Constructing the Legitimate Knowledge

edited by

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Reinhold Hedtke, Claude Proeschel, Andrea Szukala

The Transformation of Civic and Citizenship Education: Challenges to Educational Governance, Agency and Research
An Introduction

Keywords
Sociological theory of civic education, neo-pragmatism, educational governance, materialism; governmentality

1 Introduction
The current issue of the Journal of Social Science Education wants to start a conceptual debate about the impact of recent challenges for the making, regulating and the practical performing of civic education in different educational contexts and settings. As is well known, educational politics today comprise almost always multi-level settings from local to international or from micro to macro levels. This suggests, in the first place, to make use of a broad basic concept, the approach of educational macro levels. This suggests, in the first place, to make use of a broad basic concept, the approach of educational governance. We want, however, to go beyond and advocate a widening of empirical and theoretical perspectives on civic and citizenship education. Therefore, we propose neo-pragmatistic approaches from sociology for an elaborate and productive analysis of multi-level dynamics in civic education. By doing so, alternative theoretical foci can be set on domains of critical transformative impact and significance, without, however, losing sight of the broader context of civic education in the political field.

As there is little consensus in the field about the meaning and the epistemological status of the concept of governance and its analytical potential, we want to clarify its key conceptual foundations and definitions (section 2), before demonstrating its diverse uses in the field of educational research (section 3), raising the crucial problems of analysing agency in civic educational research (section 4), suggesting new research perspectives for analysing actor-centred multi-level dynamics in civic education by means of neo-pragmatist conventionalist educational research (section 5), and finally presenting and theoretically contextualising the contributions of the authors of this volume (section 6).

2 Governance: A multivocal concept
Despite its established roots in the very early days of new institutionalist economics (Coase, 1937) and later in business management through the idea of corporate governance, governance as a social science concept was established more generally in the 1980s as part of public policy analyses to describe “the interaction between many governing actors that are not all state nor public stakeholders” (Leca, 1996, p. 339).

It is generally defined as “the process of coordinating actors, social groups and institutions to achieve goals that have been discussed and set collectively in fragmented and uncertain environments” (Le Galès, 1999). It also refers to “new interactive forms of government in which private actors, various public organisations, citizens’ groups or communities, and other types of stakeholders take part in the formulation of policy” (Marcou, 1997). Governance is therefore a means to better understand and to explain the evolution of decision-making tools and the coordination of public action. The need to develop a new heuristic framework has emerged after the reconfiguration of nation-states and their changing roles because of globalisation and international developments both in the European and global stage since the 1990s.

The use and application of the concept of governance in the European Union (EU) as a tool to form partnerships between citizens and civil society has played a particularly decisive role for the concept’s career. In this context, governance describes the concept of institutional polycentrism (Boussaguet, 2010), which puts emphasis not only on the complexity and multiplicity of places where decisions are made, but also on a modus operandi that is more horizontal and less coercive compared to the processes of authoritative policy making within hierarchical constellations of actors (Gräsel et al., 2011). “Governance regimes” are understood here as “the specific combinations of principles, norms, rules and procedures guiding the actions in a constellation of actors unique to a certain field or area” (ibid., p. 812).

As one can see, governance is not a concept or a theory, but a heuristic notion, which is better than others...
suited to new situations, where the classic framework of "government", connected to the monopoly of the state, is no longer appropriate.

But now and again, the term “governance” is used more prescriptively than analytically (see Sack on the twofold notions of governance as a normative and an analytic concept: Sack, 2015). It also highlights, for example, problems concerning the democratic quality of policy processes, such as the EU’s democratic deficit (strengthening the nation state’s central executives: Moravcsik, 2003) to emphasize the importance of democratic inclusiveness and the integration of civil society in public decision-making processes. "Governance" is also used normatively to debate the legitimacy of the state in regulating increasingly complex issues in the context of risk societies (Beck, 1986) and to illustrate the necessity to reconfigure the state in a way that calls on the particular knowledge and expertise of relevant civil society actors. These uses sometimes involve questioning how parliamentary democracy works in Europe:

"One of the main reasons that parliamentary systems are increasingly marginalized in modern politics and governance is that western societies have become highly differentiated and far too complex for a parliament or its government to monitor, acquire sufficient knowledge and competence, and to deliberate on. Today manifold discourses, negotiations, policy-making and implementation take place in thousands of specialized policy settings or sub-governments" (Andersen & Burns 1996, 229).

For that reason, governance has been particularly used in research about the construction and functioning of the EU and its specific modes of decision-making, characterised by multi-level governance and the juxtaposition of non-state actors alongside government bodies (Hooghe, 2001.

The analytical perspective of "governance" is a changing one, connected in specific ways with the theoretical frameworks within which the concept is used and appropriated (see also below). It has as well been used by theorists of rational choice and public choice as by theorists of public management sticking more particularly to the idea of efficiency. These theories seem to translate governance in terms that are typically addressed in the political science of neoclassical economics, which puts emphasis on the idea of optimisation and balance. “Good governance” thus implies a weakening of the state and government, the creation of new spaces for the free operation of the market and the freedom of various strategic actors. It also illustrates the idea of an institutional polycentrism that is more efficient in areas of collective choices (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977). Thus, in this context institutional interventions and public actions seem to focus solely on dealing with potential market failures.

But governance has also been used by neo-marxist proponents, including Anglo-Saxon researchers in urban sociology, and their analyses of public policy, marked by the limited role of local governments compared to the private interests of real estate agents. In this sense, neo-marxist studies allude to the substitution of the idea of governance to that of government (Jessop, 1995).

Other research has used the concept of governance to analyse the different forms of the modern state’s failures in fulfilling its mission and its inability to enforce laws or decisions and impose its legitimacy to civil society groups (Mayntz, 1993). The idea of governance also reflects the drive of civil society groups to take active part in solving social problems and creating multiple social opportunity structures (Kooiman, 2003).

3 Between economisation and globalisation: Governance approaches in the study of educational systems

Governance in educational research is heuristically relevant to the multi-level analysis of the control over reform processes, but also to the observation of practical behaviour in the implementation of reforms by actors in specific situations. It allows the study of multiple institutional levels in the management of education and thus often thoroughly integrates the logic of new public management (NPM) and accountability, initiated more particularly at the European and/or international level (Merki et al., 2014). Thus, many analysis of this type remain more or less descriptive and do not fully seize the need for a theoretical framework, as governance analysis itself only provides a heuristic for analysing multi-level policy-making, new regulative modes and public-private networks of actors (Altrichter et al., 2007).

In public policies in general as well as in education policy, current changes of the modes of governance are the result of several crucial factors, including the increased importance of the supranational and/or the local, as well as the common challenges and the participatory claims of economic and professional stakeholders. Traditional theories of education and educational policy have been conceived within the conceptual framework of the modern state and the essential and notably unique role of government, which is being challenged by globalisation and economisation. In this context, governance approaches are used to question the evolution and deep realignment in the processes of organising and managing educational systems (Pelletier, 2009).

Today, the new managerial public organisation of education is discussed as being an intrinsic part of the process of globopolitanism, a result of the dual phenomenon of localisation and cosmopolitanism (Ulijens & Yilimaki, 2017). There is a “redefinition of how power and influence is distributed anew between levels, transnational e.g. agencies, central administration and local schools, between state level administration and private (family) interests, but also within each level.” (ibid, 5). This is especially true for the antinomic globalisation and renationalisation dynamics of curricula under transformative stress (see in civic education: Szukala, 2016).

Alongside the analysis of the consequences of regionalisation and decentralisation movements (Mons, 2004; Nickel, 2016), which are sometimes rooted in the local traditions of participatory and deliberative democracy (Lessard, 2006), studies on educational governance also
chiefly address the problematic roles of private and semi-private actors in the management of educational systems (Alexadriou et al., 2000) and in the development of learning materials and curricula (Ballarino, 2011, see in economic education: Hedtke, 2011). Newer analysis seem to point to clearcut neo-marxian and materialistic types of theoretical perspectivation, when questioning the basic role of corporate actors (Gunter et al., 2017) and the privatisation of education in general (see Ball & Youndell, 2008: endogenous privatisation by importing ideas, practices and technologies from the market world; exogenous privatisation by commodification and commercialisation of school services and technology/materials used in the classroom).

A third important approach that uses the concept of governance in the field of education questions the growing importance of output-evaluations and quantification-orientation in public action and policy decisions in the context of internationalisation (Musselin, 2008; Altbach & Knight, 2007; Chatel, 2001), more particularly Europeanisation (Normand, 2016). In general, Europe is increasingly a matter of concern while becoming "the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world" (Kok, 2004).

Furthermore, the concept of governance is recurrently used for meta-analyses of how different claims on democratic regulation of education are balanced and to understand how "the apparent consensus on values, norms and modes of collective functioning within various socio-demographic areas is built, maintained and changed" (Charlier & Croché, 2017).

Finally, educational governance analysis replicates some of the strengths but also the weaknesses of governance analysis in other fields of public action: Some strands are overly functionalistic, descriptive and power-blind, they sometimes badly conceptualize the real "new" role of the national states and have a quite poor explanatory power with regard to problems of participation and the legitimacy of actors in typical concrete educational settings (Sack, 2015, p. 113).

4 Theoretical strands of governance analysis and educational regulation of citizenship: The problem of agency

The above brief introduction into "governance" as an approach for analysing post-modern policy-making and different forms of cooperation ("governance modes") between different types of actors at different levels of government also refers to the specific contexts of educational governance and above all to the continuing transnationalisation of the field.

The problem of balancing and acknowledging democratic responsibility and agency is particularly highlighted in the context of European policy steering, which has triggered the emergence of a European educational space through regulation and re-regulation of important parts of the national education systems (Jakobi et al., 2010; Capano & Piattoni, 2011). This is especially true for the tertiary level as a target of European policy of mutual recognition of educational certificates and diploma. In the OECD, the "peer-learning" of nation states in context of the so called "soft governance" via the 1995 "Soft Governance in Transition"-campaign transformed the ways education is "self"-governed by establishing new governance structures such as a decentralisation/devolution and the centralisation of steering functions as well as new governance devices such as performance standards and certificates.

These new modes of governance are actively promoted by central agents in recently established international networks (Hartong & Schwabe, 2013), who support these new governance modes and (sometimes) simultaneously discredit the more or less "overstable" institutional arrangements driving the national arenas of educational policy making, where traditional stakeholders and organisations, such as teacher unions and academics' professional associations, play an important part (see e.g. Wilkoszewski & Sundy, 2014).

Thus, the globalized transformation of education through trans- and supra-national governance is habitually disconnected from typical policy networks of practitioners and regulative styles in education and is primarily related to the means and discourses, which promote perspectives that highlight how education systems are linked to production regimes and markets (see for the PISA example: Dale and Robertson 2007).

The new basic premise is an entrepreneurial nation state in global competition (Hartong & Münch, 2012). Here, educational governance mainly refers to the competitive distribution of economic opportunities through the allocative functions of education systems (Fend, 2011), which in modern economies connect human resources with employment in manifold ways, often also sideling socio-economic contexts and the functions that public education performs in different national welfare models (see also the connection to Varieties of Capitalism, Iversen & Stephans, 2008; Hoelscher, 2012; Hurrelmann & Quenzel, 2011; Busemeyer, 2014).

In this context, institutional change from above triggers educational systems that are undergoing rapid change at the macro-level, characterized above all by the increasing organisational differentiation, regulation by output standards and commodification as well as the Europeanisation of certificates, which have been exhaustively analysed in the last decades: Education has become a prominent field of European-level action and governance through harmonisation policies, such as the Bologna process (Lawn 2002). These policies are based on shared and comparative assessments, which have formed a genuine common "know-how of governance" (Novoa & Yariv-Mashalt, 2003; Grek, 2008, 2011) built on a mix of policy diffusion and supranational regulation (Rogers, 2010).

However, these international directives face a certain resistance and a critique (Coman & Lacroix, 2007; Jones, 2011), which is reinforced by the procedural opacity due to the multiple levels of decision-making and also due to the fact that European and international institutions develop efficient enforcement strategies that are always effective when highly organized stakeholders
representing powerful special interests successfully instrumentalise international obligations and circumvent national gatekeepers (Panait & Teodoru, 2017; Gunter, et al. 2017).

But, while the rapid transformation especially of vocational education systems (Trampusch, 2009; Verdier, 2008; Verdier, 2012) is in the focus of extensive social scientific analysis and critique, other functions of the systems of education, above all those still characterised by particularly strong levels of path dependency and actors’ resistance to change, are less taken into account (Green & Preston, 2006).

Beyond that, all types of educational regulation and government are carried out under conditions of improbability of effective outcomes of macro-political-programs in micropolitical educational situations. Curricularly formatted school knowledge provided in teaching situations always suffers from the technology deficits of pedagogy (Luhmann & Schorr, 1979). Those regulative “failures” elucidate the contingent conditions under which specific educational governance outcomes – the “production” of skills and competencies – tend to be even more uncertain in the pedagogical domain than in a good number of other policy domains (Dimmock, 1993).

Paradoxically, despite current high levels of concrete micro-regulation, a new culture of control and guidance (e.g. standard setting for specific teaching and learning processes, ubiquitous evaluation), educational actors get more and more under stress, because the general orientation towards evaluation and control creates growing internal incongruities and subjective strain, e.g. at the school actors’ level, who have till then been driven by local compromises and flexibility (Dérouet, 1992): As the micropolitics of educational regulation (Moos 2017) tend to undermine more general pedagogical norms and non-quantifiable educational objectives, actors in concrete educational settings express difficulties when trying to refer to a stable set of culturally shared educational norms, discourses and routine practices/heuristics to legitimise and to stabilise their concrete pedagogic actions. This is especially true for practices, which affect the sensible actualisation of the social, the moral, the economic and the political in school, most prominently in contexts of civic education.

Still, under growing societal tensions and intensifying claims on education in a context of a debate about decivilisation/radicalisation, political polarisation, “re-gression” and social and normative erosion in West European societies (see the eminent international volume about societal regression: Geiselberger, 2017) a new debate on education and the pedagogical performances of educational actors emerges.

Actors are called to provide social stabilisation at public micro-levels (class-rooms) and to fulfil multiple tasks for the social system apart from those of allocation, the mandatory certification of skills and the provision of human resources to markets (Oelkers, 2000). As the institutionalisation of mass education went hand in hand with the establishment of modern systems of government (Green, 1990; Luhmann, 2002) the functions of social integration, cultural transmission and the stabilisation of behavioural expectations in the constitutive era of modern mass societies are still valuable and still pivotal for understanding the institutional setting and ideational contexts of current educational systems (Popkewitz, 1991). Still, there is incongruity and there is an ever-growing tension between the allocative and integrative functions that also affects the justification strategies of actors vis-à-vis schools and education in situations, when concrete transformative pedagogical and organisational norms are to be explained and legitimised.

Uljens and Ylimaki point to this issue as being a critical asynchronicity, a parallelism of continuity and discontinuity of current educational norms and theory with ongoing societal transformations:

“In the beginning of the (this) nation-state era, citizenship as cultural identity and religion was promoted over citizenship as political participation. Today the idea of education is, therefore, connected to a political-democratic citizenship idea, both in terms of that education was to be equally offered to each and every one, but also that education was to prepare individuals for political participation, economic life and culture. The recent policy, education for the globalized competition state, is redefining a concept of citizenship emphasizing the subject, not as a cultural or political citizen but as an economic one.” (Uljens & Ylimaki, 2017, p. 15).

In this context, conventional governance research may be able to describe empirical multi-level transformation processes and globalized actor networks, but lacks a comprehensive understanding of the individual actors’ orientations and their handling of contradictory norms in concrete educational settings.

This is not only valuable for “institutionalised” agency, such as government actors, educational professionals, learners and parents. But it is also relevant for ways of subjectivation of societal norms and ideas in general, when education performs as “ultimate anthropopolitical” device (Ricken, 2006). A device, which explicitly does not address the different modes of governance, such as the hierarchical intervention, context regulation and adaptation, but the cultural transmission of values, the assimilation of societal norms and aspirations towards a “good life” as a human and a citizen incorporated at the subject’s level (see critical on educational expansion towards a moral and/or value education of the individual: Luhmann, 2002, p. 122f.).

Current theories habitually connected with educational governance approaches (e.g. rational choice and the institutional economics of education) start from stable sets of assumptions explaining behaviour in certain fields of educational governance research (such as parental school choices, veto player constellations in implementation processes, resource allocation and standard setting in educational systems). They fail, however, to provide valuable working hypotheses about when and how which norms and beliefs are mobilised to stabilise and to justify specific actions in power driven and/or ambiguous educational settings, where actors have to
make critical choices and to provide an interpretation of the setting making their own choice possible and sensible.

Recent research is progressively focusing on these blind spots mobilising Bourdieusian field theory as well as Foucauldian governmentality theory to provide deeper understandings of the creation of the field and the instrumentalisation of the new international symbolic capital (Bourdieu, see e.g. Hartong & Schwabe 2013) as well as the embodiment of new educational efficacy and efficiency norms, such as a quasi-panoptical educational monitoring, which creates and affects educational practices at any level of policing and classroom implementation (Foucault, see Moos, 2017, p. 164) in ways Sørensen and Torfing call the simultaneity of subjection and subjectification (Sørensen & Torfing 2008, see also on subjectification in education: Davies, 2006).

After this very brief outline of governance approaches in research of the educational field, we now turn to a very short outline of a neo-pragmatistic, conventionalist approach to provide an approach aiming at connecting competent agency with a critical structural analysis in civic education.

5 Comparing concepts for comparative analysis of citizenship education
Cultural, political, cognitive embeddedness and path dependency are key characteristics of civic and citizenship education. This field of education and educational policy is involved in potent normative contexts shaped by the processes of nation-building, the specific institutional set-ups of the school systems, citizenship conceptions as well as norms and routines driving educational policies and actors’ strategies (see e.g. the paper of Ahmad, Ethier and Lefrançois as well as Sen and Starkey in this issue of the JSSE). Moreover, institutions, situations and practices of citizenship education are connected and contingent upon one another, in terms of concepts, expectations, legitimations, organisations, persons and resources. Usually, these entanglements of citizenship education are conceived as a system of vertical levels – micro-, meso-, macro-level, often assumed as a hierarchical order – and complementary horizontal relations. This strand of thinking is exemplified by drawing a straightforward picture of citizenship education policy from the supranational and to the national as the Council of Europe or the European Union and national governments or ministries of education, via regional bodies or local school authorities down to the micro-level of classroom management (cf. Hedtke & Zimenkova, 2008).

Such multi-level structures of citizenship education governance are often taken for granted. But empirical evidence is increasingly pointing to alternative ways of analysis adopting a reverse direction: educational policy analysis is highlighting that education, its curricular content, goals and procedures cannot solely be understood as results from the efforts of a broad range of stakeholders, competing and collaborating for specific educational goals while continuously transgressing the micro-macro-divide (Levin, 2008; Westbury, 2008; Hedtke & Zimenkova, 2008). Historical analysis has shown how at classroom levels even school subjects themselves have come into being through a complex process of actors organizing and lobbying for their introduction – contrary to the idea of government or the academy handing them down to the general public (Goodson, 1999). This research gives sufficient reason for questioning the prevailing image of a kind of hierarchy of levels and for choosing research approaches which put the actors’ agency, perspectives, practices and collaborative action, in brief: the situation, in the centre of interest (Eymard-Duvernoy, 2012; see Grass in this volume).

The économie des conventions or economics of conventions (EC) provides the theoretical and methodological framework, concepts, methods and empirical evidence to overcome well-established, still influential dichotomies of social science research like micro vs. macro analysis, individualism vs. holism or agency vs. structuralism. Drawing on EC allows an elaborated research in the field of citizenship education, a field populated with embedded and competent actors who are strongly interested to stabilise their situation by establishing a common understanding, normally via working on a compromise. In doing so, competent actors are accustomed to refer to a limited plurality of values and justifications and to make use of an assemblage of objects (form investments) in order to justify their claims and to coordinate themselves in an uncertain or contested situation (cf. Boltsanski & Thévenot, 1991, pp. 286-290; Dodier, 1993; Thévenot, 2002; Thévenot, 2006, pp. 227-259; Thévenot, 2007).

Below, we will compare the leading questions and the potential performance of conventionalism with the main features of a multi-level governance approach. Within this context, we focus on the understanding of situations and the conventionalist methodology of situationalism and the concept of interlinked situations.

5.1 Multi-level governance and économie des conventions
Seen from a conventionalist standpoint, the approach of multi-level governance still includes a more or less managerial core idea. This mode of thinking, however, was weakened by moving away from a machine model of political steering towards an enlarged, differentiated, loosened and less state-centred understanding of governing which also encompasses leeway in decision-making, self-management and self-governance (Gunter et al. 2017). In contrast, from a conventionalist strand of thinking, research should not focus on specific mode(s) and levels of governance, but concentrate more generally on the situation of a group of actors who are challenged by the practical problem of coordination (Diaz-Bone, 2015, p. 329).

Nevertheless, both approaches have some common ground. By and large, the conventionalist concept of situation shares the emphasis of the governance regime approach on polycentrism, complexity, horizontality and actors’ scope of action. Apart from that, the bulk of EC research is not devoted to the research of the changing
role of the state and its relationship to non-state actors, the reconfiguration of policy making and implementation, questions which are at the centre of governance research. Rather, instead of analysing different forms and levels of governance and its impact, the conventionalist situationalism has been applied in research of a broad scope of empirical phenomena, ranging from the construction of markets for specific products and goods, environmental conflicts around infrastructure projects to the reconfiguration of categories in welfare and labor statics. Moreover, conventionalist research addresses the field of education (Derouet, 2000a; Imdorf, 2011 and 2017; Leemann, 2014; Leemann & Imdorf, 2015; Normand, 2000; Peetz et al., 2013; Verdier, 2017).

Having said that, it has to be realised that governance and conventionalist approaches and research may complement one another. This holds especially in the field of citizenship education. In some respects, the situationalist approach resembles concepts of soft governance which emphasise informality, horizontality, intentionality of actors’ action taking place in switch-role playing field of governors and governed (Göhler et al., 2009). Soft governance analysis focuses on influencing actors, their options, decisions and actions via communication and interpretation, argumentation, discursive practices and symbols. At first glance, this approach seems to have a great deal in common with a conventionalist approach. A closer look reveals some complementary differences, the two most important of which are the understanding of situation and the concept of actor and agency in a situation.

5.2 Situations and situationalism

The conventionalist notion of situation emphasises problems of coordination of actors in situations marked by uncertainty, critique and conflicts, arising from a plurality of justifications and their agency and competencies for tackling such coordination problems of situations. On one side, this plurality generates the contingency of practical situations, but at the same time it provides a limited number of acceptable justifications and a variety of material objects actors in a situation lean on to create a common interpretation, to construct a compromise and to resolve problems of coordination and conflict, albeit often only for some time (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p. 338-343). Common worlds or “orders of worth” which actors may refer to for justifying and evaluating actions, actors and objects are the inspired, domestic, civic, opinion, market and industrial world and, introduced later, the ecological and the project world (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, pp. 369-373; Thévenot et al. 2000/2013, pp. 241, 256-257; Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999, pp. 161-207; Díaz-Bone, 2015, pp. 135-153). For research on civic and citizenship education, the approach of “worlds of justification” offers the advantage of a theoretical sound as well as empirically well-founded tool promising to be suitable for comparative international research, too.

Situations are understood as “complex arrangements or constellations of objects, cognitive formats, problems ( coordinations to be realized), institutional settings, persons, concepts” (Díaz-Bone, 2011b, p. 49). A conventionalist analysis of a situation “reconstructs the complex practice of the interplay between coordinating actors and conventions” and investigates “the logic actors apply in order to coordinate themselves in the process of production” (Díaz-Bone, 2011b, p. 54; emphasis added).

Some examples for the diversity of such products in the field of citizenship education are syllabi, collections of material, teaching units, tests, sample solutions and rating sheets, local concepts of excursions, local mission statements of a school subject or of the school, school certificates and labels or cooperation agreements with stakeholders. Conventions denote shared supra-individual logics used in a situation by actors for coordinating their own actions and the actions of others as well as for evaluating these actions, other individuals and objects (Salais, 1989, pp. 213-214; Díaz-Bone, 2015, p. 324).

Moreover and most importantly, a conventionalist approach to situations highlights the entanglement of the actor(s) with the material environment within the respective situation and its objects. Material objects play a constitutive role for the actors’ agency and action, for coordination and evaluation of situations (Dodier, 1993). Current examples from the educational fields are classroom architecture and furniture, seating arrangements, presentation devices, computers, smartphones, wall maps, (inter-)national flags, textbooks and teacher manuals, national tests and grading, exercise books, working sheets, test forms, class-registers, voter advice applications, democracy contests and prizes and so forth (cf. e.g. Normand, 2000; Acikalin & Kilic, 2017; Kristensen and Solhaug 2016; Strandler, 2017). The JSSE issue “Insights into Citizenship Classrooms: The Art of Documentation & Description” presents a valuable photo documentation of objects in schools in Denmark, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg and Poland (Grammes 2014a and 2014b).

The logic of a convention results and consolidates from processes of iterated interactions which prove to be legitimate and viable, it is perceived by the actors as a kind of natural common accord of a situation which is taken for granted (Storper & Salais, 1997, p. 16-17; Salais, 1989, p. 213). The conventionalist starting point of understanding situations and their interconnectedness is “the individual’s interpretative effort”, seen from the perspective of the actors from inside the situation (Storper & Salais, 1997, pp. 15; Salais, 2007, pp. 96). Actors’ efforts of interpretation, their leaning on objects and their reference to other situations are best to be analysed in a critical situation which requires explicit justification (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, pp. 265-270; Díaz-Bone, 2014, pp. 325-330).

In short, situations are the units of analysis for conventionalist research (Díaz-Bone, 2015, pp. 327-330). Against this background, a radical version of situationalism would focus on the inner perspective of the situation as perceived and narrated by the actors themselves and reconstruct the situations’ context also from this internal view only. A moderate situationalist
approach starts in the same way but follows the actors’
and arrangements’ contextual references and goes
beyond the situation’s border in order to analyse the
relevant context from an outside perspective. Both un-
derstandings are quite near to an ethno-methodological
account, but enable to transcend pure localism by
considering more general modes of evaluation like ge-
eralised values, justifications or conventions (Thévenot
et al., 2000/2013, p. 266). Conventions, for example,
have a trans-situational scope and actors can use them
as principles of structuring a range of situations (Dodier,
1993, pp. 73-82).
In either case, understanding situations as primarily
locally constituted constellations of actors, objects and
devices also helps to avoid reductionist approaches
which presuppose top-down impacts from superordinate
levels on subordinate levels. In this regard, convention-
alist approaches refrain from deductive inferences, for
example from alleged characteristics of a nation down to
the feature of local conflicts (Thévenot et al. 2000, p.
236). This caveat also applies to comparative research on
contested situations in the field citizenship education.

5.3 Multi-level structure and interlinked situations
Much more than an actor-centred multi-level governance
approach, situationalist research focuses on actor-
deﬁned conceptions of and perspectives on a local
situation. In conventionalist research, “local” does not
denote the placement of a situation at the “micro-level”,
but the understanding of the actors themselves that they
are situated in a speciﬁc situation. Other “levels” get in
touch with local situations from inside, if and as far as
they are present or presented by actors, objects or
constellations. In brief, other “levels” are coming in by
being made relevant from within. Conventionalist
situationalism helps to turn multi-level governance
approaches the right way up again by reframing multi-
level analysis as locally situated links analysis.
Thévenot, Moody and Lafaye provide an example of a
situationalist multi-level approach, a comparison of cases
of environmental disputes in France and the United
States (Thévenot et al., 2000/2013). They analyse the
“claims and arguments made by the conﬂicting entities”
and its dynamics as well as the “institutional, technical,
legal, and material arrangements which support or
complement the situation” (Thévenot et al. 2000/2013,
229). Thus, the “levels” which are related to, interfering
with or inﬂuencing a speciﬁc situation are not deﬁned
and ascribed to a situation in advance but reconstructed
from the very situation itself, from its entities and their
situational communication and intervention.
For the economics of conventions and its metho-
dological situationalism, an analysis of multi-level gover-
nance requires to turn towards situations and to focus on
coordination problems of actors in a speciﬁc situation
(Díaz-Bone, 2011b, p. 49). The mode of strategically
inﬂuencing actors by modes and means of governance,
moving from one level to the next is expected only to
occur from time to time as a special form of interaction
within a local situation. Put in a nutshell, the approaches
of multi-level governance and situationalism are
distinguished by their point of view: an internal stand-
point from within the situation placing interpretative
processes of the actors to the fore versus an external
perspective putting strategic action in the centre of
conventions provides an interpretative approach to local
situational constellations which are seen as being based
on a shared legitimate principle of coordination –
embedded in a plurality of principles belonging to plural
“orders of worth” —, whereas the (soft) governance
concept represents an understanding of actors who are
strategically acting in a systematic multi-level con-
stellation and striving for an equilibrium of individual

Actors in schools legitimise their teaching practices, for
instance, by referring to objects and devices like the
national curriculum for citizenship education, to a recent
educational policy of participation communicated via
the media or by using the social studies textbook approved
by the ministry. By enacting and justifying their everyday
practices they simultaneously relate their local situation
to other situations and reinforce these relations by refer-
ing to them. In this way, they create and stabilise
multiple networks of interlinked situations.

Obviously, situations in the field of citizenship
education can also be coupled from outside by means of
power or coercion like government decrees or discipli-
nary measures because school-based citizenship educa-
tion is integrated into the partially hierarchical structure
of the public educational system. From the actors’
perspective, references to outside situations are used as
resources to articulate and structure, criticise and
legitimise claims, positions and modes of coordination in
uncertain or contested local situations.

Such external references to other situations become
visible or signiﬁcant when they are used, claimed,
articated or contested in processes of solving coordi-
nation problems of actors. Such extra-situational refe-
ences made in situations allow reconstructing the
actors’ situational perception of the relevance of other
situations and actors’ work of establishing links to
elements of other situations. An analysis of the actors’
cognition, communication and collective construction of
relevant relationships and networks of situations reveals
the working of a multi-level structure of governance in
a speciﬁc ﬁeld.

Governance performs in concrete situations and multi-
level governance is taking place in a multiplicity of inter-
linked situations. Situations may be connected through
entities like actors, objects or conﬁgurations (assem-
blages) which embody, symbolise or explicitly refer to
other situations and their constellations. Actors of a
situation in the ﬁeld of citizenship education, for
instance, may perceive themselves as incorporated into
an organisation (class, school, education authority or
school inspection), a teaching profession, an academic
discipline, the local community, the local or national
citizenry, and so forth (cf. Verdier, 2010, p. 114). These
social ties of educational actors are related to latent
outside situations of which some elements may be occasionally brought in a situation if they are thought to be useful for tackling and solving problems of coordination or supporting claims of justification.

A multi-level network of situations in the field of citizenship education, for instance, may relate a political situation of contested educational policies of integration, assimilation and participation of the migrant youth with pedagogical situations in schools where actors have to deal with the official expectation of imparting and reinforcing common political values and the students’ claims for acknowledgment of diversity and request for real political, economic and social participation.

Multi-level analysis, then, is doing research on networks of situations which can be reconstructed from the inner perspective of a number of situations and to find out how these situations are linked with one another. From within a situation, other situations may be perceived, acknowledged or contested as superordinate, subordinate or coordinate situations, entities, actors or objects. Moreover, cross-situational constraints are to be considered, too (Thévenot et al., 2000/2013, p. 266). The appropriate theoretical concept is a perspectival, flexible and changeable cluster of locally linked situations, not a whole of different levels in a more or less stratified order. Its soundness, viability and capability are a question of empirical research.

6 Empirical perspectives on educational governance in citizenship education
 Processes of financialisation in economy and society and its expressions in educational policy, instructional contexts and teaching materials from the field of citizenship education provide textbook examples for multilevel governance analysis and situationalist research drawing on the economics of conventions.

An excellent starting point for this complex of themes is the review essay “Finance-informed citizens, citizen-informed finance”, a paper motivated by reading the “International Handbook of Financial Literacy” (Aprea & Wuttke et al., 2016). Lauren E. Willis from the US-Loyola Law School presents four constructs of financial education prevailing in contributions to the field of financial education and financial literacy and thus thoroughly divulges the governmentality behind educational research in economic and especially financial education. Her review essay is a significant analysis of the governance potential of didactical constructions and therefore a valuable contribution on its own to the ongoing critical debate about the educational governance in socio-economic and civic education.

How a specific educational approach to financialisation promoted as supra-national policy concept by the OECD is translated and transformed into national and regional educational programmes can be exemplarily traced in a Canadian case study. In their article “Making ‘good’ or ‘critical’ citizens: from social justice to financial literacy in the Quebec Education Program”, Marc André Ethier and David Lefrançois use the perspective of citizenship education to analyse the development of financial education, presented in 2016 by the Ministry of Education of Quebec. Using the typology of Westheimer and Kahne, they conducted a thematic content analysis of the programme, which allowed them to identify good citizen practices. Their work sheds light on the understanding of the political presuppositions and implications of this type of education that has been developed in several western countries in the past ten years following the recommendations of the OECD. The study shows how the content and the values transmitted through this type of curriculum, but also the terms of evaluating it, reflect more broadly the choices made by a society.

Citizenship education in schools, however, is not only shaped by international organisations, national governments, education authorities and supervision of schools. Professional organisations, too, may play an influential role in citizenship education policies. In his paper “Political Science and the Good Citizen”, Iftikhar Ahmad reconstructs the impact of the American Political Science Association (APSA) on the pre-collegiate social studies curriculum throughout the twentieth century. His research reveals that APSA exerted influence as well via professional cooperation with teachers as well as via political lobbying. Ahmad traces the development and variation of the organisation’s worldviews and policies with regard to citizenship education from 1908 to 1998. He shows how organised political scientists tried to secure the conformity of school curricula with their own conceptions of citizenship and education and their changing - image of the “good citizen”. This piece of research may be read as an example of an actor centred
theory of educational governance. Moreover, the paper presents a very valuable study of the tension between the normative mission of schools to foster the citizenship spirit of the youth and the approaches to politics and citizenship from political science - which are, of course, normative, too.

The question of the “right” model of citizenship and citizen is almost always in the centre of attention. Only on rare occasions, however, the implicitly preferred picture of the citizen is carefully delineated and scholarly well-founded. Starting with the argument that cosmopolitan democracy is beyond any realistic perspective of dealing with global crises, Andreas Eis and Claire Moulin-Doos discuss challenges of citizenship education resulting from young people’s feeling of powerlessness. They hold a bi-dimensional notion of citizens as co-actors and right-holders and ask whether this is applicable to supranational and global levels. Their analysis of European and German policy documents reveals that these papers mainly address students as right-holders, seldom as political actors and even then, they narrow agency to a-political figures like consumer-citizenship, socio-civic engagement or volunteering. This also holds for the guidance of global citizenship education published by the UNESCO. These educational devices exhibit a more or less non-political construct of the citizen as a common feature and as a shared mission for education. Moreover, the authors found three blind spots: global power, conflicts and exploitation of the global south. Eis and Moulin-Doos criticise the affirmative and overoptimistic stance of these approaches, their overestimation of the power of education and their disregard of power relations and inequalities. Finally, they claim a political cosmopolitanism based on a twofold model of the citizen as right-holder and political actor. This may be understood as an attempt to change actor centred educational governance of citizenship education by establishing an alternative guiding figure of the “good citizen”.

What can be marked as a “good school” of today and how can it be legitimised? In her paper “Justification and Critique of Educational Reforms in Austria: How Teachers and Headteachers (Re-)Frame New Governance”, Doris Grass explores the Austrian case of school reforms in an actor and structure centred neo-pragmatic perspective: what are the justifications of central change agents mobilized by actors in critical situations of school reform? The article analyses the connections between everyday re-evaluation and contextualisations of educational norms with conflicting macro-political orientations of new educational governance regimes in times of societal transformation. It sticks to a conventionalist theoretical framework (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991) to analyse moments of critical evaluation and affirmative justification of macro-political reforms as well as of everyday work practices. The paper thus focuses on changing “conventions”, which on the one hand highlight the economisation of schools and education (“market”, “industrial” and “flexible” convention, Boltanski & Chiaparelli, 2009). On the other hand, the references made to the common public good and to the so called “civic convention” highlight the critical potential of conventionalist analysis to elaborate the multifaceted ways competent actors choose to stabilise their social and professional world.

If a “good school” is expected to perform in an effective way, then its social quality and outcome, too, may be subject to external inspection. The paper “Inspecting School Social Quality: Assessing and Improving School Effectiveness in the Social Domain” presents an analysis of the qualities and the impact of school climate-focused school inspections. Dijkstra and Daas raise an important problem of the evaluation-focused governance of schools: the relationship between causes and effects in contexts of institutional change. Agency is not only rooted in educational actors but also in the devices used to analyse and to organise the data gathering in contexts of school inspections.

However, the interplay of mechanisms in- and outside the evaluated organisations makes it difficult to isolate the effects of the new school governance on the social climate and democratic quality of a school. Furthermore, the authors suggest that an evaluation based school effectiveness model allows analysing central aspects of school social quality. In the end, the inspection itself can influence school performance in a quite differentiated range of ways. The authors present three ideal-type models of inspection, focusing on outcomes, school improvement and processes.

The article of Abdulkerim Sen and Hugh Starkey “The rise and fall of citizenship and human rights education in Turkey” shows specific vulnerabilities of civic education governance regimes in political systems, which undergo deep societal and political transformation. This is especially true when policy change in education is induced from the outside as in the Turkish case during the period of commitment to accession to the European Union (1999-2005). The authors explore how the citizenship education curriculum translates manifest- tations of power and change from a secular national ethos and identity to the post-Cold War democratisation movement and the electoral rise to power of a religious party from the late nineties onwards. By exploring the evolution of the curriculum in a crucial period, during which political power was switching from the ideology of secular nationalism to that of religious nationalism, the present study illustrates ways in which external and internal influences may affect citizenship education. In particular, it contributes to the international governance debate over the role of external agencies in curriculum change, not only in civic education, but probably also in other domains of socio-economic education.

The current issue presents two more papers beyond the field of the featured topic. The revival of religion and religiously framed conflicts in societies and of related religion based policies in the field of citizenship education also require changes in teacher education. Mary Anne Rea Ramirez and Tina Marie Ramirez dedicate their study “Changing Attitudes, Changing Behaviors. Conceptual Change as a Model for
Teaching Freedom of Religion or Belief (“FORB”) to the challenges of teaching Freedom of Religion or Belief (FORB) in a contemporary world that is shaped by an increase in religion-based conflicts (cf. for example the report “Mobilising for the Values of the Republic” - France’s Education Policy Response to the “Fragmented Society”: A Commented Press Review” from Matthias Busch and Nancy Morys in JSSE 3-2016 and the commentary from Claude Proeschel in JSSE 2-2107). The tolerant and respectful understanding of different beliefs by everyone is a key challenge in societies that are de facto pluralistic but also weakened by intolerance, extremism and radicalism. The authors emphasize the vulnerability of children to such intolerant views, a problem that only few curricula seem to address. Using data from research conducted between 2015 and 2017 among teachers in several countries in the Middle East who have been trained on FORB and on teaching methods and conceptual change theories, the authors examine both the consequences and the potential of these ideas, compared to more traditional pedagogical methods, in promoting an awareness of the importance of freedom of religion and belief for peaceful coexistence.

Vocational schools mostly remain in the shadows of public debates and scholarly research on social studies and citizenship education. In her lesson report “Places of Remembrance’ - spaces for historical and political literacy”, Susanne Offen presents empirical evidence from classroom observation of teaching strategies of imparting historical and political knowledge on the prosecution of Nazi crimes. She discusses how teachers may effectively foster an inquiring attitude, a critical practice of working with material from an exhibition and a differentiated judgment concerning justice in a recent Nazi trial. Her research shows how students, stimulated by an artistic intervention, not only developed sustainable curiosity, but also constructed their own conclusions on this controversial issue. One of the most important claims of this paper may be that students should be acknowledged as “legitimate speakers from the beginning” of the learning process, a process formatted as the students’ own research project. Seen from an educational governance perspective, Offen’s study provides valuable evidence of an educational setting which relies on exhibits as a specific kind of material objects things and an exhibition as a material arrangement of meanings.

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Lauren E. Willis

Finance-Informed Citizens, Citizen-Informed Finance: An Essay Occasioned by the International Handbook of Financial Literacy*

Purpose: Throughout the world, the dominant discourse treats “financial literacy” as both necessary and sufficient to improve the well-being of individuals and society.

Findings: This essay argues that financial literacy is neither, and that promoting financial literacy is a perverse way to address the inadequate retirement funding, overindebtedness, financial crises, and other social ills that have inspired governments and educators to pursue it. In its place, this essay suggests that the aim of financial education ought to be to foster finance-informed citizens, who have the capacity for civic engagement that can create citizen-informed economic policies and financial regulation.

Keywords: Financial education, financial literacy, financial inclusion, civic education

1 Introduction

It is always challenging to review an anthology, and at 43 chapters from 74 contributors spanning 713 pages, the International Handbook of Financial Literacy (Springer 2016, Aprea, Wuttke, Bruer, Koh, Davies, Greimel-Fuhrmann, and Lopus, eds.) (hereinafter, the “Handbook”) makes “challenging” an understatement. So I begin with the caveat that this is not so much a review as an essay occasioned—or perhaps stated more accurately, both provoked and inspired—by the Handbook.

The Handbook contains a comprehensive compilation of the latest research and most cutting-edge thinking from around the world on “financial literacy.” The overarching takeaway from the volume is that we all know something is not right in our approach to this topic. Yet there is no clear agreement on what the problem is, or what to do about it.

Many of the chapters in the Handbook suggest potential prescriptions for this problem, but most address one aspect of the topic, disjointed from other equally-worthy concerns. In addition, despite many of the authors’ critical perspectives on conventional thinking about financial literacy, most continue to shoehorn their policy suggestions into a neoliberal, individualist frame. Although pressing for reform in such a fashion can increase political palatability and social acceptance, the existing conception of financial literacy may be encumbered with too much ideology and wishful thinking to achieve meaningful change within its discourse.

After reading the Handbook I was thus left wanting to bring all of the authors into one room to discuss this topic together. To debate, and to clarify where they disagree. To expand upon areas of agreement. To move the discussion forward, leveraging the collective wisdom of the contributors. I do not have the power (or the financial means) to bring all the contributors together, and so I will use this essay in part to imagine what might transpire if they were to have such a conversation.

I will begin by describing the narrow and unproductive, if not downright harmful, conceptions of financial literacy that have dominated political and social discourse on the topic in both wealthy and less-wealthy countries. Next I will discuss the broader and potentially more useful approaches that many of the contributions in the Handbook bring to this topic. Finally, taking as inspiration the matters on which the more forward-thinking authors display a fair degree of consensus, I will suggest that widespread individual and collective material well-being can only be achieved through country-specific political change, and that political change requires financially-informed citizenship, not “financial literacy.”

2 Traditional conceptions of financial literacy

What is “financial literacy”? Four constructs have dominated discussions throughout the world to date: financial literacy as money management ability, financial literacy as socialization, financial “capability” but without financial resources, and financial literacy as panacea. Each construct is a bit different, but they all flow from and reinforce neoliberal ideology. Unfortunately, neo-liberalism is a leading culprit in the lack of financial well-being experienced around the world. Conceptions of financial literacy thus have little chance of improving individual and collective financial well-being. The following discusses and critiques each of the four traditional constructs in turn.

2.1 Financial literacy as money management ability

In the U.S., we favor individualist and ahistorical understandings of nearly everything, and financial literacy is no exception. Financial literacy is centrally viewed as knowledge and skills possessed by individuals. These cognitive capacities, it is believed, enable individuals to engage in money management practices that will improve individual material well-being. Similar constructs exist throughout the world.

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This narrow traditional view of financial literacy as an individual’s ability to produce her financial well-being through the application of her own financial knowledge and skills is grounded in neoliberal axioms: Financial literacy is a teachable cognitive capacity of individuals; individuals achieve success through autonomous action and success is measured in material wealth. (See, e.g., Henchoz, 2016, pp. 98-99, for more.) The existing economic order, including pre-existing resource distributions and the structure of the marketplace, is taken as an exogenous given. Community, politics, and power are absent from the model.

Particularly outside of the U.S., many have begun to rhetorically posit a broader construct of financial literacy that includes financially-informed citizenship. Yet, as astutely recognized by Retzmann and Seeber (2016) in their chapter in the Handbook, financial literacy assessment tools, including the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), continue to reflect and contribute to a narrower view (p. 12).

Financial literacy tests, particularly those used in wealthy countries, generally hew to an information, skills, and money management approach to financial literacy. This is apparent throughout the Handbook, such as in the test used to assess financial literacy in New Zealand described by Cameron and Wood (2016, p. 186), the list of questions used to measure financial literacy in Austria provided by Greimel-Fuhrmann, Silgoner, Weber, and Taborsky (2016, pp. 256-257), and the topics covered in assessments of financial literacy in Switzerland discussed by Ackermann and Eberle (2016, pp. 350-351).

As educators teach students to pass these tests, the assessment tools actively construct the very quality that they purport to measure. Thus, the money management conception of financial literacy is reflected in and perpetuated by financial education programs. For example, Hašek and Petrášková (2016) in their contribution describe topics covered in financial literacy education in the Czech Republic as consisting of “money, household management, and financial products” (p. 678).

Many financial education programs grounded in the money management view of financial literacy are fairly superficial, with an “emphasis ... on practical knowledge within a given setting at a given time” (Pang, 2016, p. 588). In the U.S., for example, the objective of financial education in secondary schools is “to equip students with practical decision-making skills” related to financial matters (Gutter, Copur, and Garrison, 2016, p. 215). More sophisticated pedagogical approaches are advocated by several of the chapters in the Handbook. For example, Pang presents an educational program introduced in Hong Kong that is deeper and more durable than most, in that it teaches how economic concepts can be used to make decisions that maximize individual wealth regardless of the particular products or circumstances involved (pp. 594-598).

However, even sophisticated money management pedagogy is imbued with ideology and false information. For example, the U.S. Council for Economic Education standards presented in the contribution from Bosshardt (2016) falsely imply that earning, saving, borrowing, investing and insuring all take place as a result of cost-benefit calculations by individuals (p. 172). That people’s financial behaviors are overwhelmingly determined by their resources, opportunities, and other circumstances goes unmentioned. The U.S. standards further assume a context in which firms pay people what their labor is “worth” and charge people prices that reflect the actual cost and risk of the transaction to the firm (see ibid).

The assumptions of the economic theory on which this pedagogy is based are under increasing empirical stress. Witness, as Budd’s (2016) creative contribution to the Handbook points out, the death of the efficient markets hypothesis (p. 623). Further, we know that economically-irrelevant factors such as perceived race or ethnicity affect employment decisions, even when controlling for all other factors (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). Moreover, while exploitative pricing is nothing new, big data, proprietary algorithms, and machine learning are today institutionalizing price discrimination. For example, personal data is now used to predict the elasticity of each consumer’s demand to set personalized prices for credit (Experian, 2013) and insurance (Earnix, n.d.).

Thus, both wage-setting and price-setting mechanisms do not function in accordance with theoretical notions of neutral market-wide supply and demand curves and consumer surplus. Financial education and the money management conception of financial literacy embedded within it are based on market ideology, not market reality.

2.2 Financial literacy as financial socialization

Individuals frequently fail to put the knowledge, skills, and money management practices imparted in financial education into action. This is attributed to a lack of confidence in financial abilities, a lack of self-control in financial decision-making, and a lack of trust in the financial marketplace. The understanding of financial literacy as money management ability has been broadened in many countries to include these non-cognitive qualities—confidence, self-control, and trust.

For example, Handbook contributors van der Schors and Simons (2016) discuss the importance of trust, motivations, and attitudes in the Dutch context (p. 311). Stillwell (2016) notes that Welsh schools use financial education to instill “positive attitudes towards finance at an early age” (p. 360). The OECD (2012) likewise has incorporated attitude and behavior into its definition of financial literacy as “[a] combination of awareness, knowledge, skill, attitude and behaviour necessary to make sound financial decisions and ultimately achieve individual financial wellbeing” (p. 2; see also, e.g., Financial Literacy and Education Commission, 2016, pp. 8-9, discussing the importance of confidence, self-control, and “comfort” for financial decision-making).

That financial literacy involves e non-cognitive components reveals that financial literacy is not a technical construct, but a culturally-defined and socialized one. A striking example comes from the book’s chapter on
financial education in Romania, where children are taught “how people should behave in a bank” (Lacatus, 2016, p. 324). Another comes from Indonesia, where the government’s financial literacy campaign slogan was, “Let’s go to the bank” (Amidjono, Brock, and Junaidi, 2016, p. 285).

Particularly in less well-off countries, where the failures of neoliberalism are more obvious, financial literacy measurement instruments reflect and reinforce a conception of financial literacy as financial socialization. In particular, individuals who trust financial institutions are viewed as financially literate. In Amidjono, Brock, and Junaidi’s contribution about Indonesia, for example, the authors use ownership of a bank account, savings within the formal banking system rather than outside it, and use of a credit or debit card as their indicators of the population’s “financial literacy” (p. 281). In another chapter, Peña (2016) measures Mexican youths’ “bank appreciation.” He then codes more positive impressions of banks, alongside more patience and more mathematical ability, as equating to better “financial culture” (pp. 474 and 482).

Yet the socialization purposes of financial education are not limited to less well-off countries. For example, in the U.S., students are taught about, e.g., “the benefits of having financial knowledge and healthy financial behaviors” and “the social desirability and impact of being a financially responsible person” (Danes, Deenanath, and Yang, 2016, p. 429).

In Germany, Handbook contributors Frühauf and Retzmann (2016) explain, financial literacy promotion has two orientations (pp. 270-271). One (“Erziehung”) teaches people to protect themselves, provide for themselves, and otherwise behave according to societal standards (for example, by avoiding over-indebtedness). The other (“Bildung”), which the authors view as more “financially mature,” promotes the idea that people should actively advance their personal financial well-being through well-informed autonomous choices, including choices that embrace risk in exchange for return. Although these orientations are different, both socialize people to accept the financial marketplace as it currently operates and both locate financial problems and their solutions within the individual.

The financial industry’s embrace of financial education further reveals an implicit motive to “socialize” the populace. Industry is involved in some proportion of financial “education” in virtually every country discussed in the Handbook, from the U.S. (Heath, 2016, p. 378), Italy (Farsagl, Filotto, & Tracolò, 2016, p. 539), and Singapore (Siu & Koh, 2016, p. 573), to South Africa (Wentzel, 2016, p. 333), Mexico (Ruiz-Durán, 2016, p. 297), and Zambia (Knoote, Partington, & Penner, 2016, p. 204). In Germany, “bank staff and even self-employed investment advisers” teach financial classes in the public schools (Frühauf & Retzmann, p. 267). Certainly, industry-supported pedagogy, even when it is not outright financial product and services marketing, aims to produce respect for the current economic order, not criticism or reform.

Financial education is thus conceived, whether more or less explicitly, as a method of financial socialization. Financial literacy continues to be seen as a capacity residing within individuals, having both cognitive and non-cognitive components. As Toni Williams (2007) recognized in her work published a decade ago, financial education teaches people to accept a reduced role of the state in consumer protection and in the provision of basic social welfare. Students are indoctrinated to embrace the role neoliberal ideology has assigned them as consumers capable of and responsible for pursuing their own material well-being without political change.

2.3 “Financial capability” without financial resources
The misleading term “financial capability” is increasingly used in place of “financial literacy” (see, e.g., Cameron and Wood, pp. 183-184; Farnsworth, 2016, p. 148). As a linguistic matter, one would think that “financial capability” would encompass an individual’s economic and social resources, which are almost always the biggest determinant of an individual’s capacity to achieve material well-being. But a closer look at materials employing this term demonstrates that individuals’ resources are typically not considered part of their “financial capability” (see e.g., Financial Literacy and Education Commission, 2016, p. 7).

Instead, the “capability” advocates perpetuate the idea that teachable knowledge, skills, and money management practices as well as trainable confidence, self-control, and trust are not merely necessary for financial well-being; they are sufficient. The normative messages of this construct are clear—resource distributions are unquestioned, the market should not be interfered with, and the individual should maximize material wealth within the existing order. A recent article in JSSE found a similar pattern with respect to economics pedagogy: “A study of the eight economics textbooks used in contemporary American high schools found that seven do not address wealth distribution, a fundamental measure for evaluating the economic system of a given society” (Neumann, 2017, p. 11).

The only recognition that socioeconomic position might relate to financial well-being in the dominant financial literacy discourse is a nascent admission that financial education must “recognize” inequality. Disturbingly, what is meant by this, at least in the U.S., is not that society should ensure that the poor have a more equitable share of financial and social resources. Instead, “recognizing” inequality means that course content must be adapted—to a degree—to address the needs of those with fewer financial and social resources (Financial Literacy and Education Commission, 2016, p. 21). That is, pedagogy must assist the poor with the knowledge, skills, and money management practices that the current economic order demands of them. Other countries take a similar approach. For example, Cameron and Wood’s chapter on New Zealand discusses the specialized financial training given to certain minority populations there, which is adapted to, e.g., focus on the types of products these populations are frequently sold (pp. 189-190).
The Handbook’s chapter from Wentzel takes a quite progressive stance here, advocating that financial education be refocused to teach the poor how to minimize uncertainty rather than maximize wealth, increased certainty being more important for the well-being of the poor than increased wealth (p. 337-338). That material wealth might not be synonymous with well-being is a crucial insight. However, tying this insight back to teaching the individual to take particular financial actions maintains the idea that the marketplace is beyond democratic control and the individual must simply do her best to achieve well-being within it.

Still, Wentzel goes farther than most; the degree to which the dominant financial literacy discourse will recognize inequality is much more tightly circumscribed. For example, as Henchoz brilliantly observes in her chapter, ignoring dummying letters until one’s financial circumstances change may be the best course for someone who cannot pay off current debts, in that it avoids stress and increases physical and psychological well-being; it may even increase financial well-being, to the extent that income is related to physical and psychological health (p. 108). But one cannot imagine even a “culturally sensitive” financial education program teaching people not to open their bills. Most financial educators would be appalled at the suggestion.

Instead, the recognition of inequality by conventional financial literacy proponents has led to the conclusion that society must work harder to socialize the poor to exercise self-control, to trust the system, and to believe that by their autonomous actions they can increase their personal wealth.

In Romania, for example, Lacatus observes that pain inflicted by the 2008 global financial crisis and generally low income levels have led to widespread “skeptic[ism] with respect to the long-run benefits of free markets” (p. 322). She appears to conclude from this not that critique and distrust of the current system is justified, but rather that the Romanian populace requires an extra dose of education to become financially socialized.

Others assert that financial education for disadvantaged groups can level the playing field for wealth accumulation (see, e.g., Pinto, 2016, p. 137, documenting the prevalence of the claim in the Canadian press; Hill & Asarta, 2016, pp. 555-556, noting gender differences in financial literacy, another leveling justification for financial education). The evidence does not support this conclusion. Very little money will remain very little money whether held in a bank account at 1% interest, invested in a booming stock fund, or stuck under a mattress. Net of fees, bank accounts and stock funds may well be worse for wealth accumulation than the mattress.

As thoroughly explained by Arthur (2016) in his fine contribution to the Handbook, the “financial capability” discussion challenges neither inequality nor the economic structures that produce it (pp. 113-125).

2.4 Financial literacy as panacea

Whether viewed as money management ability, socialization, or capability, the conventional conceptions of financial literacy are all quite narrow. Yet the functions this narrow conception is expected to perform are prodigious. The oft-repeated trope in the Handbook’s chapter from O’Neill and Hensley (2016) is illustrative:

Perhaps at no other time in history has the need for financial education been as great as it is today. The global financial crisis clearly demonstrated what can happen when people do not understand complex financial instruments (e.g., option ARM loans and derivative securities).

(p. 640; see also Schuh and Schürkmann, 2016, p. 384, making a similar claim). Financial literacy is imagined to be capable of thwarting financial crises.

However, the most financially knowledgeable people in the world—those working in the financial industry—did understand option ARM loans and derivative securities. The financial firms that failed in the crisis were not saved by the advanced finance and business degrees of their officers and employees. As Pinto observes in her Handbook contribution, the claim that financial literacy would have averted the 2008 global financial crisis is commonly asserted in Canada as well, but the evidence points to monetary policy failures, insufficient regulation, and risky, exploitative behavior by financial institutions as the causes of the crisis (p. 136-37).

Nonetheless, financial literacy is proposed as the cure to a multitude of financial ills throughout the world. In wealthy countries, including, e.g., the Netherlands (van der Schors & Simonse, p. 316), the U.K. (Stillwell, p. 358), Germany (Barry, 2016, p. 450), and Singapore (Koh, 2016, p. 500), three woes are commonly cited. First, financial literacy is suggested as an antidote for low savings rates, over-indebtedness, and bankruptcies. Second, financial literacy is suggested as a means to protect people against poor retirement-related decisions, including insufficient savings, overpriced investments, overly risky and insufficiently risky portfolios, and myopic asset withdrawal behavior during retirement. Third, financial literacy is expected to dispel consumers’ confusion when they are faced with the growing complexity of financial products.

Curiously, financial literacy is also promoted on grounds that it is needed to “cope” with affluence in well-off countries. One of the chapters from Germany cites the prevalence of inheritances as calling for financial education because “[inheritance] beneficiaries can and must make investment decisions of considerable weight” (Frühauf & Retzmann, p. 264). Another chapter cites Singapore’s recent surge in household wealth as calling for financial literacy interventions (Lee & Koh, 2016, pp. 415-416).

In less wealthy countries, financial education is believed to be the solution to very different problems, primarily low levels of involvement with the formal financial system, particularly among the poor. In Mexico,
financial education is part of the national strategy for “financial inclusion,” meaning placing savings in accounts at and taking loans from formal financial institutions. The government has even set a goal of “increasing credit in the private sector from 28 to 40% of GDP” (Ruiz-Durán, pp. 293-296 and 302). In Indonesia, financial literacy campaigns aim to promote the population’s use of savings and credit products from the formal banking sector (Amidjono, Brock, & Junaidi, pp. 285-286).

Thus, it appears that financial literacy in wealthy countries is medicine for too little savings and too much debt, and in poorer countries it is medicine for too little savings and too little debt.

The International Handbook of Financial Literacy itself begins with the panacea construct of financial literacy. In the introduction to Part 1 of the book, the editor asserts that “the promotion of financial literacy is of outstanding importance for individual and collective well-being in the twenty-first century” and that “[g]iven the complexity of economic, political, and social trends, it ... should be a concern for political and educational actions throughout all countries in the world” (Aprea, 2016, p. 5). Quite a few of the contributors either take a similar view or have seen it expressed in their country’s popular and political discourse—the view that current economic, political, and social trends are inalterable, and individual financial literacy is the only way for people to keep up.

As with other traditional conceptions of financial literacy, the panacea conception locates the problem and solution in individuals. This perspective does not so much define the content of financial literacy as to simply assert that financial literacy is some set of qualities or behaviors of individuals—other than their economic and social resources—that will inoculate them against or even cure them of financial problems. It treats recent changes in social policies that place more financial responsibility and more financial risk on individuals and that generate greater inequality and widespread financial distress as givens.

However, these are not givens, they are all choices. Cameron and Wood’s chapter explains that financial education in New Zealand was “born out of retirement income policy”—that is, a policy choice to cut rather than continue to fully fund public pensions, thereby making individuals responsible for providing for themselves in retirement (p. 182). In the British Parliament, Farnsworth explains, financial education has been supported as a way to address deception of consumers that is committed through complex financial product terms, such as terms found in credit card contracts (pp. 154-159). Rather than implementing policies to prevent sellers from engaging in deceptive practices, the policy choice is to arm consumers with financial literacy in the hope that they then can protect themselves. In Canada, financial education rather than, for example, monetary policies, regulation of financial institutions, or policies to directly reduce medical debt and poverty, has been promoted as a way to prevent national and personal financial crises (Pinto, pp. 136-138).

However, the cost-benefit method of calculating value so ardently promoted by mainstream financial pedagogy demonstrates that financial literacy is a suboptimal and even bizarre policy response choice for each of the problems at which it is aimed. Financial education is not terribly expensive. However, promoting financial literacy as it is conventionally defined has serious opportunity costs, because policy options with higher prospects for success are not pursued.

For example, Heath, in her chapter about the situation in the U.S., asserts the following non sequitur: “The sheer magnitude of student loans suggests a lack of financial education...” (p. 370). But people with college degrees, regardless of their student loan debt, fare far better on financial literacy tests and earn far more income than those without college degrees. Moreover, eliminating student loan debt could be achieved more surely through reducing college tuition and shuttering over-priced ineffective schools.

Teaching individuals to each manage their own retirement finances is a far less efficient response to poor retirement planning than maintaining public pensions. Similarly for financial product complexity, teaching every individual to understand complex products seems a less efficient and more uncertain course than making the products simpler or imposing fiduciary duties on those who sell these products. This is not to say that any of our financial woes are easy to solve, but that pursuing financial literacy has a lower probability of success than alternatives.

In less wealthy countries, the argument for prioritizing financial literacy is even less compelling. In Indonesia, the government promotes financial literacy “with the eventual objective of building a higher quality of life” (Amidjono, Brock, & Junaidi, p. 286). This is in a country where about half the population lives below the international poverty line and even those above the line “are vulnerable to shocks such as food price increases, environmental hazards and ill health, which can easily drive them into poverty” (ibid, p. 280). If food prices, environmental hazards, and ill health are driving people into poverty, financial literacy is not going to keep or pull them out.

Thus, not only is financial literacy as panacea implausible on its face, but it is likely an ineffective policy instrument for addressing any of the ills at which it is aimed. Further, it perpetuates the neoliberal myths that the marketplace is sacrosanct, the individual is inevitably responsible for her financial plight, and the current economic order’s distribution of resources is alterable only by individual action and not by political change.

Financial literacy as money management ability is not terribly useful for securing the individual and collective financial well-being with which it is charged. Adding financial socialization is not enough; confidence and trust can be affirmatively harmful. Being able to read a map combined with confidence in one’s navigational skills and
trust that the map is accurate are insufficient when you lack fuel or an effective means of conveyance and the distances are too great, the mountains too high, and the rivers too wide to traverse on foot. And it is even worse if the map suggests routes are accessible when they are blocked.

3 Broader conceptions of financial literacy

Most of the contributors to the International Handbook of Financial Literacy demonstrate a broader and more thoughtful approach to the topic of financial literacy than the traditional approaches described above. Collectively, the chapters contain abundant insights about problems with the dominant conception and the type of financial education that flows from and feeds that conception. However, many reforms suggested by the contributors hew too closely to the neoliberal paradigm to result in much improvement. Some of the others take the form of general attacks on that paradigm, without presenting a credible actionable alternative. Neither approach is sufficient to move us forward. The following discusses some of the insights contained in the anthology and analyzes the limitations of each.

3.1 Abandoning the rational wealth-maximizing actor assumption

The first expansion from traditional conceptions of “financial literacy” is a realization common among the Handbook’s authors that people’s financial actions are shaped by more than their money management abilities, confidence, self-control, and trust; actions are influenced by biases, modes of thinking, culture, and values. These contributors generally propose adding something to existing financial education approaches to respond to these influences.

Loerwald and Stemmann, for example, describe ways in which financial choices are influenced by decision-making biases (2016, pp. 25-38). They advocate adding behavioral economics to the content of financial pedagogy, on the claim that understanding decision-making biases will help people avoid them. Similarly, the chapter by Antonietti, Borsetto and Iannello suggests that the use of different modes of thinking—deliberation, intuition, or heuristics—might have a greater impact on financial actions than knowledge of financial information or the possession of money management skills (2016, pp. 57-68). They recommend metacognitive training, teaching students to first identify which decision-making system ought to be employed in a situation, and then employ that system to make the required decision.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence that metacognitive training will lead to better financial decisions. Even as a theoretical manner, it is difficult to see how someone can consciously choose to use an unconscious decision-making process. Worse, there is evidence that teaching people about their decision-making biases has little to no effect on the quality of their decisions (see Willis, 2011, surveying evidence).

Koh argues that imparting the right cultural values of thrift, self-restraint, and sharing (charity) is foundational to educating students to put financial information to good use (pp. 501-508). Marchetti, Castelli, Massaro and Valle also suggest that social norms should be incorporated into financial education (2016, p. 78). Koh goes so far as to claim that if students are taught that they should stay within their means, they will not overspend (p. 504). In contrast, empirical work suggests that while teaching students to live within their means is likely to increase self-reports of living within their means, it will not necessarily reduce actual debt (see Willis, 2009, pp. 427-429, surveying evidence).

Budd hypothesizes that personal morality and personal finance are entwined (pp. 621-638). He submits that if students are taught the theory and practice of double-entry bookkeeping, they will be financially literate and guided to honest living and dealing. However, accountants knowledgeable about the theory and practice of and engaged in all kinds of bookkeeping have been implicated in dishonesty and malfeasance in recent financial scandals (see, e.g., Toffler & Reingold, 2004).

Yeo emphasizes that financial pedagogy should teach students to not only maximize their own wealth, but also to share that wealth with those who are less fortunate (2016, p. 60-67). It is true that charity in everyday life often increases the happiness of both parties. On the other hand, charity alone cannot create genuine and sustainable individual and collective well-being. Charity as a source of material well-being keeps the poor powerless, as they are subject to the charitable whims of the well-off.

But the deeper issue is that all of these prescriptions remain rooted in the idea that the problem and solution to financial distress lie within the individual. As I have explained elsewhere, changing individuals so that they can and do successfully navigate today’s financial marketplace is not realistically possible. Even apart from the overwhelming influence of existing resource distributions on financial outcomes, the speed of financial innovation is too swift for education to keep up, the complexity of financial products too great for non-specialists to master, the frequency of big financial decisions (e.g., retirement savings and home mortgage choices) too low for consumers to learn from experience, and the marketing power of financial institutions too strong for education to override (Willis, 2008). The Handbook itself provides some interesting evidence in this regard. In chapter after chapter, authors from around the world bemoan the poor state of financial literacy among their country’s populace. In Romania (Lacatus, p. 327), South Africa (Wentzel, pp. 332-333), Mexico (Ruiz-Durán, p. 302), and New Zealand (Cameron & Wood, p. 189), financial literacy levels are low. In the U.S., “Americans’ borrowing habits are risky, and their knowledge of basic financial literacy concepts low,” although most are nonetheless self-confident in their financial understanding (Heath, p. 373; see also Frühauf & Retzmann, p. 269, reporting similar over-confidence among German youth). Even in Austria, a
country with one of the lowest poverty rates in the world, “there is an urgent need to improve the understanding of money and financial matters” (Greimel-Fuhrmann, Silgoner, Weber, and Taborsky, p. 260).

Perhaps literacy levels are not too low. Perhaps it is the demands society places on individuals to achieve their own material well-being in the current economic system that are too high.

Or perhaps financial literacy is simply irrelevant in most people’s lived experience, giving them scant reason to pursue it. Multiple chapters in the Handbook report findings that financial literacy has little effect on financial behavior (e.g., van der Schors and Simonse, p. 318; Greimel-Fuhrmann, Silgoner, Weber, and Taborsky, p. 260), although the validity of most measurements of financial literacy has been called into question (Schuhen & Schürkmann, pp. 384-388).

For some, financial literacy is unnecessary, and therefore irrelevant. The well-off do not need to be particularly financially literate to achieve material well-being. As Sherraden and Ansong insightfully note, the employers and social systems of the well-off steer them to healthy financial “behaviors” regardless of their literacy levels (2016, p. 87; see also Aprea & Wuttke, 2016, p. 402, making a similar observation).

In contrast, as the contribution from Henchoz elucidates, for those with few financial resources and unpredictable income and expenses, many money management practices promoted by financial literacy initiatives, including saving, investing, budgeting, and planning, are impossible (pp. 100-105; see also Wentzel, p. 337). This makes financial literacy, conventionally-defined, irrelevant for them too.

Evidence from Indonesia is instructive. Farmers given financial literacy training and a sum of money in a bank account were made better off than a control group given no treatment, but were no better off than farmers given just the money and the bank account (see Amidjono, Brock, & Junaidi, p. 89, citing study). It was not the financial training that mattered, it was the cold hard cash.

3.2 Financial opportunity and inclusion

The next level of insight comes from those contributors who re-locate the problem of financial well-being from within the individual to the opportunities presented to individuals, and in particular the lack of high-quality financial product offerings in the existing marketplace for those who are not wealthy. Sherraden and Ansong, for example, stress the need to consider an individual’s access to beneficial financial products, such as low-cost bank accounts, which are not yet widely available in the U.S. (pp. 83-96). Knoote, Partington, and Penner likewise emphasize the need for access to “established” financial services and describe efforts, primarily by international organizations and non-governmental organizations, to provide such access in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 193-197). Ruiz-Durán focuses on financial inclusion and discusses the various ways in which the Mexican government has made it easier for financial institutions to offer low-cost accounts and for consumers to use these accounts (pp. 293-296).

The movement to bring the “unbanked” into the financial mainstream, pressing them to use savings accounts and credit products sold by banks rather than “fringe” credit providers such as moneylenders, appears to have support world-wide. However, without price regulation, mainstream banks will not necessarily offer low-cost products to the poor. Experience in the U.S. with mainstream bank account overdraft fees, which can produce an effective interest rate of over 7,000%, provides a cautionary tale (see Willis, 2013, p. 1176).

Mobile phone and electronic/debit card banking are energetically promoted by many financial inclusion programs as being more affordable and practical than brick-and-mortar banking (Ruiz-Durán, p. 296). However, the immediate and constant availability of funds in an account may well deprive those having trouble making ends meet of a useful budgeting tool. As Henchoz’s work reveals, optimal behavior for some could be physical budgeting by disbursing cash to themselves weekly and not allowing themselves to spend any more each week (p. 105). For others, she explains, failing to save might maximize personal welfare; to save and budget as financial educators advise demands of the poor a degree of sacrifice and self-denial that is unknown to the well-off (p. 106).

Moreover, high-quality financial products and services are only relevant to those who have the money to use them. If carefully regulated, these products can help preserve what little surplus most people have, but unless the person is already wealthy, these products cannot ever generate much of a return.

The wealth-creation myth upon which many financial education programs are sold (see Pinto, p. 137) is a ruse, notwithstanding the oft-mentioned “magic” of compounding. The financial inclusion approach may be little more. The inclusion approach brings more citizens into the existing financial order, perhaps legitimating that order, but only barely changing it.

On the other hand, the financial opportunity and inclusion discourse does admit that the “free” marketplace is not currently serving society well and is not entirely beyond political or social control. Making good products and services available to the unbanked requires intervention in the market, either by the government or by charitable organizations not driven by profit. The government of South Africa has already intervened to create the Mzansi bank account, “customized to the needs of low-income earners” (Wentzel, p. 334).

Thus, the contributors to the Handbook who advocate for financial inclusion have taken two important steps beyond conventional narrow constructs of financial literacy, admitting both that financial well-being is not entirely within the control of individuals and that the “free” market is not sacrosanct.

3.3 Financial literacy nihilism

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the Handbook comes from Remmele, who contends that the
conventional financial literacy project must fail because finance is incomprehensible (2016, pp. 39-56). He asserts that the market and the economic order of which it is a part are unintelling in a variety of respects: money itself is so abstracted as to be not fully graspable, the immense power of the market puts it beyond ordinary meaning, and the injustice produced by the system renders any explanation of it absurd. Further, the market’s workings are too complex to be fully understood, feedback loops that operate within the market are too counterintuitive to accept, and deceptive practices change too quickly to master.

As Nobel Laureates Akerlof and Shiller (2009) have suggested, that even those with advanced degrees in finance cannot predict market crashes creates the impression that animal spirits are in control. Further, the destruction that crashes leave in their wake solidifies a sense that these animal spirits have a vicious disposition.

Remmele’s aim in positing the market as incomprehensible is to make the case for financial education to be a rallying point for political action. He writes, “comprehensibility is not what it is all about, but rather democracy” (p. 40).

However, constructing a sphere as “incomprehensible” risks naturalizing and mythologizing it, rendering it unquestionable and unchangeable. We might not understand all the dynamics of the market, but the “incomprehensibility” trope is both false and counter-productive. We create the market, we are responsible for it, and we cannot wash our hands of it. Budd provides a pithy response, critiquing those who would analogize financial events to storms at sea “as if they were natural events before which we are helpless, when they are of course of our own making” (p. 624 n.13).

4 Routes forward
At the end of his contribution, Remmele explains that financial education must foster students’ abilities on the one hand to undertake concrete personal economic actions and on the other hand to perceive and judge abstract economic processes as a basis for political actions. He further asserts that there is no bridge between these two functions (p. 50). The following attempts to harness the collective wisdom of the Handbook’s contributors to suggest promising routes forward and even some bridges between the individual and the political.

4.1 Citizen-informed finance
If we were discussing people’s ability to navigate the physical environment we would not start from the assumption that topography is fixed and we must teach individuals to find their own resources, build their own paths, and change their own physical abilities. Instead, we see the relationship between people and their environment as one in which the environment should be adapted to people’s physical capacities.

It is strange that we see the concrete physical world as more adaptable than the intangible, unstable financial world. The dominant financial literacy discourse attempts to change people, to train them how to interact well with whatever the market is offering up today. Financial literacy is thus a peculiar, if not perverse, concept. And it is one that probably must be abandoned, laden as it is with the belief that the individual can and should be changed to meet the needs of the market.

As Sherraden and Ansong, drawing on the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, perpectively recognize, what we really care about, or ought to care about, is not a capability that resides within individuals (pp. 83-96). Rather, it is the interaction between people and their economic world that determines people’s financial well-being. To improve that will require some mix of changing the financial terrain that individuals must traverse and giving individuals the means of transportation to traverse it, not just handing people a map.

“The” market cannot be treated as a natural given in this approach. To say that policy choices ought not to “interfere” with the market must sound to our ears as odd as to say that policy choices ought not to “interfere” with the national highway system. Just as physical infrastructure—roads, tunnels, and bridges—is a public good, so too financial infrastructure—economic policies and financial regulation—is a public good. We have built our financial infrastructure just as we have built the highways, and we must take responsibility for how it has been built, for who it helps and hurts, and for improving it.

Changing the financial landscape is not a technical regulatory project, it is deeply political. Citizens must decide how that landscape should change and must make that change happen. The value-laden tradeoffs required in this process demand democratic, not technocratic, judgments. How should income and expense shock risks be reduced, at what costs should they be reduced, and how should residual risk be distributed? How much inequality should society accept? How much wealth should be transferred from the affluent to the poor?

As Arthur demonstrates, conventional financial literacy discourse accepts and normalizes the individualization of economic insecurity (pp. 116-117). In addition, with its studious avoidance of discussions about inequality, the discourse allows us to imagine that no tradeoffs are needed, that financial literacy itself will generate wealth for the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution, without taking anything from the wealthiest 10%. The paradigm paints any other choices about economic risk as inconceivable and any tradeoffs to address inequality as unnecessary.

But decisions about the distribution of risk in society can be revised, and all economic systems involve tradeoffs. What is important is for choices to be made knowingly, based on accurate information and considered judgment, by all who will be affected. This calls for finance-informed citizens, who can create a citizen-informed financial order.
4.2 Finance-informed citizens

To understand the tradeoffs at stake and make the political judgments that democratic control of the economy requires, people must understand how the economy and marketplace really work. It must go beyond the neoliberal story that conceives of market failures as bugs rather than features of the current order. Financial education must convey how government policies allow and even drive the economy and marketplace to operate in these ways. And, as Arthur reminds us, we must be mindful of the pain this system inflicts along with its benefits (p. 114).

But understanding how the system works and its current effects is not enough. Financial education “that explains but does not question finance,” as Budd puts it, will not result in widespread individual and social financial well-being (p. 622).

Key to critique of the current order is an ability to see not only *how* it is constructed, but *that* it has been constructed by society in the first place. An understanding of different economic orders and financial systems that currently exist and that have existed through history reveals that constructedness (Budd, p. 628; Arthur, p. 121). Here, Berti in her superb chapter presents an anthropological, scientific approach to teaching:

> Economic theories should be discussed both diachronically, as answers to the problems arising in different historical periods, and synchronically, as different, competing perspectives on the workings of economic systems, the role of the state, and solutions to the main economic problems occurring in a certain period (2016, p. 521).

Such an approach to creating financially-informed citizens will no doubt be deemed as ideologically-biased. Neoliberalism tolerates no criticism. One of the chapters in the anthology even notes that some financial textbooks used in Germany have been criticized because they “allegedly promoted an anti-capitalistic attitude by, for example, conveying a negative image of entrepreneurs and market economies” (Frühauf & Retzmann, p. 267).

Yet, as Lucey’s thoughtful contribution to the anthology observes, conventional financial education with its focus on wealth accumulation promotes the ideological view that individuals ought to compete against others for scarce resources within the current market structure, rather than the view that individuals ought to cooperate with others to produce equitable financial conditions for all (2016, p. 659). Beyond the resources required to meet basic needs, individual material wealth is not a universal goal or transcendent value.

Tellingly, Lucey measured attitudes before and after receipt by social studies teacher trainees of traditional instruction in financial education pedagogy and of social-justice-oriented instruction that related traditional financial concepts to broader economic and political concerns (p. 667). Some of the trainees in the latter group changed their views of the role of social studies teachers, expanding from an initial view of that role as being only to prepare students to be participatory citizens, to a view of that role as also including training students to seek justice and help the less fortunate.

But some of the trainees who received traditional instruction in financial education pedagogy also changed their views. They began with the same initial view of the role of the social studies teacher as being to prepare students to be participatory citizens. After traditional financial education teacher training, they shifted to a more conservative view that the teacher should develop responsible citizens, who pay bills on time and earn, save, and invest well within the current system, rather than participate as citizens to improve the system.

Neoliberalism masquerades as positive description rather than normative prescription. But ideology is inherent in approaches that train people to take particular financial, social, or political actions. Although no pedagogy is neutral, the more anthropological and historical approach suggested by Berti encourages students to develop their own views about how their economic system ought to be structured and regulated.

Those views will necessarily support particular values. Financial pedagogy should not only admit that values are implicated in financial policy choices, it should expose how values are implicated in those choices. That is, one purpose of financial education is to help people understand which values are supported by particular policy choices, so they can take political action consonant with their own values.

4.3 The bridge between personal finances and political action

The most advanced analyses of the financial literacy project agree that civic education must be part of financial education and civic engagement with political decisions about finance must be part of our conception of financial literacy. Berti, for example, points out that teaching children about money management is insufficient because adult citizens must understand and participate in social decisions about, e.g., the “regulation of financial markets, individual [and] collective risk management solutions, tax policy, [and] how to deal with financial crises” (p. 520).

But there is an apparent tension between teaching people how to manage their personal finances today—how to increase wealth or reduce financial uncertainty within the current economic order—and teaching them how to change the world to improve the financial well-being of all tomorrow.

On the surface, the tension has the shape of a question frequently posed in social justice lawyering: Should one engage in direct services, helping the disadvantaged one-by-one to immediately obtain remedies available through current law that will help them lead better lives? Or should one engage in impact litigation, long-term litigation that aims at structural changes in society and in the law itself that, it is hoped, will help large numbers of people over time? The answer in that context must be both; only through direct services can lawyers come to
know the true nature of individuals’ needs and the obstacles that stand in the way of meeting those needs, and this knowledge is necessary for developing successful impact litigation.

Note that no one suggests that society should resolve the legal problems of the disadvantaged by training every poor person to be his or her own lawyer.

In the financial context as well, we need both to help people live their everyday financial lives and to empower them become part of the process of making social change. Financial well-being supports “the freedom and independence necessary” for individuals to actively engage as citizens (Farsagli, Filotto, & Traciò, p. 537). But conventional financial literacy education is unlikely to be useful in this regard, given that this education appears to have very little effect on financial well-being (Fernandes, Lynch, & Netermeyer, 2014). “Give a man a fish and he will eat today; teach a man to fish and he will eat tomorrow,” is sometimes a useful aphorism. However, teaching a man to fish when his lake contains no fish is foolish or even cruel.

Instead, as Retzmann and Seeber explain, “it is important to switch from the agent’s perspective, which is adequate for individual money management and financial transaction processes, to that of an observer on rules, markets, order and system to enable the individual to make sound political judgements..., participate in society, and contribute to political affairs” (p. 21). Teach individuals to drive on the financial highways is part of this project, not only so they can drive successfully, but also so they can see how the highways are currently built.

Stimulating a critical observation of the individual’s role within neoliberalism’s financial order is also key. This is sound pedagogy—abstract concepts are better understood when their effects can be observed in personal experience. It is also politically galvanizing, as seeing how government policies ultimately affect individual lived experience can motivate action.

Here again, the conventional conception of financial literacy as money management ability and the educational interventions flowing from that conception are counterproductive. The Handbook’s chapter on Switzerland explains that the country’s “baccalaureate” schools, for the approximately 20% of the population who aim to attend university, teach about finance with a broad “general economic-financial perspective” aimed at the students’ future roles as citizens; the “vocational” schools, for the 75% of students who complete their education at the secondary level, teach about the topic with a personal finance focus (Holsch & Eberle, 2016, pp. 699-700). In some sense, this is backward. The highly educated are already satisfied with the current economic order, whereas the rest of the population needs to understand how that order operates in order to change it.

Relatedly, O’Neill and Hensley bemoan that the very schoolteachers who are expected to teach students to be financially literate live paycheck-to-paycheck rather than engaging in the “proper” behaviors of saving and investing (p. 643). Yet, it may be that the experiences of these teachers make them more qualified, not less, to teach about financial matters.

The bridge between the personal and the political is shrouded by neoliberal ideology, but is revealed when that ideology is no longer the operative lens for seeing the world. Teaching people money management skills, when done within a context of understanding that these skills are required only because some societies today have adopted social and regulatory policies that in turn make these skills necessary, can illuminate the fairness or unfairness, efficiency or inefficiency, and wisdom or absurdity of those policies.

The student who plows through a realistic simulated exercise on buying and financing a car, for example, might not quite grasp the algebra behind adjusting car and loan prices in tandem to ensure that the financing seller earns the same amount no matter how successfully the student bargains over car price. But she will likely learn that car and loan prices are not set by an invisible hand, that sellers sometimes charge vulnerable buyers more, and that the law constrains this in several respects but facilitates it in others.

Although her eyes might glaze over when told what retirement savings and investing decisions she should make, if she then tries to make those decisions in a realistic pedagogical simulation exercise, she is likely to discover the enormity of the task. If she is also taught how various societies at various times have employed diverse approaches to the support of people past working age, she will have the opportunity to appreciate the tradeoffs among different policy choices.

Finally, civics education and financial education must be recognized as interdependent. Many of the most important political choices people make pertain to financial affairs, and many of the most important financial actions people take are in the civic arena. Civics education, like financial education, must bridge the personal and the political, teaching both about the system and the individual’s role within the system. Financial education must impress upon students their responsibility and their power to affect, through political actions, society’s financial order.

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The ends that all contributors to the Handbook seek, at least at an abstract level, are uncontroversial—increased individual and societal well-being. Unfortunately, financial literacy as conventionally understood does not equip people to achieve these ends. We must rebuild the financial terrain itself and ensure that all people have effective means of conveyance. Therefore, the role of financial education in increasing well-being must be to enable, empower, and inspire ordinary people to knowledgeably participate in political decisions about finance and the economy. We must develop finance-informed citizens, who can build citizen-informed finance.
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Making ‘Good’ or ‘Critical’ Citizens: From Social Justice to Financial Literacy in the Québec Education Program

- Definitions of ‘financial education’ and ‘financial literacy’.
- The new Québec Financial Education program does not encourage students to develop or use a critical thinking process.
- The actual Financial Education program educates students to become personally responsible citizens at the expense of justice-oriented citizens.
- The actual Financial Education program, which is a subset of the Social Sciences subject area, does not provide opportunities for students to deconstruct and reconceptualise the structure of their society.
- To achieve the critical analysis objective of the Social Sciences subject area, the new Financial Education program must be adjusted.

Purpose: The Québec Ministry of Education has introduced – as of September 2017 – a new mandatory course focusing on financial literacy and addressing such issues as credit scores, loans, taxes and budgets. This announcement has created intense educational debate on the raison d’être and content of the course. This article will summarise the heated debate and will examine content knowledge and the type of ‘good’ citizens that the course seeks to create.

Method: We use thematic content analysis to identify textual patterns and themes in the Québec Education Program (QEP) pertaining to financial literacy.

Findings: Our assumption is that the QEP reproduces and shapes a personally responsible citizen at the expense of systemic criticism and justice-oriented citizenship education, according to Westheimer and Kahne (2004)’s typology.

Keywords:
Financial education program, social sciences, critical thinking, citizenship education, Québec

1 Introduction

From 1982 to 2009, secondary schools in Québec (a mainly French-speaking province of 7 million inhabitants in Eastern Canada) required a 100-hour micro- and macroeconomics course for students in Secondary V (corresponding to the 11th grade of school in the United States). In 2009, this mandatory course was replaced by a geopolitical course, called Contemporary World. In 2016, Sébastien Proulx, Québec Minister of Education, presented plans to introduce a new 50-hour mandatory course on personal finance. This new course, called Financial Education, follows the international tendency to financially educate citizens (Aprea, Wuttke, Breuer, Keng Koh, Davies, Greimel-Fuhrmann, & Lopus, 2016) more explicitly after the financial crisis and recession of 2007-2009 (Arthur, 2016). In this context, Québec embraces a global trend. Beginning September 2017, the proposed course focuses on financial literacy and addresses issues such as credit scores, loans, taxes, budgets and cell phone contracts. The announcement, made at such a rapid rhythm, ignited a contentious debate about the place for this new course in the schedule (and what course should be removed) and ignited skirmishes about its content. To participate in the debate, one must analyse the course content and the desired impact of the course among the population.

The purpose of this article is to examine (1) the context and content of the Financial Education course, (2) the legitimacy of the course in an international context, and (3) the kinds of ‘economic citizens’ that the course valorises and wishes to produces for a future society. Specifically, this paper documents the main tendencies and conventions of today’s educational making of ‘good’ citizens and ‘good economic’ citizens in Québec.

We argue that the new course exclusively focuses on ‘financial literacy’ while it should consider a critical approach of ‘financial education’ as a social and economic science; in other words, it should promote the teaching of a critical, scientific approach of the socioeconomic system, an argument which is largely inspired by criticism.
in Germany and France (Szukala, 2015). The first and second parts of the article describe the course in its context and content, and its reception. The third part recapitulates the various typologies of citizenship taught by schools. The fourth part analyses the course in terms of the presented typology. What is the content of the program and what are its underlying assumptions? What information does educational research provide to interpret the letter and spirit of this program? Finally, we present some guidelines to direct the teaching and some research to allow descriptive and critical analyses of the degree of anchoring of this Financial Education course within the disciplines of social sciences, their intellectual operations and their heuristics.

2 The course in its context

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines financial literacy as the:

“knowledge and understanding of financial concepts and risks, and the skills, motivation, and confidence to apply such knowledge and understanding in order to make effective decisions across a range of financial contexts, to improve the financial well-being of individuals and society, and to enable participation in economic life (OECD, 2012).”

Gale & Levine (2010) define financial literacy as “the ability to make informed judgments and effective decisions regarding the use and management of money and wealth” (p. 3). Both definitions are consistent with Aprea et al. (2016)’s definition which states that financial literacy encompasses the “ability to deal effectively with money and financial matters” (p. 1) and the understanding of what is being offered to them. As Retzmann & Seeber (2016) wrote, (n)one of these definitions is aimed specifically at school education” (p. 11). For them, “being financially educated means more than being financially literate, and that financial education can and should be seen as a proper subset of economic education” (p. 9). Retzmann & Seeber (2016) state that financial literacy, if seen as the ability and knowledge to manage finance, is too narrow for the school missions, one of them being preparing students for their future life.

Indeed, the Québec Education Program (QEP) is supposed to enable schools to help students deal with social change and participate actively in their learning, especially thanks to social sciences. The QEP puts forward social sciences in order to promote students’ openness toward the world, and become aware of the value of individual and collective involvement in social choices and its impact on the course of events. Such aims converge toward the prospective function of social sciences long identified by historians and educational researchers alike. They are also aligned with the concept of agency, defined as the capacity to act upon the world or to see oneself as a actor/subject (Novack, 1972).

In history teaching, as an example, such an understanding of agency calls upon the confrontation of a diversity of viewpoints from which history, as an interpretative discipline, is constructed. It distances students from conceiving of history as the linear march to progress driven by the actions of ‘great white men’, in part through polyphonic sets of problematization regarding primary sources which further the analysis of historical phenomena by students. However, in light of the analyses presented thereinafter, the letter and spirit of the Financial Education program tend to portray competences and ways of thinking that are incompatible with the attainment of the above-described aims.

As history or geography teaching, for instance, financial education “seen as a proper subset of economic education” should include and insist on the development of critical thinking so that students have the tools to understand the structure of the world they live in. We extensively subscribe to the point of view conveyed by Retzmann & Seeber (2016):

“We [...] define financial competence as the sum of an individual’s cognitive judgment, decision-making and planning abilities, their practical and technical skills for implementing decisions and plans, including the use of electronic media, and their motivational, volitional and social disposition with regard to liquid funds (cash, bank money), recent and future income and material and nonmaterial assets for themselves, as a trustee for other people, and as a social or political representative for the general public, in efficiently and responsibly generating and implementing such assets to achieve the best possible effect on the short, medium and/or long-term well-being of the people concerned. The term financially educated is used to describe a person who is willing and able to judge, decide and act autonomously (self-governing), appropriately and responsibly in accordance with these transferable competences in financially shaped life situations (p. 15).”

To sum up, ‘financial literacy’ refers to the ability to manage money and wealth efficiently, but ‘financial education’ refers to a larger definition that includes critical thinking and the abilities to understand and analyse the world we live in.

The 2008 economic crisis has left the international community with a financial and economic insecurity (Arthur, 2016). As most countries, more specifically the ‘developed countries’, still feel the consequences of the crisis, national governments are pressured to act to prevent another crisis (Elson, 2017). At a macroeconomic level, the individual decisions are little often considered as having an impact and “(a)lthough these decisions seem minor on individual level, their aggregation could have severe consequences on the country level” (Fabris & Luburić, 2016, p. 68). The OECD (2012) argues that financial illiteracy is linked to contribute to ill-informed financial decision making that can have enormous negative consequences on a macroeconomic level. As Bay, Catasu, & Johed (2012) state, “international reports are univocal in their conclusion: the level of financial knowledge needs to be raised so that non-professional investors can act in a financially responsible manner” (p. 37). As a result, it is seen as unequivocal – at both a macroeconomic level (raise financial security and stabilised financial market) and microeconomic level
(help individuals making rational financial decisions) – that financial literacy has to be implemented in the education system of every country to raise “individual and collective wellbeing in the twenty-first century” (Aprea, 2016, p. 5).

However, the OECD (2017) offers important nuances in the actual effect of a specific financial education course on the level of financial culture/literacy, which is more influenced by other school subjects.

“On average across the 10 participating OECD countries and economies, around 38% of the variation in financial literacy scores reflects factors that are uniquely captured by the financial literacy assessment, while the remaining 62% of variation in financial literacy reflects skills that can be measured in the mathematics and/or reading assessments (p. 2).

Several countries have started integrating some financial literacy topics into existing school subjects, such as mathematics or social sciences. However, more evidence is needed to show the extent to which incorporating financial literacy elements into existing subjects is effective as compared to other approaches to improve students’ levels of financial literacy (p. 5).”

According to the OECD (2017), socioeconomic and family environments are two external variables that heavily influence students’ financial literacy.

“In 10 countries and economies with available data, socio-economically disadvantaged students are more likely than advantaged students to be low performers in financial literacy, after accounting for student performance in mathematics and reading and other characteristics (p. 3). What students know about financial literacy depends to a large extent on their parents and families, both in terms of the resources that they make available to them and through direct engagement (p. 6).”

Other studies, made by Lachance (2014), Lusardi (2008), and Lusardi, Mitchell, & Curto (2010), also find that financial literacy skills are mostly moulded by the socioeconomic context – e.g. the parental level of financial literacy (Mimura, Koonce, Plunkett, & Pleskus, 2015). Therefore, some authors question the legitimacy of a financial education course to rise the level of well-being among citizens, given the infinitesimal influence of a financial education class on prevailing behaviours at home and socioeconomic determinism. Despite such nuances regarding the relevance within the school curriculum of a specific financial education course and its effect on the development of financial culture/literacy, the OECD recommends that countries continue to strengthen national strategies for financial education.

1.2 The Québec context
In the spirit of this recommendation, by promoting faith in the financial system and its stability, the QEP has tried to shape ‘personally responsible’ economic citizens who are integrated within society and act in a ‘responsible’ manner, such that society functions ‘well’. Indeed:

“Individuals take on greater responsibility as they enter adulthood. Everyday situations become more complex, particularly those related to personal finances, which involve making choices which will have a variety of long-term effects [...]. Financial education prepares students to manage their personal finances and helps them make informed choices. It promotes responsible behaviour and the development of sound judgment (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 1).”

In its aims, the program seeks to enable students to develop ‘critical judgment’ in the management of their personal finances. With the Financial Education program, students will acquire various skills and competencies, such as taking a position, consider various options and comparing them, determine the different consequences of their possible choices. In analysing financial issues that affect them, students exercise and develop their critical judgment. By exercising the competency developed in this program, they are also able to learn more about themselves, which helps them set their own goals and determine the degree to which they can tolerate the risks associated with the management of their personal finances (p. 1).

The fifth and final year of secondary school in Québec is composed of six subject areas: Languages; Mathematics; Science and Technology; Social Sciences; Arts Education; Personal Development, Career Development. The Financial Education course has been conceived to be part of the Social Sciences program. As constructed to focus on financial literacy, the Financial Education course could have been part of the Mathematics, Science and Technology (as the OECD categorised it for the Program for International Student Assessment (2012): Frameworks – Mathematics, Problem Solving and Financial Literacy). It could also have fallen under the Personal Development or the Career Development, but the QEP has chosen to place it in the Social Sciences area. Is it because the Financial Education course focuses on financial literacy and ‘literacy’ has a strong social connotation (Rogers, 2001)? It is difficult to know, by reading the QEP, the exact raison d’être of this conceptual, disciplinary link between financial education and social sciences. ((One can suspect – and disrelish – more pragmatic reasons linked to a timetable in schools or an allotment of time that would support inconspicuous priorities within the curriculum – showing the presence of an underlying stratification of school content where everything would have a hegemonic position over Social Sciences: no minute should be ‘lost’ in Mathematics, but perhaps some can be ‘spared’ in Social Sciences.) However, from this choice should arise requirements related to the field of social sciences helping students take on and debate socially controversial, engaging and emancipatory issues, and thus afford them the opportunity to see themselves as actors/subjects of change in their community.
2 The course in its content

Our corpus comprises the short texts forming the 24-page program, which specify the issues involved and the general context in which students are called upon to apply what they have learned. The program concentrates on what 11th grade students should know in order to manage their actual and future personal finances. Students must examine three financial issues: (1) consuming goods and services, (2) entering the workforce and (3) pursuing an education. These issues are considered from situations already or soon-to-be experienced by the students. For each issue, students should develop one competence: that of taking a position on a financial issue (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 7).

The program defines ‘taking a position’ as the selection of one of several options. Taking a position in personal financial issues is presented as being a difficult process, involving the use of human, documentary and legal resources and the exercise of critical thinking. Students must explore every facet of the situation, including their own needs, necessary budget, nature of the situation and socioeconomic context. After this analysis, students must evaluate their options in terms of costs and risks (financial, personal, social, family, etc.), and then must make a choice. For example, a purchase that requires payment on an instalment basis can result in undue risk for a person with variable income.
Students need to know who they should address to ensure that their rights are respected, such as when they want to accept an employment contract or honour a guarantee. Even when financial resources are sufficient to meet their needs or when the selected option will be fulfilled later, the decision must be put into perspective.

Students must compare their choices with those of others and recognise who influences their decision-making (e.g., peers, media, etc.). An option that is initially advantageous may later be rejected as inappropriate. When the choice is reconsidered, the decision-making process resumes.

The evaluation of learning is founded on the exercise of this competence (taking a position) and the acquired knowledge, and includes concepts specific to each theme. More precisely, taking a position on the first financial issue (consuming goods and services) involves considering the rights and responsibilities of consumers and vendors, exploring different options and making an informed decision that considers the long-term legal, family, personal or social consequences (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 11). To avoid disappointment, students must consider the legal aspects of their options; for example, Québec laws do not always apply, especially when students purchase goods online. This process also requires, *inter alia*, the use of proper strategies and the exercise of one’s critical judgment, such as by consulting sources of information, in order to act rationally without being hesitant. In this case, students must learn and apply four concepts: consumption, debt, purchasing power and savings.

Taking a position on the second financial issue (entering the workforce) relies on similar abilities to gauge diverse consequences, mobilise strategies to frame the outcome, examine options and select one choice. In this case, the student must consider the rights and duties of workers and concepts of employment, remuneration and taxation (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 14). Finally, when taking a position on the third financial issue (pursuing an education), the student must appraise the situation and choose among different options while considering similar consequences and harnessing the same strategies and resources as above. In this case, the student must employ three new concepts: financing, qualifications and training (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 17).

The Financial Education program received a very variable reception from its various commentators. Employer associations and large financial institutions applauded the new program, whereas many unions and teachers considered the program to be an ‘improvisation’ and a ‘political manoeuvre’. Teachers expressed fear of a domino effect of this change, with some fearing the elimination of elective social studies courses and the disarticulation of the Contemporary World course on geopolitics. Others deplored the poor quality of the program and putative apocryphal intentions of its implementation based on the functional, utilitarian demands of employers and financial circles.

Szuškáló (2015) in Germany insists on the ‘crisis’ or post-2000 debates that have called into question curricular proposals ‘where economics was an integral part of multidisciplinary social sciences teaching’ (Szuškáló, 2015, p. 69). One example of convergence between the educational situations in Germany and Québec regards the emphasis on the inadequate capacity of workers to adapt to the new demands of their employers and the financial circles, and the insufficiency of social sciences to guarantee a knowledge of finances and of the enterprise domain, although the Québec program accords little space to discourses focusing on the adaptation of human resources to a globalised economy (e.g., the Québec program does not emphasise mastery of other languages in order to integrate the labour market). Thus, there are political and intellectual debates in Germany and Québec in this field. However, in Québec, didacticians in economics in particular are extremely rare and didacticians in social sciences in general have not yet given their opinion on the Financial Education program. For many of these didacticians, this program does not fall under their domain – in contrast with the Anglophone part of Canada (Arthur, 2016, p. 116), there is no community of financial literacy researchers in Québec.

### 3 Typology of citizenship

As it is mentioned above, the Financial Education course is part of the Social Sciences program, in which citizenship education is also included. For Aprea et al. (2016), “financial issues play a vital role in current conceptions of citizenship education” (p. 2). We do not argue that the Financial Education course is not included in the right subject area, only that it has to be modified to fulfill the requirements of the Social Sciences program subsuming citizenship education, one of them being to help students develop critical thinking.

In a widely cited study, Westheimer & Kahne (2004) characterised and exemplified three conceptions of the ‘good’ citizen, which are embedded in citizenship education. Specifically, a ‘good’ citizen is conceptualised as a person who is personally responsible, participatory or justice-oriented.

Personally responsible citizenship describes citizens who follow the law (e.g., the highway safety code), expect their rights to be protected (e.g., from discrimination by race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age or mental or physical disability) and donate to charity. Programs aimed towards personally responsible citizenship are character-driven, focus foremost on the moral growth of students and usually contain patriotic traits.

Participatory citizenship describes citizens who go ‘above and beyond’ the necessary duties of citizenship by, for instance, starting a community centre for prevention of child injury or organising a clothing drive. Educational programs focused on participatory citizenship, of which there are few, prepare students to take personal interest in social diversity and inequality, to care for those in need and to advance cultural, economic, political or social development.
Social justice-oriented citizenship describes citizens who question the status quo that leads to scarceness amid abundance. Westheimer & Kahne (2004) found that almost no educational programs sought to form justice-oriented citizens. Such programs would encourage students to identify, analyse and stand up to the root causes of structural social, economic or political problems, become aware of and reflect on diverse perspectives and values, develop critical-thinking skills, and collectively challenge or reform the norms, policies and practices of their school or the public. In economic and financial terms, this conception of the ‘good’ citizen would be conceived as a ‘critical’ financial literacy which is not a reduction of:

“[…] the critical inquiry which discerns whether bond a or bond b offers the better investment/risk ratio. It is instead a humane critical thinking that is antagonistic towards and is aimed at shedding light on capitalist exploitation, alienation and further neoliberalisation. It does not operate within the boundaries set by capitalist relations of production and neoliberal ideology but critically inquires into the justness of the limits imposed by accumulation requirements and neoliberal doxa. Critical financial literacy contains a criticalness that implies a caring and ethical aspect that goes beyond the neoliberal valuing of the consumer over the citizen […] (Arthur, 2011, p. 210-211).”

These different conceptions of citizenship are not necessarily cumulative, but rather are typically antithetical. Each reflects a different ideology: more conservative (law-abiding) and individualistic for the personally responsible orientation, more reformist for the participatory orientation, and more liberal and collective for the justice-oriented orientation. As we have mentioned, the QEP wishes to promote faith in the actual financial system and shape personally responsible citizens who manage their finances in a rational manner so that the actual financial structure can be maintained. Thus, financial literacy as a limited ability to manage money and personal finances could be linked to the first type of citizenship.

4 Content analysis
Following Aprea (2016)’s idea that a better financial knowledge will help the individuals to achieve a higher level of well-being in the 21st century, teaching financial literacy in schools is then coherent. Unsurprisingly, on the one hand, the Financial Education program in Québec sticks to most of the components characterising the idea of ‘financial culture or literacy’, according to the OECD (2017): making decisions about everyday spending, recognising the purpose of everyday financial documents, analysing financial products, solving financial problems, etc. Within the 24-page program (including appendices), on the other hand, the ‘critical judgment’ unit only occurs seven times, although the same sentence is repeated three times: “It [taking a position] […] involves using appropriate strategies, exercising critical judgment, especially when consulting sources of information, taking any opportunity to learn more about oneself and developing the confidence needed to take responsibility for one’s choices” (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 11, 14, 17). Akin to Retzmann & Seeber (2016), some operative verbs (to take a position, to choose and to reconsider) that are used in the description of the competence and its components generally correspond to intellectual operations and critical high-level heuristics associated with critical training and high cognitive engagement. Because they fall within the competence – the ability to mobilise the available resources in order to solve a problem (Perrenoud, 1999) – operator verbs refer to actions and indicate what students should be able to do.

The most substantial part of this program (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 9-18), the ‘Program Content’, is comprised of three financial issues and ten associated concepts: consuming (consumption, debt, savings, purchasing power), working (taxation, remuneration, labour) and studying (financing, training), qualifications. Within this part of the program, promoted disciplinary operations are of low intellectual level and low epistemological sophistication. From a cognitive perspective of learning (Bloom & Krathwohl, 1956; Gagné, 1985; Anderson et al., 2001), low-level intellectual operations include knowing (e.g. defining, identifying, describing), understanding (e.g. explaining, identifying, grasping) and applying (e.g. solving, constructing, illustrating). Analysing (e.g. deducing, criticising, differentiating), synthesising (e.g. developing, structuring, concluding) and evaluating (e.g. selecting, predicting, recommending) are high-level intellectual operations associated with critical training and cognitive engagement. Every constructivist category of learning (Piaget, 1960; Bruner, 1966) mobilises high-level intellectual operations (Greene & Miller, 1996): problematizing, conceptualising, analysing, contextualising, justifying, experimenting, reinvesting and objectifying. Similarly, the critical perspective of learning (Giroux, 1981; Apple, 1993; Robertson, 2009) mobilises high-level operations: analysing, comparing, localising (currents, models, etc.), evaluating the validity, deconstructing, taking a position and arguing.

Going back to the three types of citizenship exemplified by Westheimer & Kahne (2004), we argue that the new Financial Education program seeks to form the first type which is not wrong in its itself, but as a part of the Social Sciences program, it should also tend toward the third type, mainly for the critical thinking aspect that the social sciences bring forward. When going through the exercises proposed on the Recitus website (http://www.recitus.qc.ca/edufin), no high-level intellectual operations surface: students have to state their needs (e.g. the choice of a cell phone), identify three options that fit those needs and explain their final choice. It seems that ‘financial knowledge’ takes the whole part. As it is presented in the introduction, the exercises offered were developed in partnership with scholars in accounting sciences. As Retzmann & Seeber (2016) argue, this kind of financial education focuses on the wrong goal:
“The limited capabilities associated with financial literacy seem to be more geared towards providing an initiation into an increasingly complex, difficult and uncomfortable social and economic environment than to enabling citizens to participate in social change. Our criticism of this over-emphasis on meeting external requirements is that it reflects a limited understanding and is therefore incomplete — at least in a school context (p. 12).”

Such a conception of financial literacy hinders the understanding of its plurivocal and problematic nature, in addition to being an obstacle to students’ adopting a transformative stance and envisioning the diversity of choices and interests at the core of agency purportedly taught and developed in social sciences curriculum.

In the Financial Education program, despite the formulation of the competence, operator verbs in the ‘Learning to Be Acquired’ section (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 12-13, 15-16, 18) are limited to the following actions: 38 occurrences of the verb ‘indicating’, 11 of ‘naming’, 7 of ‘describing’, 5 of ‘giving’, 5 of ‘explaining’ and 1 of ‘identifying’. Verbs that are absent include ‘evaluating’ (consequences of the financial and banking organisation modes on social differentiation), ‘comparing’ (imperatives of state/financial capitalism and the policy of distribution of world wealth advocated in contemporary world) and ‘criticising’ (biases and interests of a dominant financial class to the detriment of the most disadvantaged). These examples are ideologically antagonistic to the neoclassical perspective. Such ideological oppositions inherent in economic theories of consumption, production and distribution (Marxist critical theory versus neoclassical theory, in particular) are neither analysed nor presented in the Financial Education program. To do so, the program would need to be an economic education course and not only a financial literacy course. Indeed,

“(…) the fields of neoclassical economics and education invested with neoliberal and Canadian capitalist doxa (ideology) support the neutral, technical characterization of financial literacy and the reproduction of a neoliberal consumer habitus. The internalization of the neoliberal ethos as individuals create for themselves a neoliberal habitus further legitimizes blaming individuals or their inability to succeed in the post-Fordist world and supports the use of coercive measures to move those who fail closer to norm compliance. At the same time, the habitus, capital and fields that are linked to the financial literacy initiative discourage these dominated individuals from mobilizing or understanding the need to mobilize public resources in order to mitigate the consequences of post-Fordist risk and abolish neoliberal capitalism (Arthur, 2011, p. 190-191).”

Thus, in the Québec Financial Education program, it appears that the verbs used to define disciplinary learning can describe the actions and behaviours of the type 1 citizen, acting within and respecting the system and the established social order. Firstly, the intellectual and social autonomy of students is little mobilised because the questions and possible solutions are reduced by conceptually and ideologically calibrated choices. Indeed, neoclassical economic analysis seems to be dominant in the choice of concepts and contents. Even if, herein and elsewhere, ‘economic research calls into question the neoclassical thinking’, it [neoclassical thinking] is always omnipresent in SES [social and economic sciences] curricula and textbooks’ (Szukala, 2015, p. 77) — it is presented as an immutable fact. For instance, in the study of ‘pursuing an education’, the program ‘indicates the main criteria used to determine a salary: qualifications, skills, duties, responsibilities, job performance’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 18) with no frictional unemployment, no shortage of human resources and no underutilised or over/underqualified workers. In the study of ‘entering the workforce’, there is no occurrence of the concepts of exploitation (of the labour force), strike, solidarity or equality. Rather, the program promotes state institutions that ensure the flawless application of ex nihilo labour laws and regulations. How can one take a position other than limiting oneself to existing non-problematic financial frameworks, the reformist and paternalistic state essentially wanting the good of citizens who are working and consuming?

Secondly, there is no mention of any debate between disciplinary specialists. Indeed, when the program invites students to exploit expert sources of information (see footnote 5), it does not lead them to evaluate the interests of the authors, their ideological orientations or the schools of thought that ensue from them, let alone to analyse their way of posing the problem, the methods undertaken to arrive at the conclusions they propose or their evidence. Instead, the program only ascertains the relevance and reliability of the obtained information by determining, for example, ‘whether the [web]page was produced by an organisation, a company or an individual’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 24). These expert sources of information may appear ‘neutral’ in the students’ eyes, as if the ‘economic savant knowledge and its ideological controversies should not go too far between civic education in public schools and the horizon of the world of the social market economy’ (Szukala, 2015, p. 72). Consequently, the program does not lead students to develop a critical sense in regard to sources and interpretations, as required by processes and heuristics (problematizing, contextualizing, corroborating, etc.) specific to social sciences. Socially controversial issues are absent, such as those concerning the continuity of social struggles in the present, notably against cutbacks in education and social services or against the retreat of social measures such as unemployment insurance, and hunger relief in schools. Here, analogies between Québec and European contexts are numerous, with the ‘financial’ approach becoming transferable from one state to another in the West. This transferability is not surprising; in school, as with any curricular disciplinary matter, economic, financial knowledge reflects the adjustment of teachings to dominant models. Consequently, ideological, heated controversies are only taught rarely (Hedtke, 2002, cited in Szukala, 2015).
In fact, whether it be the problematization of capitalism itself or that of the management of capitalism, the program fails to problematize any controversial or socially vivid subject (e.g. consumption of GMOs and labelling of foods, strikes by public sector workers, financial fraud within provincial and federal governments, increase in post-secondary tuition fees – an issue considered by numerous secondary and post-secondary students as a question socialement vive that has intensely resonated in Québec since the 2012 student movement preventing the Québec Liberal government from drastically increasing tuition fees), nor does it consider these issues from the perspectives of political economy or social history. As a language that repudiates the moralist, instrumentalist, mechanistic or static visions of knowledge and politics, while emphasising reflection and debate about the social factors of individual problems, social sciences disciplines are not mobilised to assess, for example, systemic influences, such as state debt or financial and economic crises, on the well-being of individuals and different social groups, according to their interests and socio-economic status. In short, ministerial speeches concerning social sciences disciplines contradict each other, insofar as the formation of citizens who are ‘participating in debates on social issues’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2004, p. 306) is absent from the issues and concepts of the Financial Education program – with no latent capacity of being developed in an ‘act of dissensus’ (Arthur, 2012, p. 172).

On the one hand, despite ministerial pretentions, this program has no explicit link with history, geography or citizenship education, constituting the disciplines in social sciences taught from primary to secondary school. On the other hand, scholars insist on the focal link between financial education and social studies, in particular the link between financial literacy and historical analysis (e.g. considering social phenomena in term of duration, using historical narratives to inform judgments about policy questions in the present) (Lefrançois & Demers, 2009):

“In schools, we should promote age-appropriate inquiry into the reasons for and effects of collective and individual provision of significant goods, services and opportunities: water, healthcare, law enforcement, employment, education, retirement, food, energy, transportation and housing. This critical inquiry should compare present, historical and possible means of providing security — i.e. a study of past, present and possible political action aimed at instituting particular security solutions and definitions of security (e.g. security as a right to one’s basic needs, the ability to collectively decide what those needs are and access to opportunities and resources to pursue projects one finds fulfilling) (Arthur, 2016, p. 121-122).”

However, this educational aim may raise objections, including an ideological one concerning the reformist illusion, denounced by Bourdieuan analysis and possibly maintained by this article, of a school changing society in favour of the social interests of citizens, whereas political economy over-determines problems (epistemic, socio-economic injustices, for instance) in school. Marxists, among others, have denounced as fallacious the claim that school escapes or reduces real inequalities in social life (Apple, 1982; Barnes, 2000). Thus, in fact, school is a place where social injustice and social reproduction are concealed, especially when it shows its indifference to the heterogeneity of school provisions, which are strongly correlated with the social and cultural characteristics of students (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970). School is therefore a privileged place for the exercise of symbolic violence, the dominants extorting (consciously or not) from the dominated the free adherence to their own domination (see Ethier & Lefrançois, 2007; Lefrançois & Ethier, 2008).

5 Conclusion

The Financial Education program seems to be a response to the global trend of educating citizens on financial issues to, hopefully, avoid any future economic crisis. In short, the system must function optimally and must be the most stable, sustainable and profitable for small and large local capitalists. That program wishes to create ‘good’ citizens at the expense of ‘critical’ citizens. It appears the Gouvernement du Québec has omitted that this new course is part of the Social Sciences program, and should encourage and teach students to be intellectually engaged. The narrow and bourgeois conception of economic citizenship embedded in this course reflects an ideologically conservative notion of political economy that has political implications. In our opinion, by limiting financial literacy to personal finances, efforts to mould personally responsible citizens are detrimental to efforts aimed to equip critical, justice-oriented citizens.

The program proposes an ‘uncontroversial’ world where consumers consume without loss, workers produce without feeling wronged and the workforce is trained to have the best possible jobs. Nevertheless, the program does not systematically question this world through numerous debates, processes and heuristics specific to social sciences.

References


Endnotes

1 Unlike the other nine concepts, ‘training’ cannot be mobilised in the specific disciplinary context and language of financial education because it is absent from the section ‘Learning to Be Acquired’.

2 Recitus is a website created in partnership with the Gouvernement du Québec that provides documents and materials for the Social Sciences program. Because the Financial Education course is new, high school teachers do not have yet acces to textbooks. Texts and exercises available on this website are then an important part of the teaching material in financial education.

3 This section addresses the three financial issues: ‘Consuming goods and services’, ‘Entering the workforce’ and ‘Pursuing an education’.

4 For example: ‘Indicates some of the reasons that the government imposes taxes (e.g. to fund public services, to redistribute incomes)’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 12).

5 For example: ‘Names resources that provide information or points of view on goods and services (e.g. websites, discussion forums, specialized magazines, public affairs programs)’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 12).

6 For example: ‘Describes the risks involved in using credit (e.g. high interest charges on credit card balances, debt accumulation, difficulty in accessing credit, lower credit rating, negative effects on health)’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 13).

7 For example: ‘Giving reasons for saving money (e.g. to increase his/her consumer choices, to make a dream project come true, to have an emergency fund)’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 13).

8 For example: ‘Explains the purpose of a credit report: to outline a consumer’s credit record’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 13).

9 Only occurrence: ‘Identifies some of the elements taken into account in determining eligibility for credit (e.g. income, job stability, debt load)’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 13).

10 Throughout the program, there is one mention of the words ‘pay equity’, and one of the words ‘union/union accreditation/union dues’ (Gouvernement du Québec, 2017, p. 15).
**Iftikhar Ahmad**

**Political Science and the Good Citizen: The Genealogy of Traditionalist Paradigm of Citizenship Education in the American School Curriculum**

- This article examines American political scientists’ contribution to pre-collegiate citizenship education curriculum.
- During the twentieth century the American Political Science Association (APSA) promoted three different conceptions of citizenship education reflecting paradigm shifts in political science.
- The state-centric approach, as introduced during the 1910s, remained canonized in the school curriculum.
- By the end of the twentieth century a society-centric curriculum framework was proposed.

**Purpose:** The purpose of this article is to chronicle paradigm shifts in American political science during the twentieth century and their influence on political scientists’ perspectives on pre-collegiate citizenship education curriculum.

**Methodology:** The research questions explored in this article are concerned with the history of political scientists’ ideas about citizenship education. Therefore, historical method is used which involves an examination of evidence—primary sources. Those sources are the APSA’s ten reports and statements.

**Findings:** In different decades of the twentieth century, the APSA committees and one taskforce prepared ten (10) reports and statements on pre-collegiate citizenship education which reflected three different paradigms in political science—Traditionalism, Behavioralism, and Post-behavioralism.

**Keywords:** Citizenship education, political science, curriculum, traditionalism, history

### 1 Introduction

Citizenship education is a contentious realm. In democratic societies, diverse voices assert their own conceptions of good citizenship. In the United States, one notable group that spoke with the loudest voice and played an intermittent role in the pre-collegiate citizenship education in the twentieth century was the American Political Science Association (APSA), which not only shared its conceptions with school educators, on some occasions, it also made political attempts to influence the school curriculum. This paper chronicles and analyzes American political scientists' varying conceptions with regard to citizenship education in the public school curriculum.

All through the twentieth century, some authors studied the APSA’s myriad activities with regard to citizenship education in public schools. However, they examined the APSA’s activities in specific historical periods and, based on the evidence they examined, they reached diverse conclusions. For example, in their research, American scholars including Henry J. Ford (1905), Rolla M. Tryon (1935), Cora Prifold (1962), Jack Allen (1966), Hazel W. Hertzberg (1981), Mary J. Turner (1978), Cleo H. Cherryholmes (1990), Hindy L. Schachter (1998), Stephen T. Leonard (1999), and Stephen E. Bennett (1999) present competing interpretations of the APSA’s conceptions of and approaches to citizenship and citizenship education. Although the scope of their study was limited because they examined isolated pieces of evidence, in their own way and time, these scholars engaged themselves in the extant discourse and produced a rich body of historical knowledge that contributes to our understanding of the APSA’s approaches. More importantly, these scholars’ findings are wide-ranging with regard to the APSA’s activities related to the pre-collegiate citizenship education curriculum. While I find this literature valuable and take into consideration these scholars’ findings and conclusions, my review of it, however, generated three questions which merit further inquiry. For example, a) what different conceptions of citizenship did the APSA promote in the twentieth century; b) did paradigm shifts within the discipline of political science influence political scientists’ conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education; and c) what variables may explain the rise and decline of the APSA’s level of activities in pre-collegiate citizenship education?

These inter-related questions warrant examination because the literature on political scientists’ activities in public schools seems to pay little attention to the relationship between the development in the field of political science and the APSA’s varying degrees of interest in the school community. In other words, since its birth in 1903, the APSA’s myriad activities and standpoints with regard to citizenship education have not always been uniform but experienced several intellectual transformations. Thus, this paper argues that understanding the nature of those intellectual transformations is vital for understanding the APSA’s motives, approaches, and activities with regard to citizenship education.
education in schools. This also helps in understanding the question of compatibility between political science and citizenship education in schools.

The paper also argues that what students learn today in the school curriculum was set in motion a century ago. The APSA’s own reports and statements shed a shining light on political scientists’ activities and changing conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education. For example, the APSA’s documents suggest that Traditionalism, the APSA’s earliest approach to citizenship education, remained canonized in the twentieth-century American curriculum and has not been replaced. The Traditionalist worldview firmly established its ideological hegemony through the placing of teaching and learning about the state institutions squarely at the center of the citizenship education curriculum. Although other paradigm or movement, i.e., Behavioralism, developed within political science that promoted empiricism and inquiry within the field, Traditionalism remained firmly entrenched in the citizenship education curriculum.

It took political scientists many decades to realize that citizenship education was indeed a complex educational enterprise that required an interdisciplinary approach, and that simply teaching young people about governmental institutions was insufficient for preparing a caring, tolerant, and responsible citizenry. In other words, political scientists realized that their predecessors’ approaches, i.e., Traditionalism as well as Behavioralism, were ineffective models for addressing the challenges of apathy and civic disengagement. Hence, by the late twentieth century, a new generation of political scientists, mostly women, briefly floated a normative conception of citizenship that introduced the concepts of tolerance, respect, and collaboration. However, they did not make any inroads into the school curriculum and quickly departed from the scene. Thus it appears that political scientists would rather focus their energies on doing empirical research in colleges and universities than delving into normative activities such as citizenship education in schools. This observation raises the question of the reward system in the field of political science as well as the question of compatibility between the field of political science and citizenship education. This and similar other questions are explored in this tentative historical inquiry.

2 Review of literature

In the twentieth century, many scholars, including political scientists, historians, sociologists, psychologists, and school educators have studied the problem of citizenship education in American schools. Most of them are aware of the APSA’s past contributions to the public school curriculum and attempt to establish a connection between the APSA and the teaching of political science in secondary schools (Schaper, 1906; Tryon 1935; Pettersch 1953; Litt, 1963; Quillen, 1966; Turner, 1978; 1981; Shaver & Knight, 1986; Patrick & Hoge, 1991). Nonetheless, more than anyone else, it has been mostly political scientists who studied the activities of their own organization, namely, the APSA, with regard to its efforts towards reforming the citizenship education curriculum in schools.

Indeed, literature on political scientists’ educational ideas and activities in the area of pre-collegiate curriculum and instruction in political science may be disparate—when synthesized, two competing arguments emerge. The first argument presents a sanguine view of political scientists’ contributions, suggesting that political scientists promoted the teaching of political science in schools to prepare good citizens. They would like to see political scientists continue working with the social studies educators in schools. For the lack of a better term, I call this group the Believers.

The second argument questions the compatibility of political science and citizenship education. The proponents of the second argument contend that since the intellectual mission of political science has been mainly limited to academic and empirical research, it is unfeasible for its practitioners to achieve any beneficial results in a normative activity such as citizenship education. I call this group the Skeptics.

Although both groups acknowledge political scientists’ educational initiatives in schools, they disagree on the appropriateness of the ideas they may have introduced for the preparation of democratic citizens. For instance, the Believers, including Jack Allen (1966), Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus (1967), Hindy L. Schachter (1998), Richard G. Niemi and Jane Junn (1998; 2005), and Stephen E. Bennett (1999), affirm the educational value of political scientists’ contribution to citizenship education. Conversely, Bernard Crick (1959), David Ricci (1984), Mary Jane Turner (1978), Cleo H. Cherryholmes (1990), and Stephen T. Leonard (1999) consider the teaching of political science material in schools consequential for fostering democratic citizenship among the youth.

The focal point of the Believers’ argument is that although the APSA’s efforts in schools did not fully succeed in preparing democratic citizens, its original mission included citizenship education (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Schachter 1998). More importantly, some of the Believers argue that political science research and civic pedagogy in schools were mutually compatible (Bennett 1999, p. 755). Citing the contribution of Behavioralist political scientist Charles E. Merriam (1934), the Believers posit that it was feasible for political scientists to straddle both empirical and normative missions.

On the question of educational benefits that may be derived from the teaching of political science in schools, the Believers argue that such a course “palpably contributes to young people’s understanding of public affairs” (Bennett, 1999, p. 756). In contrast with the Believers’ sanguine view, the Skeptics characterize political scientists’ efforts pertaining to the preparation of good citizens as no more than “pure futility and waste” (Leonard, 1999, p. 749). Indeed, this argument is as old as the APSA itself. For instance, soon after the formation of the APSA as an independent learned society in 1903, political scientist Henry Jones Ford (1905) questioned the
epistemological foundation of political science for good citizenship. The APSA had sought to integrate its three goals, i.e. the study of the state and its organs, the use of empirical methods, and the preparation of good citizens. In Ford’s view, these three goals were irreconcilable at best.

In the succeeding decades of the twentieth century, political scientists, disciplinary historians, and philosophers of education, including John Dewey (1916), William B. Munro (1928), James Fesler, et al. (1951), Bernard Crick (1959), Edgar Litt (1963), Mary Jane Turner (1978), David Ricci (1984), Evron Kirkpatrick and Jeane Kirkpatrick (1962), Cleo H. Cherrylholmes (1990), and Stephen J. Leonard (1999), echoed Ford’s prescient skepticism. In essence, this group of authors advances the proposition that professional prestige and the reward system in the field of political science came from empirical research and not normative activity such as citizenship education in schools.

In a sense, the Skeptics argue that political scientists could not make a substantial contribution to citizenship education in schools because it required forsaking their primary academic mission: conducting dispassionate empirical research for discovering generalizations, formulating theories, and explaining political phenomena.

Although the conceptual insights of both Believers and Skeptics enhance our understanding of the connection between political scientists and pre-collegiate citizenship education, both groups seem to paper over two pivotal issues in the debate.

First, proponents of both approaches assume the APSA to be a monolithic group, and in so doing, they inadvertently overlook the existence of multiple ideological cleavages within the APSA. Second, both perspectives consider the APSA as a learned society and hence discount the possibility that, at some point, the APSA may also have behaved as an interest group lobby that was engaged in promoting its members’ ideological as well as professional agendas disguising as citizenship education. That is to say, understanding the APSA’s motives is vital. Third, only a few of these scholars pay attention to civics pedagogy in schools.

On the APSA’s activities pertaining to the promotion of political science in the school curriculum, one could argue that, because during the formative phase of their discipline, political scientists struggled to establish independent departments in colleges and universities, their advancement of knowledge of the national government was inextricably linked with their own professional self-interest. One could say that in the embryonic phase of their field of study, political scientists and their association sought to achieve two urgent goals: legitimacy and respectability. Indeed, they thought they could achieve both by promoting their field as a science, recruiting more students into political science, competing with historians, and by making political alliances with teachers’ associations. Therefore, in the first three decades of the twentieth century, the APSA’s behavior was more akin to a political lobby than a learned society. Nonetheless, it was during the early three decades that the APSA achieved its goal: gaining a capstone status for political science in the school curriculum. Once political science achieved the capstone status in schools, it was canonized for the rest of the century and could not be replaced. For many decades of the twentieth century and beyond no one questioned why political science was considered necessary and sufficient for citizenship education.

Moreover, with a few exceptions, the bulk of the literature on the APSA’s activities in the area of pre-collegiate citizenship education was produced by political scientists who focused on the curriculum aspect and not pedagogy. Political scientists engaged each other in the discourse but ignored the school teachers who teach citizenship in schools (Hepburn, 1987; Mann, 1996). The teachers’ organization, the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS), which represents the pedagogical aspect of citizenship education, disagree with political scientists on what counts as citizenship education. Since 1994, the NCSS has been defining citizenship education in interdisciplinary terms in that, in its view, teaching political science is necessary for citizenship education but it alone is not sufficient. In its definition of social studies, the NCSS asserts that citizenship education includes the teaching and learning of all social sciences, law, religion, as well as humanities (National Council for the Social Studies, 1994). Similarly, the findings of some education scholars’ research, who studied citizenship education in schools, including Edgar Litt (1963), Jean Anyon (1978) and Cleo H. Cherrylholmes (1990) seem to concur with the Skeptics by arguing that the teaching of political science has not produced positive results.

3 Methodology
Since my inquiry primarily focuses on the questions of the political scientists’ ideas with regard to pre-collegiate citizenship education, paradigm shifts in the field of political science, political scientists’ activities in schools, and the compatibility of political science and citizenship education, it is vital to examine the historical record for information and perspectives. Fortunately, the record of the APSA’s documents since the organization’s inception is currently accessible both in paper and electronic form and could be interpreted through the canons of the historical method. In academic world, the historical method is recognized as a scientific method and has been successfully applied by notable twentieth century American historians of education including Lawrence Cremin (1964), Merle Curti (1978), Dorothy Ross (1992), Hazel W. Hertzberg (1981), Herbert Kliebard (2004), and Diane Ravitch (2007). Following the tradition of these education historians, I examine the relevant evidence to explain political scientists’ ideas and activities in historical context by using the historical method of inquiry that requires taking four progressive steps. First, I gather the historical record or evidence. Second, I evaluate the evidence for validity and reliability. Third, I try to comprehend the meaning of the evaluated evidence in social and political context. Fourth, I separate, compare, categorize, and group the evidence according
to the message, ideas, and concepts embedded in each document. The raw material and tool at my disposal is the written record, i.e., the printed material consisting of the primary sources. In this case, the primary sources are the ten (10) different reports and statements that the APSA’s leadership released periodically, some of which were published in the two official journals of the APSA, namely The American Political Science Review and PS: Political Science and Politics and others were published by the APSA in the form of books. The APSA’s documents are the work product of its authorized committees and the Task Force between 1908 and 1998 and are believed to be credible, authentic, and valid primary sources, which are easily available to the general public. Moreover, the selected documents represent the social, political, and historical context in which they were written and, therefore, they mirror the real world. Although the selected documents offer an unobtrusive data, they have a disadvantage as well, which is that the documents are disparate and fragmentary that required cobbling up to establish a balanced historical account.

The documents were prepared by the APSA’s seven committees and its Task Force, which mainly consisted of political science professors who taught political science courses at universities all across the United States and represented diverse regions and viewpoints. The seven committees and the Task Force were charged with the responsibility to convene meetings, to deliberate on the status of citizenship education, and to prepare reports and statements on behalf of the APSA. In other words, my assumption is that the reports and statements represented a direct description of the APSA’s official policies and visions with regard to citizenship and citizenship education. Since the author of the selected primary sources is the APSA itself or its authorized representatives, one could presume their legitimacy, validity, reliability, and authenticity. More importantly, since the APSA published those reports and statements, it indicates that the APSA did so with the expressed intention that its policies and standpoints become part of the public record. Therefore, the degree of reliability of these reports and statements as primary sources is high. Hence the selected primary sources embody the APSA’s ideas, values, aims, vision, and policies concerning the teaching of political science for the purpose of citizenship education in the pre-collegiate context. Moreover, the selected primary sources also indicate a significant evolution in the field of political science, more specifically, evolution in its realm of knowledge, methodology, as well as its raison d’etre.

Between the first and its last decades of the twentieth century, the APSA’s myriad committees issued the following ten reports and policy statements about the citizenship education curriculum in the public schools:

- APSA Report of the Committee on Instruction in Government, (1908)
- APSA Report of the Committee on Instruction, (1916)
- APSA Report of the Committee on Instruction in Political Science, (1922)
- APSA Report of the Committee of Five, (1925)
- APSA Report of the Committee on Cooperation with NCSS, (1939)
- APSA Report of the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching, (1951)

4 Findings

First, the chronology of these reports and statements point to a simple but significant historical fact which is that the APSA issued its first five detailed and extensive reports (1908, 1916, 1922, 1925, 1939) within the four decades of its existence; the next two reports (1951, 1971) were detailed but issued after a gap of twenty years; in depth and breadth the APSA’s last three policy statements (1996, 1997, 1998) are unlike the former reports and were released for three consecutive years after a hiatus of a quarter of a century. Second, my library search indicates that the APSA Committee on Education, 1991-1993, issued “APSA Guidelines for Teacher Training: Recommendation for Certifying Pre-Collegiate Teachers of Civics, Government, and Social Studies” (APSA, 1994). However, the APSA provides no information about the membership of its Committee on Education, 1991-1993, that prepared the guidelines and, therefore, this document is excluded from the analysis. Hence the analysis will concentrate on the ten (10) reports and statements noted here.

Third, between 1908 and 1971, the APSA formed seven committees which, in total, prepared seven extensive reports on the subject. However, after 1971, it stopped forming committees on citizenship education. In 1996, the APSA formed the Task Force on Civic Education for the Twenty-first Century, with an aim to promote citizenship education in schools but it did not prepare any extensive report similar to those issued between 1908 and 1971. For three consecutive years, 1996-1998, the Task Force issued three short statements articulating the APSA’s vision on citizenship education.

Fourth, there is a clear difference between a report and a statement: whereas, in this case, a report provides data and a detailed account of the activities of the group, a statement, on the other hand, expresses the group’s general opinion or intentions on a particular subject and also identifies the participants included in the group activities. Also, making a distinction between a report and a statement is vital because it points to the amount of time, energy, effort, and resources an organization may have allocated to preparing a document.

Thus my raw material or primary sources consist of the APSA’s seven (7) reports and three (3) statements which I used for clues and information. My review of the
relevant literature on the subject reveals that no author, past or present, identified, gathered, or analyzed all ten of the APSA’s reports and statements in one article or book.

I discuss the ten documents in chronological order and summarize the contents of the documents. The APSA’s first report in 1908 was in fact based on William A. Schaper’s survey of 238 high school students. In 1905, Schaper, a professor of political science at University of Minnesota, presented his paper at the APSA’s annual conference: “What do our students know about American government before taking college courses in political science.” Schaper concluded that high school students’ knowledge of government was dismal. Alarmed by Schaper’s findings, the APSA formed the Committee on Instruction in Government (CIG) to make recommendations on improving the teaching of political science in secondary schools. The CIG had five members. After collecting an extensive data on the status of teaching political science in high school, the CIG made several recommendations which included the separation of the subject of political science from history, making the course on political science mandatory for high school graduation, and preparing teachers to teach political science. In brief, the 1908 report was the APSA’s first and, a fairly successful attempt, to introduce political science as a capstone course to the pre-collegiate academic community. In other words, the APSA asserted itself in an academic and intellectual space that was hitherto occupied by the American Historical Association (AHA). The APSA had arrived on the scene as a new formidable rival throwing down the gauntlet to AHA and confidently claiming a share for political science in the school curriculum. Thus the APSA’s first report may be considered as a blueprint for its future activities.

The APSA released its second report in 1916, which was, in its scope, much more extensive than 1908 report, and was published in the form of a book titled The Teaching of Government: Report to the American Political Science Association. This report was prepared by the Committee on Instruction (CI) which consisted of seven professors including Mabel Hill, the first woman ever to serve on any APSA committee. The report noted that “deplorable deficiency” existed in high schools with regard to the teaching of political science and made recommendations for improving the teaching of political science (APSA, 1916, p. 61). First, it equated the teaching of political science with citizenship education. Second, it proposed that teachers training institutions should include civics in their curricula. Third, it recommended that unprepared teachers should be properly trained to teach civics in high schools. Fourth, it suggested that textbooks on civics should include topics on the structure and functions of local government and other social science topics such as sociology and economics should be excluded from it. The CI expressed the desire that political scientists gain a complete proprietary control over the civics curriculum in schools.

Several years later, the APSA appointed the Committee on Instruction in Political Science (CIPS) which had five members. Some of its members had previously served on the two similar committees. The task before the CIPS was “to define the scope and purposes of a high school course in civics and to prepare an outline of topics which might properly be included within such a course” (APSA, 1922, p. 116). In 1922, CIPS published its report “The Study of Civics” in the American Political Science Review, the APSA’s official journal. Around the country, fifty-eight professors of political science, history, and other fields, including historian Charles A. Beard of Columbia University and social scientist Charles E. Merriam of the University of Chicago approved the report (APSA, 1922, pp. 124-125). The CIPS’s report declared that “in the field of social studies all roads lead through government” (APSA, 1922, p. 117). The report equated the civics course with political science).

The APSA launched its fourth committee in 1923 and was named the Committee of Five (COF) which submitted its report in 1925. The task assigned to COF was to study the state laws regarding the teaching of political science in secondary schools and to lobby the state legislatures. The COF found that laws around the country in this regard were dissimilar and, therefore, it recommended standardization across the United States. First, it proposed that the APSA should draft laws regarding making the teaching of political science mandatory for high school graduation and send them to all fifty state legislatures. Second, the laws would include that teachers in all states must complete a course in political science before receiving professional certification. Third, the contents of a civics course should be limited to political science (APSA, 1925, p. 208).

In the late 1930s, the APSA used a new strategy for promoting the teaching of political science in public schools. This time it authorized its fifth committee—Committee on the Social Studies—for the purpose of fostering cooperation between the APSA and the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS), an organization of teachers engaged in the pedagogical aspects of the social sciences in schools. This committee noted that citizenship education was the direct function of the state because a large number of the young people attended government-funded schools; only a small number attended colleges. It claimed that improvement in the teaching of civics in schools was achieved due to the APSA’s contributions. In its report of 1939, this committee recommended three areas in which the APSA could cooperate with NCSS: 1) curriculum recommendation for a senior high school course in political science; 2) teacher preparation and certification in social studies; and 3) political scientists will publish articles in Social Education, an official journal of NCSS.

After the 1939 report, it took the APSA a decade to authorize Committee for the Advancement of Teaching (CAT), which had seven members. The CAT was assigned to conduct a study on the status of the teaching of political science in public schools across the United States. The study was funded by a grant of $10,000.00 from Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. The CAT submitted its report to the APSA in
1951 under the title, Goals for Political Science. The report expressed its disappointment over the effectiveness of the APSA committees, both past, and present, to have had any “significant effect in increasing the rapport between the two groups of teachers” (APSA, 1939, p. 221). This referred to the nature of the relationship between political scientists in colleges and teachers in schools. The report recognized that since political scientists had a low regard for school teachers, this mindset kept the two groups from collaborating (APSA, 1939, p. 229). The report’s recommendations with regard to political scientists’ role in the pre-collegiate citizenship education triggered an intense debate among fellow political scientists. The intramural debate was published in the APSA’s American Political Science Review in 1951. Those who participated in the debate were political scientists James W. Fesler, Louis Hartz, John H. Hallowell, Victor G. Rosenblum, Walter H. C. Laves, W. A. Robson, Lindsay Rogers, and Clinton Rossiter. The participants offered their competing views on political scientists’ role in the pre-collegiate citizenship education.

After about twenty years of inertia, in 1970, the APSA once again formed a committee to study the status of curriculum and instruction in the area of “political science education” in secondary schools. The new committee was called the Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education, which had six members. After working for a year, in 1971, the committee issued its landmark report “Political Education in the Public Schools: The Challenge for Political Science.” The report conceded that political scientists and school teachers lived in a state of “two socio-cultural systems that largely co-exist in mutual isolation of one another” (APSA, 1971, p. 432). Political scientists had remained “uninterested, ill-informed, and contemptuous” of schools because those were “primitive” and “unhappy places,” and “the two groups were like foreigners who spoke different languages and, therefore, did not communicate” (APSA, 1971, p. 433). This was the APSA’s last report.

For one-quarter of a century, after the APSA released the 1971 report, it remained silent on the issue of teaching political science or citizenship education in public schools. No committees were appointed and no reports were released. In brief, during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, as a learned society, the APSA remained quiescent towards schools. Occasionally some APSA members, such as Mary A. Hepburn (1975; 1987) made attempts to draw the APSA’s attention to the question of improving citizenship education in schools through collaboration with school teachers. Sheila Mann (1996) notes that the APSA declined to participate in America 2000: An Education Strategy that President George H. W. Bush had launched in 1991 to improve curriculum standards of school subjects. The APSA’s premise was that there was no consensus among its members on the civics and government curriculum.

The protracted lull was interrupted in 1996 by the then APSA’s president-elect, Elinor Ostrom, who submitted a proposal to the APSA Council for creating the Task Force on Civic Education for the Next Century. Ostrom argued that civic engagement had fallen, citizens’ political efficacy had declined, and citizens’ participation in the political process had plummeted (APSA, 1996). The term “civic engagement” was borrowed from an article “Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital” written by Robert Putnam (1995), a Harvard professor. Ostrom complained that schools presented a “cardboard model of citizenship” to students with a little emphasis on teaching inquiry and organizational skills” (APSA, 1996, p. 756). The Task Force was authorized in 1996 comprising of eleven political scientists—six of them were women. One of the six female members was Elinor Ostrom, who won the Nobel Prize in 2009.

In 1997, the Task Force released a one-page document, “Statement of purpose of the American Political Science Association Task Force on Citizenship Education” that identified the problem of civic apathy among American citizens, offered an explanation, and proposed steps the Task Force would be taking to foster civic engagement through citizenship education (APSA, 1997, p. 745).

In 1998, the membership of the Task Force expanded to fifteen, adding two more female political scientists to the list. The same year, the Task Force released a two-page progress report, “Expanded articulation statement: A call for reactions and contributions,” in which it conceded that political scientists’ emphasis on teaching about government in citizenship education may have contributed to the engendering of “unhealthy cynicism and political disengagement” in the American polity (APSA, 1998, p. 636). The document suggested that citizenship education should emphasize teaching virtues, tolerance, collaboration, analysis, and traditions. This was the last statement the APSA released on the subject of citizenship education or the teaching of political science in the pre-collegiate context. The Task Force wrapped up its activities in 2002. Melvin J. Dubnick (2003), the co-chair of the Task Force, lamented that the Task Force did not leave any noteworthy legacy behind.

5 Discussion
First, between 1908 and 1998, the APSA’s seven committees and one Task Force released seven reports and three brief statements on citizenship education. No evidence is available to suggest that the APSA released any other reports or statements on the subject of pre-collegiate citizenship education. Indeed, in their private capacity, some political scientists may have conducted research on citizenship education. However, for our purpose, we are concerned exclusively with the reports and statements that the APSA, as an organization, authorized and approved.

Second, since the ten documents were written in different historical contexts, they reflect not only the moods of the historical periods in which they were written but also the extant paradigms in political science. A review of the conceptual frameworks presented in the documents suggests that they may be divided into three different categories. Each group of documents repre-
sents the APSA’s three distinct approaches to and visions for the pre-collegiate citizenship education, i.e., Traditionalism, Behavioralism, and Post-behavioralism.

Third, the first five (5) reports (1908, 1916, 1922, 1925, 1939) consider the study of the structure and functions of the government as sine qua non for citizenship education. Those five reports categorically claim that all roads to citizenship lead through the study of the institutions of the state (APSA, 1922, p. 117). In other words, the five reports considered the state to be the unit of analysis and, therefore, recommended that students must complete a course in government to graduate from high school and, also that teacher training programs must include a civics course for teacher certification. In addition, the five reports emphatically rejected the notion that citizenship education was an interdisciplinary field. The APSA asserted its desire that it wanted a proprietary control over the subject of civics, and expressed its angst when it discovered that the existing civics curriculum included other social sciences; it declared that the civics course in schools should include only political science or the study of government, and nothing else. To promote its agenda, the APSA not only engaged in a propaganda campaign but also lobbied state legislators for making the teaching of political science mandatory for high school graduation and teacher certification. As an independent learned society, the APSA sought to secure its monopoly over the construction of knowledge.

A question may be raised about the APSA’s motive behind its activities. Was it patriotism that the APSA was promoting? The first five reports certainly do not mention patriotism. Besides, patriotism is a normative activity and the APSA was projecting itself as the purveyor of the scientific study of politics. Patriotism was an activity for other civic, philanthropic, and professional societies, such as American Bar Association, the American Legion, and the National League’s Committee on Constitutional Instruction that had taken political measures towards enacting laws mandating the teaching of government and civics courses in schools. Their goal was to inculcate patriotism in millions of American citizens, mostly new immigrants, who they believed not to be “devotedly loyal to the United States” (APSA, 1925, p. 207).

The APSA’s objectives were different from philanthropic organizations in that its interest in the matter was not related to patriotism—it sought to carve out a niche for political science in the pre-collegiate educational arena under the garb of citizenship education. In addition, the APSA considered itself the sole authority on the contents of civics; its interest in promoting the teaching of civics or government courses was therefore markedly different from the civic organizations’ normative and public welfare missions. More importantly, whereas civic organizations focused their attention on society and its myriad problems, the APSA’s constitution of 1903 called for “the encouragement of the scientific study of politics, public law, administration and diplomacy” (APSA, 1903, p. 5). Nonetheless, the APSA’s activities suggest that it promoted a normative agenda as well which was to establish and strengthen the national state (Gunnell, 1995; Dryzek, 2006).

Fourth, the reports of 1951 and 1971 recommended a central role for political science in pre-collegiate citizenship education. However, the two reports discard the APSA’s time-honored approach to citizenship education. The two reports proposed an innovative conceptual framework that relegated the study of the state institutions to the margins and recognized the individual and his behavior as the unit of analysis in citizenship education. For example, the 1951 report noted that formal knowledge of governmental institutions was not sufficient to inculcate democratic attitudes. In a sense, by not stressing instruction in government, the authors of the 1951 report repudiated the state-centric Traditionalist approach to citizenship and citizenship education.

Thus, as a research method and, as a movement, Behavioralism was a significant conceptual about-face in political science. The early proponents of Behavioralism were political scientists Charles E. Merriam and Harold Lasswell and their graduate students at the University of Chicago. In 1925, in his inaugural address as the APSA president, Merriam introduced the idea of scientific research methods in political science. In 1925, Merriam also published a book New Aspects of Politics that explained development in political science and made the case for the scientific method, a method popular in other social sciences such as psychology and sociology. It was a revolutionary orientation. From then on, political scientists borrowed research ideas from other social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology, and began introducing them into political science (Waldo 1975).

After the Second World War, Behavioralism emerged as a new paradigm or a research program in political science and its proponents received generous financial support from philanthropic foundations such as Carnegie Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and Ford Foundation. Behavioralism became popular when three authors, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet (1944) published their The People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. It would be fair to posit that this book revolutionized social sciences, including political science.

Yale University political scientist Robert Dahl (1961) notes that in contrast with the Traditionalist paradigm that focused on the study of the state, the new generation of political scientists applied opinion survey methods to study citizens’ political behavior, attitude, and opinions. Because political scientists who served on the APSA committees of 1951 and 1971 belonged to a generation of scholars who were part of a protest movement, i.e., Behavioralism, I call their approach Behavioralist, which is to a large extent, reflected in the two reports.

Thus the APSA’s reports of 1951 and 1971 present a conception of citizenship that was different from the Traditionalist conception presented in the earlier five reports. Instead of a state-centric approach embodied in
the APSA's first five reports, the reports of 1951 and 1971 seek to promote a value-neutral approach that, like other social sciences, underscores empiricism, formulation and testing of hypotheses, and ordering of evidence. Informed by Behavioralism, the two reports recommended the teaching of inquiry, opinion survey, cognitive skills, hypothesis testing, and empirical methods in citizenship education.

Fifth, the APSA's last three brief statements were released in 1996, 1997, and 1998 by its Task Force on Civic Education for the Twenty-First Century. The Task Force's primary mission was to foster civic engagement. All three statements were published in the APSA's official publication, PS: Political Science and Politics. The brevity of the statements somehow demonstrates a lack of urgency on the part of the APSA towards citizenship education. Nonetheless, the Task Force's Expanded Articulation Statement of 1998 showed political scientists' volte-face on the teaching of government for the purpose of citizenship education: The Task Force recommended a complete departure from its predecessors' prescriptions, both Traditionalist and Behavioralist, by offering an alternative prescription which was that teaching "virtues", "diversity", "tolerance", and "collaboration" were vital for citizenship education.

One may question why the Task Force would use such normative language that could not be found in the APSA's prior seven reports. Neither Traditionalist nor Behavioralists mentioned words like "diversity", "tolerance" and "virtues". Indeed, the Task Force suggested that teaching values were vital for good citizenship. Although the three statements are very brief, they mirror the sentiments of the Task Force members. More importantly, the statements are a repudiation of the previous two conceptions of citizenship education: Traditionalist and Behavioralist. Clearly, this approach was society-centered because it highlighted the basic social problems that plagued American democracy in the late Twentieth-century. Since the new approach stepped away from a value-neutral to a value-laden framework, it may be called the Post-behavioralist approach. This approach shied away from studying either the institutions of the state, as Traditionalist had promoted or, the individual's behavior, as Behavioralist had proposed; instead, it underscored the study of societal problems.

To understand the sentiments of the members of the Task Force concerning citizenship education, that they expressed in Expanded Articulation Statement in 1998, it is first necessary to learn about the participants as people as well as their research orientation in the discipline of political science. One key fact to mention is that six of the fifteen members of the Task Force were female, which never happened in previous committees. One woman who served as co-chair of the Task Force was Jean Bethke Eilshain, philosopher of peace and feminism from the Divinity School of the University of Chicago; she was well-known and widely published. Another woman member was the APSA's president, Elinor Ostrom whose research focused on ordinary people in different societies. One female member was political scientist Mary Hepburn who had an extensive experience in building bridges between college professors and school teachers. Similarly, the other three female scholars had also accomplished a great deal in political science and were well known in the profession. Thus the composition of the Task Force was different from the APSA's former committees in that gender equity received full attention here. In a sense, the membership of the Task Force reflected not only the reality of the advances in social and gender relations in the late twentieth century but also mirrored social and paradigmatic shifts within the field of political science. One could argue that as liberal and progressive orientation in political science, Post-behavioralism had opened doors to fresh ideas and new people.

What then differentiates the Post-behavioralist paradigm from the Behavioralist paradigm and what doctrine it proposed on citizenship education? The term, Post-behavioralism, became well-known among the late twentieth-century political scientists. In fact, the term was coined by the David Easton, the president of the APSA in 1969. Easton also served on the APSA committee that prepared the 1971 report. If Behavioralism was a protest movement against the Traditionalist paradigm in political science, Post-behavioralism challenged the orthodoxy of empiricism in Behavioralist political science. Whereas Behavioralists focused on value-neutral political research, values were at the core of the Behavioralist research. Also, whereas Behavioralism promoted apolitical political science, Post-behavioralists fostered the importance of relevance and social action for change. Research techniques and sophistication were less important for Post-behavioralists than substance.

Easton (1969) noted that since the Behavioralist paradigm in political science failed to explain or predict the myriad social, racial, economic, political and international problems of the 1960s and 1970s, it had become irrelevant as a research agenda. Easton argued that it was one of political scientists' social responsibilities to "improve political life according to humane criteria" (Easton, 1969).

Thus the Task Force's Articulation Statement of 1998 was consistent with the Post-behavioralist credo that the liberal purpose of citizenship education was to teach citizens to aspire to freedom, dignity, and equality, and to play active roles as political actors in all social settings, including labor unions, church governance, and corporate management (APSA 1998, p. 636).

Nonetheless, none of the Task Force's three statements discussed any practical solutions, such as: a) how the Task Force would collaborate with public school communities to improve citizenship education; b) what curriculum to be recommended to schools; and c) what goals were to be achieved and how? In essence, the three statements were no more than mere identification of the problem, i.e., the lack of civic engagement in American democracy.
6 Conclusion

The APSA's activities with respect to the pre-collegiate citizenship education curriculum have generated a body of literature that sheds light on the complex nature of the relationship between the academic discipline of political science and pre-collegiate citizenship education. A review of the literature generated three inter-related questions: a) what different conceptions of citizenship did the APSA promote in the twentieth century; b) did paradigm shifts within the discipline of political science, in any way, influence political scientists' conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education; and c) what variables may explain the rise and decline of the APSA's level of activities in pre-collegiate citizenship education?

Thus this exploratory historical inquiry seeks to ferret out plausible explanations for the above three questions by examining the primary sources: the APSA's ten reports and statements—all released between 1908 and 1998. These documents represent the trajectory of the APSA's evolving approaches to the idea of citizenship and the citizenship education curriculum for the public schools. The APSA released its first five reports (1908, 1916, 1922, 1925, 1939) during its Traditionalist phase prescribing the scientific study of the structure and functions of the state and presenting it as citizenship education. In so doing, the APSA struggled to eliminate all other social sciences from the civics curriculum except political science; that is to say, the APSA defined civics as political science. Thus, for Traditionalist political scientists, the purpose of citizenship education was limited to the study of the political organs of the nation-state—in their view, other social sciences had a peripheral status. Moreover, based on the evidence, one could argue that with its early and persistent efforts the APSA succeeded in canonizing its Traditionalist conception of citizenship education—a state-centric world-view—in the school curriculum.

However, the Traditionalist paradigm in political science lost its intellectual luster when other social sciences—psychology and sociology—emerged in academia that emphasized the empirical study of the human behavior and society. Influenced by psychology and sociology, the new generation of political scientists questioned the validity of Traditionalism as a useful research paradigm and, therefore, introduced Behavioralism as a new research paradigm into the discipline of political science. Behavioralism promoted a value-neutral political research methodology—it presented politics as an apolitical activity. Unlike the Traditionalist approach, the APSA's two committees of 1951 and 1971, underscored the teaching and learning of empirical methods, formulation and testing of hypotheses, and constructing theories. Political scientists authored several high school textbooks from the Behavioralist perspective which underscored the scientific study of the voters' behavior. After the APSA released its 1971 report, Behavioralists jettisoned any normative activity, such as citizenship education. The scientism of the Behavioralist paradigm was found to be inadequate and was challenged by the society-centered political scientists, namely, the Post-behavioralists. Even though the Post-behavioralists claimed that they considered substance to be more important than methodology, and values more important than objectivity, there is no documentary evidence to suggest that their liberal rhetoric yielded any concrete results for the pre-collegiate citizenship education curriculum.

As compared with the achievements of Traditionalists and Behavioralists, the Post-behavioralists actually ignored citizenship education altogether as a meaningful activity. To be fair to Post-behavioralists, the Task Force, which included the APSA's two presidents—Elinor Ostrom and Robert Putnam—did suggest certain progressive ideas to be included in the school curriculum; however, in the words of its co-chair, Melvin Dubnick, the Task Force was wrapped up in 2002 and "did not leave any legacy" (Dubnick, 2003, p. 253).

All three paradigms in political science—Traditionalism, Behavioralism, and Post-behavioralism—were orientations, world-views. More importantly, the three paradigms may be viewed as three distinct ideologies about the construction of knowledge. The state-centric ideology demonstrated its power and influence over the school curriculum and hence shaped it to achieve its desired goal which was to strengthen the nation-state. In comparison with Traditionalism, the proponents of both Behavioralism and Post-behavioralism failed to assert their impact on the citizenship education curriculum and quickly became irrelevant.

Based on the APSA's first five reports, one may theorize that three independent variables may have contributed to the rise of the APSA's activities in regard to citizenship education in the schools. First, in its Traditionalist phase, establishing political science as an independent academic subject was a major motive. Second, the APSA faced a formidable and experienced competitor—American Historical Association (AHA)—that had established its roots in the school curriculum. To carve out a niche for political science, the APSA committees had to work harder than the AHA to promote political science both as a genuine science and as citizenship education. Third, in its Traditionalist phase, the APSA used political lobbying to make the teaching of political science mandatory for high school graduation. Hence the Traditionalist conception of citizenship and citizenship education which captured the intellectual beachhead in the school curriculum during the early twentieth century remained canonized for over a century and could not be challenged or replaced. This suggests that the ideological antecedents of the current American model of citizenship education may be traced to the Traditionalist approach promoted by the founders of the American Political Science Association.
References


Cosmopolitan Citizenship Education: Realistic Political Program or Program to Disillusioned Powerlessness? A Plea for a Critical Power Perspective within Global Citizenship Education

- Citizen understood as both co-actor and rights-holder at the national level, and mostly as a limited rights-holder at the supranational and global stage
- Do political educational programs overestimate the power of education in creating a global citizen (with no actual power)?
- There is a lack of a critical power perspective on Global Citizenship Education.

Purpose: The aim of the research is to determine to what extent one can talk about “cosmopolitan citizenship” not only programmatically, but also as an already functioning entity. And what role can and should civic education play in the development of such a citizenship?

Methods: A working definition of citizenship at the national, supranational, and global level is developed with the help of political theory and European and international law.

Several theses on the understanding of cosmopolitan citizenship in Global Citizenship Education and Education for Sustainable Development programs are discussed thanks to a policy analysis of, for example, UNESCO documents.

Findings: Supranational programs and German curriculum-recommendations are mostly reduced to the level of rights-holders and if “political action” is envisaged then it is mostly focused on its individual dimension of (private) social responsibility i.e. in its post-political dimension. This lacks analysis of global power conflicts and of the question of democratic participation on supranational policy regulation.

Practical implications: There are implications for curriculum development and implementation of educational policy.

Keywords: Cosmopolitan citizenship, EU, Council of Europe, UNESCO, power critique, policy implementation

1 Introduction
Debates on Global Citizenship Education (GCED) and Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) stress the importance of transnational engagement of civil society and the possibility of influencing global policies. One reason for a revival of the normative orientation to political cosmopolitanism, as defended by authors such as Jürgen Habermas (2001), John Rawls (1999), Ulrich Beck (2006), Daniele Archibugi and David Held (1995) or Anthony McGrew (together with Held, 2000) among others, can be seen in the ongoing economic and social-ecological crises and the crisis of democratic legitimacy in the European Union (EU) as well as in its member states. The cosmopolitan assumption that global problems can only be handled on a global scale (Beck, 2006), however, could also lead to misleading educational objectives. We will argue that there is no realistic perspective for a cosmopolitan democracy in order to deal with global crises like climate change, poverty, or migration. We experience only a very limited dimension of global citizenship as a "declarative" rights-holder or through a few (mostly professional) political actors such as international NGOs and transnational protest movements. This can lead to a deceptive experience of powerlessness among young people, because of the gap between the hope created by declarative models of cosmopolitan citizenship and the absence of political influence on global political issues. In this context, what should be the role and (potential) power of citizens in influencing politics at the supranational level, in a context where they experience powerlessness (meaning the lack of democratic influence) and a subsequent democratic deficit affecting both political institutions and decision-making at the supranational level?

In the first part of our paper, we will clarify our working definition of citizenship, distinguishing between two dimensions: citizens as political co-actors and citizens as rights-holders (i.e. citizenship in its democratic and in its liberal dimensions) (2). We will then analyze to what extent this model of citizenship (which has been developed at state level) can already be applied—not only

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normatively-programmatically, but also de facto—to a supranational and global level (3). Considering this legal-theoretical background, we will then turn to the educational context and its representations of citizenship. We will analyse, in which ways international, European, and German civic education documents address students as cosmopolitan citizens instead of (or in addition to) national (sub-national) and transnational citizens (4). We will show how these documents have primarily reduced citizens to the rights-holder dimension and if “political action” is envisaged, it is then in its individual dimension of sustainable “consumer citizens”, intercultural competencies and, (private) social engagement or voluntary service, that is in a post-political dimension. Moreover, these documents show a prejudicial absence of analysis from global power conflicts and exploitation of the global south in Citizenship Education (5).

2 Definitional clarification: Citizens as political co-actors and rights-holders

A liberal-democratic citizenship encompasses a double dimension in which a citizen is both a political co-actor and a legal subject or rights-holder. According to the collective-democratic dimension, citizens, understood as co-actors, initiate, co-decide, and control collective political actions. According to the liberal-individual dimension, a citizen, understood as a rights-holder, owns rights that he or she can defend individually before a court.

In the liberal tradition, political action is to be understood as a consequence of the ownership of rights (Rawls, 1971). The rights-holder exists before they become a political co-actor. He or she owns these Rights by Nature (Locke) or by Reason (Kant, Rawls). In Habermas’ interpretation there is a “co-originality” of the Rechtsstaat (constitutional state/rule of law) and popular sovereignty (Habermas, 1992, p. 117, 154 ff.), which, in our model, implies a co-originality of the liberal and democratic dimensions of citizenship. The “original” rights would be participation rights that allow for political action. But why should citizens be given a right to participate before they act politically?

In accordance with the democratic idea (Rousseau, Maus 1999), on the contrary, citizens first fight politically to establish what rights they own because these rights are not given by God, by Nature or by Reason, but result from political struggles (Moulin-Doos, 2015, p. 83 ff.). Citizens are political co-actors and co-authors before they become the holders of the rights they fought for. Following Rousseau’s argument, it is not the natural rights that are defended after the social contract has been concluded (as is the case in Locke, 1989, 283-4 §134), but the laws, which have been adopted by the citizens within the course of a legislative process (Rousseau, 1992, p. 80). The Rousseauan rights, which are decided upon by the Sovereign, are different from the Locke pre-political rights. Even in an established constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) there is always the possibility of new rights or of a new interpretation of rights being fought for, of obsolete rights to be fought against (patriarchal rights for example), of political actors without participation rights, and of new forms of political engagement that may emerge in the course of political struggles (ib., p. 182 ff.). In this democratic (and not liberal) tradition, one must be a co-actor before one can become a rights-holder, in order to be part to its adoption and interpretation. According to the democratic idea, citizens create their rights or, following Rancière, their political stage (Rancière, 2003), which is never fully complete.

Moreover, to be able to legitimate collective political decisions and to grant rights to other members of society, a certain degree of solidarity and a certain sense of “living together” (“vivre ensemble”) are required (see Kymlicka, 2001). Firstly, this is because in order for the rights-holder to have his or her rights respected, not only is there a need for formal police and judiciary measures, but first and foremost there should be an internalization and acceptance of these rights, which we recognize and grant another. Secondly, in order for the collective decisions of a political majority to be accepted as legitimate by the political minority, not only should there be a formal acceptance of these decisions but also the feeling of belonging to a “we” and the knowledge that this political minority can become a political majority in the near future and decide otherwise (cf. Toqueville, 1961, p. 212; this is missing in the European context: Weiler, 1998, and in civic education: Meyer-Heidemann, 2015).

This model of citizenship in its liberal and democratic dimensions has developed at the state level. To what extent can one already speak—not only programmatically, but also de facto—of other dimensions of citizenship at a European and/or global stage? Does the liberal dimension of the rights-holder exist on its own? Or does the democratic dimension of the political co-actor also exist? What if the two dimensions are dissociated? Who then decides what rights rights-holders should possess and how they should be interpreted if there are no democratic co-actors at the European and/or global stage? Can a solely liberal dimension lead to a non-democratic liberal citizenship?

3 The supranational and global citizen: solely as a (liberal) rights-holder or also as a (democratic) political co-actor?

3.1 EU citizens: historically only as a rights-holder and then as subsidiary, partial political co-actors

The European Union offers citizenship status to national citizens of Member States (Art. 9 to 12, TEU). The EU citizen holds rights and can, under certain restrictions, act collectively (indirectly through political representation, directly through legally recognized petition initiatives and, of course, through transnational political movements related to European issues). The liberal dimension of the rights-holder was significantly developed first, thanks to international treaties, directives and regulations, as well as the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law (Eis, 2010, p. 166 ff.). This dimension of the citizen as a rights-holder is much more developed at a European level than in the political co-actor dimension. Even social demands are formulated in terms of rights
when they reach the European level rather than as a political claim (cf. Buckel, 2011), the addressee of the demands being more often the Judiciary than Parliament. The EC/EU was foremost a liberal construction before attempting to develop into a democratic Community/Union.

It is very controversial as to whether or not (or how far) one can speak of democracy at all within the political system of the EU (see Scharpf, 2014; Grimm, 2015; Streeck, 2011). The great democratic hope brought by the direct election of the European Parliament (EP) (1979) and by the increasing expansion of the co-decision procedure, was hardly fulfilled. Union citizens’ representatives at the EP have no right of legislative initiative, only limited co-decision rights in adopting legislation, and limited power in the adoption of the budget. Moreover, in the EP there is no functioning opposition and majority, which would allow for a politicization of the institution, but only a permanent “grand coalition”. The two major political groups (the European People's Party and the Party of European Socialists) always make decisions by consensus. There is no realistic possibility for promoting political alternatives (Watkins, 2014). The EP is therefore not a functioning political organ, understood as a politicized democratic institution. The EP was created from above, before a (conflictual) European political society even existed.

If we address the dimension of solidarity and the sense of living together, it should be added that Parliamentary representation only makes sense if there is a certain level of trust and recognition between representatives and the represented, to accept decisions as legitimate. According to a republican understanding of representation, the representatives represent all interests rather than sectional interests, which is not the case for the EP. A liberal understanding of representation, according to which the representatives represent only part of the political society, better corresponds with the practice of the EP: political societies or different demos (Nicolaïdis cited by Mouffe, 2012, p. 635) are represented. Brunkhorst (2008) – in a similar (German) cosmopolitan perspective as Habermas or Beck – wishes to overcome the national dimension of solidarity and sees potential in a post-national and especially European solidarity. These authors tend to consider national forms of political identification dismissively. Habermas advocates for constitutional patriotism as a rational post-national form of political society. Yet national political societies are not necessarily ethnically exclusive, there could also be non-necessarily cultural-political constructs on which democracies are built (Moore, 2001, p. 2; Kymlicka, 1997). Europe, however, is (still) very strongly based on national and even sub-national forms of identification that contain both rational and emotional dimensions (Mouffe, 2012, p. 634). EU citizenship is to be conceived of as a subsidiary to national citizenship – both in its emotional and in its rational dimension – rather than as possibly overcoming established national political identities.

However, a European public sphere has emerged through the politicization of social protest movements, especially since the multiple crises. European issues appeared in the transnational public sphere and are now politicized in the form of conflicts (cf. Rancière, 1995). According to the democratic idea, EU citizenship is politically fought for and not only legally (i.e. formally) created. Participation rights such as electing representatives to the EP were a “gift” from above, but only a partially fulfilled promise. For, only when citizens mobilize to politicize issues at the European level, can a democratic citizenship emerge, which is more than solely a liberal citizenship. Through joint actions, political identity (identities) and possibly also political awareness at the European level are emerging and being articulated. The left, but also conservative parties, ally to defend another model for Europe. For example, right-wing parties are defending a Europe understood as a cooperation of sovereign nation-states and politicize the issue of identity in a more conservative fashion than the liberal left. A diverse European political society has developed both on the left and also on the right of the political spectrum. This politicization could lead to the politicization of the EP in the near future, but for the time being politicization still shows its influence at a state level.

3.2 "European citizens" of the Council of Europe: Human rights-holder and precursors of an elitist political actor

If we now look at the (much larger) Europe of the Council of Europe, (not the 28 EU countries, but the 47 countries, including Russia and Turkey, belonging to the Council of Europe), there are rights-holders, specifically human rights-holders, whose rights can individually be defended in front of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The Council of Europe is not only the oldest, first pan-European Organization, it is also the only supranational institution, where citizens are eligible to complain against human rights violations or discrimination allegedly carried out by their own state. Can we speak then of European citizens? However, this is only one half of citizenship: the European citizen is a (human) rights-holder, but not a formal political actor.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that some actors act politically when they try to enforce a policy objective through a judicial procedure in the ECHR. Firstly, the lawyers who bring the action before the Court (who are often specialized in human rights) pursue a political goal in defending their interpretation of rights. In addition, the procedure before the ECHR allows collective actors such as NGOs to intervene in writing to a case. That way they can defend their political position (their interpretation of human rights) in court. However, to describe these actions as political actions of co-citizens, is unfounded. Many tend to consider litigation as a major alternative form of civic engagement in defending matters of public interest, such as consumer, environmental or anti-discrimination rights (Kavanagh, 2003). But here we are dealing with a very limited range of political actors who also have very elitist resources (the
need for money, legal knowledge etc.), which cannot be com-pared with democratic co-actions.

3.3 A very limited global citizenship: a “declarative” rights-holder and a few, mostly professional, political actors

A declarative rights-holder that is without legal enforcement has existed since the end of World War I and has quantitatively as well as qualitatively expanded, especially since the end of World War II. Since the euphoric nineties, where a cosmopolitan world seemed attainable – the liberal world had “won” and the “end of history” (Fukuyama) was postulated – a limited rights-holder has developed. This was especially prevalent in cases of massive violations of human rights, thanks to the proliferation of universal jurisdiction and so-called “humanitarian intervention”, later renamed “responsibility to protect” (R2P). Ad hoc criminal tribunals in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes have been established under the leadership of the UN. A permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) was also established to punish crimes against international humanitarian law. All these measures, which create a kind of partial global justice, carry opposing trends: a motive of solidarity, but also the tendency of liberal paternalism and neo-colonialism (see Andreotti, 2006). As the practice of the ICC shows, with the exception of one case in January 2016, official investigations have only taken place against Africans. In February 2017, the 54 heads of state of the African Union committed themselves to a collective withdrawal from the ICC (Pigeaud, 2017).

Regarding the second dimension of citizenship, the co-actor dimension, it is questionable as to whether such a thing can be identified at a global level. Of course, many professionalized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) create solidarity as transnational collective actors. These are made up of a few amateur, but mostly professional, activists forming a kind of global civil society. These NGOs are active at a global level and lead numerous political struggles. They ensure politicization and public visibility of, to name only a couple, economic and environmental issues. Some NGOs that are active in the field of economic and social development have received a consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council and also take part in some international conferences such as the climate conferences. They play a role in the perception, and addressing, of global problems and interests. They inform experts and they lead lobbying actions. It is highly disputed as to what extent professionalized NGOs and a small number of political lay activists lead to an increased democratization of a “global society” (Brunkhorst, 2008) or bring democratic legitimacy to global decisions. A citizen is a layman and not a professional who gets paid for his political fight. “[F]oot-loose NGOs have their safe home bases in the liberal nation-states from which they draw most of their resources” (Canovan, 2001, p. 211). Eurocentric individualist interpretations of human rights and a Eurocentric articulation of political struggles bring us back to the high risk of liberal paternalism and liberal neo-colonialism.

4 Concepts of Citizenship in European and international civic Education Documents: local, national, transnational or global citizenship?

In this fourth part of the paper, we will analyze concepts of European and global citizenship referring to the approaches of Citizenship Education coming from the Council of Europe, UNESCO and networks of societal actors (like Networking European Citizenship Education, NECE). Through selected documents we analyze the concepts of citizenship referred to for educational purposes in different scenarios for the future of the European Union (NECE, 2013) (4.1); in programs on Citizenship and Human Rights Education of the Council of Europe (4.2); and finally in the Global Citizenship Education policies from UNESCO (4.3). The choice of these documents is intended to show the predominance of the (liberal) rights-holder dimension of citizenship over a (politic-democratic) co-actor dimension in these discourses. These findings should be seen as an illustrative starting point that still need to be thoroughly confirmed in further investigations (through systematic analysis of educational policies, curricula, and in political discourse), which cannot be achieved within the scope of this article.

4.1 European Union Concepts of Democratic Citizenship

The “Four scenarios on the Future of Citizenship in Europe 2030” (NECE, 2013) illustrates a very good example of both the transformation of citizenship concepts by societal and educational actors and the question of how far citizens are able (or unable) to influence politics at a supranational level. This document is the result of an international workshop held in 2013 in The Hague, Netherlands. These scenarios have not been developed by so-called experts (such as academics or politicians), but by societal actors including students, associations in Citizenship Education, and other Non-Governmental-Organizations such as trade unions supported by the German Federal Agency for Political Education (bpb).

Although these future scenarios focus on the possible consequences of the recent economic and social crises in the European Union, participants at NECE-conferences are not only EU-citizens, but come from all over Western, Eastern and Southern Europe, even from some Mediterranean neighbour states including Egypt, Morocco and Israel (www.nece.eu). They focus on educational policies and programs by the Council of Europe (like Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education, cf. 4.2).

In these scenarios there are two “key uncertainties” and options for a future development of citizenship in Europe: a Europe “in which top-down government prevails” or “in which bottom-up forces become dominant”, which would mean more democratic influence from citizens over politics. The second uncertainty refers to different options of a “unified” or a more “diversified”
Europe. If we look at the two “bottom-up” scenarios, we get an interesting picture of the ambivalent future role of societal actors – perhaps not too dissimilar from our current situation.

Figure 1: Four scenarios on the Future of Citizenship in Europe 2030 (NECE 2013, 5)

In the Scenario “Union of Communities”, we find the following description (ib., 8) under the heading: “A world in which the ‘Do it Ourselves’ generation takes the lead.”:

“It is more important for your job, pension, health or education to have a good social network than to belong to a country or to the EU. Everyone is a member of multiple communities and associations. People avoid working with governments as much as they can. [...] Participation in civil society has become a necessity for most people. There are de facto two separate societies. The formal and institutional sphere of national and EU governments with their focus on economics and finance, and a large informal sphere in which many networks of communities operate, unified in their multiple and diverse efforts to shape civil society for the benefit of its members.”

This scenario already gives us a very good hint as to the ambiguous role of active citizenship and the power or powerlessness of civil society, here in a liberal sense of a “separate society” of social self-organization. In this scenario, citizens and civil society are not really sharing competencies in the decision-making process of democratic institutions. It is actually a disturbing scenario, where people have lost their confidence in public institutions, and even these institutions have lost their capability to really solve public problems – except those relating to the economy, finance and security. The very active role of civil society described here, is mainly based on the necessity that citizens are forced to take self-responsibility for organizing their social life which also means that more and more private actors pay for economic and social risks instead of a public social welfare.

A slightly more progressive, emancipatory, grass-roots oriented political scenario, where citizens make demands for more direct democracy is described in the fourth scenario: "European Spring". Nonetheless, the authors do not see this kind of citizenship as a final solution without obstacles. As we have seen during the protest movements in several Arabic countries since 2011 (Arab Spring) and also in the course of current protest movements in Europe, “citizens reclaim their political power and democratic rights”. But those “bottom-up revolutions” also tend to endorse charismatic leaders and populist movements, not only those of the left-wing, but especially those with right-wing, religious, nationalist or xenophobic objectives: “Traditional power hegemonies are besieged by all sorts of movements that use combinations of liquid democracy and charismatic leadership. [...] People align (temporarily) on issues and choose their political leaders by following them on liquid democracy platforms and then voting them in and out of office, by ‘liking’ or ‘disliking’ them and by very quickly mass-mobilizing around certain topics.” (ib., 9).

4.2 Concepts of Citizenship in the educational programs of the Council of Europe

The Council of Europe, besides its human rights’ policies and its jurisprudence, focuses extensively on educational programs for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (cf. www.coe.int/en/web/edc/home). The main aim of the Council of Europe is to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, as implemented by several European Conventions on Human Rights, ... the Prevention of Torture, ... against Racism and Intolerance, ... on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation, ... against Trafficking in Human Beings, ... for linguistic and minority rights and for social and educational rights, as established by the European Social Charter (ETS 35/1961) and by the Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (CM/Rec(2010)7).

The basic dimensions of active citizenship according to the educational citizenship programs of the Council of Europe are encompassed within the following two approaches: Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) and Human Rights Education (HRE), both of which received support from UNESCO. In these approaches, the Council of Europe has developed different recommendations for curriculum, teaching, and learning materials for schools, pre-schools and higher education, as well as tools for non-formal education and training sessions for volunteers or professionals.
In the diagram Active Citizenship Composite Indicator (Figure 3, cf. Hoskins & Mascherini, 2009, p. 469), there are four dimensions of citizenship activities and competencies. These four dimensions try to combine and to include different approaches to citizenship and democracy theories.

There is, on the one hand, the traditional way of participating in representative institutions, that is membership in political parties, voting turnout, and additionally – still within the logic of representative democracy – the participation of women and minority groups. On the other hand, there are more “unconventional” ways of active citizenship such as protest movements and taking part in social net-works, e.g. human rights or environmental organizations.

Besides the basis of “Democratic Values”, there is also a fourth dimension of “Community Life”, which includes all sorts of cultural, social, or even economical voluntary service and charity work from the football club to the volunteer fire brigade, to the church and other religious aid associations.

The “Active Citizenship Composite Indicator” was proposed by an international research group (Hoskins & Mascherini, 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012), which also measured several citizenship competencies, such as Citizenship values, Participation attitudes or Cognition about democratic institutions. Although we remain somewhat skeptical as to whether it makes sense at all to measure citizenship competencies, what was really interesting in the results of this study was the fact that it was not always the established “stable” democracies of, say, England, Sweden or Finland who scored highly in citizenship values. „The opposite is true for less stable and more recent democracies that can be found in Southern and Eastern Europe: in these countries young people have greater Participatory attitudes and values.” (Hoskins et al., 2008, p. 9).
4.3 Recommendations on Global Citizenship Education policies from UNESCO

Although the Active Citizenship approach focuses primarily on Democratic Citizenship Education in single states and in (transnational) European societies, these dimensions look very similar to the “learning objectives” for “Global Citizenship Education” (Figure 4) developed by UNESCO (2015a, p. 29), but with the substantial difference that the UNESCO-approach does not enhance a specific dimension of “protest and social change”.

Figure 4: Global Citizenship Education – Overall Guidance (UNESCO 2015a, p. 29)
The “first pedagogical guidance” of UNESCO on “topics and learning objectives” of Global Citizenship Education (UNESCO 2015, p. 7) was developed by an Expert Advisory Group and field tested by teachers and curriculum planners in five member states over three continents (ibid., p. 74). As a competence-oriented curriculum recommendation, the guidance differentiates a multidimensional concept of Global Citizenship within three cross-disciplinary domains of learning: Cognitive, socio-emotional, and behavioural (cf. Fig. 4). As a central “key learning outcome” of the socio-emotional domain, the guidance repeats its global citizen definition: “Learners experience a sense of belonging to a common humanity, sharing values and responsibilities, based on human rights” (cf. Fig. 4, p. 29, see also p. 14). At first sight, the guidance combines both the political analysis of “global issues, governance systems and structures” and the knowledge of “actions that can be taken individually and collectively” (Fig. 4: see “Key Learner Attributes” and “Topics”). Nonetheless the intended “actions” tend to be reduced to non-politicized “actions” within civil society such as “community work” and “civic engagement” and do not encompass the action of co-citizens as described above that take part in the political elaboration of collective choices and values, through the adoption of legislation and of rights.

The concept of citizenship is further differentiated between learning objectives and topics and according to different groups of learners from “pre-primary & lower primary (5-9 years)” up to “upper secondary (15-18+ years)” (pp. 31-40). The learning object “introduce[s] the concept of citizenship” for young pupils and the connection between “key local, national and global issues” within the “cognitive domain” corresponds to the “socio-emotional domain” with the objective to “recognize that everyone has rights and responsibilities” (p. 31). These responsibilities should be further developed through upper primary as a behavioral competence to “discuss the importance of individual and collective action and engage in community work” and at the upper secondary level to “develop and apply skills for effective civic engagement” (ibid.).

The guidance also mentions “inequalities and power dynamics” (at lower secondary level) and focuses at the upper secondary level on “critically assess[ing] the ways in which power dynamics affect voice, influence, access to resources, decision-making and governance” (ibid.). Nonetheless, these topics do not lead to a critical reflection on agency nor of the limited power—or even powerlessness—of citizens especially at the supranational and global level. The “behavioural” domain is dominated by the social—individual and interpersonal—“behaviour” and not the political “action” and power struggles of communities. Even at the highest learning level, it is about “social justice and ethical responsibility” or about “action to challenge discrimination and inequality” or to “propose action for and become agents of positive change”, and not about how global inequalities are reproduced by everyday economic activities and political decisions.

5 Conclusion: Adding a critical power perspective to the optimistic (post-political) Global Citizenship Education

The recent UNESCO program Global Citizenship Education (GCED) shows similar problems to those of various former programs of Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC), also promoted by UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the European Union. There is a significant number of important topics, skills, and attitudes which focus on the personal, social, and ethical dimensions (as “domains of learning”, cf. Figure 4) to educate “ethically responsible and engaged” citizens who “demonstrate personal and social responsibility for a peaceful and sustainable world” (UNESCO, 2015a, p. 29).

Yet many open questions still remain as to whether these programs have anything to do with political or democratic education in the sense of analysing global power relations, reasons for global inequalities, failing political regulation and the lack of (and often ineffective) ways of “political action” and not solely “post-political action” on a global scale (cf. Dean et al., 2009; Harvey, 2009).

(1) The concept of GCED is too broad, too inclusive and in normative terms, it is far too affirmative and optimistic. The GCED-concept includes every conceivable and consensual educational goal (such as peace, tolerance, conflict resolution, environmental protection, gender equality etc.). However, at the same time it (usually) does not focus on the economic and social resources as a precondition for political action. Global citizenship should first of all enable students to analyze global exploitation and power structures, the inequalities of the Global South, and the extent to which the Global North contributes to this. In addition to this critical analysis, we can also search for possible means of empowering collective actors (or subordinated groups) to make their voice heard, to take part in transnational decision making, and to democratize global economic power structures (Dean, 2006; Dean et al., 2009; Eis et al., 2014; Frankfurt Declaration, 2016).

(2) GCED overestimates the function and influence—meaning the power—of education. How far can education initiate or foster change in societies and “help build peaceful and sustainable societies” (UNESCO 2015b, p. 2)? Empirically, the social function of education in the first place is to stabilize power relations by selecting individuals for access to higher education and to privileged positions in the labor market; to stabilize hegemonic discourses, produce societal consensus and not to initiate (counter-hegemonic) social transformation.

This leads us back to a fundamental question and dilemma of Citizenship Education: is it and should it be the objective of education to actually solve political problems, to change or to develop societies? There may be a difference in formal or non-formal education: in schools, universities, professional training, or in educational programs of societal actors. This is of course very often the intention of educational policies which shape curricula in order to educate socially responsible and economically competent young citizens who are capable of developing their personal, social, and economic lives.
in a globalized world (cf. UNESCO, 2015a, b; Engagement Global/KMK/BMZ, 2016). But could it realistically be the aim of social science education to change society? Could there indeed be something like an Education for Sustainable Development in a free-market capitalist society based on permanent growth and unsustainable conditions of production and consumption? To formulate unreachable and excessive educational objectives may overburden educational practice. With regard to this point, we are definitely not arguing that we should only teach and learn what we can measure and quantify by standardized tests. One could even argue, that some of these objectives only “simulate” a cosmopolitan, sustainable and/or democratic development. But there is of course a substantial difference between encouraging students to participate in neoliberal self-governance, self-responsibility (e.g. voluntary services) or simulated (post-political) procedures – or to educate people in critical thinking and show them the limits of political regulation and participation (cf. “Soft versus critical global citizenship education”, by Andreotti, 2006).

(3) GCED has – similar to the EDC programs – a structural lack of theories of democracy. Furthermore, it is lacking suitable analyses of power relations and of growing global, as well as societal injustices. Finally, perspectives on failing global political regulation and a general lack of supranational democracy as well as the dimension of democratic co-actors are absent. Criticisms of power have always been a key competence within an emancipatory understanding of “Political Education”, which were revised once more in the Frankfurt Declaration 2015: “autonomous thinking and action are limited by dependencies and structural social inequalities. These relations of power and domination should be detected and analysed. […] Which societal problems are being debated, which voices are being heard and which actors impose their understanding of the common good? What are the reasons for social- and self-exclusion of groups and individuals from social and political participation? Political Education discusses how exclusions are produced and how barriers are created: between the private and public sphere, between the social and the political, legitimate and illegitimate, experts and lay people.” (Eis et al., 2016) Instead, the concept of GCED seems to a greater extent to be pure simulation, if not a misleading illusion, of current global politics. What otherwise should be the meaning of “global” or “cosmopolitan citizenship”, if it is not a political citizenship, i.e. power critical with the possibility of acting politically?

(4) With the aspiration of cosmopolitan citizenship education – similar to some EU Citizenship Education programs – there seems to be a questionable political program: the possible further development of political and democratic conceptualizations of postnational citizenship. This raises questions over to what extent (political) education can and should fill the role of creating the conscience of a global, cosmopolitan citizen. Decoupling the rights-holder from the political co-actor raises the problematic issue of their relationship: If the supranational and global dimensions of citizenship are reduced to the rights-holder component and to a post-political actor within civil society, then is this cosmopolitan citizenship necessarily post-democratic? Who can lead the political struggle for the adoption of new policies, of new rights, or of new interpretation of rights and who should decide upon these interpretations? Only the double-dimension of rights-holder and the political co-action of fellow citizens allows for the possibility of a democratic adoption and interpretation of policies and rights (cf. Haller, 2012; Maus, 1999). Otherwise political cosmopolitanism transforms into solely moral cosmopolitanism.

There seem to be only two possible solutions to this dilemma if we still cling to the idea of democracy (which of course we don’t necessarily have to) and therefore want to link the dimensions of the rights-holder and the co-actor/co-author once more. The two options are, on the one hand striving for a global democracy, or on the other hand returning to regional, national, state, or sub-national forms of political societies as (political and economic) decision-making levels. The first solution runs the risk that the liberal individualistic values would not (demographically) win as the cosmopolitans often imagine. Therefore, from a liberal perspective the striving for a non-democratic liberal moralism on the global stage may be more desirable than the political risk of the rise of democratic anti-liberalism. The second solution suggests a kind of "de-globalization" or "re-localization". Such movements can be seen everywhere in Europe (Scotland, Brexit, Catalonia, right-wing populisms, left-wing populisms such as PODEMOS...) as a reaction to the loss of power of citizens as political co-actors (Moulin-Doos, 2017). This second solution runs the risk of being judged as retrograde, conservative, and even illegitimate from a liberal cosmopolitan perspective, and requires a kind of revolution in liberal thinking, but if we stick to the idea of democracy and not solely of liberal moralism then it seems to be the only emancipatory way.

References:


Endnotes

1 Political Cosmopolitism addresses the needs and interests of individuals directly as “cosmopolitan citizens” and not as national or state citizens, that is, via their membership to a particular collectivity.

2 This section builds on the following article: Moulin-Doos (2016): Bürger als Mit-Akteur und Rechtssubjekt: europäische und globale Bürgerschaft als Orientierung für die politische Bildung? In: Zeitschrift für internationale Bildungsforschung und Entwicklungspädagogik (ZEP), p. 12-16.

3 EC/EU stands for the European Community and its successor the European Union.
Doris Graß

Justification and Critique of Educational Reforms in Austria: How Teachers and Head Teachers (Re-)Frame New Governance

- The article explores how teachers and head teachers make sense of a new education governance.
- It presents a pragmatic conventionalist approach to analysing actors’ judgements of educational reforms.
- Results of a study, researching teachers and head teachers at three Austrian new middle schools, are discussed.
- A repertoire of seven conventions was empirically reconstructed, following the work of Boltanski and Thévenot, however, arriving at a differing typology.
- Results indicate a pervasion of the market-based convention; a dominance and subsequent economisation cannot be deducted.

Purpose: Against the backdrop of a new governance regime of schools in Austria, which combines policies of decentralisation and school autonomy with an accountability program of standardised outcome control, this article explores how the so called “agents of change” – teachers and headteachers – take up these ideas and corresponding governance instruments and frame them on grounds of moral considerations. The aim is to present a theoretical framework for analysing – at the individual level – moments of critical evaluation and affirmative justification of more general political actions as well as of every day’s work practices.

Approach: Drawing on the concept of orders of justification and the pragmatist theory of conventions, a qualitative, interview-study with 15 teachers and head teachers in Austrian middle schools was conducted with the intention to discover a repertoire of educational conventions applied by the actors to criticise or justify reform-based decisions, expectations and subjective claims to work.

Findings: Besides presenting seven conventions, the article puts a special focus on arguments and corresponding conventions that – on one hand – characterise an economic perspective on schools and education (the market, industrial and flexible convention) and are thus important in deciding whether the new education governance regime is supported by an ‘economised’ constellation of frames that teachers and head teachers use to interpret their actions as well as others. One the other hand, the role of the civic convention receives special attention in relation to the aforementioned ones to include a further aspect into the diagnosis of an economisation of educational practices.

Keywords:
Austrian school system, economisation, new education governance, theory of convention, reconstructive research

1 Introduction: Economisation of education?
For at least two decades there has been talk about the marketisation, commodification and/or privatization of public services in academic as well as political discourses around the globe. Often used interchangeably these concepts point towards a dynamic of far-reaching ideological, political and analytical change in the organisation of different social fields such as education, science, health care and social services. The common denominator is the gradual increase (or even dominance) of economic mechanisms and criteria, economic capital or an economic rationality into social spheres that have formerly been operating on a non-economic logic. Many diagnoses of an “economisation of education” (Spring, 2015) – for example the German-speaking discourse around the concept of “Ökonomisierung” (see Höhne, 2012) – are predominantly borne by a critical impetus, pointing to the manifold social consequences of an omnipresent economic logic. However, looking at another influential discourse within the field – the educational governance perspective on recent reforms within the educational and in particular the school system – the difference in and lack of a similar motivation seems striking. Based on the analysis of a “new educational governance” that can well be regarded in terms of an “Ökonomisierung” of education, leading representatives as well as many analysts steer well clear of such a label and instead employ a more functionalist approach to core elements such as quality improvement, output orientation, evidence based decision-making, school autonomy and accountability. This paper is well interested in the analysis of processes of economisation. However, by asking what these transformations linked to the new educational governance mean to actors who face them on an everyday basis, and developing a more fine-grained heuristic for the moral deliberations that underlie these engagements, I attempt to further the understanding of the different ‘logics’ and their relevance to decision-making processes in schools.

So far, education governance research has had its focus on the question of how education as a specific good is produced through the cooperation and coordination
between a multitude of (individual and corporate) actors (see Altrichter & Maag Merki, 2010; Kussau & Brüsemeister, 2007). Thus, while much attention has been paid to look at different modes of coordination that allow for the ‘successful’ (re-)production of educational performances, the role of the normative dimension underlying processes of coordination and decision-making has not received equal attention. This, I argue, is mostly due to the educational governance approach’s foundation in an actor-based institutionalism and the significance of micro-economic principles stated by Institutional economics (e.g. transaction cost theory, principal-agent theory, property rights theory). The result of such a theoretical (pre-)positioning is that action in general, but also the aspect of legitimation of educational decisions, governance mechanisms or larger bodies of policies are primarily considered a strategic or instrumental expression of an actors’ interests (Brüsemeister, 2007). Thus, while much attention has been on the productive dimension and the role of the normative dimension, the processes of coordination and decision-making have not received equal attention.

Institutional economics (e.g. transaction cost theory, principal-agent theory, property rights theory). The result of such a theoretical (pre-)positioning is that action in general, but also the aspect of legitimation of educational decisions, governance mechanisms or larger bodies of policies are primarily considered a strategic or instrumental expression of an actors’ interests (Brüsemeister, 2007). Thus, while much attention has been on the productive dimension and the role of the normative dimension, the processes of coordination and decision-making have not received equal attention.

However, instead of focussing on legitimacy as a possible - or what von Blumenthal (2014) has called “input-legitimation” of governance (see Dale, 2005).

To meet this conceptual as well as empirical desideratum the paper pursues two objectives. First, I propose the French sociology of conventions (see Diaz-Bone, 2011) and in particular the concept of modes of justification (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) as a theoretical, yet also methodological framework for the research of changes in the educational governance. This approach stresses the normative, and in fact moral dimension of the institutional embeddedness of action. However, instead of focussing on legitimacy as a possible (and desirable) outcome, the theory of convention is interested in the processes of justification and critique. The educational field, its structure and the principles of organising the school and teacher-pupil-interaction can thus be analysed as the result of ongoing processes of evaluation based on normative orders or ‘logics’. Second, the paper acknowledges that the analysis of educational governance regimes and corresponding institutionalised conventions, especially in light of vast political reforms and shifts in the cultural and socio-economic landscape, demands a close link to empirical research, thereby not only gaining new insights into field specific and more localised modes of governance and coordination, but also preventing the danger of reifying ideological assumptions about the nature of such diagnoses as the aforementioned economisation.

Taking the Austrian case, I present findings from an explorative, qualitative study aimed at identifying modes of justification and critique, employed by teachers and head teachers in new middle schools with regard to changing mechanisms of school governance. Such mechanisms encompass the expansion of elements of school choice, the promotion of school specific profiles, the introduction of performance benchmarks and their standardised testing as well as the hanging thread of comparative league tables for schools. Resting on the epistemological assumption that different (field-specific) conventions are available to actors when it comes to making sense of and in particular justifying their engagement with educational reforms (or the lack of it) special emphasis will be put on arguments and corresponding educational conventions that characterise an economic perspective on schools and education and are thus important in deciding whether the new educational governance regime is supported by an ‘economised’ normative framework that teachers and head teachers use to interpret their actions as well as others’.

2 A new governance in education

Perhaps in line with the dominant modes of regulation and control during a historical period, more traditional concepts such as government and steering assume a rather linear relationship between different levels of the political and subsequent organisational and individual levels, especially when it comes to questions about triggering change and impacting wanted behaviour. In contrast, the governance perspective has set out to widen the understanding of how different modes of interactions and in particular modes of coordination in a complex system shape its outcomes, i.e. the production of a system-specific performance (Benz, 2004; Bevir, 2013). Rooted in political studies and sociology the concept of governance was not widely considered within educational research until some ten years ago. In the German-speaking discourse, even though the language does not know any such word as governance, the term ‘educational governance perspective’ has since become the label of a considerable, continuously growing body of work that is in particular aimed at describing and analysing a multitude of recent transformations, such as “changes in the provision of education, changes in actors and actor constellations, and changes in the mechanisms of policy formation – from top-down, hierarchicals models to more horizontally differentiated, network-like models” (Amos, 2010, xii; see also Maag Merki, Langer, & Altrichter 2014). The topical focus encompasses – apart from schooling – pre-school education (Neumann, 2010), higher education (Boer, Enders, & Schimanek, 2007) and further education (Schrader, 2010).

Whereas critical voices in the international discourse have often pointed to the common position between the New Public Management program, a neo-liberal reform agenda and governance issues (Brownyn & Bansel, 2007; Dale, 1997; 2005; Davies, 2011; Lorenz, 2012), the proponents in the German-speaking context have chosen...
to emphasise the analytical, non-normative program of the concept and its possible connectivity to different theoretical and methodological stances (Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007, p. 3). The debate has subsequently paid much attention to the conceptualisation of educational governance as an analytical tool or framework (Altrichter, 2015; Amos, 2010; Kussau & Brüsemeister, 2007). Despite the concept being used from different positions and the on-going conceptual debate between educational governance scholars, Altrichter and Maag-Merki (2010, p. 20) define the educational governance framework as a research approach that analyses the emergence, perpetuation and transformation of social order and performances within the educational system from the perspective of coordination of action between a plurality of actors in a complex multi-level system.

Looking at schools in particular, their governance has traditionally been described as a bureaucratic-professional hybrid. This refers to the twofold institutionalisation of schools as part of the hierarchical-bureaucratic structure of administration and control on one hand and to the expert-organisation that is independent on the professional (pedagogical) autonomy of teachers on the other (Altrichter, Heinrich, &Soukup-Altrichter, 2011, p. 13). Critique has long been addressing both of these aspects: It was (and still is) thus argued that bureaucratic regulation by a distant public administration can never be flexible enough to match and react to the necessarily particular local situations of individual schools, their members and communities (Dumay & Dupriez, 2014). Regarding teachers’ autonomy in classrooms it was (and again, still is) criticised that the actual teaching is rendered outside the public’s view, is mostly unaccounted for and mainly depending on individualised skills and motivations which leads to a lack in ‘quality control’ (Graß & Altrichter, 2017).

In the Austrian case (for the transformation of the Austrian school governance see Altrichter & Heinrich, 2007) these critiques were first taken up in the mid-1990s and responded to in reforms that aimed at (slightly) increasing the schools’ autonomy and their responsibilities at the same time. These initial endeavours were – similar to other countries like Germany – strongly propelled by the 2003’s PISA test results, which were considered a shock and interpreted as a necessary wake-up call for policy-makers, practitioners and the concerned public. In search for a legitimate political reaction to this ‘crisis’ of the education sector (Odendahl, 2017; Tillmann, Dedering, Kneuper, Kuhlmann, & Nessel, 2008) the last decade has seen the introduction of a new governance ideal that is strongly influenced by international political trends and scientific debates (Lindblad, Ozga, & Zambeta, 2002; Mok, 2005; Mundy, 2007; Ozga & Jones, 2006). This new model of school governance integrates the ideas of a strong output-orientation, evidence-based decision-making and public accountability with the policies of decentralisation, the strengthening of a site-based management and school autonomy (Graß & Altrichter, 2017). From a political perspective it is proposed that corresponding measures, especially the increase in autonomy will contribute to a school’s overall quality, as long as certain system-wide requirements and standards are in place to align the school to fulfill its mandate. Böttcher (2002, p. 97) used the contradictory word pair “de-centralisation and re-centralisation” to account for these two distinct directions. Thus, like the bureaucratic-professional governance mode which it is put in opposition to, the new governance constellation is a hybrid, too (Maroy, 2009), that not only encompasses a plurality of instruments of coordination, but also rests on distinct governance principles. In line with works by educational governance scholars (Altrichter, Heinrich, & Soukup-Altrichter, 2013; Boer, Enders, & Schimank, 2007; Moos, 2011; Pavolini, 2015) the system, that is currently being pushed, can be characterized by the following three logics (Graß & Altrichter, 2017):

1) A logic of autonomy and site-based managerialism: Reforms focused on giving more autonomy to individual schools and in particular to the school’s heads. Provided with more powers and the opportunity to make certain decisions alone or in consultation with authorities the latter are urged to apply principles of organisational management to their schools and efficiently economise with the allocated resources.

2) A logic of output-orientation and accountability: In line with the concept of autonomy regulation is effected by communicating certain expectations regarding pupils’ and teachers’ performances as well as the overall quality of the school (e.g. educational standards, national curricula, targets and quality agreements). Compliance with and fulfilment of these goals are subject to monitoring by (more) centralised authorities, for example through standardised testing of pupils’ performances and regular school and teaching inspections. Characteristic for the new use of instruments of evaluation is that their results are supposed to be fed back to all levels of the educational system and expected to trigger a rationalised process of school improvement. Again, the school perceived as an autonomous unit of (re-)action is then considered responsible to take consequence based on the evidence provided (Bergh, 2015; Pogodzinski, Umpstead, & Witt, 2015).

3) A logic of competition: The fundamental argument for the introduction of markets to the field is that in choosing an attractive school for their children, families are better prepared to exert power over schools than a centralised public authority. Following Le Grand and Bartlett (1993), this approach, first, depends on the ability of families to freely choose a school. Second, schools in turn need a high degree of autonomy to “specifically adapt to their respective situations and to differentiate their provision from that of competing schools” (Dumay & Dupriez, 2014, p. 511). Third, the funding has to be pupil-based, that is proportionate to each school’s population and, therefore favours the ones that are successful in attracting higher numbers of students. Though with a different intensity than in other countries, e.g. the UK, the introduction of elements such as (free) parental choice of school, individual school programs and specific profiles as well as the aforementioned standardised testing and evaluation accompanied by the publication of the respective results points towards the growing relevance of mechanisms that enhance the coordination of action via competition
between individual actors or whole organisations (Altrichter, Heinrich, & Soukup-Altrichter, 2013).

3 The legitimacy of school reforms: insights from the theory of conventions

Whereas the previous paragraph looked at instruments and the ‘logics’ that seem to inspire the current mode of a new governance of the (Austrian) school system, the focus of the paper now shifts towards a more actor-based perspective and the question of how teachers and head teachers (re-)frame these policies of ‘modernisation’ and evaluate their ‘worth’. This is of importance, as these two groups of actors are sometimes indirectly, often explicitly addressed by the proposed reforms and widely considered as relevant agents of change (Fullan, 1993). Their actual work practices as well as their professional identities are likely to be subject to change (Graß, 2015b).

Though there have been many studies trying to determine the impact of some of the latest reforms on teaching behaviour, students output and school development (for a comprehensive meta-analysis see Seidel & Shavelson, 2007) most have addressed the issue from a perspective of efficacy and efficiency of teachers’ (and head teachers’) actions. This paper argues to consider the sociology of conventions and, in particular, its variation in Boltanski’s and Thévenot’s moral-philosophical work on orders of justification (and critique) as an adequate theoretical framework that is able to integrate different levels of interest: the discursive level of educational policy and policy reforms, the level of institutionalised ‘logics’ present in (educational) governance regimes, the level of the school and its organisation and institutionalisation of (learning and) professional action, as well as very prominently the level of the actor and its processes of evaluation and coordination. In the following discussion, I will review the keystones of the sociology of conventions and characterise the so-called orders of worth, as proposed by the two authors. Subsequently, the framework will be transferred to the field of schooling, before, in chapter five, I present an empirical reconstruction of conventions that was drawn from a study on teachers’ and head teachers’ justifications of governance issues.

The approach that became known as the theory of sociology of conventions’ was first devised by a group of French heterodox economists, among them Thévenot, Salais and Eymard-Duvernay. Their focus was to develop a new governance of the (Austrian) school system, the focus of the paper now shifts towards a more actor-based perspective and the question of how teachers and head teachers (re-)frame these policies of modernisation and evaluate their worth. This is of importance, as these two groups of actors are sometimes indirectly, often explicitly addressed by the proposed reforms and widely considered as relevant agents of change (Fullan, 1993). Their actual work practices as well as their professional identities are likely to be subject to change (Graß, 2015b).

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The approach that became known as the theory of sociology of conventions was first devised by a group of French heterodox economists, among them Thévenot, Salais and Eymard-Duvernay. Their focus was to develop an institutional theory of economics that allowed the exercise of rationality in real-world situation and coordination behaviour (Daudigeos & Valiorgue, 2010, p. 7). Taking as their starting point the fact that all economic life is inherently ambiguous in that “problems and their solutions are linked on a flexible and situational basis” (Knoll, 2013, p. 39) their central assumption was, that

“Economic actors [...] rely on conventions as socio-cultural frames for mobilising a shared interpretation of the objects, actions, goals, and collective intentions involved in situations of production, distribution, and consumption.” (Diaz-Bone, 2016, p. 215)

Simultaneously a strand of French sociology – centred on Boltanski and the “Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale” – took off in a similar direction, distancing their work markedly from Bourdieu’s critical theory which, then, dominated the French discourse. Drawing on early American pragmatist philosophers such as Dewey and Peirce and incorporating phenomenological and ethnomethodological traditions, their aim was to build an open concept of action which is grounded in a specific situation and directed by the actors’ cognitive and evaluative capacities to overcome inevitable uncertainty that marks all action (Diaz-Bone, 2011, 2016).

To apprehend the theory of convention it is imperative to understand it as a comprehensive paradigm of social analysis rather than just a single concept or a “one-issue” approach (Diaz-Bone & Thévenot, 2010, pp. 4-5). The core idea is that conventions – understood as collectively established socio-cultural frameworks for interpreting a situation of uncertainty – are handled by actors in order to decide upon the validity and appropriateness of a given claim in a given situation, and thus serve to evaluate and coordinate actions. In other words, conventions are “problem-solving procedure[s]” (Daudigeos & Valiorgue, 2010, p. 15); they are used to justify an actor’s conclusion about how ‘things’ and persons should be. Given the relevance of conventions to an actor’s evaluation of a given situation, it is necessary to stress the institutional nature of conventions. They are of universal validity, abstract and relatively vague, of unknown origin and they cannot be enforced legally (Knoll, 2013, p. 40; see also Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, p. 365). They precede the situation and individual deliberations about it.

Next to conventions, the idea of justification is pivotal to the approach, resulting in a shift in the notion of legitimation – away from a given status towards the ever ongoing evaluative processes that accompany its production. Following Boltanski und Thévenot, justification a positive assessment in opposition to the negative devaluation that is associated with criticism – always sets in in undecided or conflictual situations where legitimacy is established on the grounds of arguments and public discourse (differentiating them from situations that are characterised by and ultimately deemed legitimate because of violence, tradition or love, see Bausare, 2011; Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 37f.). In justifying (and conversely in voicing critique), people refer to higher, value-giving principles, which sit at the heart of a convention and define notions of what is worthy and considered a social good. Thus, conventions, if explicitly used to justify or criticise, are also called orders of justification or orders of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, 2006).

As a decidedly pragmatic approach that is “concerned with the analysis of how actors reflexively do different types of justification work”, criticising or justifying particular orders of worth in specific situations” (Jagd,
the theory of conventions builds on a couple of connected positions. First, it is understood that there is a plurality of coexisting conventions. As real-life situations are generally considered complex and rooted in a specific and historic environment, they are also characterised by a specific constellation of conventions. Second, and perhaps most pivotal is the assumption that actors are considered competent, i.e. able to judge different situations and what is most appropriate in them. “Employing ‘pragmatic versatility’, they switch references from one convention to another in order to solve the complexity of situations.” (Knoll, 2013, p. 40; cit. of Thévenot, 2001, p. 407). Actors, in being aware of different conventions as they are part of the socio-cultural framework, are able to communicate their approval or denial of a situation’s justice through reflexively applying conventions, switching between them and even combining them in order to come up with new justifications. From this follows, third, that individuals (or groups) cannot simply be aligned to a single convention or a core value.

The plurality of distinct orders of worth marks an important contrast to both, other moral theories that attempt to find a universal procedure to decide upon the important contrast to both, other moral theories that individuals (or groups) cannot simply be aligned to a specific and historic environment, they are also characterised by a specific constellation of conventions. Second, and perhaps most pivotal is the assumption that actors are considered competent, i.e. able to judge different situations and what is most appropriate in them. “Employing ‘pragmatic versatility’, they switch references from one convention to another in order to solve the complexity of situations.” (Knoll, 2013, p. 40; cit. of Thévenot, 2001, p. 407). Actors, in being aware of different conventions as they are part of the socio-cultural framework, are able to communicate their approval or denial of a situation’s justice through reflexively applying conventions, switching between them and even combining them in order to come up with new justifications. From this follows, third, that individuals (or groups) cannot simply be aligned to a single convention or a core value.

The plurality of distinct orders of worth marks an important contrast to both, other moral theories that attempt to find a universal procedure to decide upon the justice of a situation and also to other lines of sociological thought which view the plurality of conventions as the result of a plurality of social groups and their particular references to a single logic. Thus navigating between universalism and infinite pluralism, the theory of conventions regards the multitude of conventions, i.e. orders of worth, as limited, though not determinate (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999). Based on empirical studies and the analysis of a corpus of texts from classical philosophy such as Hobbes’ Leviathan or Rousseau’s The social contract, in their early work Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) identified six such ideal-typical orders of worth, that are employed to solve disputes about justice. In a rather particular diction they named these the world of inspiration, the domestic world, the civic world, the world of renown or fame, the market world and the industrial world. Subsequent collaborations led to an extension of this typology, including a green world (Thévenot, Moody, & Lafaye, 2000) and a project-based world (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005a, 2005b). Each of these worlds (conventions) is set around a core principle and characterised by a set of criteria, for example a typical object or subject that is considered worthy, a situation in which the worthiness is tested or a form of evidence that indicates success in each world (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 140 ff.)

Instead of going into these worlds and what constitutes them in more detail here, I concentrate on the application of the concept of conventions to the field of education. So far, the framework – even though employed to various contexts (as examples see Giulianiotti & Langseth, 2016 or the manifold perspectives in Knoll, 2015) – has not been met with a big response from educational scholars. Some notable exceptions are Chatel’s (2009) analysis of French social science education, Leemann (2014) who asks from an organisational perspective, “how schools deal with expectations of gender equality” and Imdorf (2011) who – also from an organisational point of view – uses the approach to explain the emergence and justification of ethical inequality in school selection. The latter, drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot’s concept of orders of justification and additionally building on Derouet’s analysis of managerialism in schools’ organisation (see Derouet, 1992), comes to differentiate four worlds within the realm of schools that are employed to justify selection modes and ethnic inequality. They are the market world, the civic world of a general interest and equal opportunity, the industrial world of efficiency and the domestic or familial world that values a community-spirit. Imdorf’s premise, that schools as public organisations justify their selection of pupils (and already anticipate possible justification strategies while selecting) in way of referring to a common good, which is deemed fair and appropriate, comes close to the one presented here. Similarly, the argument leading my work emanates from the assumption, that by introducing reforms to the organisation of schools and ultimately to classrooms, head teachers and teachers are put into a position of re-negotiating their actions and justifying decisions, in particular, if these appear to break with previously accepted routines.

Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, p. 359) call a moment, when a person realises “that something does not work”, “that he cannot bear this state of things any more” (ibid., p. 360) and/or “that something has to change” (ibid., p. 359) a critical moment (moments critiques). Subsequently, they argue that the person enters into a “scene” (ibid., p. 360), i.e. a dispute, in which they criticise the current situation or defend their own action by mobilising certain, socially well-accepted conventions. During the course of such a scene arguments are exchanged with the person that is criticised or that is criticising oneself until a “legitimate agreement” (ibid., p. 363) is found, meaning until a convention is established as appropriate to judge the situation or a compromise agreed upon, which is able to withstand further critique.

However, as teachers and head teachers may not enter directly into a dispute with policy-makers, changing arguments and searching for an appropriate compromise to a problem, critical moments might also arise from the (perceived) need to justify the school’s action towards a broader public, in factual discussions with parents and other concerned parties – or as a result of an interview directed at change and transformation. As the faces of a school, embedded in the hierarchy of the education system, teachers and especially head teachers find themselves in a situation, where, on one hand, they might want to voice critique in respect to their own position as well as with view of their clientele, the school’s pupils. One the other hand, they are the subject of criticism; addressed as individuals but also as representatives of the system and its political and ideological principles. It is therefore safe to assume that, asked about recent transformations within their schools, both teachers and head teachers will draw on a wide
array of justifications, often simultaneously, to frame their decisions and therein re-frame new policies and their implications. The leading question to be answered is thus: What does the repertoire of conventions look like, that teachers and head teachers mobilise in order to respond to school reforms, and here especially transformations linked to a new governance, such as school autonomy, a managerial organisation of schools, expectations of accountability and the role of markets in producing quality.

4 The study: A reconstructive approach to conventions applied by teachers and head teachers in Austrian middle schools

To answer this question an explorative study with head teachers and teachers in three Austrian middle schools was conducted in 2015/2016. Apart from the analysis of school documents such as online profiles and mission statements the data collection was based on episodic in-depth interviews – a method creating both narrative and evaluative sequences (Flick, 1998, 2000) – on the topic of individual experiences with recent school reforms, changing expectations of work performance and subjective claims to good work.

The schools in the sample underwent a more or less extensive organisational change within the past five years, experiencing a transformation from ‘traditional’ middle schools into the so-called “Neue Mittelschule” or new middle school. Whereas in the beginning this conversion was left to the individual school, depending on the initiative and engagement of school leaders, teachers as well as in some cases on local authorities, the transition was made compulsory for all remaining middle schools in 2015/2016. Against this background, three new middle schools were selected that had implemented these changes at different stages – from the pilot phase to the mandatory conversion. The local situation of the schools was also considered, choosing schools in a rural and urban context. However, as the study’s orientation was clearly explorative and aimed at reconstructing relevant conventions to the field of schooling, the selection of the three schools was not meant to be representative to the Austrian case nor directed at testing hypothesis about conventions and a schools’ context. In total, 15 interviews were conducted, ten with teachers, five with head teachers. All interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and followed a loose guide containing aspects of school development, change and working experiences.

In line with the theory of convention’s roots in pragmatism the study was drawing on a qualitative methodology and applied a hermeneutic approach to the analysis of the interviews (see Diaz-Bone, 2011). According to the proceedings for an integrative approach to reconstructive research (Kruse, 2014) the analysis included five steps. First, based on an initial analysis of three interviews a coding system was developed inductively, comprising the topics raised in the interview by both interviewer and interviewee, but also including heuristic or sensitizing concepts drawn from theoretical considerations, such as conflicts and discrepancies, arguments and evaluations. Second, the corpus of data was coded accordingly, using the software MaxQDA. Third, each interview’s initial sequence was analysed in detail, combining topical and text linguistic aspects to develop readings of what has been said and how it was said. This step led to the identification of varying numbers of orders of justification/critique, upon which, fourth, further sequences were analysed, then focusing on controversial situations where criticism was voiced or reacted to. Finally, the main orders, and the dynamics between them, were determined. Thus, the study resulted in a detailed reconstruction of the conventions referred to in the interviews, their relation both to each other and to reforms and particular modes of school governance.

5 Justifying governance reforms: Reconstructions of school-worlds and conventions

The empirical reconstructions led to a repertoire of seven different conventions, most of which played a part in all the interviews, though to a different extend. They are oriented towards the ones identified by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). However, as some of the conventions reconstructed in the data have a different direction, different names were chosen to prevent confusion and allude to each’s distinctive feature. The conventions are briefly sketched in table 1. The focus of the account below is on the role of the civic convention and its ‘relation’ to other orders of justification, especially one that can be considered economic. Picking up central topics relating to changes of the educational governance, I will illustrate the nature and line of the arguments in referring to some interview excerpts.
### Table 1: Repertoire of reconstructed educational conventions

| **The industrial school and its industrial convention** | The school’s task is seen in teaching students a curriculum that is agreed upon and standardised and thus makes sure that every child is equipped with the necessary knowledge to lead a productive life. In analogy to a fordist-operating company a school is considered a successful organisation, if it guarantees its members an unobstructed, frictionless functioning according to the role inhabited. A teacher’s function is the transfer of knowledge. A high significance is placed on objective knowledge, which is open to standardisation. The principal is viewed as a school manager; someone who makes sure that everyone and everything is in place, and functioning. The head delegates and commands from a hierarchical position. The industrial convention values clear defined procedures and structures that allow for a reliable planning of action and effects. People, things and processes are judged on the basis of effectiveness. A reform is considered “worthy” if it helps optimising the running of the school. |
| **The flexible school and its flexible convention** | The school is treated in analogy to a modern company, which, like the industrial school, is (and should be) efficiently managed. Unlike a fordist-like organisation, the flexible school does not attain its effectiveness from pursuing a fixed, standardised path. It is considered successful, when organisational and personal necessities, arising from changes to the inner and outer environment of the school, can be addressed locally and quick. Knowledge is considered fluid, therefore teaching, too, has to adapt to changing demands. Head teachers are described as school leaders; their task is to permanently adjust the conditions of “production” — technically and socially. In the flexible convention people are positively judged if they do not rely on ‘dusty routines’ or set-in-stone rules, but instead assess situations or problems individually and come up with localised solutions. School reforms are thus justified if they allow for, or expand, decentralised decision-making structures. |
| **The civic school and its civic convention** | The school’s task is seen in providing for every pupil being able to actively participate in society later in life. Therefore, a school must teach a body of general knowledge, but also emphasise political education and the transfer of core civic values such as equality, democracy and solidarity. In its present form the civic school is considered a social-democratic one, as it places high significance on social justice and the idea of leaving no child behind. As a sort of playground for society, democratic practices are represented in organisational structures; students (their parents) and teachers (formally) are involved in decision-taking processes. The civic school builds on equality, so decisions, practices and people are deemed worthy, when they consider and treat everyone alike, irrespective of their individual background. However, the notion of justice connected to the convention is oriented towards the collective rather than any particular interest. Thus, reforms are positively justified if they serve at least the majority. Perhaps more important, they are legitimate when they support the integration of students and thus allow for their equal participation in the school and in society. |
| **The community school and its domestic convention** | From the perspective of the domestic convention the school is the extended arm of family education. Apart from knowledge transfer the school’s main task is to build children’s characters, help them develop into ‘whole’ persons by integrating their bodies, personal sensibilities and affectivities into the educational practice. The school is a community, bringing together individuals from different backgrounds. It is viewed as a safe place for children to grow up; teachers take on the role as guardians. The preferred style of teaching is collaborative, so that pupils can learn with and from each other. Teachers evaluate outputs individually, based on their experience, taking into account developments outside the classroom. The domestic convention is oriented towards the school’s community and its culture; the latter being of one trust, security and harmony. Traditions are valued, but different from the characterisation of the domestic world by Boltanski and Thévenot, the socialising and community building aspect make up the core of the convention. |
| **The creative school and its inspired convention** | The school’s task is to provide an environment that allows people to develop and express their individual uniqueness. As this can’t be done following a standardised curriculum or strict patterns of learning and teaching, the creative school has to facilitate the particular experiences of its members by offering open forms that do not or least pre-structure the results of individual inspiration and intuition. Teachers take on the role of such facilitators to students’ creative autonomy. However, the school is also a place of free creative experience and expression for teachers themselves. Teachers refrain from measuring and evaluating outcomes. The inspired convention worships individual, creative autonomy. Therefore decisions are considered legitimate if they further the individual liberation and independence. |
| **The performing school and its meritocratic convention** | The performing school is above all oriented towards outputs. It is believed that the common good is achieved best when everyone’s performance is considered individually and rewards are allotted accordingly. People are considered equipped with particular abilities and needs. Different from the creative convention however, these are seen as functional regarding a desired output and not an end to autonomous expression. The school’s task is to address these individualities and support people based on their personal set of skills – their ‘potential’. Curricula and didactics should be differentiated, or allow for differential treatment, to accommodate this plurality. Motivations are considered likewise; those who are willing to learn / perform should be especially promoted. The core principle of justification in the meritocratic convention is differentiation. Inequalities are considered equitable if they represent different levels of (individual) performance. Reforms that enhance differentiated practices and judgements are deemed appropriate so long as they mirror different levels of performance [not however other ascriptive features such as class or gender]. |
| **The competing school and the market convention** | The market convention rests on the belief that the common good is served best, when people are free to make choices based on their needs and desires. A prerequisite to exercising choice is the existence of differentiated offers to choose from. Therefore, it is a school’s task to provide a palette of offers. It is considered successful when these meet the wishes of parents and children and are subsequently selected. Schools find themselves on a market and hence in competition with other schools, as people are considered to be competing with each other over positions and rewards as well. The competing school is one that provides a curriculum and a didactic program based on what there is a market for. The market convention judges reforms according to whether they are able to enhance the market-like conditions of the school sector. |

While all these conventions play a specific, though not equally dominant role in the interviews, certain configurations can be observed with regard to different topics. I will concentrate on aspects that address the new governance, and specifically the increase in output orientation and the growing importance of school profiles, while also including the issue of rising expectations towards schools, principals and teachers on a general level as well as in light of new modes of teaching.

5.1 Rising expectations
Most interviewees raise the question of what a school should, but ultimately can achieve within the current society. They ponder over the multitude of different expectations, name social circumstances that not only frame but perhaps limit their work as good teachers and principals and challenge their own responsibility in relation to other actors regarding the success of teaching as well as of running a school. Taking up this issue a head teacher draws attention to the tasks they and their colleagues are currently facing:

“There is this transfer to the new middle school and a move from educational targets towards flexible skills, from an old to a new public service law, from a morning to full-time school, from an isolated to a cooperative school etc. The whole field is moving, we face massive changes. The requirements regarding the school’s organisation change, new forms of evaluation and grading, team teaching in classes- Always more. With the same amount or fewer teaching hours we are supposed to support pupils individually, supposed to promote their language abilities, prepare students who don’t speak a word of German to participate in class, we are supposed to teach pupils with special needs inclusively, provide vocational counselling, regularly talk to parents, come up with complementary student assessments. I could go on for minutes. (head teacher)”

Far-off from solely lamenting, interviewees address the increase in responsibilities, mostly imparted by official regulations, which to them seem hard to meet under the current circumstances of stagnating or decreasing financial resources.

Regarding the high workload and plurality in different tasks, many critical arguments are voiced on the basis of the industrial convention that refers to the efficient running of the school. Especially the introduction of new topics to the curriculum, the conversion to different styles of grading, new forms of teaching and the extra attention paid to students with special needs mean an interference with ‘well-tried’ routines; something that produces frictions in the short run. These changes are also described as hindering because they turn the teacher’s focus away from the actual teaching in the sense of knowledge transfer, which, the interviews show, many consider the core of their professional identity. Teachers thus complain about a lack in reliability in their work. They want to be able to rely on experiences and trust that past investments into teaching practices are not rendered invaluable in the future. In this, they criticise a certain level of flexibility that they see expected of them. Head teachers appear mainly understanding of this perspective that they sometimes refer to in the interviews on behalf of their staff. Their own criticism, however, is not primarily addressed towards the idea of innovations but towards the ineffectiveness of some of the reforms they experience. Thus, they also apply the industrial convention, criticising new processes that themselves draw their justification from the industrial world:

“These constant reforms are really tiring, nerve-racking. And you know, most of the time it’s only new procedures where you have to fill out forms. It becomes a paper-war.” (head teacher)

Taking a step further towards some particular reforms addressed in the interviews, the analysis reveals a marked differentiation of arguments and conventions that are employed. Again, looking at new teaching forms in particular, the most prominent issue arises from the question, whether all students should be taught together, irrespective of their level of skills and performance. This is associated with the fact, that the introduction of the new middle school was accompanied by an exchange of ‘external’ with ‘internal’ differentiation of pupils. Though formally implemented in all schools, some teachers and principals question this alteration while some defend its introduction. Criticism is expressed on the grounds of the meritocratic, the industrial and the market convention whereas support combines justifications from the market, civic and domestic convention.

One argument often brought forward states that teaching all students together results in a decline of the general level of education. Based on the meritocratic convention it is said that – though everyone should have equal opportunities – not everyone is equally talented or motivated and better students should not be held back by weaker ones, in the same way that less apt pupils should not be asked too much of.

“I was really quite sad that we don’t have the different performance groups anymore. At least you knew that everyone was more or less at the same level. And now it is quite the opposite and you have everyone, from really bad to very good in one room. So you have to think what to do with them. And then you just muddle through. For a very long time I was clueless how this can work, and actually I am still of the opinion, that you will never really succeed in bringing out the best in the best because you always have to look out for the weaker ones.” (teacher)

This statement shows how the meritocratic convention is also supported by the industrial one in order to criticise a mode of school organisation that refrains from selecting pupils into different classes according to their performances. The teacher, in this case, argues that a classroom organisation, which doesn’t allow for a differentiation between pupils of varying performance
levels, does not serve the individual student in developing his or her ‘potential’, but also makes it hard to teach efficiently as standardised procedures cannot be applied to all pupils in the same way. There is another argument that is more present in interviews with head teachers and that looks at the new situation from a market perspective of competition with other schools. It states that parents of relatively high-performing children are less inclined to send their offspring to a new middle school since they assume they won’t receive the intellectual stimulation wished for, which in turn leads to a sinking of the measurable performance outcome and a decline in the overall attractiveness of the school.

However, there are also justifications pointing towards the benefits of new forms of teaching, especially new didactic styles, which also draw on the market world, but, in combination with other conventions, most prominently the civic and community one. It is, for example, argued that a school can profit and succeed in the competition by putting the benefits of these ‘innovations’ to the front – that is, in the school profile – and thus actively ‘advertising’ as a comprehensive school which serves the needs of all kids, integrating them into a big school community where values such as cooperation and social cohesion are important and where students are prepared for society rather than just the job market.

5.2 Governance by numbers

Aside the multi-disciplinary expectations towards schools and professionals, another source of pressure, that is prominent in the data, is the perception of constantly having to be “successful”. However, interviewees rarely refer to their own ideas of what constitutes a successful working day or a successful engagement for students. Rather, success appears to be an abstract concept, which is a good in itself and mostly externally defined and judged. Especially head teachers point to the constant worry that missing certain targets might result in consequences such as reductions of staff or even the closing of the entire school.

“We are under permanent, constant pressure to be successful. Because only if we have enough pupils, and there aren’t any catchment areas, everyone can freely decide which school he or she goes to, only with enough pupils the school can continue. There is the pressure to meet the standard, to keep the team together.” (head teacher)

As indicated here, attracting students is a central worry to principals. The number of pupils attending the school is treated as a sign of its success (or the lack of it). This seemingly apparent correlation is referred to in all interviews with head teachers. Another measure of success that is often mentioned – and in the example above alluded to with the expression of meeting certain standards – is the score a school achieves in national or supra-national student assessment tests. The proclaimed line of argument, that high-performing schools according to test scores will be able to attract more and especially good students is, again, directly connected to the amount of pupils. This number-based mode of evaluation of what constitutes a ‘successful’ school – though the foundation of interviewees’ justifications of other decisions – is itself both treated as an inevitable reality and as a major object of critical contestation. As a principal puts it:

“It is wrong to say, that a school should be measured by how many good and excellent students they have and how many weak ones and then conclude, ‘Oh, you have more bad pupils, this makes your school a bad one.’ But that’s the danger with teaching standards and assessment tests. We were absolutely against rankings based on the standards, because it’s simply the biggest assumption. There are so many factors at work here. How can you blame the school, or the teachers, that they are in a particularly difficult part of town. Not that I blame the people here, or the parents.”

And another principal takes up this last aspect and remarks on the topic of test scores:

“Of course, with the migration background that the students have and the difficult socio-economic position of families you have an expected range for the school. And you can’t really expect that this school then produces students who out-perform and score disproportionally high.”

The criticism expressed here arises from a feeling of injustice, that all schools – and with them the teachers – are regarded through the same lens of standardised tests, which downplays or even ignores the widely different situations of schools, deriving from the unequal backgrounds of their clientele. Teaching standards and student assessment tests are seen to belong to a complex combining the market and the industrial convention, seemingly allowing for an efficient comparison of individuals, classes and whole schools on one hand, while one the other hand taking on the form of a measure of equivalence to determine the position in a market-like environment. They are presented as precise, reliable and objective, that is independent of personal factors and less prone to errors due to teachers’ judgement. The interviewees contrast this (mostly implied) justification with arguments that are based in the meritocratic, the civic and also in the domestic convention itself. The perhaps strongest critique, already quite visible in the excerpts above, draws on the meritocratic order. It is argued, by both teachers and head teachers, that schools – however good their work is – cannot compensate for the unequal skills of pupils, which are considered the result of their cognitive abilities and in particular their socio-economic background. Though social inequality, that makes it harder for some students to succeed in school, is in itself seen as problematic, the responsibility for pupils’ outcomes is nonetheless rejected as something “that is out of my reach” (teacher). Teachers view themselves as supporters and sometimes even protectors of disadvantaged students – in line with the domestic school-world – but they emphasise individual and family responsibilities and criticise parents’ lack of engagement;
effectively holding them accountable for their children’s success or failure. Whereas this line of argument, which assigns tasks and also blame to students and parents, is present in various contexts, it is particularly explicit regarding student assessments and comparative testings.

Other criticism refers – mostly implicitly – to an educational ideal of general knowledge and the necessity to educate students in a wide range of topics as well as prepare them to be active and responsible members of society. Based on the civic convention it is thus argued, that a concentration on those subjects and topics, which are later tested (standardised) and thus the basis for a school’s score, leads to the constriction of Bildung to an immediate usability of certain knowledge and to the idea that ‘only counts what’s counted’. A head teacher emphasises this relationship very pointedly. Its reference to the necessity of intercultural understanding is directly relating to the school culture and additionally points to the importance of the community world of the school:

“We are supposed to be good all-around, but the standard’s test is only looking at some cognitive abilities. If I say, we need to see that we bring together cultures and invest time in intercultural exchange, than I am convinced, it is important and good. But my evaluation only depends on the results of the test. So, yeah, if I want to score well and move up in the ranking and still invest time in important issues, I actually have to cut back on other classes, that aren’t in the spotlight; social learning, biology, musical education.”

The solution to this dilemma is often seen in more funds in order to flexibly include extra classes to the timetable when they are needed. But, as it seems very unrealistic that this demand will be met, principles ‘juggle’ with the given resources, basing decisions on their own perception of what the local situation requires (putting forward the flexible convention) as well as on what appears as inevitable exterior expectations, such as delivering best possible performance scores in a limited number of subjects in order to exhibit a high level of output-quality (market convention): “Well, to react and take up these issues, I try to take [teaching] hours away from everyone at times, so that there is no discrimination. But sometimes, even if I don’t like it, I have to stick with the plan and then good ideas get dropped.”

5.3 School profiles, representation and competition with other schools
As shown, interpretations of a school’s quality in light of its market position, in regard to performance assessments and even more so subsequent score-based rankings, are subject to various criticisms. However, there is also a sort of fatalistic approach to this output-oriented practice of evaluation. While the interviewees mainly agree that their hands are tight when it comes to actually improving their students’ performance scores – thus delegating responsibility to the individual learner and its family (meritocratic convention) – the alternative to competing with other schools by way of output-indicators is seen in creating a competitive school profile and culture, that enables the attraction of parents and students. Also perceived as a fait accompli one head teacher points towards the sheer necessity of being considered an attractive school to ‘recruit’ students, therein employing language that bears close resemblance to the world of dating: “We have to be visible out there. Of course, teaching comes first but you have to show what’s going on inside the school. And more, you have to be interesting, attractive.” Another principal allows an insight into what this entails, highlighting the need of visibility and shining a functionalist light on extra-curricular activities:

“We have a folder, an open-door day for primary schools, we work with our website. We performed a play in the mall in town, just to be out of the school. We organized a boot sale in front of the school, we have had public appearances of our school choir and so forth and so forth.”

Similar to the perception of a market-like situation created through performance scores and rankings, as shown above, the competition between schools in order to attract students on grounds of more ‘qualitative’ aspects of performance, such as creating an inviting school culture or offering a range of activities and extra-curricular classes, is not so much challenged in itself but seen as “natural”: “Let’s be honest, there are only so many students in this place and we are in a competition” (head teacher). However, whereas criticism in the first case mainly stems from the idea of unaccountability for students’ performance based on the meritocratic convention, the competition based on a visible attractiveness appears less contested, but is in some interviews accompanied by doubts regarding the benefit of such measures to actually influence one’s market-position. A teacher voices its scepticism towards “market conform” behaviour that she feels bound to participate in by alluding to the questionable effect of such efforts, thus drawing on the industrial convention:

“Our principal is really nervous about the numbers. He believes we have to utilise any opportunity to recruit students: yes recruit. And the more elaborate and creative the better. He always asks us to perform publicly and act as representatives. You know, involve media and newspapers and so forth. Presentation is really really important. But I am not convinced, if that pays off, how big the benefit of an event is, even if it’s perfectly conceived and carried out. But what can I do, the principal really cares.”

Connected to this is complaint about the efficacy of tasks that promote only the visibility of the schools’ work – and therein opposing what could be called an opinion-market complex with regard to the work of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) – is the criticism that “all this extra input” takes away time from the teachers “real work”, which is understood as “being in class”. Though not alluding to any particular convention, this points again to a professional identity that become under threat by the increased orientation towards creating a public image to succeed on the school market.
When it comes to signalling differences that should be considered by parents exercising a free choice, schools are urged to not only advertise, but first to develop a specific profile that sets them apart from competing schools. One school in the sample had an established music profile for some years that attracted a lot of students, also from outside the district. The interviewees in this case all defended the idea of specific profiles as a necessary prerequisite to any informed parental choice. In line with the market convention they argue that their particular position within the local school landscape allows them to successfully compete, not only with other middle but also with the grammar schools. In this case, there is a strong justification that connects school profiling to the positive selection of good students and subsequently high performance (as well as ‘good’ school culture). Contrary, there are strong contestations grounded in the civic convention that address the negative effects of such a student selection:

“Well, the specific profiling has catastrophic effects. I know, because we tried that once, tried to create a media profile. So we had two distinguished classes, a media class, an integration class and a normal one. [...] In our first year we more or less separated everyone who could properly write and count. They were all in the media class, whereas in the other two classes, you suddenly had the ‘rest’. And you cannot do this. That’s socially irresponsible. And so we gave up on it again and now offer an extra-curricular media course for everyone who wants to." (head teacher)

It is striking, though perhaps not surprising, that the evaluation of tasks that are oriented towards a perceived market, such as profiling and outward representation, differ markedly with the interviewee’s perception of how ‘successful’ the school actually is. Teachers and principals who feel or know that their own school “attracts” a lot of pupils, and in particular “good students, nice ones” (teacher), relate this to their own and the entire school’s engagement. The market then seems to work in their favour. If, however, a school finds itself in a rather precarious situation, struggling to keep student numbers stable, market mechanisms are criticized as inefficient, socially selective and thus irresponsible.

6 Conclusions: Conventions at work in schools

The study aimed to show how teachers and head teachers – two important groups of actors within the realm of a school – interpret and judge ideas and instruments associated with recent reforms. Educational governance research points out that these reforms are carried by a new constellation of modes that coordinate decisions and actions in the field. Of particular significance is the increased relevance of market-based forms of governance, the drive towards efficiently managed organisations and the introduction of standardised curricula as well as modes of performance evaluation. These external expectations are accounted for by actors in schools. However, following a pragmatic approach, people are not determined by them; they are considered competent to judge the appropriateness of these expectations in a given situation. What does that mean? Teachers and head teachers “show responsiveness to the expectations of educational reform as they go about teaching and carrying out organisational tasks” (Leemann, 2014, p. 232; see in particular Peetz, Lohr, & Hilbrich, 2013). But, far from simply being puppets of the reform agenda, they re-frame them, making use of socially accepted conventions.

1) The analysis so far revealed seven distinct conventions. They differ from the repertoire developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), but also from other subsequent works applying the approach within the field of education (Derouet, 1992; Imdorf, 2011; Leemann, 2014). For example, the meritocratic school world has not yet been considered separately, which is unexpected given the vast body of work connecting questions of justice to meritocratic arguments; especially within educational research on social inequality. The flexible convention, which I have only sketched here, is perhaps closest to what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005a) called the “project world”. Its lack in other works is, again, surprising as it seems that, apart from market-related ones, many arguments advocating instruments of a new educational governance are based on a flexible convention. Furthermore, the domestic convention, reconstructed from the data, is characterised by a strong emphasis on community, whereas the notion of tradition, heritage and paternalism does not appear to be of much significance.

2) The new education governance is characterised by a partial retreat of the state when it comes to direct regulation and school management. This coalesces with an increase in responsibilities at the level of the school, especially for head teachers. In an environment of stagnating financial provisions principals understand that it is within their mission to manage as best as possible under the given circumstances. Fulfilling or missing targets (in terms of student enrolment and overall performance scores) is interpreted as the schools success or failure – more or less directly accounted for by the performance of the staff. Though this narrative is not at all fully supported by the interviewed persons it becomes clear that the conventions, on which justifications and especially critique are based, do not primarily address the state and its role as provider for schools. In contrast, the schools’ need to attract (the right) pupils appears a commonplace; competition is taken-for-granted. Thus, the data suggests that schools are seen as responsible when it comes to the ‘acquisition’ of students. However, the same accountability is not taken in regard to pupil’s performance. The interviews clearly show, how the meritocratic convention functions as a frame for critique, allowing teachers (and head teachers) to diffuse and refuse responsibility for students’ in-school performance. This is especially remarkable as the interviews leave no doubt that both groups are well aware of issues of social inequality and its impact on students’ performances. The pattern of pushing responsibility away from the
individual school and teachers therefore indicates that a core idea of the new educational governance policy, namely accountability, is rejected – with consequences to teachers’ professional identity and their concept of self-efficacy.

3) Davies (2014) highlights that competition is the basic normative principle behind the neoliberal governance agenda. The study has shown, that competition and success in the context of a school-market is a very prevalent idea. It is presented on two levels: first, succeeding in attracting students and second, attracting high performing students. How to achieve these goals is less clear; success becomes the proof of success. Furthermore, there is a moral argument, that whoever comes out on top of the competition, must have done something right and therefore deserves the success. This perception is partly reflected in the interviews and seemingly depends on the position of the school. School profiles, work that enhances the visibility and outwardly-oriented attractiveness of a school are justified when they appear to have been successful, i.e. when the number-game is (temporarily) won in one’s favour. Criticism, on the other side, emphasises that the playing field for the schools is not levelled, however much advertisement is offered.

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The:#Thévenot,#L.,#Moody,#M.,#&#Lafaye,#C.##(2000).#Forms#of
valuing#nature:#arguments#and#modes#of#justification#in
French#and#American#environmental#disputes.#In#M.#Lamont#&#L.#Thévenot#(Eds.),#Cambridge#cultural#social
studies.#Rethinking#comparative#cultural#sociology.#Repertoires#of#evaluation#in#France#and#the#United#States
(pp.#229–272).#Cambridge:#Cambridge#Univ.#Press.

Fallstudien#in#vier#Bundesländern#[PISA#as#an#event#in
education#policy.##Case#studies#of#four#German#'Länder'].
Wiesbaden:#VS.

Endnotes

1#The#observation#that#all#social#fields,#practices#and#discourses#always
incorporate#some#economic#structures#(for#example#time#management)
remains#therefrom#unaffected.

2#This#applies#in#particular#to#the#German-speaking#research#discourse
on#educational#governance,#which#is#dominated#by#a#so-called#analytical
direction,#whereas#in#the#English-speaking#context,#especially#in#the
tradition#of#Critical#Education#Policy#Studies,#there#are#numerous#works
highlighting#the#relation#between#a#new#education#governance#and
processes#such#as#privatisation,#decentralisation,#globalisation
(Lindblad,#Ozga#&#Zambeta,#2002;#Mok,#2005;#Moos,#2011;#Mundy,#
2007;#Hall,#2005)#or#between#new#governance#and#the#neoliberal
paradigm#(Davis,#2016).

3#The#approach#is#also#known#under#the#term#Sociology#of#critical
capacity#(see#Boltanski#&#Thévenot,#1999)#as#well#as#under#the#French
title#Économie#des#conventions.

4#As#Daudigeos#and#Valiorgue#(2010,#p.#14-15)#point#out:‘The#whole
conventionalist#stream#hinges#on#the#seminal#work#of#D.#Lewis#(1969),
who#took#the#stance#that#there#are#three#components#to#a#convention:
1)#a#convention#emerges#in#a#situation#of#uncertainty#where#an#agent’s
utility#is#indeterminate#outside#of#their#utility#as#pre-expected#by#other
agents;#2)#a#convention#offers#regularity,#making#it#possible#to#resolve
repeat[sic.]#problems#that#could#not#otherwise#be#resolved#by#hermetic
individual#calculation#alone;#3)#a#convention#is#based#on#shared#belief
[...]’.

5#This#type#was#introduced#into#the#Austrian#school#system#following
the#idea#of#a#comprehensive#secondary#school#for#all#pupils#between
the#ages#of#ten#and#15.##However,#as#the#concept#of#a#‘levelled’#school
landscape#was#(and#still#is)#widely#contested#within#the#political#sphere
as#well#as#by#the#broader#public,#the#final#reform#didn’t#meet#its#original
agenda#and#was#effectively#reduced#to#the#creation#of#a#new#type#of
middle#school#which#replaced#the#former#one,#without#touching#the
position#of#the#existing#grammar#schools.##Despite#this#continuation#of
the#two-track#system,#the#new#middle#school#was#sold#as#a
comprehensive#school#and#a#milestone#towards#a#fairer#system.##This#is
because#the#curriculum#was#adapted#to#the#one#taught#in#grammar
schools#to#enhance#pupils#mobility#but#also#because#it#was#linked#to#the
expansion#of#day-care#facilities#in#schools#and#integrated#all-day
schools.

6#Two#additional#principals#were#interviewed#at#schools#at#which#no
teacher#participated#in#the#study.

7#All#interviews#were#conducted#and#subsequently#transcribed#in
German.##The#quotas,#included#in#the#following#section,#were#therefore
translated#into#English.

8#For#epistemological#reasons#there#will#be#no#mentioning#of#the
interviewee’s#gender#or#age,#but#only#of#the#position#as#either#a#teacher
or#a#headteacher.##This#is#due#to#pragmatists’#rejection#of#Bourdieu’s
structuralist#approach.##As#Leemann#(2014,#p.#223)#explains,’The
advocates#of#a#new#pragmatic#sociology[…]#do#not#trace#the#causes#of
complexity#and#conflict#in#the#social#coordination#of#action#to#the
affiliation#of#actors#with#groups#of#different#status#and#the#struggles#and
conflicts#of#interest#between#them#but#to#pragmatic#processes#of
negotiating#plural#logics#of#action.”

9#External#differentiation#refers#to#the#separation#of#pupils#into#three
groups,#depending#on#their#performance.##These#groups#were#separately
taught#and#graded.##In#contrast,#internal#differentiation#refers#to#the
new—that#is,new#to#Austria—situation#of#all#pupils#being#taught
together,#however#coupled#with#the#innovation#of#having#pairs#of
teachers#in#some#main#subjects#as#well#as#the#provision#of#extra
FINANCES#FOR#CREATING#TEMPORARY#LEARNING#GROUPS.##All#interviewees
were#affected#by#this#change,#even#young#teachers#who#had#still#been
accustomed#to#this#practice#during#their#formation.

10#I#thank#one#of#my#anonymous#reviewers#for#pointing#out,#that#the
described#criticism#towards#tasks#that#mainly#increase#a#school’s
visibility,##with#the#intention#of#attracting#pupils#in#a#market-like
environment,#can#be#understood#as#criticism#towards#practices#that#are
justified#on#the#combined#ground#of#the#market#convention#and,#what
Boltanski#and#Thévenot#have#called,#the#“world#of#renown”#or#opinion.
So#far,#this#latter#convention#has#not#received#much#attention
throughout#the#analysis#of#my#data.##However,#I#will#be#taking#up#the
role#of#reputation#and#visibility#for#school-based#decision-making
processes#in#an#upcoming#project.
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Inspecting School Social Quality: Assessing and Improving School Effectiveness in the Social Domain

- School inspections can take different approaches to evaluating school social quality.
- This paper discusses three distinct models of approach: a process model, a school improvement model and an output model.
- Each of the models serves different mechanisms for effective school inspection.
- The paper presents a school effectiveness model of social outcomes of schools.

Purpose: School inspection of school social quality is, in contrast to inspection in the cognitive domain, still in its early phase of development. While schools are shown to affect social outcomes, the interplay of mechanisms makes it difficult to isolate the effect of the school. This paper aims to evaluate different approaches to inspecting school social quality.

Methodology: Based on a school effectiveness model, we consider what aspects could be taken into consideration to evaluate school social quality.

Findings and implications: Using insights from inspection of cognitive outcomes, we present three ideal-type models of inspection, focusing on outcomes, school improvement, or process. There is as of yet no clear best approach to inspecting school social quality, as inspection of school quality can influence school performance in a range of ways. Implications of the described models and possible strengths and weaknesses are discussed.

Keywords:
School inspection, social outcomes, school quality, school effectiveness, quality assurance

1 Introduction
Ideas about the role of government in educational quality assurance (i.e. school inspections) mainly appear to involve the qualification function. For a long time, the extent to which education succeeds in realizing its socialization function was underplayed in many countries. In recent years attention has increasingly shifted towards the ‘social outcomes of education’. In comparison to research into the effectiveness of schools in promoting academic achievement, which has a long robust tradition (cf. Creemers & Kyriakides, 2008; Hattie, 2009; Townsend, 2007), research into school effectiveness and social outcomes is in its childhood. Correspondingly, most current school effectiveness research focuses on teaching and learning in relation to academic achievement. We still know little about what the focus of evaluation and assessment of school effectiveness should be in relation to social outcomes of education. Does the knowledge we have about educational supervision and school improvement (Ehren, 2016) in the area of academic achievement also apply to the social domain, or does effective assessment of social quality require a different approach?

At the same time, the increasing focus on social outcomes of education means national inspectorates of education are faced with the challenge how to incorporate these outcomes in their assessment of educational quality. In other words: is it possible to measure the outcomes in this domain in relation to the quality of schools? And can school inspectors assess the effectiveness of schools’ efforts in this area? A number of inspectorates has already included (aspects of) social outcomes in their assessment schemes (cf. Dijkstra & De la Motte, 2014). This paper aims to conceptualize different methods of evaluation of social quality in education, and offers an overview of different models for inspecting social outcomes of schools.

We use the term ‘social outcomes’ to refer to various benefits of education in the social and (in particular) societal spheres of life. At the individual level, social
outcomes of education are considered in this study to consist of the social and civic competences that students develop. We define social quality as those aspects of school quality that are primarily relevant to promoting such competences. These include aspects of teaching and learning, pedagogical characteristics, the school climate and the characteristics of the school as a social community. This study addresses school inspections and social outcomes of education and aims to contribute to answering two questions: Is it possible to measure school effectiveness in the area of social outcomes? And How can inspections strengthen school improvement in this area?

2 Social outcomes of education
Almost two decades ago, the OECD (2001) published The Well-being of Nations, a study whose core message was that education is not only of great economic significance but also contributes to the well-being of countries and governments should focus not only on the production of human capital but also on social capital. The study marked a trend which had begun earlier as a result of developments like uneasiness about the erosion of social cohesion and the ensuing attention being paid to the issue by policy makers, and growing scientific interest in the concept of social capital. Social cohesion and social capital are closely related. Social cohesion refers to the extent to which social structures affect people’s behaviors and the extent to which behaviors and attitudes contribute to the perpetuation of social structures, norms and trust (Dijkstra & Peschar, 2003). Social capital is defined as ‘networks together with shared norms, values and understanding that facilitate co-operation within or among groups’ (OECD, 2001), which means that social capital is highly dependent on social cohesion and vice versa. Social capital facilitates collective action and contributes to the functioning of democratic institutions, and participation in institutions of civil society is related to a higher degree of social trust and involvement in public issues (cf. Putnam, 1993).

The importance of promoting social cohesion and the role of education in this respect is acknowledged and stimulated by many parties. The OECD (2001) underlines the importance of social cohesion and an interest in the development of ‘key competences for a successful life and a well-functioning society’ (Rychen & Salganik, 2003). Inspired by concerns about civic involvement, increasing intolerance and other developments, in 2002 the Council of Europe acknowledged the importance of ‘Education for Democratic Citizenship’ and activities aimed at stimulating it, such as the formulation of competences to be pursued by education. Many countries have included citizenship education in their (formal or informal) curricula (Eurydice, 2005, 2017). Within the scope of the Lisbon ambitions, in 2000 the European Union not only formulated goals for strengthening a knowledge-based economy but also for strengthening social cohesion and promoting active citizenship. This initiative built on earlier action programmes to strengthen learning for active citizenship (cf. European Commission, 1998). In 2006, the EU included interpersonal, intercultural, social, civic and other competences in its framework of key competences (cf. Gordon et al., 2009; Halász & Michel, 2011).

Large scale studies of civic outcomes of education have shown differences between countries and school in students’ civic competences (e.g. Schulz et al., 2010, 2017). The 1999 Civic Education (CIVED) study, for instance, showed educational practices to play an important role in preparing students for citizenship in 28 countries (Torney-Purta et al., 2001), as did the latest International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (Schulz et al., 2017) in illustrating the importance of school factors, like an open school climate. These studies also showed differences between countries in the relative contribution made by schools, suggesting differences in educational practice, management and policy. Based on analysis of the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS), Isac et al. (2011) showed student citizenship outcomes are influenced by factors at country, school and student level and concluded that a school effectiveness model of citizenship education should take a multitude of factors into account.

3 School effectiveness and social outcomes
To answer whether school effectiveness in social outcomes can be assessed, we start from a general model of school effectiveness. Models of school effectiveness typically consider four components: input, process, output and context. These include levels of school organization and management, teacher and/or classroom level and the level of individual student performance and background (cf. Scheerens & Creemers, 1989). The model presented in Figure 1 offers a global conceptual framework, indicating the main school factors related to the social outcomes of education (Dijkstra & De la Motte, 2014). As a result of the modest empirical status of the knowledge about effective schooling in the social domain, the model—based on assumptions taken from general effective school models and comparable to citizenship models suggested before (cf. Maslowski et al., 2009; Scheerens, 2011; Isac et al., 2013)—should primarily be understood as a heuristic device.

In light of this conceptualization, we define output as social outcomes of education; i.e. its individual and collective benefits for interpersonal interaction in the social and societal spheres of life. This concerns direct outcomes in the form of competences acquired through education and indirect outcomes produced by the effect on other domains of life (Dijkstra, 2012). Outcomes are a primary indication of school quality in the social domain. The underlying philosophy is that, in the end, education is not only about the processes taking place, but also whether teaching and learning lead to the results pursued: students achieving the intended learning objectives in the form of acquired knowledge, attitudes and skills. From this perspective, the quality of education is made visible by the educational outcomes. Depending on one’s vision of the contribution that is expected of education, conditions may be imposed, for example the possibility
of distinguishing the contribution of the school from the influence of other factors. Schools are part of the social context in which students develop, and it might not be realistic to expect education to solve social problems. Although schools are undoubtedly confronted with both the resources and constraints in the socioeconomic and socio-cultural context of the student population, and are expected to contribute to student development also—or even: especially—in the face of disadvantages and risks, their capability to do so is not without limitations. Because of the significance of the successful acquisition of knowledge, attitudes and skills, the outcomes of the process of learning are nevertheless a primary indication of the school’s quality in the social domain.

Various indicators can be used to measure schools’ social outcomes. Social and citizenship outcomes at the individual level can be assessed by measuring students’ competences, or components like knowledge, skills or attitudes, and aggregated to the school level these measures indicate the school’s quality and room for improvement. To a certain extent, students’ behavior both inside and outside of schools can also be an outcome of school efforts. Although not offering a direct measure of competences, behavioral intentions (such as intentions to vote) can also be regarded as social outcomes (cf. Schulz et al., 2008).

![Figure 1: School effectiveness model of social outcomes (Dijkstra & De la Motte, 2014, p.46)](image)

School quality is not only assessed on the basis of outcomes. The factors *input* and *process*, like the quality of the curriculum or the teaching and learning process are also relevant to the school’s social quality. School and classroom climate (including social safety) and the pedagogical quality of the school (including aspects like school ethos) are not only in themselves goals to be pursued, but also beneficial to the school’s social outcomes (cf. Geboers et al., 2013). This is also true for the quality of the curriculum content—for example in the form of subject matter introducing the students to aspects of history, heritage, identity and culture. Both high-quality processes and provision have an additional value because they contribute to better student performance.

To realize the social goals of education, the educational *context* can have both beneficial and inhibiting effects. As indicated before, the composition of the student population is a relevant factor to take into account. Correspondence between the home environment and the school also play a role, most notably where the school’s goals in the social domain are not supported by the parents or the community around the school.

Although the above is not meant to offer an exhaustive overview of factors explaining differences in social quality of schools (e.g. Dijkstra et al., 2015; Geboers et al., 2013; Isac et al., 2013) and our understanding of school effectiveness in the social domain is still limited, it does give an impression of the factors to be taken into account in the assessment of the effectiveness of schools in this respect. Effective teaching becomes possible particularly where there is a fit between the goals the school is pursuing in the social and civic domain and the resources available to achieve these goals. Empirical knowledge about the influence of aspects of quality on the acquisition of social competences is still scarce, which means that, for the time being, models of school effectiveness and inspections will mainly be based on a more general understanding of school quality and school improvement.

Having thusfar argued that assessing school effectiveness in the social domain should include context, input, process and output factors, we now turn to the question of how school inspections can contribute to accountability and improvement in the social domain. Since the research linking school inspection to the social outcomes of schools is scarce (cf. Ehren, 2016; Scheerens, 2005) we can also make deductions from the results of research of school inspections in the cognitive domain (for overviews: Ehren, 2016; Klerks, 2013; Nelson & Ehren, 2014; OECD, 2013). We build on knowledge available about the mechanisms operating in the inspection of the core
Curriculum and the impact of inspections on school improvement and cognitive student outcomes to outline the assumptions of effective inspections in the social domain. School inspection is effective when it evaluates the quality of education in the social domain and facilitates schools to improve the characteristics of effective teaching that are conditional to students’ mastery of social competences (e.g. through inspection feedback, publication of results, standard setting, support and sanctions), when it informs parents and the public about the school’s quality, and when it is relevant for accountability (cf. Ehren, 2016; Karsten et al., 2010).

Little is known about the factors that make schools effective in the social domain (cf. Dijkstra, 2012). Although a general sketch can be given of the factors that may be assumed to have a bearing on educational quality in the social domain, empirical knowledge of the effects of these factors and their interplay is limited (e.g. Geboers et al., 2013; Schuitema, Ten Dam & Veugelers, 2008; Solomon, Watson & Battisch, 2012). Not only is this knowledge required for a useful cost-benefit analysis (to what extent is a substantial contribution of school inspections to expect?) but also to identify areas where successful intervention is possible. From the perspective of efficiency it is worthwhile to have school inspections focus on the factors where schools can make a contribution, for example objectives that are susceptible to influence through education and outcomes that contribute to collective social benefits in the long term.

School inspections in the cognitive domain have an impact on the improvement of schools, schools’ self-evaluations and ultimately student outcomes in maths and literacy through the feedback during inspection visits and in inspection reports, the setting of expectations through standards and the publication of inspection results and actions of stakeholders, and consequences of school inspections (cf. Ehren, 2016; Klerks, 2013). So far, inspections in the social domain have a different setup. Standardized tests to measure student achievement are widespread in the cognitive domain, but in the assessment of school quality, instruments for measuring social competences play a modest role (cf. Daas et al., 2016). Maths and literacy are often the core focus of teaching and learning in schools, and over the last decades social quality and social competences of students have recurringly been mentioned as deserving more attention (cf. Scheerens, 2011; Dijkstra & De la Motte, 2014).

The lack of knowledge about what constitutes good social quality of schools and how it contributes to the social competences of students means that little is known about the relative importance of the various indicators in the effectiveness model. The need for a better understanding of impact, validity and reliability of these indicators also means that school inspections thus far primarily focus on evaluation in the form of elucidation, performance feedback and benchmarking, and adopt a modest approach to high-stakes incentives. On the other hand, particularly because there is little available knowledge, school inspections may render important contributions in the form of systematic assessments of teaching and learning and the information this provides about effective methods of teaching. Comparative knowledge of different school practices through the exchange of knowledge and identification of good practices can play an important role in this respect.

If we assume that effective supervision in the social domain should fulfill one or more of the accountability, school improvement and consumer information functions (cf. Karsten et al., 2010), the above allows us to infer the building blocks for the organization of school inspections of social quality that are listed below. To do so, we formulate assumptions about the intended state of the subject (i.e. the desired situation), what should be done to achieve that situation, through which processes will outcomes be affected and under which conditions are these processes expected to operate (cf. Donaldson, 2007). Because a detailed account of a program theory falls outside the scope of this contribution (cf. Ehren, 2016), the discussion is limited to a brief sketch of the main elements (for examples of detailed accounts of school inspection in the social domain see Dijkstra & De la Motte, 2014).

Accountability. Accountability concerns providing an insight into the extent to which the intended goal (and the level of effectiveness) is achieved. Although there may be differences due to the nature of the goal, the desired situation contains information about the provision, process and/or results of teaching. The outcome could for example be the scores on a standardized social skills test. Collection of such data requires objective measurement methods and criteria for school-independent assessment. Essentially, accountability in the social domain focuses on an understanding of the results of education in the form of social and civic competences of students. Depending on the goal, it may also encompass the quality of the educational process (including pedagogical behavior and school climate) and curriculum content.

School improvement. School inspections for school improvement aim to provide information for improving the quality of teaching in such a way that the school is able and willing to undertake the activities required. The school’s willingness to take action may be based on internal incentives (e.g. the belief that improvement is necessary and feasible) and/or external incentives (e.g. receiving support for school development or avoiding damage to the school’s reputation). When internal incentives predominate, it is important that supervision contributes to convincing teachers and school managers that the school’s social quality can be improved and helps them understand how. This requires information-rich evaluations providing insights into the processes of teaching and learning. It is also necessary that the school recognizes itself in the information and feedback and buys in to the inspection findings.

Consumer information. Supervision aimed at informing parents about quality in the social domain should primarily provide data about the extent to which the teaching fits their expectations and goals. Parents, for example, will be interested in the school’s social climate,
the social, societal, religious and/or moral goals pursued by the school and the way in which it achieves these goals. The provision of school indicators can influence parents’ school choice (cf. Waslander, Pater & Van der Weide, 2010). Pedagogic quality and school climate are thus important elements in consumer information.

Although the weights attached to these goals through inspections might differ across national contexts, in practice the functions of school improvement, consumer information and accountability will often be combined. Effective supervision in the social domain will then include:

- A coherent system of standards: clear standards that give a good insight into the goals to be pursued and the various components of social quality;
- Outcome indicators: knowledge of the students’ social and civic competences as an indicator of educational outcomes, with a view to accountability and providing incentives for quality improvement;
- Insight into curriculum content and teaching process: knowledge of the quality of teaching and learning, particularly as a means to provide an insight into options for educational improvement;
- Ownership of the school: involvement of school management and teachers in the quality assessment in such a way that they can own the results and are willing and able to work with them;
- Insight into pedagogical quality and school climate: knowledge that parents can understand and is relevant to their situation, so that they can make choices that best fit the developmental needs and characteristics of their children.

Depending on the weights of these components, the combination of i) standards directing the efforts made by schools; ii) information required for educational improvement; iii) incentives for school improvement (including, for example, public information about the quality of schools) and; iv) dissemination of the results, provides the mechanisms that lead to quality and stimulate school improvement.

Because it makes the social quality and the results of the school in this domain more visible, supervision not only provides more knowledge about options for quality improvement but is also expected to make it more relevant, acknowledging the—usually unintended—one side emphasis on academic achievement effects and broadening the scope of school inspections (cf. De Wolf & Janssens, 2007). Because social quality becomes a more prominent element of the school’s public profile, reputation effects are likely to occur that will stimulate schools to improve their quality. As the meaning attached to social quality increases, so will its visibility and status, and this will have a positive effect on the allocation of resources within the school.

4 Towards models of school inspections in the social domain

The foregoing shows that inspection of school social quality can serve a number of functions, and can focus on a range of aspects of teaching and learning. When we look beyond this variety and pay attention to the key components in various assessment systems, three models can be distinguished, based on Dijkstra and De la Motte (2014). These should be understood as ‘ideal-type models’ based on variation in central characteristics of the focus of school inspections (what is the subject of assessment and what criteria are applied?) and the purpose of inspection (what does assessment aim to achieve?), in order to analyze the different mechanisms and features of systems of school inspection when it comes to social quality. The ideal-type models should primarily be understood as heuristic devices, and comprise a process model, a school improvement model and an output model.

The process model emphasizes (assessing) the quality of teaching and learning, covering aspects like curriculum content, the ways in which teaching and learning takes place and relevant constraints. The principle underlying the process model is that the way in which teaching and learning occurs should be central to the assessment of school effectiveness. This notion may be based on the idea that alternative approaches are less suitable or lacking, or that the quality of the teaching processes within schools is a better indicator of quality than indicators of student performance. From this perspective, school climate is central to the process of teaching social outcomes, and play an important part in assessing schools’ social quality. The main quality aspects in this approach are the quality of educational content (including the extent to which the curriculum meets national requirements as formulated in education legislation), the quality of its design (such as the inclusion of clear learning objectives, the included subjects and the educational program over the years), the classroom and school climate and the quality of the social context in which teaching and learning take place. Although attention to outcomes is not necessarily absent, student results primarily play a role as a point of reference for structuring and adjusting curriculum content and level. Examples include measuring how satisfied students, parents and other stakeholders are with the results of teaching and learning, measuring student well-being, or using such measures for risk assessment, for instance as indications of poor school climate.

The process model presupposes standards on the basis of which the quality of teaching and learning can be assessed. These standards can be based on national legislation if the requirements stipulated are sufficiently specific to determine content and quality. If standards are based on learning objectives set by the school, the emphasis will be on the quality of the process, that is, on the question whether the school indeed teaches the content it claims to offer. In this context, it is less important whether this complies with external expectations and or with what is seen as desirable from a broad societal perspective. Another interpretation of the process approach focuses on the quality of the school as a social community and places emphasis on school climate, student well-being and the pedagogical quality of the teachers. In this case standards are primarily
determined by the satisfaction of those involved, including the external stakeholders. This means that contextual factors—for example student background characteristics and school diversity—play an important role in assessing whether the school’s educational quality is satisfactory.

Assessment of educational quality based on the quality of aspects of educational process generally requires more intensive data collection—e.g. school and classroom observations, interviews and document analysis—due to the scope of the areas to be included and limited possibilities for deriving valid generalizations from a limited number of observations.

The school improvement model focuses on the contribution school inspections can make to school quality. Taking the school improvement model as the starting point focuses school inspection on the areas where improvement can be achieved and promotes school ownership of the improvement process.

Apart from provision and process factors (e.g. the quality of teaching and learning), the conditions for school improvement also play a substantial role in the school improvement model. These concern the school’s capacity for improvement, which includes an understanding of its situation, the ability to perform self-evaluations, sufficiently developed quality assurance processes and the managerial skills of school management and school authority. The importance of school ownership may consist of involvement of teachers and management in data collection and data analysis, understanding of the situation and background of the assessments and acceptance of these assessments. The school improvement model will usually focus on the development of teaching and the quality of processes and – provided minimum output requirements are met – use performance information to guide the process of school development instead of regarding it as an outcome of the school inspection.

Organizing school inspections so that they promote school improvement also affects the organization of inspections. Usually, this will mean that forms of self-evaluation will take a prominent place within the inspections. This may concern collecting and analyzing information about the school on the basis of external standards and assessments based on evaluations performed by the school or peers with the help of external standards but also the setting of standards by the school and evaluations based on these standards. In the latter variant, the role of the inspectorate changes towards validating the school’s assessments and taking a more active role in the event of risks, incidents and situations in which self-evaluation is insufficient.

The setting of standards plays a less important role in the school improvement model. The impact of external standards is less great due to the importance of school ownership and the relevance attached to the school using methods for promoting involvement in and understanding of its own situation. It is likely that there will be variation in the way in which assessments are made because schools can collect and interpret their own data. This is not just an incidental effect but an intentional goal and will become even more prominent in situations where the school also formulates its own standards. The school’s autonomy decreases the normative effect of school inspections since it presupposes a reduction of external control. A possible limitation is the reduced comparability of the outcomes of inspection. As opportunities for performing school specific assessment increase, variations in the way in which these assessments are made will also increase. This variation however, also increases the chance that ‘real’ differences between schools will not be identified. The limitations caused by the loss of standards at the supra-school level (as is also the case in the process model) – less impact due to a reduced role of the normative effect of school inspections and reduced identification of differences between schools – may thus play a role in this model too.

The broad scope of the school improvement model, which can involve input, process, and outcome factors as well as the schools’ quality assurance, presupposes relatively intensive forms of inspection that may include document analysis, interviews, observations and verification of the school’s self-evaluations, depending on the weight given to self-evaluation and its validation in the inspection process.

The school improvement model offers opportunities for accepting the outcomes of quality assessment by the school, and the motivation to work towards school improvement based on these outcomes. Another advantage is the validity of assessments: because external norms and their application in the specific situation of the school play a less important role, the assessments will usually fit the school’s situation. Where the school improvement model leads to schools formulating meaningful standards, it will also be less hampered by a limitation of the other two models, namely the scarcity of clear external standards in the social domains of education. For similar reasons, the school improvement model could be an effective tool for improving educational quality.

The output model assesses the social quality of schools primarily on what the students have learned. The underlying principle is that what primarily matters is students successfully acquiring social and civic competences. Several outcomes have already been mentioned: through assessment of students’ competences; through evaluating well-being and school safety indicators; and by assessing student behavior or intentions.

Measurements of student satisfaction and well-being can be regarded as indicators of both process or outcomes. In practice, however, these measurements are mostly limited to determining risks or problems in the social environment rather than assessing the average social skills of students. Using measurements of social competences or measurements of social safety has the advantage — especially when compared to the other models — that relatively little effort is needed to gather the necessary information. Another advantage is that it is relatively easy to apply standards based on a clear
reference point (e.g. national benchmarks). A limiting factor is the interpretation of the data, especially if the findings are used to assess the effectiveness of the school. Such assessment assumes that the influence of the school can be distinguished from other factors affecting social competences of students, such as family and peer effects. Although approaches that measure the school’s ‘added value’ might not be feasible in the short run, there are several options for assessments based on test results. Benchmark approaches comparing the results of a school to those of other schools in similar situations, or comparing results of the same school over time can be used for this purpose.

School inspections based on an output approach offer opportunities for addressing the social quality of schools through monitoring, in which outcomes are used as indicators of possible deficiencies in the quality of the school (a signal that improvement is required) and on the basis of which further assessment can be carried out. This approach offers opportunities for systemic assessment of educational quality aimed at understanding potential weaknesses and strengths of schools or educational systems. A limitation of the output approach is whether it provides detailed information about school processes that are relevant and useable for school improvement.

Throughout each of the three models described above, inspections can employ a range of strategies and mechanisms to influence schools. Table 1 compares the main features of the three inspection models in relation to the appropriate mechanisms (Dijkstra & De la Motte, 2014), which we will briefly explain below.

Setting clear standards & acceptance of findings. One of the mechanisms leading to inspections contributing to higher quality is the formulation of standards that provide schools with guidelines for the organization of teaching and learning. Output-oriented models in particular have this characteristic because of the usually specific (often quantitative) nature of output measures. This also applies to the process model, although to a lesser extent because of the more general nature of teaching quality indicators. The process and output models also provide for clear standards. Examples are quantitative criteria (e.g. the percentage of students with higher than average scores on a nation-wide citizenship knowledge test) and the degree to which the curriculum realizes statutory requirements about content. Because the school improvement model doesn’t make much assumptions about these points, this model provides fewer guidelines in the form of external standards. This means that standards (as chosen by the school) might be more relevant to the school, but also that there is less opportunity for central control than in the output model, and less insight into the results and functioning of the school system.

Focus on learning & focus on results. There are clear differences between the models in terms of the weight given to provision and process factors and results as the principles underlying school inspections. Provision and process are central to the school improvement and process models. Results play a limited role in the process model, play a limited role in the output model, and the school improvement model assumes the middle ground. Because of the great variation in classroom practices that may be used to realize the social goals of education, the school improvement and the process models are best suited to accommodate variations in types of teaching and learning. The output model allows for a more systemic evaluation of students’ learning outcomes.

Self-evaluation, sense of ownership & guidelines for improvement. Involvement of the school (e.g. in the weight attached to self-evaluation and the relevance of school ownership) plays an important role in the school improvement model. Inspections focusing on these aspects provide opportunities for building on the context, vision and culture of the school. In the externally oriented output model, elements such as self-evaluation and ownership play a secondary role. Process-oriented inspections assume the middle position in this respect: although the inspection process (most of which takes place in the school) stimulates the school’s involvement, the assessment is based on external, school-independent standards. Since process indicators can provide more tangible support for schools than outcome indicators, these can be considered more susceptible for self-evaluation or improvement.

Administrative burden on schools, inspectorate activities & risk assessment. The place of provision and process factors within school inspections also have an impact on the resources required of the schools and the inspectorate to implement assessments. As teaching and learning assume a more central position within the assessment, relatively labor-intensive instruments such as lesson observations, interviews and document analysis are used more often. This applies most to the school improvement model (in which schools are given opportunity for collecting and analyzing data and thus makes less use of standardized assessment methods) and – albeit to a lesser extent – to the process model (in which external standards allow for more standardized assessment methods). Due to the more standardized nature of the data required in output model, this also means that risk-targeted supervision is particularly feasible here because the data offer a more standardized assessment over schools.

Consequences & focus on compliance. As external standards become more important and more specified, it becomes easier to impose consequences on schools for insufficient quality. As standards become clearer, it becomes easier to assess whether a school conforms to the standard and there will be less reason to dispute the assessment, which will strengthen the acceptance of findings and implications (especially regarding negative evaluations or even sanctions). Clearer standards, as assumed in the output model for example, will increase the likelihood of inspections leading to (positive or negative) implications as a driver for change. Where a process model is more directed at the teaching approach, and therefore compliance, the output model focuses more on
outcomes allowing for corresponding incentives or consequences.

Table 1: Ideal-type assessment models of school effectiveness in the social domain (Dijkstra & De la Motte, 2014, p.185)

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Characteristic of assessment model: • major ▫ partial minor / none

5 Conclusion

The models presented allow for a more detailed answer to the central questions of this study: Is it possible to measure school effectiveness in the area of socialization, social competences and citizenship education? and How can school inspections strengthen school improvement in this area? The preceding discussion shows that several answers may be given and that several approaches to school inspection can be distinguished on the basis of the position taken in these two dimensions. Thus, there are various answers to the question how inspections can be organized in the social domain – and various results to be expected – depending on the priorities chosen. These answers may be summarized by using the three models described above; once again, we should stress that these are ideal-typical models that offer an insight into possible approaches. In the actual practice, combinations – with different weights given to the various elements – will usually be found.

• Output model. In this approach to inspection, output in the social domain is the central issue. The focus is on assessing quality as reflected in the extent to which education realizes its intended goals. As Table 1 shows, this approach is characterized by a primarily external orientation: the impact of inspections mainly results from setting clear quality standards combined with a focus on the results of education and external improvement incentives. Characteristics of this approach are a relatively extensive inspection practice placing only a minor burden on the school, a central role for result indicators and limited attention for the teaching program and process as long as the school meets output standards. The external orientation of this model implies a relatively restricted ownership of the evaluation process by the school, which has to conform to external standards. The assessments do not necessarily indicate how improvement may be realized. The result can be pictured as a report card rather than a roadmap.

• School improvement model. In many respects, the school improvement model offers the opposite perspective. It focuses on a school-oriented approach to social quality. The ideas and practices of the school are an important starting point for determining both goals and standards and the way in which the quality of education is assessed. The effects of supervision are not so much achieved by external setting of standards and attention for their realization but by focusing on the process of education. In this approach, the primary mechanism is a dialogue about the quality of teaching and learning. The orientation on the school’s internal processes broadens the support base for the inspection results and increases the motivation for school improvement. The school improvement model presupposes a relatively intensive effort made by the school and the inspection. Because unambiguous standards are lacking in this model, it provides only a limited insight into what results are achieved at school and school system level.

• Process model. A process-oriented approach to social quality is also mainly external in orientation but focuses more on the quality of teaching and learning than on results. Although external standard setting is again the primary mechanism underlying the inspections, its effect is less strong because of the variety of educational practices schools can use to achieve the social goals of education. In other words, the coercive power of standards is smaller. Because the inspection assessments primarily target the way in which the educational process satisfies external standards, compliance with the standards plays an important role and inspections will focus on the extent to which elements of curriculum and learning process satisfy quality demands. Inspection is directed at evaluating and improving the teaching and learning process, and thereby at the processes taking place in the school and classroom. The evaluation of provision and process factors makes this a relatively labor-intensive form of inspection for both schools and inspectorate.

The choice for an appropriate form of inspection will in practice only partially be inspired by considerations concerning the effectiveness of inspections on social quality. Its embedding within the general approach to inspection, the legislative context and implicit assumptions about the effect of inspection models often play a substantial role. However, the above shows that when choosing a supervision approach, it is wise to take into account the mechanisms within the various forms of inspection and the effects these may produce.
References


The Rise and Fall of Citizenship and Human Rights Education in Turkey

Purpose: This article shows the effects of competing political forces on citizenship education in Turkey during the period of commitment to European Union (EU) accession (1999-2005).

Methodology: It draws on textbooks, archival documents and interviews. Whilst Turkey had a history of civic education to promote a secular national ethos and identity, the post-Cold War democratisation movement encouraged the Turkish government in 1995 to attempt to internationalise civics by adding human rights themes.

Findings: This effort occurred at a time when the hegemony of the secular nationalist establishment was challenged by the electoral rise of an Islamist party. Although Citizenship and Human Rights course suited the purposes of the secular nationalist establishment, after the EU recognised Turkey as a candidate in 1999, a new political Islamist government, elected in 2002, chose first to align the course with its ideology and later decided to repeal it. By exploring the evolution of the curriculum in a crucial period in which political power was switching from the ideology of secular nationalism to that of religious (Islamist) nationalism, the present study illustrates ways in which external and internal influences may affect citizenship education. In particular, it contributes to debates over the role of international agencies in curriculum change in citizenship education.

Keywords:
Citizenship education, human rights education, curriculum change, role of international agencies, Turkey

1 Introduction
Citizenship education in one form or another has been a staple of the compulsory centralised national curriculum of Turkish middle schools since the founding of the modern state in the 1920s. This article focuses on a sudden change in emphasis in the course for eighth grade students (13-14-year-olds) who historically received instruction in the official ideology of secular nationalism according to which the State is blind to individual characteristics of religion, culture and ethnicity. Citizens are deemed to be equal within the Republic so long as they refrain from claiming recognition of diversity within the public sphere.

In 1995, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) agreed to reform the eighth-grade citizenship education courses in response to the United Nations’ (UN) Decade for Human Rights Education initiative. The MoNE changed the title of a course from ‘Citizenship Studies’ to ‘Citizenship and Human Rights Education’ and revised the course’s curriculum through the integration of some human rights themes (MoNE, 1995). However, this reform was overtaken by political events including the rise to power of the political Islamist Welfare Party [Refah Partisi, RP] and the subsequent military coup of 1997 that toppled the Islamist-party-led coalition government (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Çınar, 2003).

Following the military overthrow of the Islamist government, and the re-establishment of secular nationalist control, the MoNE launched the first curriculum of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course in 1998 (MoNE, 1998). Critiques noted the inclusion of militaristic perspectives which sat uneasily with Turkey’s case for recognition as a candidate for European Union (EU) membership, which was nonetheless achieved at the 1999 Helsinki Summit (Gülmez, 2001; Üstel, 2004). This article investigates the evolution of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course during the post-Helsinki era (1999-2005) in which the EU membership reforms created a sea change in the balance of power between the forces of dominant ideologies. It seeks to explore, through the analysis of interviews with key informants, archival policy documents and textbooks, ways in which

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the EU accession process affected the content of Citizenship and Human Rights Education in the post-Helsinki era. We find that, after the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP] in 2002, the content of the course was aligned with the new ruling party’s ideology of political Islamism, and subsequently the course was wholly removed from the middle school programmes in 2005.

This article focuses on the evolution of citizenship education from the 1999 Helsinki Summit in which Turkey was accepted as an official candidate for EU membership until 2005 when the MoNE repealed the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course. Whilst a number of scholars have previously researched citizenship education in Turkey (Çayır, 2014; Çayır & Bağlı, 2011; Çayır & Gürkaynak, 2008; Gök, 2004; Gümze, 2001; Ince, 2012; Karaman Kepenekçi, 2005; Üstel, 2004), this article breaks new ground in investigating its evolution in relation to the effects of the EU accession process and in drawing on the accounts of key informants and our privileged access to archival documents.

Previous studies other than Türkmen (2009) rarely investigated the impact of the ideology of the ruling party on the curriculum. Rather, the main tendency has been to explore the ways the official ideology, backed by the state establishment, has permeated the curriculum (e.g. Altunay, 2004; İ. Kaplan, 1999; S. Kaplan, 2006). In fact, the context of previous research has been the hegemony of secular nationalism that left little space for alternative ideological influences. By exploring the evolution of the subject in a crucial period in which power was shifting from the ideology of secular nationalism to that of religious (Islamist) nationalism, this study illustrates how external and internal influences moulded the curriculum. It also contributes to the debate on whether international agencies have created a convergence towards a global model of citizenship education.

2 Curriculum change in Citizenship Education

Much international discussion on curriculum change in citizenship education revolves around the question of whether or not there is a cross-national convergence in the content of citizenship education courses. A group of studies has argued that change in citizenship education has been driven by exogenous factors rather than the internal dynamics of a country. Examining a cross-national dataset of social science courses between 1900 and 1986, Wong (1991) found that social science courses replaced national history and national geography courses and epitomised the decline of nationalism in curricula. Rauner (1998, 1999) conducted a cross-national longitudinal study drawing on civics education materials from 42 countries belonging to the period from 1955 to 1995. She found a transition from a national to a global model of civic education as evidenced by the increase in references to rights, global issues and the individual that she attributed to the effective role of UNESCO in the worldwide dissemination of new civic topics.

Moon (2009, 2013c) showed that the best predictor of the adoption of HRE was a country’s commitments to international human rights regimes. Countries with a high level of involvement in UNESCO’s efforts created more provision for HRE within their educational systems. Other studies highlight the effectiveness of international agencies, by identifying the preponderance of certain common themes in citizenship education (e.g. Bromley, 2009; Buckner & Russell, 2013; Meyer, Bromley, & Ramirez, 2010; Ramirez, Bromley, & Russell, 2009; Terra & Bromley, 2012).

Other qualitative studies maintain that national curricula are shifting from nationalist to post-national emphases as evidenced by the increasing references to diversity, human rights and global issues (e.g. Bromley, 2011; Soysal & Szakács, 2010; Soysal & Wong, 2007). These studies found an increase in the emphasis on human rights, global issues and diversity after the end of Cold War. They also found that militarist themes reduced and the historical narratives shifted to a new tone that foregrounds the socio-economic history of people, not that of rulers, military leaders and dynasties.

Another group of studies admitted the impact of exogenous factors with a caveat that local and national influences remain highly influential in the shaping of citizenship education curriculum. After presenting a detailed analysis of the evolution of social studies, Morris, Clelland, & Man (1997) argued that:

“Worldwide trends can provide both rhetoric and models for specific sorts of policy changes. At a micro level, however, conflict or competition among subgroups can modify or transform proposed changes, and the adoption and implementation of the changes are determined by a range of pragmatic considerations within schools (p. 43).”

Cardenas (2005) suggests that the cross-national adoption of HRE can be accounted for by the fact that HRE provides nation-states with a source of prestige, legitimacy and respectability in national and international communities. Nonetheless, she underlined that the tension between HRE and the priorities of state authorities may lead to largely symbolic changes that eventually engender a gap between the promotion and implementation of HRE.

Some studies examined changes in citizenship education policies in European contexts. They acknowledged the influence of international agencies, but concluded that citizenship education was still far from being a standardised and homogenous entity (Keating, 2009a, 2009b, 2014; Ortloff, 2005; Philippou, Keating, & Ortloff, 2009). Hahn (2008) eloquently posited that ‘civic education in particular serves as a wonderful window on a culture’ (pp. 4-5). Janmaat & Piattoeva (2007) and Piattoeva (2009, 2010) observed great variation in the curricula of the countries, which are members of the Council of Europe (CoE) and influenced by UNESCO’s projects, and concluded that the international agencies had limited influence.

Supporting this line of literature, a recent study found that nationalism was not diminished, but remained unchanged in 576 social science textbooks from 1955 to 2011 (Lerch, Russell, & Ramirez, 2017). This study de-
monstrated that the international convergence argument is not well-founded. It encouraged caution about cross-national generalisations.

3 Political Context
The founding leaders of modern Turkey established secular nationalism as the official ideology from 1923, and it enjoyed powerful legal and military protection (Göle, 2013). Whilst this official ideology eschewed diversity, from the 1990s, struggles for the recognition of ethnic and religious identities re-emerged in the region, having been frozen under communism during the Cold War. Two contrasting worldviews confronted each other. On the one hand, there was a rise of political Islamism, reclaiming a Turkish Islamic identity, and Kurdish separatism. On the other, secular nationalism grew in popularity amongst the urban middle classes using symbols associated with Atatürk such as his signature, image and aphorisms, to signal their attachment to the secular constitution and modern liberal values (Özyürek, 2006).

Secular nationalist groups are identified with modern values and use liberal western societies and the Republican era of Atatürk as the primary frame of reference to legitimise their group beliefs and behaviours (Bora, 2003). By contrast, those who embrace political Islamism use the religion of Islam, the Ottoman past and the Islamic golden era of the Prophet Muhammed as the primary frame of reference to justify their beliefs and behaviours. Secular nationalism holds that Turkish society is secular, modern and in the process of becoming a part of liberal western societies, whereas political Islamism envisions society with an emphasis on its Islamic past and status amongst other Muslim nations.

The 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey’s application for the EU membership was formalised, represents a turning point in the democratisation history of Turkey. During the post-Helsinki era, the Turkish Parliament passed democratisation reforms to meet the EU criteria for opening accession negotiations (Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2000). The balance of power between these ideologies changed considerably in the post-Helsinki era because the status of the military as the guardian of Atatürk’s legacy of secular nationalism and hence what Jenkins (2007) calls ‘the mystical embodiment of the Turkish nation’ had to be re-defined in order to meet the EU criteria (p. 354). Although the EU accession process required the military to relinquish its dominant role, leaders of the armed forces in fact applied pressure on the government to resist such EU demands. The tension between the government and the military was starkly revealed when the Deputy Prime Minister, fearing damage to the case for EU accession, blamed the military for afflicting Turkish politics with ‘national security syndrome’ by prioritising ‘the indivisible and secular character of the regime as more important than the need for democratic reform’ (Cizre-Sakalloğlu, 2003, pp. 213-214).

The EU accession process for a while provided a context for democratisation and limitations to military influence. Military judges were removed from the state security courts in 1999 (Jenkins, 2007). In October 2001, the composition of the National Security Council (NSC) was reconfigured by including the Justice Minister and Deputy Prime Minister thus increasing the proportion of civilian members (Hale, 2003). The state of emergency and effective military rule in some parts of southeast Turkey were repealed in 2002 (Müftüler-Baç, 2005). The death penalty was abolished, and the ban on broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was lifted.

The limitation of the military’s power provided an opening for political Islamism to prevail in the post-Helsinki period. A group of young Islamist politicians founded a new political party in 2001, the AKP, which came to power in 2002 following an extended period of coalition governments. Even though the military was alarmed by the AKP’s rise to power, the new political context was no longer favourable to military interventions (Jenkins, 2007). Indeed, unless the AKP pursued policies that were explicitly in contradiction with secular principles, known as laicism, the military was powerless to influence events.

In addition, the AKP, with its conciliatory rhetoric, used the EU integration reforms to reduce the role of the military (Tombuş, 2013). In the early years of the AKP government, none of the parties wanted to jeopardise Turkey’s chances of opening accession negotiations due for the Brussels summit in December 2004 (Jenkins, 2007). That said, it was not long before the AKP government’s enthusiasm for the EU waned (Öniş, 2008, 2009; Patton, 2007). The AKP developed an instrumental view of the EU accession process that enabled it to consolidate its power domestically (Usul, 2008). For example, the EU accession required reforming the National Security Council by reducing the frequency of meetings which limited the military’s contact with the cabinet (Müftüler Baç, 2005). These significant changes in restricting the military’s influence enabled the Islamist government to challenge the hard-line secularism that was the Kemalist legacy to the Turkish state.

4 Background of citizenship education reform
In Turkey, citizenship education courses were historically used in the service of promoting secular nationalism. Their status in the timetable and content changed according to the direction in which the dominant groups in power wished to take the country. The immediate responsiveness of citizenship education to the regime in power resulted from the fact that one centralised curriculum authority made all curricular decisions and approved all curricular materials in Turkey. Table 1 shows the names and dates of the citizenship education course, which have been taught since 1923:
The concept of citizenship first appeared in the title of the course in 1948 after the transition to multi-party democracy in 1946; human rights, in 1995; democracy, in 2010. The changing course titles are linked to the resurgence of democracy and human rights in the wake of the end of the Cold War, epitomised by the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993 (UNHCR, 1994).

In the single-party era (1923-1950), citizenship education courses promoted a monolithic national identity that relied on the ethno-cultural characteristics of Turkishness (İnce, 2012). The motto of the Republic, one language, one culture, and one ideal, was repeated, while the terms of citizen and Turk were used synonymously in textbooks (Çaymaz, 2008). After 1936, citizenship education took on a political role to create a social base for the single-party in power. Since the ruling party was identified with six principles, known as six arrows, the inclusion of those principles in citizenship education textbooks led Gülmez (2001) to call the version of citizenship after 1936 as ‘six-arrow citizenship’ (p. 218).

After the democratic transition of power to a new party in 1950, citizenship education textbooks included a new unit, entitled ‘Democracy’, in which the multi-party regime was positively presented (Çaymaz, 2008; İnce, 2012). One of the statements of Atatürk, ‘peace at home, peace in the world’, was included in textbooks, while some introduced a full text of the UDHR in their appendices (İnce, 2012). In this period, textbooks included an image of a woman wearing a headscarf and a modified definition of the concept of nation, whereby religion was counted as a constitutive element (Üstel, 2004). These changes were significant because the single party rule had eradicated all religious visibilities in education.

In 1985, citizenship education was reinstituted as a discrete subject again as one of the three courses replacing Social Studies was a course, entitled Citizenship Studies (Üstel, 2004). The objectives of Citizenship Studies included the term of ‘citizen’ on only one occasion. Citizenship Studies textbooks defined a nation as ‘a unity of language, religion, race, history and culture’ (p. 177). The inclusion of religion is significant constricting that religion had not been previously included in the definition.

After joining the UN Decade for Human Rights Education initiative in the 1990s, the MoNE changed the name of Citizenship Studies course to Citizenship and Human Rights Education. A programme for the course was announced in 1998 (MoNE, 1998). The longest unit of the programme which made up 30 per cent of the content was entitled the Elements of National Security and National Power (Gülmez, 2001). After identifying many human rights issues in textbooks, Gök (2004) concluded that ‘the main goal is to impose and indoctrinate a militarist and nationalist ideology under the pretext of international threat, terror, and animosity’ (p. 116). Similarly, Çayır and Gürkaynak (2008) pointed out that the textbooks promoted a ‘very particularistic, nationalistic, passive and authoritarian notion of citizenship’ (p. 56). Üstel (2004) found that the textbooks depicted religious nationalists as internal threats.

After examining citizenship textbooks, Çayır (2007) and Çayır & Bağlı (2011) concluded that an ethno-religious conception of national identity underpinned by a notion of assimilationist citizenship permeated textbooks. Investigating the evolution of the promoted notion of national identity in textbooks, Kancı (2009) concluded that the ethno-religious citizenship definition permeated textbooks in more subtle forms in the post-Helsinki era. A European Commission-funded project examining Turkish textbooks across the curriculum concluded that ‘the most serious problem observed in almost all textbooks is the underlying state-centered mentality that prioritises and indeed often sanctifies the state, the state authority, and national unity over the individual’s rights and freedoms’ (Tarba Ceylan, & Irzık, 2004, p. 3). The MoNE repealed the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course in 2005 with a promise that the content would be infused to the content of other courses.

5 Methodology
This research is based on an analysis of policy documents, interviews and textbooks. The Board of Education (BoE), the national curriculum authority, granted the first author access to make a photographic record of nearly 900 archival documents in September 2014. The first author made seventeen semi-structured interviews with key informants from September 2014 to October 2015. They included civil servants, philosophy and history teachers, curriculum designers, academics and the CoE educational experts. Of the seventeen interviewees, nine worked in the curriculum development committees for the citizenship education courses, two were civil servants, two were members of the BoE, one was CoE expert, one was EDC/HRE coordinator, one was a member of Turkey’s EU delegate team, and one was an NGO representative. The common characteristic of the interviewees was that they played a role in the evolution of citizenship education curriculum in the given period.

In addition to interviews and policy documents, we analysed the course’s textbooks (Çiftçi et al., 2001,
The curriculum reform in the pre-AKP period (1999-2002)

Turkey’s recognition as a candidate for EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit changed the official approach to reforming the militarised content of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course. The archival documents show that the Board of Education (BoE) gave a diplomatic response to the CoE invitation to participate in the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) initiative in the pre-Helsinki Summit period (BoE, January 14, 1997). This lukewarm response was an effect of the power struggle between the forces of the dominant ideologies before the 1997 coup. However, after the military suppressed the Islamist movement and the EU signaled its positive approach to Turkey’s membership at the 1998 Cardiff Summit (Müftüler Baç, 2005), the BoE began to express an interest in the EDC/HRE initiative discreetly at first (BoE, January 11, 1999) and then quite overtly following the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

An archival letter written by the head of the foreign relations directorate of the MoNE shows this change in the official approach (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate General for Cultural Affairs, February 18, 1999). The director wrote the letter after joining a meeting of the CoE’s Council for Cultural Co-operation (CDCC), that brought together state representatives, high-profile bureaucrats and NGO representatives to promote the CoE’s core principles (democracy, human rights, the rule of law) through education, culture and sports. In the letter, the director first gives introductory information about the administrative structure of the CDCC to show ways in which Turkey would participate in the works of CDCC more efficiently. The letter gives an impression that Turkey approaches the CoE to make a positive representation of itself, not primarily to collaborate on educational reforms.

Just as this archival document revealed that the MoNE’s engagement in the Europe-based educational projects was driven by the prospect of EU membership, one of the key informants underlined the same external source of motivation for the curriculum reform:

“For the first time, a ministry responsible for the EU is created under AKP rule. Now, we are talking about a country with this perspective and this ministry. When we hear Europe, the first thing that springs to our minds is a thoroughly-functioning judiciary. How is that possible? It is possible through democracy. Then, it needs to be addressed in the curricula, in the education system (Interviewee 9-Curriculum Designer, 1 September 2014).”

According to the interviewee, citizenship education reform is an educational effort to bring Turkey’s culture of democracy and human rights in line with European standards. There is a sense that it is only external pressure that motivates the introduction of democratic citizenship education. Similarly, Interviewee 10, who is also a curriculum designer, agreed that Turkey turned its face to the West at this time and that education policies were affected by this choice (September 1, 2014). The archival documents and interviewees’ accounts suggest a close association between the citizenship education reform in Turkey and the EU membership bid.

In 2000, a board member for the first time joined in the final conference of the first phase of the EDC/HRE initiative. This high-profile representation of Turkey in the meeting is another indication of the growing interest. After the conference, the board member reported that pupils should be given opportunities to practise democracy while teachers should be offered in-service training on democratic citizenship education. The report also emphasised the importance of school-society cooperation in
terms of providing a quality citizenship education (BoE, September 19, 2000).

In 2001, at the request of the CoE, the BoE appointed a national coordinator for the second phase of the EDC/HRE initiative (BoE, March 3, 2001). The appointed national coordinator joined the EDC/HRE activities, maintained correspondence and organised several efforts, including the formation of an EDC/HRE project group and advisory committee, the adoption of an EDC/HRE national plan and pilot implementations (BoE, August 2, 2001). The way in which the advisory committee was formed and the way in which the EDC/HRE project group held meetings manifested a concern to keep in line with the CoE’s recommendations. The EDC/HRE plan was developed with the contributions of 42 participants from various sectors. Two primary and two high schools were selected to pilot the materials (BoE, March 8, 2002). Interviewee 14, who was Turkey’s EDC/HRE coordinator and took part in the preparatory efforts, acknowledged the positive approach to the citizenship education reform:

“It was 2001 or so, efforts on democratic citizenship education began in the Board of Education, and sub-committees were formed (...) in that period, there were board members at the BoE who were dedicated to this business [citizenship education reform]. There were board members who were working diligently with a full effort (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015).”

Interviewee 14’s testimony corroborates evidence from the archival documents that the citizenship education reform was taken seriously in this period. Interviewee 15, who was a high-profile educational bureaucrat, described the efforts of this period as ‘in-depth’, ‘having philosophical depth’ and ‘well-established’ (August 4, 2015).

Following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, a Turkish EU Secretariat-General was created in 2000 to develop relations with the EU authorities and started work using the ‘Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance’ (IPA) framework. The IPA framework is intended for candidate countries to apply for financial assistance in realising integration reforms (European Union Ministry of Turkey, 2015). Although the EU acquis does not include a criterion concerning citizenship education, education was perceived as an instrument to meet the Copenhagen criteria in the Turkish case (Alexiadou, 2014; Keating, 2014). One of the interviewees, who worked in Turkey’s EU delegation team mentioned that they considered citizenship education as a tool to improve human rights and democracy in Turkey (Interviewee 13, July 6, 2015). This perspective on citizenship education paved the way for the preparation of an IPA project proposal on citizenship education in 2001 (BoE, September 27, 2002). In the following years, the official interest in the IPA project proposal served as a barometer that showed the level of interest in the citizenship education reform.

6 The curriculum reform in the AKP period (2002-2005)
The first appointee of the Islamist AKP government to head the BoE began work in March 2003. The archival documents show that the new administration was less enthusiastic towards collaboration with the CoE in respect of the EDC/HRE activities. After the new head came to the BoE, the last EDC/HRE activity report, which had been sent to the CoE in February 2003, was revised and re-sent in April 2003 (BoE, February 20, 2003; April 30, 2003). The differences between the old and revised versions show how the official interest in the curriculum reform changed under a new government.

The new version uses a formal and diplomatic language in informing the CoE about educational reforms (BoE, April 30, 2003). It does not include anything about the government’s democratisation agenda. It presents democratisation efforts in education as part of the implementation of the 2001-2005 Working Programme. The new report signals that the new administration intends to maintain the relationship with the CoE in a diplomatic manner.

After the second half of 2003, no EDC/HRE activity report was sent to the CoE. In August 2003, the BoE declined the CoE’s invitation of a representative to participate in an upcoming EDC/HRE initiative meeting (BoE, August 19, 2003). The BoE’s response to the draft of a CoE-sponsored study, All-European Study on Education for Democratic Citizenship Policies, shows an early symptom of this negative approach (BoE, June 27, 2003). One of the CoE experts who had been commissioned to review EDC/HRE policies of a group of countries including Turkey sent his draft to the BoE to receive comments. In response, the BoE criticised the CoE for including a topic entitled “The 1974 Coup and the Ensuing Turkish Invasion”.

In 2004, the BoE decided to appoint an academic as the new EDC/HRE national coordinator (BoE, May 10, 2004). Unlike the previous national coordinator, the new coordinator had not previously worked in the BoE:

“It is a job which you are supposed to do completely voluntarily (...) What I mean by this is that there is no financial profit from this job for me (...) It was an effort to show that (...) the name of our country is heard, something is being done in Turkey and some things are really done in Turkey (...) I want to underline that when I was appointed to the project, I could not reach any document, there was no information. I was not going there for decorative purposes. Someone from there told me, dear, this project is like a stillborn child, do not tire yourself too much (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015).”

The commissioning of an academic from outside the MoNE is indicative of the MoNE’s indifference to the EDC/HRE activities in this period. In fact, the interviewee clearly felt that it was a purely nominal or ‘decorative’ role and was shocked at the lack of cooperation from the civil servants even though the appointment was made by the education minister. The likening of the EDC/HRE project to ‘a stillborn child’ is highly suggestive of institutional indifference. The Interviewee’s account and the archival documents provide ample evidence of the declining interest in citizenship education reform after the AKP’s rise to power.
7 The revision of the main textbook

Previous researchers who analysed the course’s textbooks did not note that the different editions of the course’s main textbooks were different (Çayır, 2007; Çayır & Bağlı, 2011; Gök, 2004; Ince, 2012; Üstel, 2004). Our examination showed that the textbook content became subject to an ideological shift after the AKP came to power in 2002. Our line-by-line comparison revealed a discursive shift in the content of the course reflecting the alignment of the curriculum with the dominant ideology in power. For instance, the militaristic discourse denigrating the Kurdish people as an internal enemy who colludes with foreign enemies was toned down in the new series of the textbook:

The old version is based on a discourse that the people of the region where terror is rampant, which Turkish readers will recognise as the southeast region, are abetting and aiding terrorists. It blames the Kurdish people of the region for facilitating terrorism. This statement was replaced with a more neutral phrase in the new version which makes a general warning regarding terrorist organisations. The phrase ‘citizens’ becomes more inclusive, ‘our citizens’, and the phrase ‘terrorist/s’ becomes ‘terror organisations’. In this way, the new version is phrased as a piece of advice in contrast to the old version’s accusatory tone.

The new textbook also tones down ethnic-nationalist discourses. The following comparison illustrates this discursive shift:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
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<td>In some places, citizens’ not reporting terrorists, unconsciously hiding them as a guest, abetting them, providing their needs for food and dress led terror to thrive (Çiftçi et al., 2001 p. 69).</td>
<td>Our citizens should individually be sensitive to activities of terrorist organisations (Çiftçi et al., 2004, p. 63).</td>
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The old version attaches the attributes of secular nationalist groups to the whole of the Turkish nation. Some of the descriptors used in the old version like ‘fundamentalism [köktençilik], bigotry [taassup], backwards-looking [gerici], and pious [yobaz]’ were the pejoratives that were used to denigrate political Islamists. In the new version, the italic part is removed, and the characterization of the Turkish nation is made in a more inclusive way.

The old version of the textbook aimed to justify the anti-democratic measures of the 1997 coup, such as the headscarf ban. The new version reflects a discursive shift:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Turkish nation is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. The Turkish nation is respectful to its faiths, rejects fundamentalism, and does not like bigotry. It is neither backwards-looking nor pious. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious (p. 73).</td>
<td>The Turkish nation is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious (p. 66).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The old version aims to make students agree with the military impositions of the 1997 coup that people must respect the authorities and accept limitations on their freedom of conscience and religion. The new question conveys a message that education is a fundamental right, and no one should be deprived of the right to education under any circumstances. It may encourage students to question the still existing headscarf ban in schools.

Many parts of the previous version of the textbook depicting the army as the most vital institution are modified in the new version. The old version of the textbook presented weapons as a basic need, which is modified in the following way:

The old version of the textbook aimed to justify the anti-democratic measures of the 1997 coup, such as the headscarf ban. The new version reflects a discursive shift:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What would be the dangers [sakınclar] of people’s interpretation and practice of the freedom of conscience and religion in their own way? (p. 74).</td>
<td>Is the right to education a fundamental right for the enjoyment, improvement and protection of other rights? (p. 84).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the old version, the first quote from Atatürk presents Turkishness as an identity that can be adopted by everyone who says I am Turkish. However, this is contradicted by the second quote from Atatürk that implies that Turkishness is acquired by birth. By removing the italicised part of the old version and highlighting the last sentence, the new version eliminates the contradiction by focusing on the possibility of self-identifying as Turkish.

When political Islamists, who were referred to by derogatory expressions in the previous version of the textbook, came to power after 2002, the expressions used to denigrate them were wholly removed from the textbook. For instance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By saying ‘How happy is the one who says I am Turkish’, Atatürk expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish. This understanding shows unity in plurality [understanding] in our culture. Atatürk summed up his love of Turkishness for a society that was in the process of becoming a nation in the following way: ‘if there is something superb in my nature, it is my being born as Turkish.’ We should all be proud of our country and society. As Our Great Father advised, we should all work, be proud and trust (p. 76).</td>
<td>By saying ‘How happy is the one who says I am Turkish!’ Atatürk expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish (p. 68).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The new version subverts the discourse of the old version firstly by specifying a reason why mankind needed weapons, and secondly by getting rid of the part which compared the need for the weapon with the need for food and drink. The new version explains the need for weapons by highlighting a reason for it (protection and nutrition).

The old version of the textbook presented a glorified picture of the army. It included statements that can be construed as legitimising the military’s interferences with Turkey’s parliamentary democracy. The old version of the textbook also strongly promoted secular nationalism through adulation and veneration of Atatürk as an incontestable national hero. Atatürk’s aphorisms were included throughout the textbook. The following expressions exalting Atatürk were in the previous version: ‘the republic which Atatürk founded’ (p. 80), ‘Atatürk gave the Turkish citizens the Republic of Turkey as a present’ (p. 75) and ‘this duty [of protecting the Republic] assigned by Atatürk’ (p. 75). These phrases all disappeared in the new version. The following comparison illustrates the discursive shift in respect of Atatürk:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mankind needed weapons as much as food and drink since the first day of his existence (p. 68).</td>
<td>Mankind has needed weapons to hunt animals in nature or benefit from them since the first day of his existence (p. 62).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The old version overlooks women’s agency, instead glorifying Atatürk’s contribution. It portrays the progressive reforms regarding women’s rights as Atatürk’s personal success. The new version recognises women’s agency in gaining their rights and de-emphasizes the personal role of Atatürk. It links the progress in women’s rights to women’s ‘heroic acts’ in the War of National Independence. The last statement of the old version is expressed in an active form to highlight the role of Atatürk, whereas the same statement is expressed in a passive form in the new version, which breaks the tie of dependency between ‘opening up new horizons for Turkish women’ and Atatürk’s leadership. The backgrounding of Atatürk’s role and removal of discourses exalting Atatürk are manifestations of the changing balance of power at the time of the EU integration drive.

8 The repeal of the citizenship education course

In spite of the revised textbook that introduced some religious discourses to the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course, the ruling AKP decided to repeal the citizenship courses in 2005 (MoNE, 2005). An informant revealed that after the course was abolished, the BoE turned down the EU’s offer to start the implementation of the IPA project in 2005 on the grounds that this was an external rather than a national project:

“The head of the Board of Education rejected it by saying ‘We do not need a course which will be taught as a result of an imposition from outside, we are successfully teaching it as cross-disciplinary subject, we do not do business by incultation from outside’. With this idea, he rejected the project and whatever that would come with the project (Interviewee 5-Curriculum Designer, September 2, 2014).”

However, the removal of the citizenship and human rights education course required governmental support because the BoE sits within the MoNE, under the education minister who is part of the Government. Since the head and members of the BoE board are appointed by a tripartite decree of the prime minister, education minister and president (MoNE, 2012), the removal of the citizenship education courses and the dismissal of the EU’s offer for the IPA project were not simply decisions of the head of the BoE.

Arguably, the demise of citizenship and human rights education was an effect of the dominant ideology in power which considers citizenship education as a way of the adoption of European values. In Turkey, political Islamist circles make a distinction between scientific advances and the moral values of Europe. They tolerate the adoption of scientific and technological elements but are careful to abstain from the adoption of moral values (AKP Program, 2002). At the same time, there was a worsening of Turkey-EU relations following the 2004 Brussels Summit, which took its toll on the citizenship education reform.

9 Discussion

This study reveals that the EU reforms facilitated the ideological shift in the citizenship education curriculum by contributing to changing the balance of power between secular and religious nationalism. Changing government priorities have been shown to influence citizenship education in other contexts. Parker (2004) noted a close association between dominant ideologies and citizenship education in Palestine, Brazil, Israel, the United States and South Africa. Davies & Chong (2016) found that the formation of a Conservative-led government led to less emphasis on human rights and the positive representation of the monarchy in citizenship education in England. Soysal & Wong (2007) found that after the socialists came to power in France, ‘ample space is devoted to substantiate and prescribe plurality and tolerance as corrective measures to racism and dis-criminalisation’ (p. 83). In South Korea, after the transition to a democratic system, citizenship education textbooks began to
mention women, workers, immigrants/refugees, indigenous peoples and sexual minorities (Moon, 2013a).

The present study challenges the main argument of previous studies that there is a cross-national transition from nationalist to post-nationalist forms of citizenship education (e.g. Bromley, 2009; Meyer, Bromley, & Ramirez, 2010; Moon, 2013; Ramirez, Bromley, & Russell, 2009; Ramirez, Suarez, & Meyer, 2007; Rauner, 1999; Soysal & Schissler, 2004). Unlike these studies, we found that Turkish citizenship education curriculum remained essentially national. References to human rights, diversity and global issues were largely tokenistic since they were evoked only in the context of other countries not Turkey itself.

In this respect, this study shows that curriculum change cannot be explained without taking into consideration the local and national influence (e.g. Cardenas, 2005; Keating, 2009a; Levinson, 2004, 2005; Morris et al., 1997; Ortloff, 2005). The ways in which human rights were instrumentalised in the power struggle showed that the gatekeepers of the citizenship education curriculum in Turkey were still nationalist actors in the given period. Even though these gatekeepers had been exposed to transnational educational discourses, their aim was to serve their group interest in the ongoing power struggle. In fact, the first (pre-AKP) textbooks contained militarist and exclusionary discourses targeting the Kurdish people and religious nationalists. What was called human rights education in Turkey had little in common with international standards. In this sense, this study found that the international agencies had a limited and largely symbolic impact, while the underlying discourses kept favouring those in power.

10 Conclusion
Since the government-controlled curriculum development system in Turkey reflects the dominant ideologies in power, it is not surprising to record the rise and fall of the citizenship and human rights education course. The pre-AKP part of the post-Helsinki era saw a series of preparatory efforts undertaken in collaboration with the CoE, but no tangible change in the militarised curriculum of the course. Under AKP rule, the transition of power from secular nationalism to political Islamism created opportunities for the curriculum reform. Since the AKP government wished to replace militaristic discourses in education, it reinforced a reform rhetoric that the EU membership requires to re-design the curriculum.

Since the AKP’s ideology of political Islamism disputed the discourses of secular nationalism and European norms and values, the MoNE repealed the citizenship education courses and abandoned the reform agenda in 2005. Under AKP rule, even though the BoE was interested in removing militarist perspectives from the citizenship education curriculum, it was reluctant to introduce democratic citizenship education. The evolution of citizenship education went in parallel with the changing configuration of the balance of power, which left its discursive traces in the citizenship education curriculum.

In 2010, the MoNE introduced a new course, named Citizenship and Democracy Education (MoNE, 2010). Çayır’s (2011) research highlighted that the new course was ‘still based on Turkishness with a single language and a single culture’ (p. 27). This course too was repealed 2 years later with the announcement of a new timetable for middle schools (MoNE, 2012a). The 2012 timetable increased the weekly course hours of middle schools to 36, but did not include a citizenship course. It preserved the compulsory religious education course (two hours per week) besides introducing three new Islamic education courses (each one two hours per week). From 2012 onwards, eighth-grade students have been enabled to take an unprecedented eight-hours Islamic education courses per week out of 36 total weekly hours. It appears that the AKP government sacrificed citizenship education to make more room for Islamic education courses.

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Endnotes

1 The first Citizenship and Human Rights Education textbook, based on the programme of study of the course, was first published in 1999. Previous textbooks were based on the revised programme of study of Citizenship Studies course.

2 To avoid repetition, the excerpts from the textbooks are cited with only a page number.
Mary Anne Rea-Ramirez, Tina M. Ramirez

Changing Attitudes, Changing Behaviors. Conceptual Change as a Model for Teaching Freedom of Religion or Belief*

- Children need a framework to understand freedom of religion or belief (FORB) as a fundamental human right to prevent intolerance and radicalization.
- Currently there are limited educational programs especially on this freedom.
- Conceptual change theory and strategies have not been widely used in teaching about the social sciences, and not at all in teaching about human rights.
- Teachers showed positive conceptual change in knowledge and ideologies, increased empathy for others whose beliefs were different than their own, and were able to implement the content of the training within their classrooms.

Purpose: The purpose is to demonstrate that conceptual change theory and strategies can be applied to areas of the social science, such as human rights education on FORB.

Design/methodology/approach: The theoretical scope of this paper is conceptual change theory and is intended to introduce the theory and practice of conceptual change in teaching about FORB in social sciences and how it was used in training teachers.

Findings: Conceptual change theory and strategies were found to be effective in teaching about FORB.

Practical implications: This study introduces the use of conceptual change theory and strategies in teaching about human rights.

Keywords: Conceptual change, dissonance, freedom of religion or belief, human rights, violent extremism, tolerance, empathy

1 Introduction

Religion-related conflict is prevalent throughout many areas of the world, and is particularly acute in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. However, it has most recently exhibited itself through violent extremist acts in countries such as France, Belgium, Great Britain and the United States. Across the MENA region, religion-related conflict often disproportionately affects smaller faith communities, dissenters within the majority religion, and faith communities who do not hold political power, threatening religious pluralism and freedom. When left unchecked, the religious dimension of conflict incites social hostility and can lead to further government restrictions on the freedom of religion or belief that leave countries vulnerable to violent extremism, threatening a nation’s security and it’s viability as a diverse, stable and democratic society. Recent work, however, has provided substantial evidence of the impact that education and training programs in this area of human rights can have in combatting religious intolerance and violence in the world (Rea-Ramirez, 2017).

With the growing prevalence of religion-related conflict globally, individuals are increasingly confronted with ideas that fuel misconceptions, fears, and intolerance about those who believe differently than them. Such ideas are fed by a lack of knowledge, active engagement with, and empathy for people of different beliefs, and are often reinforced through families, communities, social networks, and political leaders. Children are particularly vulnerable to the ideas of intolerance and hate that lead to violent extremism and need a framework to understand freedom of religion or belief as a fundamental human right in order to become resilient to such ideas and know how to respond to them out of a value for people regardless of what they believe. However, currently there are very limited educational programs for children on the human right to freedom of religion or
belief, as articulated in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Teachers are often unprepared to address sensitive religious issues and resistance often exists within institutions that attempt to teach about religion. Additionally, while there are some limited educational tools to teach about the US Constitution’s First Amendment protection for religious liberty, human rights education on the freedom of religion or belief has never been developed fully in both US and international arenas. The first curricula developed in this area of human rights was designed by Tina Ramirez in 2006 and subsequently expanded through the author’s collaboration with the Tony Blair Faith Foundation in 2014. At the United Nations, the only curriculum related to this area of human rights focuses on freedom of thought and does not discuss religion or belief. In 2007, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe published the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching About Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools, however the Guidelines were not prescriptive. Education in the freedom of religion or belief is particularly needed at this time to make progress addressing intolerance, violent extremism and other related issues. This is especially true for countries in the MENA where children have been particularly affected by violent extremism, both directly and indirectly, and need to learn how to cope with the ideas of intolerance and hate they are confronted with in a way that helps them become resilient to those ideas and able to break the cycle of violence that permeates their region. It is also true for immigrant communities who are unfamiliar with the international norms related to freedom of religion or belief, as many fled from countries with the worst records on this freedom. This often causes dissonance within local communities when attempting to integrate immigrants. Community members are often unable to share their values for freedom appropriately because they have never been taught how.

Recently there has been a move among governments and experts from focusing on countering violent extremism to more preventive strategies that decrease the likelihood of radicalization. In addition, recognition of the need to address children who are reintroduced into communities and schools after experiencing radicalization requires that new measures be taken to address the subsequent problems. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy has stressed that education must be a key strategy in this endeavor (Fink, et al 2013). At the first UNESCO International Conference on the Prevention of Violent Extremism Through Education: Taking Action (2016), leaders stated that, ‘it requires addressing controversial issues in a responsible way, in and out of school through formal and non-formal education, and ensuring that education systems, as a whole, are mobilized and equipped to face the challenge.’ The keynote speaker at the conference, Soo-Hyang Choi stressed that the single most important thing that education needed to do was to foster inclusion and dignity (2016).

Initiatives for combatting intolerance are urgently needed. Since behaviors of intolerance are often based on deeply held misconceptions and fears of people who hold different beliefs, strategies of conceptual change theory, most often found in science education, were considered as a possible way to introduce freedom of religion or belief (FORB) education into one area of the social sciences. Therefore, a curriculum was introduced by a US based NGO (Hardwired) in the Middle East and North Africa on FORB based conceptual change theory. Analysis of this process and effect has allowed a deeper look at the process of conceptually moving from actions based on inherent beliefs and ideologies to new models of conceptual understanding that may enhance tolerance and empathy toward people of different religions and beliefs, including those with no religion or belief. Hardwired’s programs with civil society leaders had previously shown how effectively FORB education helped communities create a framework to address the fears and misconceptions they have of one another, reconcile their beliefs with the new friendships they make, learn how to articulate and defend the rights of others, and mitigate the ideologies that have fomented hatred and intolerance. Hardwired collected and developed a list of the most common misconceptions about the religious other and about the freedom of religion or belief often heard from people in countries throughout Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. Building on this work with civil society leaders and the collected misconceptions, the curriculum was designed in the hope of bringing about conceptual changes in the way individuals view the rights and freedoms of others and reconcile those ideals to their own beliefs. Conceptual change is not about changing someone’s religion or culture; rather, it is meant to help individuals develop new ways of understanding their religion and culture compared to the universal standard of freedom of religion or belief. Levinowitz (2015) stated:

“You can think a religious belief is wrong without being intolerant. Tolerance is not synonymous with ‘believing someone else is right’. It is a virtue that allows you to coexist with people whose way of life is different from your own without throwing a temper tantrum, or a punch.”

It was expected that this training program would give teachers and their communities the tools necessary to advance freedom of religion or belief while at the same time combat religious extremism and the intolerance and violence it spreads. The training is meant to transform their perspective about the importance of freedom of religion or belief as a critical linchpin for all other freedoms and the particular challenges facing their communities. It is the eventual goal to foster peaceful, pluralistic communities, communities where minority faith groups and those who chose to have no particular belief, not only co-exist within the larger majority communities but also maintain their own faith identities, values and practices. Pre-post gains after instruction using the curriculum described in this paper, based on conceptual change, showed a P value equaling 0.0012 for change in
knowledge and attitudes about FORB. By conventional criteria, this difference is considered to be very statistically significant. However, it is not the intent of this paper to provide the detailed methodology or analysis of data, but to present conceptual change theory as a possible vehicle within the social sciences to effect individuals’ knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes about FORB through a program to train teachers in religious literacy. It will, therefore, focus on the role conceptual change could play in designing and implementing curriculum that could have a positive effect in the field. Within the social sciences, FORB education is one of the more difficult human rights to teach because of the strong emotional attachment individuals have to deeply embedded beliefs that orient an individual’s life to an external purpose or reality. Study of these belief structures and how they may change though use of conceptual change strategies is, therefore, considered a fruitful and sound activity.

2 Conceptual change theory

Conceptual Change refers to the development of new ways of thinking and understanding of concepts, beliefs, and attitudes (Rea-Ramirez, 1998). This occurs through restructuring elements of existing concepts, but goes beyond just revising one’s ideologies to actually restructure the underlying concepts used to develop those beliefs. The concept and theory of conceptual change has its basis in Piaget’s early work in cognitive development and Khun’s work in the history of science (Rea-Ramirez, Clement, Nunez-Oviedo, 2008). Piaget’s work was not focused on finding errors in conceptions or deficiencies in reasoning held by children, but rather on how that reasoning came about. In this context, Piaget attempted to “describe their shared meanings and the processes by which they constructed meaning from their experiences (Halldén, Scheja, & Haglund, 2013”). He wanted to find out what the underlying structures were that allowed the development or acceptance of certain conceptions. However, while early work in conceptual change was strongly based on Piaget’s cognitive constructivism, it favored what is called the Alternative Framework model. This model did focus on the erroneous nature of conceptions and strategies to unlearn them. Later diSessa and Sherin (1998) proposed viewing conceptual change as “shifting the means of seeing” (p1171), focusing on the processes that take place in forming concepts. Similarly, the “positive pedagogy” suggested by Halldén, Scheja, and Haglund (2013) also changes the focus of conceptual change to the potential for learning. This is accomplished through the exploration of opportunities as the learner interacts with the content and with others (Halldén, Scheja, and Haglund, 2013).

Conceptual change theory has been strongly used in the study of learning in science and math (Champagne, Klopter, & Gunstone, 1983; Clement, 2008; Love, 2015; Nersessian, 2007; Nussbaum & Novick 1982; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Smith, 2010; Vosniadou, 2002). It has more recently been extended to other fields such as linguistics, but only weakly in the social sciences (Ranney, & Clark, 2016; Wade, 2012). According to Lundholm and Davies (2013) use of conceptual change theory in the social sciences has been under-researched when compared to the extensive research in the sciences. It is said to be “an emergent field in which theoretical perspectives are under construction and the evidence base is fragmentary (Lundhol and Davies 2013)”. However, there have been several studies conducted primarily in the areas of environmentalism and economics that give insights into the benefits and pitfalls of using conceptual change strategies. We will discuss these in more detail later.

Conceptual change theory posits that individuals come to a learning situation, whether formal, informal, or just in time teaching, with preconceptions. These preconceptions may be so embedded that traditional methods of teaching do not effectively challenge those preconceptions or have the effect of allowing for co-existing conceptions. As a result, they may respond with what is considered the answer for the test and, at the same time, maintain the original preconception about for every day use. Hewson and Hewson (1992) suggest, “When two competing conceptions both exist in the mind of an individual student, the relative status of each idea will determine which idea the student chooses to adopt.” David Ausubel (1968, pvi) stressed that, “The most important single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows.” Recognizing that individuals come to any new learning situation with prior knowledge and deeply embedded beliefs and attitudes is essential to engaging on the path to conceptual change. Strategies to address these preconceptions are needed to challenge deeply held beliefs and help students consider alternatives.

Recognizing prior conceptions, therefore, is the starting point for evaluating and challenging those ideas rather than attempting to impress on the individual what he or she should believe. Conceptual change requires that individuals first recognize prior conceptions, that they are confronted with challenging activities that cause dissonance with their prior models, that they make adaptations to those models based on new ideas, or build new models, and that they test those models in authentic situations. This is accomplished in very small cycles of criticism and revision, and occurs best in situations where the participants co-construct understanding through sharing differing knowledge, experiences and beliefs (Clement, 2008; Jeong & Chi, 1997; Khan, 2008; Rea-Ramirez, & Nunez, 2008).

Individuals develop preconceptions or alternative conceptions and beliefs over their lifetime and omit that these cannot be dispelled or changed through a lecture or a few activities (Driver, 1983, p41). Participants need time to think about and visualize through activities such as drawing to learn, analogies, role-play, case studies, and discrepant questioning, what they already know and believe, and then to work in groups to give explanations for what they believe. One step in conceptual change is experiencing some form of cognitive dissonance—an internal state of tension that arises when an existing conceptual system fails to account for integration of or
acceptance of new information (Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1962; Gawronski, 2012; Graham, 2007; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Levy, 2015; Rea-Ramirez, 2008). This dissonance, the second step in the conceptual change cycle, may be strong in that it represents an explicit, strong incompatibility between a belief and another’s belief, or weak where there is a mild sensed discrepancy but enough to feel the need to consider another idea, belief or attitude (Rea-Ramirez, 2008). The idea is to help the individual recognize that their prior conception either does not completely explain the concept or situation, or is incompatible with that of others.

Although experiencing dissonance can indicate to participants that a conceptual problem exists, the dissonance in itself will not solve the problem. This takes active construction of understanding of alternative concepts, ideas, or beliefs. In order for the dissonance to be beneficial and lead to conceptual change, participants need to be given time to: identify and articulate their preconceptions; investigate the soundness and utility of their own ideas and those of others; and, reflect on and reconcile differences in those ideas. Student groups and students and teacher need to co-construct alternative or modified conceptions (Rea-Ramirez, 2008). Since conceptual change occurs in small steps, rather than large leaps, it is not expected that teachers or students would make major conceptual changes after just one lesson. Rather it is through repeated small cycles of criticism and revision.

Construction of new ways of knowing also requires social co-constructive of understanding working in groups that include individuals with different kinds of expertise and that encourage challenging of ideas (Vygotsky, 1978; Rea-Ramirez, 2008). The facilitator and others in the groups help to create reflective discourse that allows individuals to consider their beliefs and knowledge and to evaluate whether it is effective in light of other models. As Smith (2017) states, “Such discourse probes for alternative views, encourages the clarification, negotiation, and elaboration of meanings, the detection of inconsistencies, and the use of evidence and argument in deciding among or integrating alternative views.”

Applying Conceptual Change in the Social Sciences

In the social sciences most application of the conceptual change model has occurred in economics and environmental issues such as climate change. Murphy and Alexander (2008, p. 597) believed that was due to the fact that misconceptions in biology or physics were easier to identify whereas in the social sciences it was more difficult to establish what was correct or valid. Lundholm and Davies (2015) suggested assigning a better or worse designation of conceptions individuals hold in the social sciences. They suggest, however, that little in the literature indicates that studies in economics or environmental phenomena have examined the process involved as conceptual change occurs (Lundholm & Davies, 2013). Rather, as in the early work on conceptual change in science, evidence has been gathered about what different conceptions exist. Additionally, while there is emerging evidence that actual experience has a strong effect on shaping conceptions about what is considered ‘normal’ in society (e.g., Davies & Lundholm, 2012; Philip, 2011), Lundholm and Davies (2013) suggest that, in contrast to looking at what is, looking at what ought to be requires a stronger sense of self. These issues may not exist to as high a degree in the sciences. In this regard, Murphy and Alexander (2008) state that “the conceptual change literature remains in need of a more developmental perspective (p. 597),” along with study on how prior models or initial conceptions are formed (Vosniadou, 2013).

As we have discussed previously, however, work in conceptual change in the sciences does not necessarily hold that a concept must be right or wrong, better or worse, or even scientifically correct, but rather that conceptions may be on a continuum from naive to sophisticated or expert (Gopnik & Schulz, 2004; Rea-Ramirez & Nunez-Oviedo, 2008; Vosniadou et al., 2008). Hardy et al. (2006) divided these different levels of conceptions as misconceptions, everyday conceptions and scientific concepts or scientific explanations. Whatever terminology is used, it appears that conceptual understanding develops along a continuum rather than in black and white or right and wrong as was seen in Alternative Framework held by many early conceptual change researchers. This may help to explain why the social sciences have been slow to adopt conceptual change as a strategy as many feel that the social sciences involve more gray areas related to phenomena, human decisions, beliefs, and values (Davies, 2006).

Just as in the sciences, where individuals base their knowledge and beliefs initially on observations and experiences, it is the same in many areas of the social sciences. In economics this may be seen in studying economic phenomena where choice, beliefs, and values are very different than studying a scientific concept such as mechanics (Lundholm and Davies, 2013). In other areas of social science such as human rights, individuals’ knowledge and beliefs may occur as direct exposure to intolerance and even violence, or to erroneous teaching and behaviors of those around them. Both teachers and students may not see the need to change their beliefs or attitudes when, as in the sciences, these conceptions have served them well to explain how their world works.

Gregoire (2003) introduces another facet of conceptual change that may affect the use of the theory in teaching the social sciences. That is, some concept areas in social science evoke such a strong emotion that it affects whether a person even considers changing a belief. In Gregoire’s model of teacher belief change, anxiety and fear of a suggested different way of teaching a concept may cause the teacher to see the suggested change as a threat and not engage in conceptual change. This may also occur in students where the concept change is so great, or dissonant, that they shut down to further engagement.

When we consider the use of the conceptual change model in a highly sensitive area of study such as human rights, and specifically, freedom of religion or belief, we may be very much in this area of high emotion.
Individuals then have to decide whether to engage in looking at their preconceptions and decide whether to challenge them, or whether they will not participate because it is too emotionally charged. In the area of climate change teaching, Lombardi and Sinatra (2013) found that negative emotions actually decreased the teachers’ ability to adequately weigh the evidence and decide whether factors were affecting the climate. Even where emotions are low, however, teachers and their students may find that the status they give to their beliefs is so strong they do not see a need to change them. In this instance, if a change in the concept or belief is important enough to need to undergo change, they may need help to recognize that change is needed. This is consistent with the ideas of Hewson and Hewson (1992) that the relative status of beliefs will affect which belief the individual holds on to. This is especially true in the area of teaching about FORB where not just emotions, but deeply embedded traditions affect the strength of beliefs.

Using Conceptual Change Theory to Teach About FORB

Introduction to the Professional Development Training

In the years 2015-2017 a series of trainings were held in multiple countries of the Middle East. This included teachers from Iraq, Morocco, and Lebanon. The training of teachers consisted of two major parts, conceptual learning on freedom of religion or belief, including Article 18 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and learning about effective pedagogy based on conceptual change to teach FORB. The following major concepts were included in the training as they are considered to be central to understanding and fostering conceptual resiliency and lead to prevention of intolerance and social hostility toward religious communities and those who have differing views.

- Non-discrimination: Every person has the same right to believe and practice their beliefs by nature of their common and inherent human dignity and require equal protection under the law, especially women, children, minorities, atheists, dissenters, and adherents of non-traditional or new religions.
- Conscience: The spiritual dimension of human life is provided special protection because it is where ideas, beliefs, and convictions about religious truth, morality, and life after death are explored and shape how we live; individuals within a religious community define the scope of their beliefs.
- Changeability: Every person is born with a conscience free to explore eternal truths and change their beliefs as they grow; religion or belief is changeable and no one can be forced to adopt a religion or belief; it is not an immutable characteristic like race or gender and individuals can choose not to have one.
- Individual right: Individuals hold the right to freedom of religion or belief, but this right also protects the individual’s right to practice their beliefs within a religious community and to dissent from the community; it also protects the right of parents to teach their children their religion.
- Public and Private: Religious beliefs are formed within the human conscience and influence how individuals act or express themselves publicly in accordance with their conscience and sense of religious obligation.
- Expression: Individuals have a right to practice their religion in various ways, including those most common among all religions, in order to fulfill their personal obligations of worship by acting in accordance with their conscience and beliefs; this includes right to share their beliefs with others.
- Limitations: There are no limits on what people may believe but there are limits on how they express their beliefs; religious expressions that violate the rights of others are not protected and there are times the government may need to limit expression to protect public safety, order, health or morals.

The initial trainings took place over five days. Follow up video conferences were then held throughout the months following to support the teachers in lesson plan development and in teaching on FORB in their own classrooms. A second training session took place three months after the initial training to revisit and extend learning with the teachers.

Based on the belief that conceptual change takes place along a continuum, the program to equip teachers to teach about FORB was designed to facilitate religious literacy with a change in knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes from naive conception to sophisticated. Figure 1 shows the conceptual understanding and beliefs at each level. It describes what one would expect an individual with naive, intuitive, developed, or sophisticated knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs to use in a given situation. It is not expected that every element at one level is either expressed or expressed at a single time. Some individuals may hold beliefs that cross two levels as they are struggling with new understanding. Each move from Naïve (level 1) to Intuitive/Developing (level 2) to Developed/Thoughtful (level 3) to Sophisticated/Insightful (level 4) indicates a conceptual change.

The nature of the FORB educational model is one that revisits the major concepts over time. This allows participants to struggle with the concept, adapt their model and then test that model in new circumstances before going on to another criticism revision cycle.
Use of conceptual change strategies in FORB training

To facilitate conceptual change during the program, trainers facilitated discussions and used simulations to introduce new information and perspectives that led participants to discover the universal standard of freedom of religion or belief as a human right for all. Throughout the training, teachers engaged in interactive activities in small groups where ideas were exchanged and challenged. Active engagement was believed necessary to accomplish the goal of pluralism. Trainers used discrepant questioning and open-ended prompts to address the conceptual changes they observed, incorporating into the program traditions and customs of the community, beliefs and attitudes, communal grievances, and possible conflicts. At times, the training presented information that challenged preconceived ideas, or revealed biases and misperceptions that created discomfort. This exchange often led to cognitive dissonance between members of the group as their experiences, knowledge, and beliefs differ. There were also personal, social and motivational processes particularly involved in conceptual change surrounding FORB. These include personal courage, confidence in one’s abilities, openness to alternatives, willingness to take risks, and deep commitment solving the problem.

The facilitators used research-based tools and instructional techniques to assist participants in understanding new concepts as they challenge old models. They assist participants in co-constructing deeper understanding outside their own initial beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge. Strategies such as analogical reasoning, role-play, and simulations, allow the participants to creatively extend, combine, and modify existing ideas and beliefs by constructing and testing new models of understanding.

Students then need opportunities to apply their new/revised models in authentic situations. This is accomplished in repeated cycles of criticism and revision through analysis of scenarios, role-plays, and other activities. At the end of the trainings with civil society leaders, a major component of Hardwired’s program was to assist participants in developing strategies and projects that they would then take back to their community to engage others in helping to solve the problem of intolerance, mistrust, and radicalization through directed action. Similarly, teachers developed lessons to share with their students following the training. It is through repeated applications of the new model that teachers were able to not only influence change, but also refine and solidify their own understanding of freedom of religion or belief and how they can impact long term change. Teachers constructed new lessons in their discipline whether it was science, math, literature, social science, or art to use in their own classrooms and to share with other teachers. These lessons are all based on conceptual change and rely on conceptual change strategies. For the students who they teach, application is made through on the spot scenarios, as well as extended community-based projects.

Conceptual change process and evidence

The conceptual change model used in this training consisted of three major parts, accessing prior concepts, criticism and revision, and application and evaluation. These cycles were revisited many times throughout the workshop to help all participants to move slowly through small steps in changing knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs. To provide a description and evidence of the use of conceptual change we will step through one particular activity, a simulation referred to as Sanctuary Island that was used along with other interactive activities. Throughout the engagement in the activities, not only were misconceptions addressed, but also new concepts of freedom of religion or belief such as the nature of humanity, human dignity, and the universality of freedom of religion or belief, and international law on freedom of religion or belief were introduced. These presented additional concepts that stimulated discussion.
and challenged participants’ knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes.

The Sanctuary Island activity was divided into three parts with three learning outcomes. The outcomes were broad and required many steps of criticism and revision to demonstrate competency. These included:

- Participants will be able to identify with an oppressed group, and verbalize their fears and misconceptions concerning freedom of religion or belief.
- Participants will construct a solution for how diverse groups can live together in peace without violence.
- Participants will construct a set of agreed upon rules of behavior that reflect knowledge of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

5 Accessing prior conceptions

The concepts of freedom of religion or belief and the international law protecting that freedom were introduced first through a series of activities that helped teachers access their prior conceptions, including misconceptions, fears, and attitudes about this human right. This included a major simulation called “Sanctuary Island” in which participant groups took on the role of different fruit groups. Throughout the simulation, trainers facilitated discussion of the international law and other concepts of FORB to help participants make connections between what they were doing in the simulation and the basic concepts.

Hardwired had found through conducting this activity previously with other adult groups, that assigning groups different faith identities presented a set of issues that may have retarded the conceptual change process. That is, some individuals were unable to let go of their own strong identity with their faith group to imagine what someone else would think or feel. For this reason, the idea of using fruit allowed members of the group to design their identity and area of oppression, while relieving some of the initial resistance, which improved participation and discourse about the nature of religion or belief. By determining how they were oppressed, participants were able to have a more vibrant discussion about the nature of violations of freedom of religion or belief in subsequent lessons. It ultimately allowed individuals to engage more fully and therefore fostered conceptual change.

The fruit groups were initially asked to develop their identity as an oppressed group. This was intended to encourage participants to identify fears and misconceptions by projection onto their new identity. This generation of identities actually allowed teachers to access their own prior conceptions while taking on the character outside themselves. This may have acted to decrease the emotion connected with the experiences and allowed them to engage more fully in the conceptual change process. Common misconceptions in FORB that emerged included:

1. Others are bad they may hurt us because we are different;
2. Ideas and values taught in religious schools, even when the information is false, is considered true and should be acted upon;
3. Freedom of religion is about changing religion not about human rights;
4. To accept ones own faith is to not acceptance other religions, customs, symbols, and religious differences;
5. Minorities should not be given a space to share their story;
6. Others will not listen to me because I am different.
7. Everyone in our community is tolerant. We each live in our separate groups.

While misconceptions appeared during this time, an attempt was not made to immediately replace misconceptions with the accepted belief or attitude, as this rarely has lasting conceptual change effect. The simplest misconceptions can be dealt with immediately such as what occurred with the fruit groups when they challenged each other during their presentation of the groups’ identities. This also lays the groundwork for the more complex misconceptions that will be addressed later in the training, or for some in subsequent trainings. While not drawing attention to right or wrong suggestions at this time, the facilitator made note of all major conceptions, whether misconceptions or naïve, on posters in front of the class so that as groups struggle with the concepts they could later revisit the list and begin to identify for themselves, with support from the facilitator, ones that they are now ready to address or change.

6 Criticism and revision cycles

Once prior conceptions were visualized and discussed, the simulation proceeded with all groups fleeing their country of origin and ending up on an island where now they were faced with survival among some of the very fruit they had escaped. This began the next phase of the conceptual change cycle in which teachers challenged and criticized prior models and suggested new conceptual understanding. For example, when presented with the notion that the island was small and not all areas had all resources the fruit groups needed to survive, participants had to think about how they would react in this new situation. Many might be afraid when they learn that fruit that represent their oppressors are on the island also. But now they were all on the island and needed to find a way to survive. This brought out their misconceptions and fears and suggested similarities to their own schools and communities. Indeed, when fruit groups were then asked to decide what they would do to survive, many said they would isolate themselves. This seems to be consistent to what many experienced in their own communities where there is isolation and discrimination among faith groups. Again concepts of FORB were introduced to help participants make connections between the situations in the simulation and the reality of FORB in the community and schools.

They were then challenged with the question, if the easiest solution does not work, then what would you do? This was intended to cause dissonance and to lead to co-
construction of new ways of thinking about freedom of religion or belief. If prior ways of believing and coping do not fit a new situation, in the conceptual change cycle, learners must struggle with uncertainty, and even discomfort, to come up with new ways of thinking. Throughout these criticism and revision cycles dissonance was essential to help participants recognize where fears and misconceptions about others was preventing them from building pluralistic communities.

Along with the three major stages of Sanctuary Island, three other activities were introduced to enhance learning about FORB and to challenge participants to engage more deeply in challenging their prior concepts. These were the Tree of Intolerance, Tree of Pluralism, and Galileo activities. Each explored facets of freedom of religion or belief that participants later incorporated into their decisions in Sanctuary Island. This was important as it takes many small cycles of revisiting certain concepts to help students struggle with the ideas and negotiate change. One activity is not enough to help the student move through the different levels of dissonance and construction. Breaking the learning down into small pieces has been referred to as model evolution and according to Clement (2008) may enable students to better engage in the reasoning process necessary for the co-construction phase.

One way additional dissonance was introduced was through complication cards that gave more information for each group by introducing new challenges. This stimulated more dissonance and co-construction, prompted by open-ended questions posed by the facilitators as they moved among the groups. This was an opportune time also for the facilitators to help participants make connections between elements of the simulation and the concepts of FORB as well as challenging the models they had constructed thus far.

To make decisions about how the groups could mitigate the fears held by themselves and others, groups were asked to send an ambassador to other fruit groups where they challenged one another to explain what they believed and why, along with possible solutions for living together on the island. This gave each fruit group an opportunity to ask others questions and to hear the fears and misconceptions held by different groups. This was particularly important in using conceptual change in FORB as fears and misconceptions of religious other were a major factor where participants needed time to both listen to others and to have a voice.

6 Application and evaluation

Finally, participants had to decide on a plan to live together on the island to the benefit of all. They needed new laws that would insure the freedoms that each group had come seeking. This again introduced the Universal Declaration of Religious Freedom and specific concepts of Article 18 rights and had direct application for the teachers and ultimately their students who were struggling in communities where segregation and discrimination were common. Groups were asked, ‘Who is going to decide what rights you have?’ This was important because some participants were still avoiding conflict at this point and did not recognize that they deserved to not be mistreated. They were not able to defend themselves or their idea, and their arguments were very weak. This stimulated a large group discussion where more naïve ideas were challenged by other participants, who asked, what if the law changes, and what happens if you are a minority? This led to a very heated conversation where dissonance was initiated by members of the groups and actually helped others to begin to think more deeply, enabling them to have an ah-ha moment. When they then voted on where they thought freedom of religion or belief came from, some radically changed their answers to demonstrate an understanding that it was an inherent right they were born with as a human rather than a gift bestowed by the government or society. It appeared to finally challenge some participants who had not until this time looked deeply at their own beliefs or constructed new ways of thinking about FORB.

Groups were then given the challenge of developing rules for life on the island. Drawing on what they had learned about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, several groups were able to articulate the universal depth of the freedom of religion or belief. The groups who did, had more developed rules, and had experienced greater dissonance and construction within their group discussion.

Throughout the process of the Sanctuary Island activity, participants were encouraged to go through multiple cycles of criticism and revision, central to conceptual change. Prior conceptions were accessed, dissonance was initiated, and construction was supported. After each small cycle, levels of conceptual change were assessed as participants encountered new challenges on their island. While a pre-post test was used to measure overall conceptual change, after each day participants were also asked to describe their concept of FORB. This provided a picture of how their model was evolving over the process of the workshop. Additionally, artifacts, such as their posters, constructed analogies, notes from discussions, and drawings helped to document the change as it was occurring. Feedback was collected immediately after the workshop and during the months that followed that provided anecdotal evidence of knowledge, belief, and attitude changes. Finally, student data collected from the teachers teaching the FORB lessons in their home classrooms, provided further evidence that statistically significant learning had taken place through the conceptual change strategies.

Pedagogy of Conceptual Change in FORB Training

In addition to the conceptual change that occurred with participants’ concepts, beliefs and attitudes about FORB, the training also consisted of the pedagogy of conceptual change. All of the teachers involved in the trainings had primarily engaged in a very traditional lecture style teaching prior to this. The training addressed five learning outcomes:
• Participants will articulate their current method and pedagogy in teaching and recognize how conceptual change can lead to deeper conceptual understanding.
• Participants will articulate challenges and barriers in their country and/or school that affect teaching on Freedom of Religion or Belief and propose solutions.
• Participants will design activities based on new pedagogical strategies that actively engage the students and lead to conceptual change.
• Participants will design an effective five-step lesson plan on Freedom of Religion or Belief.
• Participants will design a strategy for teaching the lesson in their home country and for training others to use the lessons in formal and informal settings.

The same strategies for conceptual change that teachers were expected to eventually use in their teaching were also used to teach the new pedagogy. Strategies were used to engage participants interest and access prior conceptions, then student active learning through analogies, drawing to learn, experiential/hands on, discrepant questioning, and role-play and debate were used to produce dissonance and co-construction. Case studies were used to apply new models for further criticism and revision. Teachers then worked together in discipline teams to design a five-step lesson plan based on conceptual change. This finally culminated on training in assessment of conceptual change.

7 Continuum of change
As described previously, evidence collected throughout the training supported that conceptual change was occurring. This included knowledge and beliefs of the concepts of changeability, non-discrimination, individual right, expression and public-private practice of faith. For example, the concept of believing that everyone has the right under international law to change their religion was noted in one teacher who also voiced several major concepts of religious freedom in this statement:

“There has to be a clear line between freedom of religion and extremism. When someone changes, we need to respect him or her. They do not present any danger to us when they change .... When you treat people with a bad attitude, you’re not doing what your religion is telling you. We have to think all religions are equal and treat people in a good manner. Even if his opinion contains some wrong ideas or wrong thinking, he can still be dialoguing to prove whether he is wrong or right ... He has the right to raise his voice to speak up for his ideas; the authorities have to provide him the tools and protection to express these ideas or else he might be harassed by the community. Not only does he need freedom of expression, he needs protection.”

Early in the training, most teachers held the belief that freedom of religion or belief could be summed up with one word – tolerance. This tolerance often came with separateness. As the teachers worked through this together, however, they began to see that tolerance is a very naïve concept on the scale of freedom of religion or belief, especially where one is also separated from other groups. In this instance, little interaction occurs, there is no need or emphasis to consider situations from another’s perspective, and little dissonance happens to cause conceptual change. The teachers found that when they were challenged by the activities and others from different faiths and genders they began to move from tolerance toward the concept of pluralism. This move, however, took many cycles of criticism and revision and only a few developed a very sophisticated level of understanding in the first workshop. At the same time, comments particularly by the third day, indicated that the teachers highly valued inclusiveness and many could voice at least the beginnings of pluralism, empathy, respect for human dignity, equality, and acceptance as needful to lead their communities to build resiliency and a respect for freedom of religion or belief.

From an initial analysis, a continuum has begun to emerge that indicates individuals pass through stages of conceptual beliefs from tolerance with separation to tolerance, to coexistence, along a path that we hope will eventually be a sophisticated understanding and belief where individuals are willing to defend others who hold different beliefs. However, we expect that while these are the first elements of language that individuals use to explain their knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes about FORB, as participants engage more in the process, many other levels will emerge that characterize deeper conceptual change and allow us to build dynamic models. This is an important point as beliefs that become stagnant at the tolerance and co-existence level do not lead to the level of FORB understanding that translates into sophisticated FORB behaviors.

In fact, one of the major behavioral changes noted in many of the teachers was empathy. At first many said they did not even have a word for empathy and were unable to recognize it. Many described actions based on culture or because they identified with a faith group but not because of empathy for others. While many of the participants came from schools with one religion, they began to form an empathy toward other participants as they shared experiences and were confronted with, not just others beliefs, but their deep feelings of isolation and oppression. This was evident in how they related to one another. Two Yazidi teachers joined together to develop and teach a lesson throughout displaced person communities called The Peaceful Garden. Others realized that even those in a majority could experience oppression. All were inspired to create lessons and/or songs for children on freedom of religion.

8 Summary
When left unchecked, the religious dimension of conflict incites social hostility and can lead to radicalization and violent extremism. Education has been widely seen as a possible preventive measure to radicalism and intolerance. Hardwired’s training of teachers, has provided substantial evidence of the impact that education based on conceptual change in the area of human rights can have in combating religious intolerance and violence in the world. (For more detailed data and analysis please
visit [www.hardwiredglobal.org/research](http://www.hardwiredglobal.org/research). This data is currently being prepared for publication).

Hardwired designed and implemented the program described in this paper to meet the need to address religious intolerance, radicalization of youth, and violence. It was based on their work in over thirty countries from every region, and the assessment of common fears, misconceptions, and challenges to acceptance of freedom of religion or belief. Hardwired’s past experience implementing training programs for civil society leaders and politicians related to freedom of religion or belief, and a survey of current initiatives on this freedom, religious tolerance, and/or interfaith relations provided the groundwork for this project. Hardwired’s teacher training program that was developed was intended to contribute to an atmosphere of respect toward freedom of religion among youth by training primary and secondary school teachers to develop and share lessons on freedom of religion with their students, other educators, and the community. The ultimate purpose of this program was to provide students with an educational curriculum that promotes human rights, freedom of religion or belief, and pluralism. Hardwired trains educators to teach lessons on these concepts in their own classrooms and to train other teachers. These lessons present students with a positive alternate narrative from a young age and establish resiliency in a potentially vulnerable population.

This paper presents a model for FORB education grounded in conceptual change theory and strategies that has been implemented in the Middle East and North Africa under a grant from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The authors drew on knowledge and success in conceptual change found in other fields such as science and math to design a curriculum that addressed the needs of teachers both in content and in pedagogy. The conceptual change model consisted of criticism and revision cycles in which the participants’ preconceptions were accessed, activities were introduced to cause dissonance, and omit to help participants co-construct models of freedom of religion or belief. During the dissonance and co-construction phases, participants challenged their own misconceptions, naïve conceptions, and fears, and those of others. This struggle helped participants to move along a continuum from tolerance but separate, to coexistence, and even for many to empathy and a more sophisticated understanding of freedom of religion or belief in which they were willing to stand up for another’s rights to believe even when it differed from their own. It allowed participants to integrate the concepts of human dignity, empathy, and universal law on FORB and then to apply this new knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes to their own classrooms and to their communities. It is expected that such as curriculum built on conceptual change theory could be used globally to build religious literacy, tolerance, and empathy.

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Susanne Offen

‘Places of Remembrance’: Spaces for Historical and Political Literacy. A Lesson Report

- Fostering historical-political awareness on Fascism/ Nazism in Germany, the Holocaust, and post-war remembrance politics
- Presenting educational media for a diverse group of learners with very little prior knowledge.

Purpose: The article shows the use of specific educational media in social studies in vocational schools to foster a differentiated historical and political literacy.

Design/methodology/approach: Accordingly, the article examines a sequence of lessons taught by the author in a vocational classroom, fostering reflexive historical-political awareness of Germany’s post-war coping with the fascist constitution 1933-1945 and specifically of contemporary legal proceedings concerning the persecution and subsequent murder of six million Jewish people during the Holocaust.

Findings: Teaching techniques comprise explorative learning through guided city walks, document analysis and expert visits, in-class discussions, and individual student-teacher-conversations and, particularly, contact with exhibits employed as educational media, originating from an art exhibition in public space covering various unsettling steps of exclusion against Jewish citizens before 1942. These materials turn out to bridge the gap from ignorance to learning by the acquisition of knowledge, demonstrating the use of artistic visual representations as educational media in the social studies classroom, especially while addressing students with little prior knowledge and understanding.

Research limitations/implications: As a lesson report, the article draws on classroom observations.

Practical implications: The approach presented includes various implications for classroom application.

Keywords: Social studies, citizenship education, historical literacy, political literacy, remembrance, National Socialism (NS)

1 Introduction

Social studies (particularly with regard to civic/citizenship education) hold a widely accepted place in German vocational school curricula and are taught at virtually every level (Besand, 2014; Wucherer, 2014). While governed by administrative guidelines, teachers are free to focus on subject matters meaningful to their specific groups of learners in order to foster political literacy and various loosely standardized competencies (e.g. Nibis, 2015). Still, based on available textbooks and the general tendency in vocational schools to focus the general education like the vocational subjects on examples from workplace situations (Zedler, 2007), aspects of history and civics beyond the vocational context tend to be marginalized. It seems essential to seek approaches that promote these topics for social studies in vocational schools in order to foster a differentiated historical and political literacy.

During the past decades, a complex culture of remembrance (e.g. marked by the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, the penal sanction of Holocaust denial or the inclusion of Holocaust Education at different levels of the curriculum) has emerged in Germany. However, recurring debates on the significance of remembrance for the civil texture of society persist (Fokus, 2017), narratives of remembrance (Köhr, 2012) and Holocaust Education as well as the pedagogy of memorial sites face challenges: a limited historical awareness, questions of adequate teaching approaches in a migration society (Messerschmidt, 2016), the impact of visualisation and media representations and/or overwriting (Kenkmann, 2013; Nuy, 2012; Paul & Schoßig, 2010; Stiglegger, 2015), or the quest to ensure the perceptibility of the victims’ perspective while the contemporary witnesses are aging and dying (Kaiser, 2010; cf. Taubitz, 2016).

A lesson sequence on post-war and contemporary prosecution of Nazi-crimes with a diverse group of learners in a German vocational school is used for reconstruc- tion and analysis of key teaching strategies, focussing on the attempt to impart historical and political knowledge to persons with little prior knowledge.

Classroom observations were made by the author during a 20-lessons-sequence in 2015 with students during their vocational training towards hotel and service specialists. The major challenge was posed by the variety of learning experiences, prior knowledge and skills and historical as well as political literacy in class.

The sequence dealt with the contemporary issue of one of the final trials against field personnel involved in the German Nazi State and the murder in the concentration and death camps. The trial in question brought to charge

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a nonagenarian former Nazi-SS junior squad leader for accessory to murder in 300,000 cases during his deployment to the Auschwitz Death Camp, specifically from May to July 1944, when Jewish deportees from Hungary were killed (cf. Connolly, 2015).

Given the wide diversity within vocational classrooms, it is vital for teachers to seek valid starting points for any subject, enabling students to link personal experiences and to become intrigued. There is wide consensus that this especially applies to social studies and civic education⁷, as research covering Germany constantly shows a disturbing gap between formal mechanisms of democratic politics as well as policy-making and adolescent forms of participation to and engagement with politics (BR, 2017; FES, 2016). In addition, awareness of democratic institutions and knowledge of current political topics beyond everyday life experiences tend to be sparse among people with limited access to educational opportunities. This underlines the importance of vocational schools as access opportunities to socially significant spheres of discourse. They address a diverse population of young adults at the threshold of their professional life and so frequently provide the last possibility to reach out to them through formal education (Besand, 2014).

Considerable efforts have been made throughout recent years to study and develop didactically and methodologically adequate approaches for civic education with educationally disadvantaged persons (e.g. Calmbach & Kohl, 2011; Detjen, 2009; Hafeneger, 2015; Ellis, 2010). Some are focussing on establishing core concepts (Massing, 2012; Sander, 2009), some on defining basic competencies (Grotlüschen, 2016) for civic participation and literacy. Teaching strategies tend to aim at an increasing ability to apprehend complexity and to judge based on facts and a careful evaluation of arguments (Autorenguppe Fachdidaktik, 2015; GPJE, 2004, considerable differences within the academic discipline notwithstanding). Most civics teachers and didactical experts in German-speaking countries basically agree on some key references, including a competency model featuring at its core the idea of political maturity. Accordingly, teaching strategies are examined extensively. Some studies have discussed the use of explorative learning, others focused on determining meaningful subjects, the use of plain language, different teaching arrangements and effective classroom management (Dönges, 2015; Kirchner & McMichael, 2015; McKee, 2015) or evaluated the longterm impact of civic education (Balzter et al., 2017).

Determining impact evidently implies estimating students’ results, for instance by measuring competencies against explicitly defined core elements of social studies (Common Core, 2017) or political maturity (Nibis 2015) or by assessing increasing levels of historical and political literacy⁸ (e.g. Nokes, 2013; VanSledright, 2014; see also Weißeno, 2008 referring to civic literacy). However, more attention could be devoted to research covering adequate ways to impart the underlying expertise. This includes conveying historical facts, political concepts and domain-specific knowledge to people with little basic historical and/or political literacy and skills, especially with regard to suitable educational media beyond the provision of textbook materials. How to do this while at the same time respecting the students’ claim to inquire about and legitimately address relevant historical and political topics may be framed as a didactical question.⁹ Useful didactical references have been established by focusing on students’ inquiries, coaching them to verbalize their questions, enabling them to use domain-specific tools and concepts for their analysis and encouraging them to argue in reference to their findings. These are teaching strategies extensively covered in designs for inquiry-based-learning.

Inquiry-based learning (c.f. Oguz-Unver & Arabacioglu, 2014), though prone to be used along specific academic traditions (e.g. Llewellyn, 2013 in terms of science education or Downey & Long, 2016 linking inquiry to historical literacy), seems to be a suitable term in substantiating the approach to didactical decisions described here, especially as it may be closely linked to the concept of literacy. Even while inquiry-based-learning represents an important point of reference, didactical decisions in the lesson sequence described here draw chiefly on the fundamental orientation towards students’ inquiries as the center of the learning process and to a lesser extent on adherence to strictly organized inquiry phases (e.g. described in Pedaste et al., 2015).

In this article, I will discuss possibilities to foster an inquiring attitude. The core of the article being classroom observations of students engagement with specific teaching materials, the text will reflect their knowledge-building and growing understanding during the process of critically engaging with the materials. Conclusions will be drawn on the interrelation of inquiry, factual knowledge development, and historical/political literacy.

First, I’ll introduce some basic facts on the trial in question, brought to court in the German town Lüneburg in 2015, to outline the circumstances triggering the lesson sequence (2.1). Subsequently, I’ll describe the lesson sequence itself, focusing on the teaching material employed as educational media (2.2) and finish the subsection by reflecting the students’ results (2.3). I’ll contemplate the relevance of inquiry-based learning in order to foster an inquiring attitude in the following subsection while discussing the implications for the social studies classroom (3). In conclusion, I’ll outline the conjunction between history and civic education as a productive sphere of tension, pending further classroom-based elaboration (4).

2. Questioning justice to foster historical and political literacy concerning contemporary and post-war pursuit of NS²-crimes – classroom observations from a German vocational school

2.1 Auschwitz Trial Lüneburg 2015

The trial against Oskar Gröning, former Nazi-SS junior squad leader and deployed to Auschwitz to serve as an accountant (where he mainly dealt with the victims looted property) and sometimes as guard at incoming
deportation trains from May-July 1944 (cf. Auschwitz Trial, 2015), was widely documented in German and international media (e.g. Smales, 2015), drew many co-plaintiffs, witnesses, lawyers, journalists, translators and spectators from several countries and touched upon the students in my class in a specific way. As all of them, during their three years of dual vocational training, were spending two days a week at school and three days at their apprenticing hotels, most of them encountered parties involved in the trial as hotel guests at work. Public opinion in Germany was ambivalent towards the trial. Arguments formed around two main lines: a) the defendant’s age of 93 and his corresponding frailty, obviously countered by the co-plaintiffs’ and witnesses’ circumstances in biography and life, and b) the question „of whether people who were small cogs in the Nazi machinery, but did not actively participate in the killing of 6 million Jews during the Holocaust, were guilty of crimes“ (Connolly, 2015), a notion formerly denied by German courts.

As they became entangled with the presence of co-plaintiffs and witnesses attending the trial, some of the students perceived for the first time in their lives the reality of the Holocaust and became consequently bewildered by their lack of knowledge and their consequential inability to take a stand beyond the widely resonated notion of the trial happening very late. Some of the students brought their confusion and their lack of knowledge to the class. This lead to the starting point for the sequence.

Aims and methods of the sequence were discussed in class and the students largely agreed upon the key questions:

a) How exactly was the defendant part of the NS-system – in general, and specifically from May-July 1944?
b) Why does this trial happen now (e.g. late in terms of the time gap from post-war to today) and not much earlier?
c) Why does the trial draw so many people to court?

The class mutually agreed to leave the detailed planning to me due to their by their own definition negligible prior knowledge and to set some benchmarks for their own learning:

1. to be able to fully read and understand a „serious“ newspaper article on the trial
2. to be able to understand and explain the basic outline of the trial and the surrounding media attention
3. to adopt a position on the question of justice concerning the trials’ procedure, written, orally or by artistic expression at the end of the sequence.

2.2 Teaching Arrangements and Educational Media – „Places of Remembrance“
The lessons were arranged as such: First, the class collected and tried to read or listen to some of the media coverage, documenting their questions visibly throughout the sequence on a flipchart.

Some basic information on the trial and the historical timeline was provided by the teacher (helping to meet most of benchmark 2).

The class met various experts throughout the sequence. A person involved in an oral history project in Lüneburg took the class around town, showing and discussing historical places of exclusion and deportation as well as the (now erased) site hosting the first post-war trial against Nazi field personnel (Belsen Trial in 1945, cf. Stiftung Niedersächsische Gedenkstätten, 2017). In addition, a lecturer working at the memorial site in Neuengamme (KZ-Gedenkstätte Neuengamme, 2017) visited the class to answer questions (answering essential parts of key questions a and b).

However, the main access to information was provided by materials from the exhibition „Memorial: Places of Remembrance: Bayerisches Viertel: Isolation and deprivation of rights, expulsion, deportation and murder of Berlin Jews in the years 1933 to 1945“.

In 1993, Renata Stih and Frieder Schnock mounted eighty pictorial/ textual signs in the streets around the Berlin quarter „Bayerisches Viertel“, a neighborhood inhabited by many Jewish people in the 1930s. Most signs show a brightly rendered picture of a domestic object: a loaf of bread, a cake, a keyring, a house or some chalk. A short text is noted on the back of each sign: each a condensed version of one of the many decrees regulating the life of Jews in Berlin from the early 1930s, each one of them marking a step in the isolation and deprivation of rights of Jewish citizens and paving the way from political-legal discrimination, appropriation of Jewish assets, isolation and confinement to destruction (Hilberg 1961/ 2003) and murder.

2.2.1 „Places of Remembrance“ – the exhibition visually
The following pictures allow a tiny in situ impression – the photographs above have been taken on-site, the maps below with the miniature-sized-signs at the margins have been made by the artists themselves for travelling exhibitions at various places (cf. Stih & Schnock, 2016).
The inscription back reads (translated): „Jews are banned from choral societies. 16.8.1933”.

(c) Stih & Schnock, Berlin / VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn / ARS, NYC, Photo by Viktor Richardsson

„Signs and texts between them make emblematic - and not at all insignificantly represent the objective evidence of - the often seemingly petty legal and juridical processes by which the Jewish population was gradually deprived of all rights. It is indicative in this respect that the series opens, chronologically, not with a dramatic gesture but with one of the first regulations passed by the Nazi city authorities ("Costs of treatment by a Jewish doctor after April 1933 will not be reimbursed by the City of Berlin's public health insurance company. March 31, 1933"). The apparent minutiae of the issue tells one immediately that the emphasis is not on the events of the Holocaust per se as we now think of them (only a few of the signs refer to the removal of the Jews from Berlin and their subsequent murder) but rather on the daily humiliations and cruelties that prepared the way for the Jews as victims-to-be“ (Dilnot & Clive, 2014, p. 215).

While the exhibits were made for and shown in public space in Berlin 1993, the work is also preserved in print and thus available (Stih & Schnock, 1993 & 2009) beyond Berlin. Apart from this very many photos were taken in situ by visitors over time and circulate online.

2.2.2 „Places of Remembrance“ – the exhibition as teaching media

The apparent malice recognizable in the depicted, sometimes exceedingly petty decrees, the vivid details representing the everyday-life-precursors of the murder on trial in Lüneburg 2015 allowed the students to understand some aspects in particular:

a) the everyday meaning of deprivation for Jewish citizens
b) the phrasing of exclusion and threat not „from the point of view of victims but from perpetrators“ (Stih in Johnson 2013)
c) the visibility of exclusion and thus the apparent complicity of ordinary neighbors in the process.

To be accessible in class, the signs were first shown as photo slides to demonstrate their appearance in public space. Subsequently, the catalog was laid out for browsing and individuals pictures were taken from the catalog and given to the students to scrutinize.

The students were sorting through the materials, discussing the decrees, the emerging timeline towards deportation and murder displayed by the dates specified in the texts. The following assignment was used to organize this task:
Arbeitsauftrag

Schauen Sie sich als Kleingruppe jede einzelne Karte genau an.

1) Tauschen Sie sich über jede Karte aus und ordnen Sie diese entlang des Zeitstrahls ein.

Was hat diese Regelung, dieses Ereignis bekannt?

Notieren Sie Ihre Ergebnisse,

Arbeiten Sie alleine:

2) Die Karten sind verkleinerte Abbildungen großrahmiger Tafeln, die 1993 im Rahmen einer Gedenkausstellung überall in einem Berliner Stadtteil ausgehängt waren. Die Ausstellungsmacher_innen Renata Stih und Frieder Schnick formulieren ihre Leitidee so: es geht um das „Sichtbarmachen von Sachverhalten, die in perfider Folgerichtigkeit Schritte zur Vernichtung der jüdischen Bewohner waren“.

Wählen Sie in Einzelarbeit drei Karten aus, an denen dies aus Ihrer Sicht besonders deutlich wird.

Nennen Sie in Einzelarbeit jeweils mindestens 2 Gründe, warum dies aus Ihrer Sicht an diesen Karten besonders deutlich wird.

Assignment

Analyze each sign in your study group:

1) Place each sign along the timeline.

Talk about each sign and take notes: Did you know about this regulation, this incident? Explain the impact on the persons affected.

Work alone:

2) The signs are scaled down from an exhibition called „Memorial: Places of Remembrance: Bayrisches Viertel: Isolation and deprivation of rights, expulsion, deportation and murder of Berlin Jews in the years 1933 to 1945“. The artists Renata Stih and Frieder Schnick mounted eighty pictorial & textual signs in the streets around the Berlin quarter, inhabited by many Jewish people in the 1930s.

The exhibition makers declare their project as such: it is about „showing issues that were with perfidious consistency steps towards the murder of Jewish citizens“.

Choose three signs especially illustrating this process from your point of view.

Name at least two reasons for your choice. Take notes.

Zeitstrahl

Januar 1933 „Machtergreifung“

März 1933 „Ermächtigungsgesetz“

Frühjahr 1933 Bau des ersten KZ (Dachau)

September 1935 „Nürnberger Rassengesetze“

9. November 1938 „Reichspogromnacht“

September 1939 Deutschland überfällt Polen, Beginn des 2. Weltkriegs

Mai 1940 Einmarsch in Frankreich, Frankreich kapituliert im Juni 1940

Juni 1941 Einmarsch in die Sowjetunion

Auftakt Massenverhaftung, zunächst Einsatzgruppen hinter der vorrückenden Wehrmacht, Ende 1941 Bau von Vernichtungslagern

Januar 1942 Wannsee-Konferenz

Januar 1943 Niederlage Stalingrad

Februar 1944 Besetzung des ehemals verbündeten Ungarns

Mai 1945 Bedingungslose Kapitulation Deutschlands

Timeline

January 1933 „Seizure of Power“

March 1933 „Enabling Act“

Spring 1933 First Concentration Camp (Dachau)

September 1935 „Nuremberg Laws“

9. November 1938 „Reichspogromnacht“

September 1939 Germany attacks Poland, start of the 2. World War

May 1940 Invasion of France, France surrenders in June 1940

Juni 1941 Invasion of the Soviet Union

Beginning of Mass Murders, initially by Mobile Wehrmacht Killing Units , by the end of 1941 Building of Extermination Camps

January 1942 Wannsee-Conference

January 1943 German Defeat at Stalingrad

February 1944 Occupation of formerly allied Hungary

May 1945 Germany’s Unconditional Surrender

This time was also used by some students to reflect their growing discomfort with the historical events in

many individual student-teacher-conversations.

Other aspects of education and learning happened incidentally. First of all, the students became engaged with the Jewish citizens affected by these decrees. While

this may sound trivial, it marks a huge change of perspective. The ability to empathize to a certain extent with the people targeted by these decrees, to reflect their situation, not as historical cardboard figures but to relate to them as persons, constitutes an important step
towards historical literacy and thus, in this context, to political literacy (cf. Borries, 2009).

In addition, the timeline provided insight into some aspects of the gradual process of exclusion towards destruction described by Hilberg and others and thus enabled the students to decipher various elements of the NS system and forms of complicity by the general public. This factor was highlighted by the introduction of various examples of neighborly behaviour and their subsequent discussion and critical classification in class, focusing on the implication of perpetrators, collaborators, and bystanders for maintaining the NS. To visualize and discuss these examples, a simple diagram was used (English version below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>geringe Bedeutung für Ausgrenzung und Entrechung/ Vertreibung, Deportation und Vernichtung</th>
<th>↑Mitläufer/in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>↑überzeugte/r Täter/in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minimal contribution for isolation and deprivation of rights, expulsion, deportation and murder</td>
<td>↑collaborator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high contribution to isolation and deprivation of rights, expulsion, deportation and murder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓perpetrator acting from conviction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups of students chose a place for the example of behaviour and placed it in the chart, subject to discussion and often subsequent relocation by the class. Drawing on different sources (cf. Dean, 2008; Dreßen, 1998), these examples encompassed the following:

- Helga P. acquires 1 closet, 1 coat and 1 sugar bowl made of silver formerly owned by the deported family G. from next door in a public sale organized by the local revenue office (1942)
- Working for the revenue office Heinrich T. types a list of movable items found in the flat of the deported family G. (1942)
- Hans V. enters the Waffen-SS (1941)
- Elisabeth A. doesn’t buy in the Jewish bakery anymore (1939)
- Gustav F. fills a position as senior physician, shortly after the former job holder was banned from the profession as a Jew and dismissed (1938)
- Gernot H. gets a divorce from his Jewish wife (1938)
- Company KLMOP uses KZ-Prisoners to produce precast concrete parts (1944)

As questions of complicity mattered significantly throughout the lessons, these examples were discussed in class as various forms people perpetuated the NS and participated in depriving Jewish people of rights and social protection. Several questions were raised by the students, including participation of German citizens in the NS system, guilt and culpability, possibilities to resist, examples of protest, obstruction and genuine help and support for Jewish citizens.

During the students’ engagement with the exhibits, a very important process happened „backstage” to their learning process. Contact with the materials allowed to acquire basic knowledge without having to acknowledge the amount of former ignorance in class. As pictures and texts spell out how „everything was meant to exclude Jews from daily life, from social structures, and to threaten them” (Stih in Johnson, 2013), students used the condensed versions of these regulations as starting points for their own individual research into social and legal structures enabling the NS. Supplementary materials were provided by the teacher, additional research was enabled by the lecturer from the memorial site and the oral history activist.

The basic knowledge of historical facts and social structures, the discussions about bystanders and perpetrators in terms of complicity in the NS system and the apparent and discursively reflected discomfort among the students laid the foundation for a deeper un-
understanding of the trial in Lüneburg 2015. As we discussed various forms of complicity in context of maintenance for the NS system, the participation and culpability of Oskar Gröning emerged more clearly, though controversial, in class. The students consulted many interviews with co-plaintiffs and witnesses concerning their widely expressed arguments about the importance of the trial. Why the trial happened so late at this specific juncture remained another topic of heated discussion in class. As this tells a lot about Germany’s post-war society, attempts at suppression and continuities in the German society and authorities, but also illuminates changes in historical and legal perspectives, this question refers to the controversy a culture of remembrance has to face. Discussions in class could guide students through the arguments, some of them provided by our external visitors. Evidently, the exchange of arguments had to stay open-ended. Precisely by this, as civic education aims for, the students could take an individual, but not subjectivistic stance on the question of justice concerning contemporary and post-war pursuit of NS-crimes, argue and weigh arguments based on knowledge and a deeper understanding of the proceedings.

Resuming the guided tour the class took with the oral history project during the lesson sequence, these discussions were steered towards an individual exhibit made by each student in the final lessons. Each student worked out a plaque representing the individual perspective on the trial on one side and basic facts about the trial on the other side, suitable to be attached to the actual public hall the trial was held in. These plaques were made on paper and exhibited in class, merging knowledge-based aspects with reflexive critical discernment of proceedings and narrative in emerging historical and political literacy.9

2.3 Questioning Justice?
By the end of the lessons the students, formerly ignorant of even the most basic historical facts and very much biased against any form of prosecution of NS-crimes to the present day on a mainly preconceived notion were able to understand newspaper articles, to outline basic aspects of the trial and to argue based on historical facts and to consider various political implications of impunity vs. persecution, some could even relate to the broader arguments concerning democracy and coping with the past. Thus, every one of these young adults enhanced their reflexive ability to judge on contemporary political questions.

Asked to connect their learning process to the guided city walk with the history workshop at the beginning of the lesson sequence and to design a plaque to attach to the building the trial was held in, very individual designs emerged, each relating to the place in a specific, informed way. Some of the students were inspired by the signs ‘Places of Remembrance’ and combined pictures and text, others just draw or wrote, thus illustrating their increased historical and political literacy on the subject. Finally, they acknowledged the social and legal position of the victims.

As the court proceedings opened a space for the victims’ narratives to be heard, the students were able to listen. The answer to the third key question about the huge attendance at the trial dawned gradually to the class – as they realized the longtime denial of legal processing and public recognition made evident by the reluctant persecution in post-war Germany, they began to gain understanding of the importance of bearing witness to the atrocities committed during the NS. Other than before some of the students read the victims’ testimonies in court and thus acquired a deeper idea of the impact on the victims’ biography. „The personal stories told by Holocaust survivors present the Jews as human beings and restore their identities (...)“, as Yad Vashem elucidates the importance of testimonies in the classroom (Magen, 2017).

Co-Plaintiffs and lawyers referred repeatedly to the immense importance to bear witness („Man weiß etwas, was sonst niemand wissen kann, der nicht dort gewesen ist.“ „You know something nobody who wasn’t there can know“, Puztai-Fahidi, 2015, translation by the author) and some mentioned the necessity to assign personhood to victims and perpetrators: „I think this trial is important in two ways. It puts faces to the numbers tattooed on arms, faces to the survivors who had the super human task of rebuilding their lives after losing everything and in many cases everybody. Part of this trial’s great value is to witness further the suffering of innocent people at the hands of the Nazi state. But perhaps more importantly, this trial puts a face to one of the perpetrators of the Final Solution. A policy is meaningless until it is enacted, and those who carry it out are individuals with names and faces as well. Too many perpetrators of the Final Solution have been allowed the privilege of anonymity. Putting a face such as Mr. Groening’s to even one of them demonstrates that a policy of murder can only be carried out by individuals.“ (Kalman, 2015).

Especially because history tends to be told by narratives of – in their time successful – historical actors (Blutinger 2009) with influence and/ or power, it seems important, to show micro perspectives: of victims, bystanders, collaborators, and perpetrators.

3 Discussion
Ultimately, the students’ interest was sparked by questioning the justification of the Lüneburg trial. This question was taken seriously by the teacher to establish common ground with the students and to initiate an inquiring attitude rather than a hasty judgement based on very little information and even less consideration. Beyond that, this question was taken as a verbalization of a political problem, made explicit. As the lesson sequence aimed more at allowing the students to weigh arguments based on knowledge, at enabling them to
search for complex answers and disaccords rather than quick resolutions, the purpose served by the lessons was predominantly an elaboration of the question and an assessment of necessary information. As the students placed the question at hand into a broader historical and political context, they grew more capable to articulate a critical appraisal – they had enhanced their historical and political literacy.

In this process they sharpened their skills and attitudes, focussing on decoding narratives and complexity, developing an inquiring attitude. Their relation to historical facts and interpretative patterns evolved, for some students up to a level of a constant inquisitiveness: with evidently improved competence they took this outlook to the following topics in class, displaying increased confidence in their own explorative skills and learning ability.

Obviously, students’ content knowledge remained limited, and, based on the diversity in terms of prior knowledge, varied in depth and scope. As the sequence was taught in a vocational school, the schedule was very much restricted by curricular requirements. Accordingly, the students’ understanding of the NS system realities remained incomplete. Still, even while some students may have ongoing difficulties in naming exact dates, places, and proceedings, each of them acquired enough basic factual and conceptual knowledge to locate the NS chronologically and in the German political context. Keeping in mind that this was not the case prior to the lesson sequence, the impartment of facts was necessary to anchor their expanding historical and civic literacy, but should not (and did not) outbalance the focus on literacy in a broader sense (Nokes, 2010a; Wineburg et al., 2011).

Historical literacy refers, among other aspects, to the ability to „learn about the past by „working it out from sources““ (Nokes, 2010b, quoting Ashby, Lee & Shenil, 2005) and to understand the „nature of historical inquiry“ (Nokes, 2010b). Similarly, political literacy can be regarded, including the ability to question political narratives and to locate political actors with different levels of power attached—while perceiving oneself as able and entitled to contribute questions and opinions to relevant political and historical topics. With this particular group of learners in the designated time frame, the lessons aimed above all at evoking curiosity and at consolidating it. Hence the emphasis on providing accessible teaching materials. Guided by this students found themselves inquiring and researching historical content and political narratives allowing them to construct their own—but not subjectivistic—conclusions. But, and this seems the central didactical decision, students were addressed as legitimate speakers from the beginning. In starting the lessons by their own questions and putting the exhibits as artistically rendered historical content and political intervention at the center stage, the students plunged straight into the narratives and content knowledge was built from there.

Numerous possibilities to expand on the subject present themselves compellingly, as each of the students, initiate questions could be taken further, should the educational setting allow for it.

Incidentally, contact to non-formal educators and activists served an additional purpose not premeditated: on one hand it allowed students to talk to extracurricular partners and thus to expand their outlook on the subject matter (this was planned), on the other hand students found out about the existence of people dedicated to the cause of remembrance, people who understand this task as a their political and sometimes deeply personal mandate. By this, democracy and the participation in its preservation as a civic obligation came, rather unexpected, vibrantly to life. As one student commented on this: „There exist real people who dedicate a big part of their life to battle these horrors – it puzzles me, but I find it rather impressive at the same time."

4 Conclusion

While many efforts have been made to preserve the impact of peoples’ testimonies to bear witness (e.g. USC Shoah Foundation, 2017; Visual History Archive, 2017, cf. Taubitz, 2016), understanding relies on knowledge building. This will be even more challenging in the future, as contemporary witnesses will no longer be available and the temporal distance will increase. Correspondingly, suitable approaches will be very important.

Reconstructing the lesson sequence as a lesson report showed the usefulness of inspiring educational media, in this case more specifically contemporary art in public space with deliberately perturbing intentions, in the social studies classroom.

Key success factors for this sequence beyond the educational media comprise the personal relevance via workplace contact, a pedagogically reliable working alliance between students and teacher and thus an atmosphere. Throughout the lessons, a student-centered classroom-management could be kept up.

Further research could be fruitful, especially employing phenomenographical approaches relating to students individual perceptions developed while interacting with the educational media presented above.

Finally, approaching the subject by detour of artistic intervention as presented above may foster a more amenable disposition to become engaged with the subject area in the first place, as it allows students various and maybe more accessible ways to subject themselves to the disturbing rupture of civilisation the NS represents, singular and simultaneously embedded as it is in the 20th century-history of violence. Looking at signs and researching their meaning and impact may provide at least some space for detachment and hesitancy needed to let oneself become involved.
There is much controversy about the appropriateness of learning about contemporary politics through history, especially in connection with Holocaust Education and Human Rights Education, Anti-Bias, promotion of Social Justice or prevention of antisemitism or racism (e.g. Zumpe, 2003).

In the classroom proceedings concerning the class specified above this nexus happened incidentally, when students spotted antisemitic slogans in public space during their leisure time and discussed possible interventions against this in class.

Still, looking at the hyphen in historical-political education (Rüsen, 1996), the conjunction between both domains should not be an equation but a productive sphere of tension. While political maturity tends to favor a – at least potentially existing – capacity to act, historical literacy enables maturity understood as finding a voice in terms of applying one’s own mind and reasoning towards a reflexive historical understanding.

Linking these perspectives allows to extend the concept of agency, focusing on the independent examination of historical and political narratives (cf. KMK, 2014) and the ability to take part in their constant and contested rewriting.

References


Online resources were last checked on 12.09.2017.

Endnotes:

1 While the lessons focused on Jewish people, researchers counting the victims of the NS System name an additional 11 million, including Soviet civilian deaths up to 17 million people (bpb 2017, Megargee 2009/2012, USHMM 2017, Yad Vashem 2017, cf. Lichtblau 2013).

2 Vocational schools in Germany provide secondary and post-secondary education to more than 2 million students compared to about 8 million students in general schools from elementary to secondary level (BMBF 2017, Statistisches Bundesamt 2017). Vocational schools teach students for non-academic professions, offering a dual training between company-based and school-based learning episodes. In dual training, students divide their time, e.g. being two days a week at school and three days at the company. Degrees are given out jointly by school and employers’ associations such as the chamber of crafts. Vocational schools comprise also full-time-schooling-opportunities, allowing students to graduate at several educational levels up to DQR/ EQR 6. Typically, the classes show a wide diversity of students, including variations in terms of gender, religion and residential status as well as entry school degrees, language proficiency, prior knowledge, cognitive skills and historical as well as political literacy levels.

3 In this text historical and political literacy are employed as describing the capacity to understand, de-construct, analyze and critically reflect historical and contemporary actors, constellations and narratives (c.f. Bochel 2009 covering some aspects of the term political literacy, Körber 2015, also referring to historical consciousness and competencies, Seixas 2015 discussing historical thinking).

4 The expression „civic education“ will be used from now on, as it seems the most common translation for „Politishe Bildung“ and so might convey the main lines taught under the German designation „Politikuterricht“ and seems the most translatable term - as a supporting notion cf. the translation of the federal institute „Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung“ as „Federal Agency for Civic Education“. Still, „citizenship education“ may describe more adequately the inherent critical core „Politishe Bildung“ carries (Arthus/ Davies 2008), even political education may be an adequate term (Balzter et al. 2017) – which is why the term political literacy instead of civic literacy is used here.

5 Even though correlations between literacy and competency models may be rather fruitfully discussed (e.g. Weber 2010), I will not proceed to do so in this article. Instead, I will be using literacy in the broad meaning of critical, reflexive understanding, including the critical use of domain-specific tools and critical discernment of narratives. A rather similar definition could be determined for competency. Still, the term tends to be used in educational policy to describe skills rather than literacy, this not being the term’s fault, but to avoid this connotation I opted for literacy for the time being. In addition, I’ll bypass debates on core concepts and curricula in this article, instead using literacy attached to a constructivist paradigm of teaching and learning as in a specific understanding of the German term „Bildung“, comprising the transformative potential of education (e.g. Koller 2012).

6 To clarify the term didactics, bridging the gap between German-speaking and Anglo-Saxon educational traditions seems challenging. As Hamilton (1999: 135) noted some years earlier: „didactics has a negative valuation in the Anglo-American mind. It denotes formalist educational practices that combine ‘dogma’ with ‘dullness‘“. Drawing on the German-language tradition while writing this text, however, the term didactics as employed in this article should be understood as describing the process of reflecting on meaningful settings for learning and teaching. The basic didactical approach depicted is leaning towards a constructivist framework and implies careful choices of topics and teaching strategies beyond instruction, focusing on the active learner.

7 National Socialism will be shortened to NS throughout the article.

8 Comparatively less attention was devoted to forms of resistance and rescue. Regrettably, this couldn’t be covered throughout the lessons, as it could have provided a broader view into different decisions, behavior, choices, and options observed by historians (cf. Facing History 2017) and added more depth to the analysis of the NS maintenance.

9 As the sequence took place in real life schooling, being part of the everyday working life, options for data collection and even more data release were extremely limited. School boards and other educational authorities tend to be notoriously reluctant to authorize research in class, due to multiple data protection regulations. Hence the students’ oral, written and artistic expressions at the end of the sequence are not to be published.