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Two Kinds of Political Awakening in the Civic Education Classroom

A Comparative Argumentation Analysis of the "Constitutional Debates" of Two "Found-a-Village" Projects with 8th Graders

This article proposes an adaption of the Toulmin model of argumentation as a congenial method to investigate interactive political learning processes. The interactive learning environment is provided by the "Found-a-Village" project, where students simulate to establish their own social and political system. I will start my essay by introducing the "genetic" village-setting which works as a trigger for the formation of political judgment and conflict resolution skills. Then, I will define claims, grounds, warrants and premises as basic parts of Toulmin's model. After presenting six types of politically relevant warrants, I will present a four-level-model for the analysis of political learning processes, distinguishing private, public, institutional and systemic perspectives on politics. Later on, I apply this model by comparing two quite different classes during the initial phase of their village-projects: While the "public" class uses the simulation to seriously negotiate their political values, the second class takes a fairly playful and "private" time-out from typical instruction. Both classes, at a different speed, undergo a continual development from unfounded claims and inadequate arguments to the reflection of their own and opposed political value-orientations. The analysis of implicit parts of individual argumentation confirms the method to be helpful for teachers' diagnosis skills.

Keywords:
Toulmin, argumentation analysis, documentary method, judgment skills, conflict resolution skills, "Found-a-Village"-Project, simulation, political ideology, political identity development

1. The "found-a-village" project as trigger for controversial political debates

What happens when 14-year-old German 8th graders simulate the foundation of their own village-community in a fictitious desert mountain region far away from home? At any rate you can expect some lively and controversial interaction. The village-project follows the idea of the genetic method, allowing students to study social issues in their "process of formation" (Dewey 1966; Wagenschein 1991; for English translations see Westbury 2000 and http://www.natureinstitute.org/txt/mw/index.htm). Therefore, the village represents a "point zero", a political vacuum provoking the students to fill it with their own political, economical and cultural ideas (see Petrik 2007, 2010 and 2011b). This starting point supports students to discover their latent ideologies and the necessity of democratic rules and institutions to coordinate controversial claims.

Thus, the simulation can be grouped within the tradition of "island-scenarios" or so-called "Robinsonades". In Adelson's (1971) famous study "The Political Imagination of the Young Adolescent" interviewed adolescents were asked to imagine a thousand people venture to an island to form a new society. However, the village-scenario is more interactive and more "institutional", offering traces of a traditional three-class structure, a city hall, a prison, a market square, a church, a workshop and cropland. This "institutional scaffolding" animates students more likely to debate basic political issues (like government, social justice, economy, religion) without teacher invention, than the "naturalist" island does:

Fig. 1: Scenario of the "Found-a-Village" project (Petrik 2007, 2011b)



Interactive political microcosms like the village are meant to foster critical judgment and conflict resolution skills. They are especially appropriate to fill what I call "the ideology gap" in Civic Education (see Petrik 2010): The lack of effective, student-to-student, controversial classroom-debates that engender and elaborate deep-rooted political values and ideologies (see e.g. Niemi, Niemi 2007; Hess, Ganzler 2007). Mainly I'm interested in students' early traces of left-libertarian, market-liberal, democratic-socialist or conservative argumentation. Those four orientations are, following Kitschelt's (1994) influential work, broadly considered as basic political ideologies shaping individual value-systems, social movements and political parties. Hence, the following coordinate system based on Kitschelt's model comprises the horizon of possible political thought in an ideal-typically way (see in detail Petrik 2010):

Fig. 2: The political compass as horizon of political judgment (Petrik 2010)



The horizon of political judgment is characterized by two major cleavages that each society has to take position on: the distributive or economic cleavage about resource allocation and the procedural, communitarian or socio-cultural one about actors, power and decision-making. The left "equality"-pole is defined as the view that assets should be redistributed by a cooperative collective agency (the state, in a democratic socialist tradition or a network of communes, in the left-libertarian or anarchist tradition). The right "liberty"-pole is defined as the view that the economy should be left to the market system, to voluntary competing individuals and organizations. „Self-determination" describes the idea that personal freedom as well as voluntary and equal participation should be maximized. „Authority" is defined as the belief that existing hierarchies and religious or secular traditions should be followed to guarantee a stable society. In previous "Found-a-village" projects, those two cleavages always represented major conflicts. The congenial method to analyze student-to-student debates in "classroom governments" and "model cities" is Toulmin's argumentation pattern (see also Nussbaum 2002).

2. Argumentation analysis as method for Civic Education classroom studies

Traditionally the Toulmin model is used for teaching composition in German or English classes and for the training of rhetorical skills (see e.g. Geißner 1975, Fulkerson 1996). Recently it was also applied in qualitative educational research, mainly in order to analyze episodes of oral argumentation. Especially in Science Education we can talk about a broadly established method to analyze individual and collective learning processes (see Krummheuer, Naujok 1999; Duschl,

Osborne 2002; Simon 2008; overview in Cavagnetto 2010). One main aim is to foster teachers' competence to diagnose their students' tacit knowledge and to scaffold students' argumentation.

The Toulminian model operationalizes the argumentation process as a mental movement from data through a warrant to a claim, sometimes supported by a backing (Toulmin 1958, Fulkerson 1996). As everyday communication rarely realizes explicitly all relevant parts of reasoning, the model provides a tool to reconstruct even implicit parts of statements. First I will introduce the classical model which I will adapt later on for Civic Education purposes:

Fig. 3: The complete Toulmin model (Fulkerson 1996, 21)



1. The *claim* is a controversial statement or a conclusion that must be supported by the evidence provided within the argument. It is an assertion about what exists or about values and underlying emotions that people hold. Though claims seem easy to recognize, they are often heavily co-constructed so that it might already be complicated to reconstruct which topics speakers are (not) talking about (see Lundsford 2002).
2. The *ground* (also known as evidence, data or argument) consists of any information that will support the claim. Grounds can be based on statistics, quotations, reports or findings that are commonly shared in the communicative context. They must be regarded as valid or at least as likely.
3. The *warrant* logically connects or relates the non-controversial ground to the controversial claim. The evidence must be relevant, pertinent to the claim, and so the warrant justifies its presence within the argument. The warrant is typically unstated.
4. The *backing* serves to support the warrant, explaining what the claim's assumptions are rooted in. It represents sort of a "universal premise" to "justify the justification". Like the warrant it remains mostly implicit.
5. The *rebuttal* anticipates any potential objection to or restriction of the argument.
6. The *qualifier* increases or decreases the amount of certainty or scope of the claim by words such as *sometimes*, *often*, *potentially*, *perhaps*, and *few*.

The basic parts of Toulmin's model – claim, warrant, ground, and backing or premise – can easily be used to re-describe assimilation and accommodation processes of conceptual change in the tradition of Piaget (see Miller 1987, 1996). A simple claim shows an individual's assimilation to a certain point of view, inducing the individual not to pay much attention to developing alternative ways of arguing. This "confirmatory bias" and "weak situational modeling" of everyday argumentation (Davies 2009) can be perturbated (disturbed) by rebuttals, provoking either changes of opinion or the search for a better and deeper judgment as accommodation. When students are encouraged – by the teacher or by their classmates – to look for evidence against their own ideas and to consider alternative possibilities, they normally ameliorate their argumentation. This is also the outcome of one of the few argumentation studies within the domain of Social Studies (see Nussbaum 2002).

The lack of argumentation studies in Civic Education is even more striking as argumentation represents a basic tool or key competence of democratic thinking and acting. A "strong democracy" (Barber 1984) is necessarily a deliberative one where every individual's controversial claim has to be justified by a collectively accepted and relevant reason. To weigh up arguments is a genuine peaceful way of reification of conflicts by finding common grounds and by creating mutual understanding, compromise or consensus (see also Lundsford 2002). Thus, argumentation analysis is the genuine method for "needed studies" on the development of students' conceptual knowledge and attitudes through discussions in the "open classroom" (Hahn 2010, 17).

Unlike some doubts if Toulmin's model can be used to analyze interactive challenge-response-moves (Leitão 2001), several convincing interactive variations are possible (e.g. Miller 1996; Krummheuer, Naujok 1999). My own approach can be assigned to reconstructive educational research following the framework of the so-called Documentary Method (Bohnsack 2010). By analyzing narrative interviews, group discussions, pictures etc. researchers want to reconstruct how social reality is produced in accordance to the actors' perspective. So we deal with a constructivist stance. In the tradition of Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge the "genesis" or ongoing negotiation and accomplishment of meaning gets examined by focusing on tacit knowledge implied in practice. The so-called "documentary meaning" goes beyond the simple "immanent" or literal meaning of statements, trying to uncover their "implicit socio-genetic sense" by means of theoretical explication. In my case, the knowledge about possible contents and development stages of political ideology is crucial to interpret students' hidden premises about politics.

3. Warrants as plausible argument strategies

The core of an argument is its warrant, as it links individual and collectively shared claims. In contrast to Aristotelian Syllogism, Toulmin radically rejected formal logics as the main criteria for the quality of naturally occurring language. He promoted the notion of plausibility and adequacy in a certain context rather than universal criteria. With his emphasis on field-dependence, Toulmin is very much compatible with contemporary qualitative research.

There are several attempts to classify typical warrants. In the US-American context, many authors refer to Fulkerson's (1996) six types of argument strategies, known under their acronym "GASCAP". Kienpointner (1992, 1996) distinguishes 30 argumentation patterns that he subdivides into nine "main classes" of everyday argumentation. In my own adaption for political argumentation (Petrik 2007) I modeled six main classes comprising both Fulkerson's and Kienpointner's strategies:

Fig. 4: Different classifications of current argumentation patterns

Fulkerson 1996	Kienpointner 1996	Petrik 2007
	1. Definitions: Content-based equivalence	
	2. Species-genus relationship: Subsumption and superordination	1. Definitions and subsumption
	3. Part-whole relationship: inclusion and membership	
1. Generalization	4. Examples: Generalizations and illustrations	2. Examples and generalization
	5. Analogies: Indirect comparisons	
2. Analogy	6. Comparisons: Similarities and differences	3. Comparisons, contradictions and analogies
	7. Contradictions and alternatives	
3. Sign/Clue	8. Causes and effects, means and purposes	4. Causation
4. Causation		5. Means and purposes
5. Authority	9. Authorities: Experts and "elders and betters"	6. Authorities and norms
6. Principle		

1. *Definitional and subsumptive argumentation:* An often underestimated strategy especially in political argumentation. The claim gets connected to a special context by definition or subsumption, like in Proudhon's left-libertarian phrase "property is theft" or in the conservative slogan "abortion is murder". As theft and murder are connoted negatively, property and abortion should be as well. Another famous example is Theodore Roosevelt's "Americanism" speech of 1915, where he re-defined Americanism as patriotic performance and therefore as a consequent willingness to enter World War I. If you are a true American, you have to participate (see Nash 2009). A typical rebuttal would put into question the stringency of the definitional links.
2. *Exemplary or generalizing argumentation:* A very common form of reasoning, assuming that what is true of a well chosen case or single event is likely to hold for a larger group. The case or event must contain generalizable messages or coherences that support the claim. Quantitative and qualitative research with polls and case studies provides us with insights in typicality. Every day experience is a further common, but less reliable source of generalization.
3. *Comparative, analogical or contrastive argumentation:* In general, comparisons aim at working out similarities and differences of related or similar phenomena. "Why doesn't Germany abandon its tiered school system, considering the fact that almost all Western countries have a comprehensive system?" Analogies are special kinds of indirect comparisons of two contexts that aren't clearly linked together. A common form are historical analogies, for example of the 2008 finance crisis and the stock market crash of 1929, e.g. to warn people about possible anti-democratic consequences. Contradictions are often used to rebut an argumentation by saying, when you say A, you can't say B at the same time: "How can you be a conservative and at the same time agree with the demolition of this Art Nouveau house to replace it by an office building?"
4. *Causal Argumentation:* Causal reasoning is one of the most frequent and most complex forms of warrants. An argument by causation needs the scientific knowledge if a given occurrence is the result of, or it is affected by the factor X. A causal argumentation against the claim to ban abortion could be: "Western Europe has one of the lowest average abortion rates because of a combination of liberal laws, early sex education and family programs. Apparently it's not abortion bans that minimize abortion". The typical danger is to confuse correlation and causation: When in a country a certain ethnic minority such as, e.g., Turkish immigrants

or Germans of Turkish origin in Germany, commit statistically more crimes, this wouldn't mean at all that those people are generally more criminal than Germans without an immigration background. In fact, not the ethnic background is the cause, but the social situation as a third factor: When you relate social background and criminality, you will get about the same results for Germans and Turkish immigrants or Germans of Turkish origin. Argumentation via signs or clues is a special form of causation applied when only symptoms or effects are perceptible, but the cause has to be supposed or extrapolated.

5. *Functional argumentation:* Functional or means-purpose-relations represent a special case of causality directed towards a future goal. Especially in political discussions certain measures are claimed to be an appropriate "remedy" for a certain social problem. Often, a commonly shared objective is used to justify unpopular or controversial means: Are lower taxes for big business the right tool to create new jobs through new investments? Or should governments rather raise taxes for higher incomes in order to increase the lower classes' economic demand by higher welfare rates? A counter-argument can either question the adequacy of means or reject the purpose.
6. *Authoritative or normative argumentation:* This pattern is a high-risk abbreviation-strategy. Especially if you rely on a cultural or even religious authority you can't convince anyone who doesn't accept the authority as such. On the other hand, a normative argumentation can also refer to celebrities, scientists or scholars that are broadly acknowledged. Third, social norms, existing laws or commonly accepted principles can be applied.

Fig 5: Plausible warrants: Six common argument strategies (Petrik 2007)



4. Levels of argumentation of political judgment and conflict resolution

There are several ideas for quality levels of argumentation. An analytical framework for science education assumes that the quality of argumentation increases with the number of Toulmin's elements (see Erduran, Simon, Osborne 2004, 928). Level 1 represents a simple claim versus a counter-claim, level 2 includes either data, warrants or backings, level 3 a series of claims or counterclaims with a weak rebuttal, level 4 a claim with a clearly identifiable rebuttal and level 5 an extended argument with more than one rebuttal.

I find it generally convincing that a higher degree of the elements' explicit realization has to do with the quality of argumentation. However, especially level 2 strikes me as a random choice of either data, warrants or backings, as if those elements were on the same intellectual level. Second, the warrant's and backing's role on higher levels remains unclear and also their possible connection. For the analysis of political arguments this framework remains too formal and quantitative.

Two further, quite similar approaches are coming from Business Studies and Geography Education (see Davies 2009), suggesting a scaffolding process inspired by Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development. This concept considers the difference between what a learner can do without help and under teacher guidance. The common core of both criteria catalogues "for improving arguments" looks like the following:

0. No argument to back the claim
1. One reason to support the claim
2. More than one reason (contradicting or adding up?)
3. Limitations to the reasons (rebuttals)
4. Relation of used reasons, considered by a wider viewpoint
5. Weighing up the strength of the evidence

There we find indeed a qualitative formal progression. It can be reframed with Bybees (1997) four levels of scientific literacy, in order to integrate the quality of the use of scientific knowledge: from a simple claim (nominal level) to relevant grounds and the rebuttal of counter-claims (functional level) over to the "objective" coordination of conflicting claims (procedural and conceptual level) to a meta-reflection of the argumentation process (multidimensional level, but in a less generalized way than Bybee defines it).

My own approach (see Petrik 2007, 2011a) is compatible with this one, adding a content-based gradation for political reasoning following the nature of political thought and Kohlberg's (1981) stages of moral development (based on Behrmann, Grammes, Reinhardt 2004). In the following, I will outline my proposition of four levels of argumentation that equally apply to critical judgment and conflict resolution skills, which I see, according to my previous research, in a dialectical relationship (see Petrik 2011a). The more students reflect on their own and conflicting value orientations, the better they can argue with dissenters; the more they are open for constructive conflict resolution, the faster they will be able to question and elaborate their personal value system.

Private level (1): The unfounded claim as pre-political and dissociating value-orientation

This level is defined by unfounded, only individually valid claims revealing a mostly unreflecting, often deeply emotionally rooted value orientation. It remains private, pre-political in so far as the speaker isn't willing or able (yet) to justify his or her concern to others. This stage involves a peer-centered perspective of dissociation with controversial opinions, leading either to the ignorance of existing conflicts or to verbal attacks of "dissidents". Though this stage is indispensable for finding peer-membership and developing a political orientation, it mostly results in unfounded dissents or verbal fights.

Public level (2): Relevant grounds as basis for the constructive exchange of political viewpoints

Using grounds with relevant warrants represents the base of political exchange, because an individual statement gets plausibly connected to collectively accepted insights. As to political judgment, a substantiated viewpoint is reached. Combined with the openness to understand others stating their views a "founded dissent" can be achieved. So we could distinguish between two public sublevels: the ability a) to use relevant reasons to state one's own view, b) to reconstruct opposed reasons of others.

Institutional level (3): Reflection of premises as coordination of conflicting claims

On the third level, one's own arguments and relevant counter-arguments get examined for underlying premises. Those are mostly unstated basic assumptions or backings as "justifications of the justification". The first sublevel is the ability to disclose and contrast one's own and opposing values and assumptions that underlie the formal warrant, taking a "wider viewpoint". Since hidden ideological structures of the argumentation get considered, we can talk about a conceptual level of judgment ability. The second sublevel represents the ability to coordinate conflicting ideological concepts by rebuttal, compromise or consent. Here a procedural or deliberative level is reached, implying the insight into the need to find common principles and methods to establish common decisions. This procedural "polity"-orientation leads me to call this the institutional level, since democratic institutions have mainly the task to peacefully negotiate and deliberate opposed political concepts.

Systemic level (4): Meta-reflection as empathic intellectual perspective

This fourth level needs theoretical knowledge about ideologies and conflict resolution. The highest level of political judgment can be described with Rorty's (1989) "Liberal Ironist", a person able to combine the consciousness of the contingency of their own ideology with the will to stand up for their values. The tolerance of ambiguity coming along with this stance is the self-ironic distance to oneself, necessary to stay open for liberal (in the sense of deliberative) dialogue. Basic knowledge about typical political cleavages and possible coalitions of political ideologies (see above) is indispensable for this intellectual level (see Petrik 2010). On the other hand, to be able to evaluate political discussions on this level, basic knowledge about argumentation strategies (claim, ground, warrant, premise) is required.

The following figure summarizes the four levels of argumentation both for political judgment and for conflict resolution skills:

Fig. 6: A Toulmin-based model for the development of political judgment and conflict resolution skills



In the following two chapters I will apply this argumentation model to two constitutive village meetings of two 8th grade classes' that participated in "Found-a-village"-projects. Both classes belong to the same urban grammar school (Gymnasium) in Germany. I myself was their teacher. The projects took place in 2004 and 2006 (for details about my data collection see Petrik 2011a). I will focus on segments of debates dealing with the procedural and the distributive dimension, with the communities' decision-making and resource allocation. For the latter, it is important to know, that the students drew lots to get a personal "monthly income" (play money) according to the average distribution of wealth of Western countries. Therefore, at the beginning of the simulation, there is a lower, middle and upper class. Of course, the students are completely free to re-arrange this "mainstream"-distribution.

5. Argumentation analysis I: The serious and "public" Village One

At the beginning of the first village meeting, Paul gets very quickly appointed as moderator to lead the discussion. Separately of this task some students muse about the need of a mayor. This is the moment when the first controversy arises. (In the following, I always start with the original German transcription to provide then an English translation):

Village One (procedural dimension): Representative or grassroots council?

Kerstin: Ich finde, wenn wir nen Dorfmeister haben, der darf dann aber nicht alleine entscheiden [Durcheinander]

Lars: Wir machen eine Dorfjury. [Durcheinander]

Manuel: Wir wäre es, wenn aus jedem Haus einer bestimmt wird und die sich dann zusammensetzen und dann die Vertreter die Meinung der Häuser vertreten?

Paul: Das finde ich gut.

Lars: Das finde ich auch.

Paul: Wollen wir das mal abstimmen, wer ist dagegen, dass wir etwas anderes machen? Wer ist gegen Manuel und will etwas anderes machen? Ja, jetzt wollt ihr wohl alle, dass wir das machen.

Marcus: Nein, das ist dumm. Ich finde das dumm.

Paul: Ja, dann sag doch was.

Marcus: Ja, weil der eine, der dann immer bestimmt und der eine sagt ...

Kerstin: Nein, der bestimmt nicht. Ja, der vertritt die ...

Marcus: ... ja, der vertritt die, aber...

Paul: Manuel, erklärst du noch mal deine Idee?

Manuel: Ja, der vertritt die. Im Haus wird dann besprochen, was man als nächstes, wenn die sich treffen, zusammen macht und da vertritt er eben nur die Meinung. Und jedes Haus kann bestimmen, welche. [...]

Birte: Ich melde mich. Nein, ich finde, der sollte schon auch, also der Vertreter, der sollte dann auch regelmäßig gewechselt werden, irgendwie jeden Monat oder alle zwei Wochen.

Paul: Aber das kann man dann auch hausintern besprechen. Ja OK, also dann sind alle dafür. [...]

Kerstin: I think, if we have a mayor, he mustn't decide on his own. [Chaos]

Lars: We'll have a village jury. [Chaos]

Manuel: How about electing one guy in each house and they would gather around and then represent the house's opinion as representatives?

Paul: I think this is good.

Lars I think so, too.

Paul: Could we vote on that, who is against that we do something different. Who is against Manuel and wants to do something different? OK, now all of you want us to do this.

Marcus: No, this is stupid. I find this stupid.

Paul: OK, so tell us something.

Marcus: OK, because the one who is always deciding and the one says...

Kerstin: No, he doesn't decide. Yes, he represents the...

Marcus: ... yes, he represents them, but...

Paul: Manuel, could you re-explain your idea?

Manuel: Yes, he represents them. Then, inside the house, will be discussed what to do next together, when they meet and there he only represents the view.

Birte: I put my hand up. No, I think, the one should also, I mean the representative, he should also be changed regularly, somehow every month or every two weeks.

Paul: But this can be discussed within the houses. OK, so everybody is for it.

Kerstin raises a counter-claim against the traditional idea of a powerful mayor. Taking this role, nobody should be able to decide on his own. Her claim remains unjustified, probably because she believes that the others share her opinion. We can assume an implicit liberal or egalitarian value orientation opposed to a conservative hierarchical approach. In fact, nobody contradicts her thesis. Instead Manuel proposes a representative system as a possible solution for her claim. His argumentation uses a functional warrant, as he considers a representative council as an appropriate means to decrease individual political power. His premise that such a council would be able to integrate everybody's interests remains unstated. Nevertheless he achieves consent. Paul quickly asks to vote for the proposal, explicitly demanding rejections to it. Obviously he wants to promote possible alternative suggestions, aiming at coordinating claim and counter-claim, although no deep controversy has arisen yet. Accordingly Paul's moderation reaches already the public level (2), with potential transition to the institutional one (3).

Now, Marcus (probably encouraged by Paul's moderation) gives an emotional counter-claim: to him the idea of representatives is stupid. Paul, confirming his moderation abilities by not accepting an unfounded claim, asks for a reason. Marcus then seems to be using a causal rebuttal: The representative would be authorized to decide for his house alone and would, as a result, disempower those he speaks for. Although Marcus doesn't clearly state his worry, the term "decide" already initiates Kerstin to interrupt him by insuring that according to her, representation doesn't include the power of decision. Though she is using a definitional counter-argumentation, Marcus isn't satisfied yet, probably because he understands the term representation in the Western countries' liberal tradition as a form of power with a free mandate. Obviously

this free mandate doesn't fit his unstated grassroots democracy value base. As neither Kerstin nor Marcus explicitly define their central terms, their possible consent or dissent remains unfounded at this point.

Paul who still takes his role very seriously tries to promote reification, gets back to Manuel, inviting him to re-explain his initial idea. Manuel clarifies his position: the house-communities decide and the representative "only" embodies their previously fixed view. Manuel defines a kind of grassroots-council whose representatives are endowed with an imperative mandate, meaning that elected representatives are to execute the will of those who elected them. But Birte isn't satisfied yet, postulating a rotation system for the representatives. Like Marcus she doesn't apply a clear warrant. Her argumentation contains an implicit comparison of different measures (types of council) to implement the common political goal "everybody decides". The exact functional reason for a rotation system remains unstated, probably appearing too obvious to Birte in this context of people who think in a similar way. The rotation system Birte suggests is a genuine left-libertarian idea that was practiced by the German Green Party during their first legislative period in the Bundestag between 1983 and 1987, where every representative had to be replaced after two years. At the end of the topic "mayor" Paul notes that a possible rotation system should be decided individually within the houses and concludes this debate by stating a final consent about Manuel's proposition. A new topic is raised.

This first "procedural" controversy during the constitutive village meeting is not about different government systems. The students rather debate the question how the common "grassroots premise" could be transformed into practical politics (functional warrants): What kind of counsil do we want? The whole debate remains consequently on the second public level where different relevant arguments aiming at a grassroots democracy are exchanged. Although not every ground and warrant gets fully elaborated, students mostly seem to understand mutually their argumentations. Apparently willing to establish a common ideological base the speakers succeed in clarifying misunderstandings and quickly reach a consensus about their governmental structures.

But as their underlying premises about the necessity of grassroots democracy and about potential dangers of a liberal representative system or an authoritarian mayor aren't stated and discussed, the consensus could only be superficial and therefore temporary. Without being the result of weighing up different value systems, and considering at the same time the policy and polity dimension a stable level-three consensus cannot be acquired. Hence, this consent is likely to be challenged later on: by experiencing its practical impacts (as it is less effective), by contradicting students who didn't raise their voice yet, or by realizing that their common understanding of representation is more controversial than the discussion suggested so far.

In the following, the class discusses economical topics like possible and necessary professions within the village community. The first serious disagreement occurs when a student proposes establishing a common fund where every villager deposits a part of his income. At this point, Anja opens the dispute:

Village One (distributive dimension): Communal or private property?

Anja: Aber was sollen wir denn für das ganze Dorf kaufen?
Paul: Alles Mögliche, Bibliotheken, Supermarkt, ...
Carsten: Hochspannungsleitung, Telefonanschlüsse ...
Paul: ... Saatgut, Samen für den Dingsda, Acker. [Durcheinander]
Thorsten: Das kann man doch auch selber kaufen.
Ramona: Ich find's eigentlich besser, dass man jetzt den Samen selber kauft.
Regina: Ja, aber es gibt noch die Telefonleitungen und alles Mögliche.
Birte: Hallo, wenn mal etwas kaputt geht oder so, ist doch Scheiße. [Durcheinander] Ja, oder zum Beispiel Medikamente. Wenn jemand krank wird [...]
Ramona: ... ja, aber wenn niemand von uns krank wird und wir dafür bezahlt haben und auch nicht das Telefon kaputt geht ... [...]
John: [...] Und ich denke, dass man um Geld nicht irgendwie abstimmen kann, dass man eine Dorfkasse macht. Weil im normalen Leben kann man auch nicht sagen, ich will jetzt Geld haben, gib mir was.

Anja: But what should we buy for the entire village?
Paul: Lots of things, library, supermarket, ...
Carsten: Electricity, telephone lines...
Paul: ... Seeds for the thing, farmland. [Chaos]
Thorsten: Everybody could buy this by himself.
Ramona: I think it's better to buy the seeds for oneself.
Regina: OK, but there are the telephone lines and lots of other things.
Birte: No kidding, if something gets broken or so, would be bullshit! Yes, or medication. If someone is getting ill. [...]
Ramona: Yes, but if nobody's getting ill and we paid for it and also the telephone doesn't get broken... [...]
John: And I think you can't vote on money to get a communal fund. Because in normal life you can't say either, I want to have money now, give me some.

Anja's counter-claim contains an implicit functional argumentation: There is no need for communal cash because there is no need to buy something for the entire village. Paul and Carsten refute her claim by listing several infrastructural essentials. But the most important part of their functional reasoning remains unstated: "Those investments are too expensive for individuals". As a consequence, Ramona and Thorsten support Anja's view by a simple unjustified counter-claim: Everybody or every house-community could buy seeds and so on independently. This call for economical independence could express the two students' need of autonomy and individuality – a need appropriate to an age concerned by the detachment of all kinds of authorities.

Regina then approves Paul's and Carsten's concern by repeating one of their examples. Now Birte starts an emotional attack on the adversaries of a communal fund. I will analyze her argumentation in detail. She defends the common cash idea with two functional arguments concerning the village's future: Something could break down, somebody could get sick. Both are factually correct and linked to her claim – a fund as means to finance medical care and reparations. By using two relevant grounds she reaches the public level of political judgment. The weak point for possible counter-claims of a level-two-argumentation is not the warrant; it can't be refused for formal reasons. In this case, the analysis of underlying premises is crucial to fully understand Birte's political judgment. First she seems to assume that a village council can't function without collective money, as otherwise infrastructural measures wouldn't be possible. In this premise she shows already a basic understanding of central governmental tasks and their material base: to establish and to maintain the common good. Without taxation (democratic) politics is impossible. At the same time, her argumentation contains a second controversial premise concerning specific governmental tasks like healthcare: Health, according to Birte, has to be a public affair, can't be left to individual responsibility. As we know especially from the recent US-American debate, this left-libertarian or democratic-socialist claim can be highly controversial. As her premises remain unstated and, therefore, unjustified, her understanding of the state's infrastructural and distributive role could be questioned easily. So we get the following argumentation scheme (grey arrows hint at implicit parts):

Fig. 7: Birte's argumentation on the "public" level: Substantiated political viewpoint



Ramona's rebuttal questions the factual base of Birte's claim: It is likely that nothing could break down, nobody could get sick. This argumentation pattern is very interesting. First, our human experience contradicts the factual base of Ramona's ground: There is no such paradise without diseases and deterioration. Factual contradiction represents the major weak point of an argument. So we can easily assume that in this class, Ramona's false assertion of the absence of typical human problems couldn't be maintained for a long time. Second, her implicit causal warrant "without illness no need for medical care" shows probably a certain rejection of the solidarity principle that most democracies are based on: Why should I pay into a common healthcare- fund if I don't get sick? This potentially radical market-liberal premise denies a mutual responsibility, especially for the weaker members of society. To pursue this direction of political thought I will now analyze in detail John's later market-liberal counter-argumentation to Birte's position. Here a typical political misconception gets manifested.

John is strictly opposed to a communal fund for the village. He applies two arguments: First, using a normative argumentation pattern, he views it as impossible to vote on money. The underlying premise suggests that private property is generally no subject to political decision. This norm obviously doesn't exist, since every political system has to be based on at least a minimal taxation – by taking money from people's incomes. Despite the fact that John's ground is irrelevant for his claim, we can impute a legitimate market-liberal value-base in favor of private property rights and an opposition to public healthcare policies. The term "irrelevance" is a technical label for arguments without a plausible warrant. The speaker's political position itself is not valued by this term at all. However, the denial of any kind of public fund remains a pre-political, "private" statement rather than a controversial political position. This interpretation gets confirmed, when we look at John's second ground that is analogical: In normal life you can't ask for somebody's money. In other words: In real everyday life what Birte and others proclaim would simply be theft. This argument by itself is indeed factually true for the private context. But it is irrelevant for his claim, as John uses a warrant consisting of a false analogy: A democratically elected village council is in fact authorized to urge money, since it represents an institutional and not a private setting. So John's premise to organize the village's politics according to the norms of private life can be rejected easily for factual reasons: Are taxes theft? How should governments work without income? Second John could be criticized – but of course not factually – for his implicit (and legitimate!) market-liberal value-orientation: How fair is a private healthcare system to those who are poor? So we get the following argumentation scheme (grey arrows hint at implicit parts):

Fig. 8: John's argumentation on the "private" level: Unreflecting value orientation



At the end of their first encounter the villagers establish indeed a communal fund – however it is based on a compromise: Only in case somebody gets sick or something breaks down, the council will collect money. For the most part, Village One shows a serious involvement in the simulation. The discussion stays mostly objective, there is almost no disorder, and emotional statements are directly linked to political issues. The discussion remains on the public level, with a final compromise pointing at the classes' prospect to reach the institutional level. At the same time, students like John and Ramona still argue on a pre-political level – which is appropriate to their age. However, even John states more than simple claims: he tries hard to find arguments and might, due to his involvement, be encouraged to elaborate his "market-liberal" values.

6. Argumentation analysis II: The playful and "private" Village Two

Right at the beginning of the first meeting, Thorsten and Joachim are sitting on the teacher's desk. They just got promoted to moderate the first village meeting. After a couple of side talks and during lots of chaotic verbal and non-verbal interaction between several subgroups (of mainly boys) Thorsten raises his voice:

Village Two (procedural dimension): Village ruler or team of representatives?

Thorsten: [laut, auf dem Pult sitzend und eine Schriftrolle entrollend, Joachim tut ihm gleich] Und wir wollen eine... hier so'n Dorfherrscher-Willen. [Unruhe, Zwischenrufe] Irgendwelche, irgendwelche Fragen hier zu?	Thorsten: [loudly, sitting on the teacher's desk enrolling a scroll, Joachim doing the same] And we want a ... here... such a village ruler's will [Chaos, interjections] Any, any questions to this?
Joachim: So, noch Fragen? Ja.	Joachim: OK, any questions left? Yes.
Kassandra: Was für Regeln wollt ihr denn aufstellen?	Kassandra: But what kind of rules do you want to establish?
Joachim: Ja, so was wie, ja so was wie Regeln halt.	Joachim: Yes, something like, simply like rules.
Thorsten: Was passiert, wenn, wenn jemand mal was verbricht, oder so, zum Beispiel...	Thorsten: What happens, if somebody commits a crime or so, for example...
Joachim: [lächelnd] Ja. So, Marc.	Joachim: [smiling] Yes. OK, Marc.
Nico: [laut] Die zehn Gebote... Mord! ...	Nico: [loudly] The Ten Commandments... murder!
Marc: Ich find, wir wählen nicht einen Dorfherrscher, sondern irgendwie so ein paar Leute, die das immer...	Marc: I think, we shouldn't elect a village ruler but somehow some people who always...
Nils: [laut] Eine Partei!	Nils [loudly] A party!
Joachim: Abgeordnete.	Joachim: Representatives.
Nils: Eine Partei.	Nils: A party.
Joachim: Abgeordnete.	Joachim: Representatives.
Marc: Ja.	Marc: Yes.
Thorsten: Ja, sowas brauchen wir noch. [Unruhe] Ja, Lisa.	Thorsten: Yes, we still need something like that. [Chaos] Yes, Lisa.
Lisa: Ich würd' auch sagen, wie Marcus, wir sollten keinen Herrscher oder so halt bestimmen, sondern wie jetzt zum Beispiel jetzt...	Lisa: I would say, like Marcus, we shouldn't appoint a ruler or something like that but like for example...
Nils: Partei.	Nils: ... party...
Lisa: Schul, Schul, Schul ...	Lisa: ... School... school... school...
Ines: Hey, könnt ihr mal ruhig sein. [Zwischenruf: Nein!]	Ines: Hey, could you shut up. [Interjection: no!]
Fiona: Sch, Schul, Schulsprecher.	Fiona: Sch... school... school council representatives.
Lisa: Schulsprecher. Genau, dass wir sozusagen so ein Team haben.	Lisa: School council representatives. Exactly, so we get a team.

Thorsten and Joachim claim to establish a "ruler's will" – accompanied by Thorsten's ceremonial voice and the theatre-like gesture to enroll a scroll that reminds of Roman emperors declaring a new law. The whole scenery appears more like an ironic citation of a historical stereotype than a serious claim within a students' village. Kassandra's question about possible rules seems to embarrass Joachim. Instead of giving a reason, he simply repeats Thorsten's claim: Rulers proclaim rules, that's it, a simple and well-known convention. This answer strengthens the impression that the moderation team isn't capable of taking their task seriously. They seem to prefer playing a non-democratic ruler's role without probably believing in it. Their premise could be: this village isn't real, it's like one of these historical role games we know from history classes (which they do indeed, as I know). So they misjudge the simulation character of the village situation. As their teacher I initially asked the students not to play a role but to act realistically, as if they had to set up a real village community.

But then Thorsten adds "crime" as a valid ground for rules, as means to determine sanctions. Nico interjects two more examples: the Ten Commandments as pre-political, historical set of rules and murder as a sort of crime – which is, however, unlikely to happen in this class. His interjections support Joachim's and Thorsten's attitude to treat the simulation as a funny role game.

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The content of these claims could hint at a (still) negative image of politics: Instead of regarding the village-council primarily as a chance of a restart, as a constructive institution to design their own community, a possibility to establish certain rights, activities, economic essentials and political visions, they define its dangers such as breaches of the rules, without talking about rules first. Without knowing the three boys' latent value orientation, we can notice them creating a conservative view on politics where "man is a wolf to [his fellow] man".

But then Marc's claim – like Kassandra's before – draws the attention back to the "real" village with its real community. While proposing that "some people" should be in charge of the village's political power, Marc undermines both the idea of a single ruler and of a historical role game. Nils sticks to his one-word interjections but his associations reach now the realm of democracy: a political party could rule the village. Joachim throws in a simple counter-claim: not a party but representatives. Nico repeats his claim once more, Joachim does the same with his one. There we have a typical claim-versus-claim situation, but without a real controversy. Both boys seem to continue playing rather than arguing: This time they stage an ironic verbal contest about political terms without really trying to define their understanding or to discuss different institutional options.

Yet, Thorsten seems to take his moderation role a little bit more seriously. Lisa picks up Marc's claim using the school's representative council as analogical argument for a possible village government. But as almost half of the boys are engaged in side talks or throwing things around, she can't express her concern without difficulty. Ines assists her by admonishing the boys to be silent and Fiona helps her by completing her argument. In doing so, the village-girls and Marc (as the only really seriously arguing boy) succeed in establishing the idea of a five people village-council.

However in the following, the meeting doesn't really get more serious. The class spends half of their time electing five students (Lisa, Thorsten, Joachim, Melanie, Moritz) – in a chaotic and ineffective way. The other half is used to discuss possible jobs, nutrition and a new name for the village. Those topics again represent rather a casting-show, a competition about the question who is the funniest boy in the class than a serious political or economic discussion. Consequently the village council doesn't come to any decision. Only at the end of the lesson the topic money comes up:

Village Two (distributive dimension): The poor clean up the rich men's houses

Nils: Ich will mein Geld wiederhaben, das mir gestohlen wurde.
Marcus: Ey, Nils...
Melanie: [laut] Ja Mann, Nils, wir wissen nicht, wer das geklaut hat...
Joachim: Wir werden...
Melanie: ... Und da können wir auch nichts machen, Pech gehabt.
Joachim: Du brauchst, du braucht einen ähm...[Unruhe]
Melanie: Wir kennen unsere Klasse ...
Dilan: Ich schenk dir nen Fünfziger, damit du auch Geld hast. Hier.
[...]
Melanie: Ich wollte sagen, dass unser Dorf ... von den Mittelreichen, wir bieten noch an, dass wir bei den Reichen putzen.
Thorsten: Also könnt ihr gemeinsam, hier... [?]
Moritz: Psch.
Lisa: Aber ihr bezahlt.
Dilan: Ja, fünfzig Euro pro Tag.
Lisa: Okay.
Pablo: Nee, ich geb nichts.
Dilan: Pro Woche.
Moritz: Ruhe!
Pablo: [lachend] Pro Monat.
Dilan: Pro Woche.
Pablo: Pro Monat.
Lisa: Okay.

Nils: I want to get my money back that got stolen.
Marc: Hey Nils.
Melanie: [loudly] Yes man, Nils, we don't know who stole this...
Joachim: We're going to...
Melanie: ... And we can't do anything about it, bad luck.
Joachim: You need, you need a ... [Chaos]
Melanie: We know our class ...
Dilan: I offer you 50 Euros so that you have some money, take. [...]
Melanie: I wanted to say that our village... we, the middle rich people propose to do cleaning jobs at the rich people's houses.
Thorsten: So you could together, here ...
Moritz: psst!
Lisa: But you pay for it.
Dilan: Yes, 50 Euros a day.
Lisa: Okay.
Pablo: Nope, I don't give anything.
Dilan: Per week.
Moritz: Quiet!
Pablo: [laughing] Per month.
Dilan: Per week.
Lisa: Okay.

Nils continues the role play by complaining that his (play) money got stolen. Melanie, Joachim and Dilan take issue with him. Now Melanie offers to do cleaning jobs in the rich people's houses. After that a little half-ironic dispute arises about the payment that the "middle rich" would get for their cleaning activities. This is the only moment in the course of the entire meeting where the village's (and therefore indirectly the society's) social inequality comes into play. Although 'cleaning up' for the rich is a realistic job option, we can assume that those students, coming mostly from the middle and upper middle class, wouldn't come up with the idea of earning their money by doing a cleaning job in real life. Hitherto, the play money seems to provoke the allusion of a funny Monopoly game. No discussion about individual incomes, let alone the funding of collective political structures occurs. The same lack of sobriety that the previous topic "government" brought about is repeated within "economic" issues.

Conclusion: Two argumentative stages of political identity formation

Apparently we witness here two very different kinds of political awakening. The first class is prepared and motivated to fill the gap the teacher left when renouncing at his normal guiding role. The students understand the village simulation as a real opportunity to state and negotiate political claims and to put into practice their own political ideas. The topics "council" and "communal fund" show a serious attempt to grasp the village as an institutional, therefore political and not only private setting. The controversy about these topics provokes the attempt to justify one's standpoint. Though some students don't succeed yet in formulating valid reasons they try at least to find some. Simple claim-to-claim-struggles are rare. Consequently the discussion level of a "stated consent" is quickly reached, building a starting point to deliberate and coordinate possible conflicting claims. The discussion (not each individual, of course) has reached the public level of conflict resolution – though the classes' consent about a governmental system might be only temporary. The general openness for mutual arguments fosters both an atmosphere of tolerance and puts peaceful pressure on those refusing to state their views or those having difficulties in finding relevant grounds. Thus, the genetic setting seems to provoke an interactive political learning process whose major outcome is the discovery of the principle of solidarity. This discovery could be even more sustainable, since it was adopted independently of the teacher's authority.

Contrary to the seriously debating "public" Village One, the second class doesn't seem to consider the simulation yet as political, but rather as a private opportunity to break out of the everyday instructional setting. The elements of role games, castings shows and Monopoly – mostly launched by a handful of boys – serve mostly to have fun, to provoke laughter, and to impress the girls. Thus far the lack of teacher guidance doesn't set free clear political interests but is understood as an arena to fulfill personal needs. On the other hand, the game-like mood might also be a sign of the students' protest against an excessive demand. Due to the absence of direct instructional scaffolding at the beginning of the simulation they might also reproduce the public stereotype of politics as theatre.

The lack of serious commitment resulting from that stance can also be observed on the formal level: The boys who lead the discussion almost always use (sometimes even ironically weakened) claim versus claim argumentations, without entering into reasoning. However there are a few moments where rebuttals provoke the search of relevant arguments. Especially some girls try to calm down the chaos in order to launch political options. Nevertheless they fail to change the prevailing game-like mood.

Yet on the whole this class remains on a private, pre-political level of conflict resolution. This stage typically results in both the denial of indispensable conflicts and verbal fights as unfounded dissents. In this context latent political values almost don't get a chance to be expressed and elaborated. Obviously, this second class will take a longer time to reach a public level of mutual acceptance than the first one did.

What are the consequences of the genetic approach in Civic Education? Should we consider the village-simulation's openness as inappropriate for possibly overwhelmed, conflict-denying, chaotic or simply playful classes? No, on the contrary. Both, the "natural state" of the students' society and their parody of "politics as theatre" provide in the long run the first deeply felt insights into the necessity of a (micro-)political organization. The own experience of collective chaos and failure goes along with the mutual critique of inappropriate behavior. This can have a much greater impact on the learning process than the well-known teacher authority – which can, during puberty, easier be ignored than the peers' view.

Indeed, this second class, while watching video excerpts of their first village meeting in the next lesson, was shocked about their own behavior. Hence, they were now seeking to establish strict rules providing a constructive atmosphere, along with sanctions (like "fines" and – most efficient – the temporary exclusion of the debates) to ensure the observance of rules. Instead of the initial parody games around the topics of "crime" and "murder" the village community now faces an authentic negative starting problem: Their own pre-democratic behavior. Of course, it still took them a while to really develop a deliberative level of discussion. But the initial minority of seriously arguing students did indeed increase over time. The provocative playful start expressed already a productive

"alienation effect" (Bertolt Brecht), provoking the students to take new perspectives on themselves.

The method of argumentation analysis seems indeed to be an adequate way to capture the dynamic formation process of political judgment and conflict resolution abilities in interactive settings. Above all, the quality of argumentation can be specified – often against our first impression. Especially unstated or slightly realized arguments can mislead us to devalue a student's argumentation. As to the case of Birte and John in Village One, two – at first sight –similarly simple argumentations revealed quite different stages of political thinking. Implicit but important political insights can be "carved out" and seemingly relevant reasons could be unmasked as being still pre-political misperceptions.

At the same time, our comprehension of pre-political, often times very emotional claims can be strengthened: By analyzing latent premises we get closer to students' basic social values as fundamental parts of their identity formation. It is important to clearly distinguish between our diagnosis of a formally incomplete or implausible argumentation and our reconstruction of political emotions as latent point of views. This is what I would call a synthesis between a deficit- and a difference-oriented approach. The deficit-perspective is important for assisting students to progress in their ability to convince others and to change their views themselves – in other words: to become democratic citizens. The difference-perspective is important in so far as it enables teachers and scholars to recognize the students' very individual approaches to develop political orientation.

I will continue my research using the "Found-a-Village" project for case studies to compare political argumentation patterns in different countries, starting with Germany, The United States and France. My first explorative study with German high school students led me to a first heuristics of eight "politicization types" which will I will differentiate and supplement in further studies. I define a politicization type as "typical argumentation patterns depending on the individuals' basic political value orientation" (see Petrik 2011a).

I hope this teaching example will encourage Civic Education teachers to experiment with open settings like the "Found-a-village"-project. In particular, socially and culturally diverse classes might profit from the project's typical moments of mutual self-correction. Of course teachers shouldn't leave their students alone during possibly destructive debates; they have to provide argumentation scaffolding whenever the village community fails to find a solution on their own. However, teachers shouldn't intervene too early because their interference would impede the students' own effort and creativity during moments of "productive confusion" (Wagenschein). The interactive training of collective conflict resolution skills is a crucial step to initiate value-debates fostering political identity development and democratic tolerance.

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