizenship education in Nigeria. When the curriculum was fully developed into a rational package, Social Studies, taught in Primary and Junior Secondary Schools, was designed to cater for aspect of citizenship education (FGN 2007). The specific objectives of Social Studies include promoting a broader understanding of the physical, economic, social, and cultural environments, develop, encourage and strengthen pupils’ enquiring minds and help teachers and pupils discover what is good and unique in the physical, social, economic and cultural traditions which hitherto have been implied or neglected.

It is noteworthy that the curriculum addresses some fundamental issues regarding the learning of citizenship that include operational definitions of citizenship, mode of acquisition, fundamental rights and duties of citizens, and national symbols. However, the curriculum content has been observed to lack depth and the teaching methods were traditional, teacher-centered with little or no practical application in the school ethos and practices. The mode of evaluation is pen and paper system in which, inmost cases students respond to questions after memorizing concepts. This negatively impacts the classroom teachings (Marinho 2009) as the commonplace experience is that after examination, students easily forget everything they have learnt even if they have performed averagely or brilliantly well during examinations. This portrays gross deficiency in the system.
The objective is invariably reduced to mere passing examination without the personal integration of ideals for active citizenship. Marinho (2009, 7) wrote further that, “the new curriculum fails to take into account useful pedagogical methods that assist in achieving goals ... Modes of teaching are outdated ...” The assessment usually fails to measure whether citizens actually practice democratic values in their relationships, attitudes and outlook. How do we assess whether a child has internalized democratic values? Is it through pen and paper mode of assessment? Could the successful internalization of values taught be a basis for selecting school prefects? Or these values are set as criteria for nominating eligible prefects and those who fall into the inclusion criteria go through election process? Obviously, there is no national or school based benchmark to ascertain the internalization of democratic values and achievement of citizenship education curriculum goal.

A critical examination of existing textbooks also shows the shallowness of the content as most are limited to a mere definition of contents. Even at higher institutions where citizenship education is taught as a general course, the content is limited to some basic concepts in political science which are taught in a separate subject (Government) at secondary school level. For the sake of emphasis, topics such as Organs of Government, concepts such as Democracy, Monarchy, Socialism, Political Party and Party System: Power and Authority are predominantly the focus of the curriculum. In addition, Nigeria political experience and social life possesses greater challenges that using the curriculum might amount to handling the issues of nation building with kid glove in the light of past frequent military intervention in politics among other challenges. In 1999, the country returned to civil rule after prolonged successive military misrule. The nascent democracy is however characterized by all sorts of semi-democracy or pseudo-democracy traits such as electoral malpractices, ethno-religious conflicts, primitive accumulation of wealth at the expense of the state by the political class and election malpractices. Ijalaaye (2009) comment on 2007 general election shed light on the nature of past elections in Nigeria. He observed that election rigging through the combined power of incumbency by government and political party in power has always been a regular feature in the election process in Nigeria. However, there was beacon of light from the 2011 general election. It was adjudged by national and international observers as the most free and fair election ever conducted in Nigeria. However, the spate of corruption in Nigeria is alarming and pervades every aspect of National life from the technocrats to the politicians. Infrastructures are at low ebbs and citizens’ disposition to taking care of public facilities is best described as non-chalant (Adebayo, 1986; Iroanusi, 2006; Ajibewa, 2006; Magstadt, 2009).

To sustain and consolidate the democracy, citizens must be taught and made to internalize the purpose of democracy. Values such as liberty, service, justice, religious equality, and tolerance among others must be inculcated. Negative traits such as religious violence, armed robbery, ritual killings, electoral malpractices, official corruption must be condemned and isolated from private and national life. Citizens must come to the realization of the fact that democratic values are not embedded in genetic code. They evolve over time and each generation can decide their values and their preferred models of society.

A major innovation towards learning citizenship and ideals of representative democracy is the introduction of Civics Education into primary and junior secondary schools in 2007. The existing Social Studies curriculum has undergone major restructuring. Aspects of citizenship education in the Social Studies curriculum for junior secondary school were completely disarticulated and a separate subject termed Civics was designed targeted towards amelioration of the vices stated above and promotion of active citizenship.

In the part of the introductory message by Professor Godswill Obioma – the Executive Secretary of Educational Research and Development Council (the body in charge of curriculum Development in Nigeria), he noted that; the curriculum reflects depths, appropriateness, and inter-relations of the curriculum contents. It was introduced to attain the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and by extension, the need to implement the core focus of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (NEEDs), which are value orientation, poverty eradication, job creation, wealth generation and using education to empower people.

A critical observation of the curriculum package shows the will to translate the intentions of the government into an institutional expression in the school where students would be taught basic values and ideals that would presumably make them responsible citizens.

The themes covered in the curriculum package are shown in tables below:
A survey was carried out by the author to determine the perceived effectiveness of the new initiative on Civics curriculum in primary and junior secondary schools. The core focus was to examine the relative effectiveness of the proposed Civics in comparison with the existing Social Studies curriculum. A random sampling of one hundred and fifty (150) Social Studies teachers who are also expected to teach the proposed Civics education subject was made. At least at present, no provision is made towards the training of new specialists. Eighty percent (80%) of the respondents agreed that the curriculum content of the new subject – Civics is more robust on democratic issues than the existing Social Studies. The probable reason may be due to the eclectic, integrative nature of Social Studies, in which the focus on the aspects of learning active citizenship may be shallow while attempting to provide curriculum balancing to other thematic focus. However, fifty five percent (55%) of the teachers argued that there is no need to create a new subject, but rather that Social Studies could have been strengthened in terms of depth in the curriculum content and improved methodology. The supporting argument is that the school time table is already overcrowded, to the extent that there is no provision for the new Civics in the School Board Assessment broad sheet. Twenty five percent (25%) of the respondents agreed to a separate subject framework in which Civics is separated from Social Studies, while twenty percent (20%) maintained a neutral position. It is the opinion of the author that integration should have been vigorously pursued. I strongly recommend that aside making an integral part of Social Studies in primary and secondary schools, teaching and learning citizenship should cut across separate subject orientations and spread across various school subjects such as language, health education, physical and biological sciences.

3. Conclusion and Future Directions

The efforts of the government and its agencies responsible for the curriculum innovation are commendable, however some fundamental issues are yet to be resolved, mainly regarding the articulation between the philosophy of the curriculum and the challenges faced by the Nigerian democracy.

Are students who are predominantly the main target group for the curriculum innovation in the position to avert undemocratic social order? If perhaps the overriding objective is to secure the future through education of the younger generation, what about the overriding influence of the society on the school community? Experience has shown over time that, students learn from what goes on in the society, an influence that seems to be more normative and stronger than set of values being expounded to them by teachers in schools. Instance where school children internalized and overtly practice anti-democratic traits prevailing in their immediate society contrary to what was taught in the classroom supports this observation (Oyeleke, 2011).

The reform which the innovation seeks to support is vague to the teachers who are to catalyze the required change and also to the generality of the citizens. Information management system is a key to success in planning and if people are part of the change process, adaptation becomes much easier. The level of consultation to the stakeholders during the process of designing the curriculum is at zero level when con-

Table 1: Primary School Civics Curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary One</td>
<td>Civic Education, National Symbol, Good Social Behaviour and Health Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Two</td>
<td>Civic Education, The school, Community and Health Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Three</td>
<td>Civic Education, National Consciousness, Duties and Responsibilities and Health Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Four</td>
<td>Our Values, Citizenship, National Consciousness, Duties and Responsibilities, Government, Constituted Authority, Social Issues and Health Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Five</td>
<td>Civic Education, Our Values, Citizenship, National Consciousness, Duties and Responsibilities, Government, Representative Democracy and Civil Society and Popular Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Six</td>
<td>Civic Education, Values, National Consciousness and Identity, Government and Civil Society and Popular Participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nigerian Educational and Research Development Council, 2007

Table 2: Junior Secondary Civics Curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.S. 1</td>
<td>Citizenship, National Consciousness and Identity, Representative Democracy, Nigerian Constitution, Human Rights, Rights and Obligation of Nigerian Citizens and Social Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.S. 2</td>
<td>Our Values, Citizenship, Rights and the Rule of Law, Nigerian Constitution and Social Issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nigerian Educational and Research Development Council, 2007
considering the new initiatives on the Civics curriculum for the primary and secondary school. One would have expected teachers, relevant professional associations, parents associations, academics and relevant educational institutes to feature in the development process. Keeping teachers abreast of the changes is a key factor to success. Moreover, in some instances, research shows that teachers have assessed themselves as having inadequate knowledge of civics and citizenship education (Mkpa, 1997; Ugwu, 2005; Eseh, 2005, Oloruntegbe et al, 2010).

Styles of teachings should also become more open. Efforts should be made to re-training teachers to embrace styles, approaches and strategies that do not endanger the curriculum content. One may be tempted to ask why, in spite of vigorous campaign for innovation and changes in the school, are the proposed changes not implemented? Why are teachers still clinging to the usual traditional approach to leadership and methodology in the classroom? Does their training and orientation support changes and innovation? A teacher trained under authoritarian style will find it difficult to adopt open, democratic system. What has never been experienced can never be given.

Finally, does the school ethos and culture reinforce or hinder democratic practices? The school ethos, belief system, structures and practices may either reinforce or hinder the teaching of democratic values. The authoritarian styles of principals and teachers in our schools should be subjected to review by formulating a scaffolding policy to strengthen the internalization of democratic values and ideals in civics classes. School should be "socially just" and avoid anti-democratic ‘norms’ such as religious, ethnic or gender discrimination, authoritarian modes of selecting school prefects, cultural and ethnicity bias, differences arising from learners’ geographical location and socio-economic background. Democratic ideas should not be limited to curriculum provisions and pedagogy, but also the real, contextual practice in the school environment. Authoritarian schools cannot deliver democratic civic education. School should embrace student-centered orientations and become democratic institutions.

Curriculum development in Nigeria is a product of various compelling forces including British Ordinance, Military Decree, research findings, and societal outcry. Occasionally, some of these forces are borne out parochial interest. However, the domain of citizenship education is somewhat different. It is unique in the sense that it is intended to serve collective, national interest. The effort of the federal government is highly commendable in taking steps toward the teaching and learning of citizenship. Innovation should be an on-going process in order to keep pace with dynamism of our ever-changing society. Moreover, as Ehindero (1996) clearly observed, “no curriculum is fault free’. This calls for constant review. The Civics curricula should neither be reduced to a mere booklet without proper implementation nor should be conceived and used as a tool for political manipulations, but as an agent of positive social transformation.
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