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Core Concept “Political Compass”

How Kitschelt’s Model of Liberal, Socialist, Libertarian and Conservative Orientations Can Fill the Ideology Gap in Civic Education

International value surveys and misconception studies reveal the crucial role of individual value orientations for political judgment abilities. But in Civic Education, political opinions are generally merely asked for or remain superficial, non-committal statements that don’t get analyzed to foster identity development, perspective-taking and tolerance. Thus, this article discusses Kitschelt’s coordinate system of political preferences as an outstanding solution to fill the ideology gap in Civic Education and therefore to enhance political literacy. At first, I will explain and outline the landscape of the four political ideologies: market-liberalism, conservatism, democratic socialism and left-libertarianism. In addition, I will trace left-libertarianism to its merely known anarchist roots. After that, I will explain how our basic political values are shaped by economic and cultural developments and how they combine to become political ideologies, social milieus and party families. As a third point, I will outline possible applications of Kitschelt’s model for the subject of Civic Education. For that, I propose a map of fundamental controversial issues to help students to discover their own political position. Finally, I will introduce the “Found-a-Village-Project” as highly interactive and controversial scenario to foster political identity formation.

Keywords:

political cleavages, ideologies, critical thinking skills, political judgment abilities, political compass, “Found-a-Village-Project”

1. The ideology gap in Civic Education

To obtain political orientation is no simple task. Most American students might wonder if Obama’s health care policy is a socialist, a Stalinist or, as it was also labeled, a fascist project. German students could ask themselves, if the Social Democrats (SPD) became a right-wing party, because they cut down on welfare or if the Christian Conservatives (CDU) did turn left, because they are about to suspend compulsory military service. Furthermore, students could get confused about market-liberals like the German Free Democrats (FDP) who appear politically left-winged, as they postulate gay marriage, but also right-winged, when urging lower taxes for businesses. Students need a dynamic core concept of political cleavages. A (political) compass – as it is defined as an instrument for finding direction – could help finding orientation within political movements, party programs and decisions and political theories, but also when it comes to a better understanding of their friends’ and families’ value orientations. This is precisely why most National Standards (see e.g. NCSS 2010 or GPJE 2004) combine their concepts with judgment abilities and individual identity development. Students should learn to distinguish between facts and opinions; they should understand the interactive formation of values and should learn to be tolerant towards different value orientations. Additionally, they should be able to analyze and solve political conflicts. But these standards don’t really take their own claim seriously. Neither American nor German programs de-

velop value systems as core concepts. Instead they emphasize value-neutral, “objective” thinking and analytical skills. The international IEA Civic Education Study (see Torney-Purta et al. 2001) focuses on basic characteristics of democratic societies, like the willingness to vote and to participate, but also on democratic skills like tolerance, compromise and cooperation. “Attitudes” are related to students’ trust in institutions, their country, opportunities for immigrants, the political rights of women, and future prospect. There we find indeed traces of political ideology, but they are neither systematically asked for nor properly interpreted.

Youth surveys do normally ask for a self-placement on the left-right scale, but since researchers do not explain their understanding of these complex terms (e.g. Schneekloth 2010, 135) they don’t get convincing and significant answers: Instead only a few percent of students dare to choose the clear left or right side, about 30% place themselves in the middle and about 20% declare not to be able to understand the categories well enough to place themselves properly. At the same time, those young people show, when asked about their primary values, indeed politically relevant ecological, religious, pacifist or private life orientations that are far from being apolitical. But they don’t understand themselves as being part of political cleavages because they never learned to do so. I call this phenomenon the Ideology gap in Civic Education.

A couple of classroom studies revealed a lack of exposure to political conflicts (see Niemi, Niemi 2007; Hess, Ganzler 2007, Grammes 1998, 299-332). Neither do many teachers want to know political standpoints of their students nor do they support politically controversial discussions in the classroom. Even verbally



open and encouraging teachers can indirectly exclude certain opinions by the power of moderation, or simply by their comments and reinterpretations, or even by ignorance. The IEA study stated only 25 per cent of students across all countries are 'often' encouraged to state their own point of view. While in theory many teachers favour critical thinking and values development, in practice they mostly deliver factual information using textbooks, worksheets and teacher talk.

Due to the absence of controversial discussions the students' own political diversity lays dormant, and they easily develop the misperception that „everybody is in the middle“. Or they might believe in the absolute truth of their values, mislabeling dissenting views as assaults unworthy of proper consideration. The resulting fear of being misrecognized, disrespected and excluded discourages students from participating in public political discussions which they sense as dangerous ventures (Conover, Searing, Crewe 2002).

The competence of distinguishing and justifying value orientations is not a random topic among others in Civic Education. Value orientations are psychologically and culturally essential for the democratic development of both individuals and even whole societies. First, they form a developmental task, an important need of self-recognition and responsibility: „acquiring a set of values and an ethical system as a guide to behavior – developing an ideology“ (Havighurst 1972, 69ff.).

Second, the European Values Study and the World Values Survey (see Inglehart, Welzel 2005 and Welzel, Inglehart 2009) conveyed empirical evidence that value orientations should be regarded as the central factor of democratization or stagnation – both in democratic and non-democratic societies. However, this is only true, according to Inglehart and Welzel, if we measure and deal with real “deep-rooted civic orientations“. Simple preferences for democracy, as stated in most political surveys, are often superficial and instrumental. Answers are mainly based on social desirability and therefore don't reveal anything about the motivation to take a stand for certain convictions. Deep-rooted civic values represent a mediating role between economic modernization and institutional settings.

Third, recent misconception research showed the crucial role of belief systems to analyze and understand political facts (Nyhan, Reifler 2010). The false belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, for example remains resistant until today among conservative adherents of ex-president Bush. False or unsubstantiated beliefs can even endure corrections, depending on ideological orientations and partisan

beliefs. Even worse, there are backfiring effects: Direct factual contradiction frequently strengthens the misperception of certain ideological subgroups.

In consequence, ideological orientations themselves must become central concepts of Civic Education. It is far from being enough to understand how democracies work. Only the reflection of different democratic ideologies can lead to a congruent world view, promote tolerance as dissociation of narrow views, reflecting partisanship and the ability to change ones perspective. Or, as Joseph Adelson (1971, 1013) phrases it in his study „the political imagination of the young adolescent“: The development of a political identity as process of „struggling to formulate a morally coherent view of how society is and might and should be arranged“.


The main thesis of my article is that the model of “Ultimate values, ideologies and forms of social order” (Kitschelt 1992, 1994, 2003), with slight modifications, should be considered as indispensable scaffolding for political literacy.

2. The Kitschelt model and the competitive space of political thought

Herbert Kitschelt (1992; 1994; 2003) created his model as heuristics to outline the competitive space of political thought. He examined (new) party programs in post-communist as well as in western democracies and how people's political preference formation related to them. This “political universe” can be captured by the slogans of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, fraternity. They represent three ultimate values or societal end-states and are associated with complementary, mostly conflicting modes of social organization. The concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity vary depending on the political issue they are applied to. Kitschelt was one of the first theorists to distinguish between two cleavages that each society has to take position on: the distributive cleavage about resource allocation and the communitarian/socio-cultural one about actors, power and decision-making. This is one main reason why his heuristics is very useful for educational purposes: Whereas cleavage approaches in the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) distinguish regional divisions such as center-periphery and sometimes even more than two cleavages, such as religious-secular, economic left-right, libertarian-authoritarian and green values (see Knutsen 2009), Kitschelt's approach provides clear linkages of value families. Since every system and political program must consider both dimensions at the same time, the form of a coordinate system seems to be the appropriate type of model:



Fig. 1: Ultimate values, ideologies and forms of social order



(Kitschelt 1994, 12)

The economic or distributive axis measures possible opinions of how people should be endowed with resources. The left "equality"-pole is defined as the view that assets should be redistributed by a cooperative collective agency (the state, in socialist tradition or a network of communes, in the libertarian or anarchist tradition). The right "liberty"-pole is defined as the view that the economy should be left to the market system, to voluntary competing individuals and organizations. This is the classical left-right-conflict that dominated the cold war. But here we don't deal with a bipolar system-conflict, but with opposites on a continuous dimension of alternatives within democracies.

The other axis - cross-cutting the first one - is concerned with values of fraternity, understood as axiological principles driving institutionalization, community, forms and actors of democracy, and the quality of the process of collective outcomes. This dimension measures possible political opinions either in a communitarian or procedural sense, considering the appropriate amount of personal freedom and participation: „Libertarianism“ is defined as the idea that personal freedom as well as voluntary and equal participation should be maximized. This would be the full realization of liberty and equality in a democratic sense. Parts of that view are ideas like autonomous, direct democratic institutions beyond state and market, transformation of gender roles, enjoyment and self-determination over traditional and religious order. On the opposing end of the axis „authoritarianism“ is defined as the belief that authority and religious or secular traditions should be complied with. Equal participation and a free choice of personal behavior are rejected as being against human nature or against necessary hierarchies for a stable society.

Each fields of the coordinate system can be linked to one of the four political ideologies, each of them combining two ultimate values. Kitschelt introduces "anarcho-syndicalism" as a sort of left-libertarian socialism interfacing economic self-management and collective property with decentralist, non-hierarchical

federalist organizations. This movement corresponds mostly with modern "post-materialist" and left-libertarian values - a fact which most other authors neglect, as we will see. "Libertarian market capitalism" combines the notion of personal liberty with unconstrained reign of market exchange. Here Kitschelt uses the American linguistic convention, to call market-liberalism

"libertarian". In the European context of political theory we talk about "liberal", "right-liberal" and "neo-liberal" movements.

The integration of the two remaining ideologies is the weak point of his model. Since Kitschelt doesn't clearly define democratic limits of the authoritarian pole, he equates "authoritarian socialism" with Stalinism. Indeed Stalinism is an extreme form of socialism; nevertheless, it is not a legitimate base for democratic parties and preferences. Instead the center of the lower left corner of the coordinate system should be filled with the democratic socialist idea. According to this position, the great majority of non-owners (workers and employees) has the democratic right to control or to even annex big company owners. A strong government representing this majority redistributes wealth and is also necessary to lead and enlighten those who are not able to identify the structural causes of exploitation and injustice. This necessarily state-centered policy caused the historical socialist-anarchist conflict between Marx and Proudhon, later with Bakunin. In contrast to left-libertarian ideas of grassroots democracy or federation, Marx and Engels already promoted in the Manifesto of the Communist Party the authoritarian (but not dictatorial) role of the party.

The second problem of Kitschelt's model is concerned with the term "authoritarian market capitalism". This ideology tries to combine political authority with a free market exchange. Kitschelt (1994, 29) explains this combination mainly with "strong Christian religious affiliation" that "typically teaches compliance with established social norms". This status quo orientation promotes a "defensive attitude" about the existing distribution of wealth. This ideology is traditionally called "conservatism".

Kitschelt's coordinate system can be seen as a renewal of Karl Mannheim's (1936) classical model of utopian and ideological thinking published in 1929. From a perspective of Sociology of Knowledge he identified four historical ideal types of political consciousness that still influence political parties and individuals today: Orgiastic chiliasm or anarchism, liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. The anarchist idea,



however, is not developed historically correctly, as it is connected to pre-Marxist German farmer's liberation movement of the 16th century. Writing from a tendentially democratic socialist perspective, Mannheim underestimates the future role of 19th century grassroots ideals as Proudhon and others developed them. This original error persists in many later attempts to classify historic political thinking.

Contemporary ideology research (Arzheimer 2009) gives support to the Kitschelt perspective. Two major ideology schools can be identified: First Karl Mannheim's and Robert Lane's sociological approach to view ideologies as deep-rooted belief systems connecting a societal diagnosis with a plea for social changes. Second the more pragmatic view in the tradition of Anthony Downs "Economic theory of democracy" (1957). His main paradigm is "rational choice" rather than identification. The cognitive costs are lowered, when relevant parties can be associated with an ideology that encompasses the interests of certain social groups. Voters don't have to be informed about each single issue to make their choice. Instead ideologies allow referring to political "super issues" as fundamental controversial questions.

There are a couple of resembling coordinate systems which are, after all, less appropriate than Kitschelt's version. Arzheimer, for example proposes the Kitschelt model in a less exact version. Furthermore, there are four popular "political compasses" aiming at measuring individual political orientations: "The Smallest Political Quiz" (www.theadvocates.org), the "Political Compass" (<http://politicalcompass.org>), the "Electoral Compass" (www.electoralcompass.com) and the "Moral Matrix" (www.moral-politics.com). In the following, I will briefly summarize the typical classification problems which most of them share:

1. The "left" distributive pole is sometimes labeled as "command economy", a term which traditionally refers to a non-democratic one-party system and not to a democratically organized political redistribution of wealth.
2. The vertical axis gets sometimes de-politicized by the usage of psychological terms like "individuality" and "collectivity" without directly focusing on communitarian issues and democratic procedures.
3. Another coordinate system based on Inglehart's value research cause confusion about the position of German parties (Raschke 1993). There, the "new" Green party within the left-libertarian field shows the largest political difference with the "old" (market-)liberals (FDP), which is only true for the distributive dimension. On the communitarian dimension, Greens and right-libertarians share the notion of civil liberties; they oppose state observation and the restriction of free speech, they are more likely to tolerate social minorities etc.
4. Mainly in US-American models, Socialism is sometimes not seen as an equitable democratic orientation (as represented by European socialist and communist parties) but equated with dictatorial Stalinism. Or Socialism gets truly defined as "statist" ideology, but without labeling conservatism in an equal measure, ignoring that conservative thoughts require strong governments as well as the restricting of personal behavior that might violate traditional and religious values.
5. It is most astonishingly that National Socialism is sometimes located in the lower middle, between the socialist and conservative field of the coordinate system (Arzheimer 2009). Or, especially in the US-American compass versions, National Socialism and Socialism are regarded as rather similar or related orientations. Although, the truly conservative German historian Ernst Nolte wrote down, National Socialism is "a clearly identifiable phenomenon of conservatism" (Nolte 1984). He describes it as radicalization process of typical conservative principles like nationalism, hierarchy and obedience. Moreover, National Socialism did neither expropriate big business nor did it redistribute wealth more equally. On the contrary, the National Socialists promoted a clearly stratified society and supported directly big business research and expansion interests. To treat National Socialism as a form of socialism perpetuates simply the cynicism of this label.
6. Anarchist or anarcho-syndicalist ideas are often explicitly excluded as they are seen as having developed no broad impact in most countries. This decision ignores the great indirect impact of participative and grassroots anarchist values in all western countries since "The Silent Revolution" (Inglehart 1977) through the raise of post-materialist and left-libertarian values.¹

The last point induces me to take a short excursion on anarchist thought to eliminate the popular "bomber image" or the prejudice of a "chaotic" society without rules and order. The first person who dealt with the four basic orientations as legitimate alternatives was probably the "father of anarchism" Proudhon himself. In his late work „The Principle of Federation“ (1863) he modified his earlier anti-state position and come up with a decentralized „theory of federal government“, calling it anarchy. He developed four "forms of government" based on "two fundamental and antithetical principles" that each have their own "legitimacy and morality":

1 Kitschelt (and Flanagan similarly) criticizes Inglehart's original four-item materialism/post-materialism index for merely measuring materialist values but mainly libertarian versus authoritarian values. Inglehart's later work together with Welzel (2009) within the international team of the World Values Survey is more clearly focused on emancipative (libertarian) versus traditional (authoritarian) values. Welzel states explicit correlations between their value research and Kitschelt's results.



"Regime of authority

1. Government of all by one - monarchy or patriarchy;
 2. Government of all by all - panarchy or communism.
- The essential feature of this regime, in both its varieties, is the non-division of power.

Regime of liberty

1. Government of all by each - democracy;
2. Government of each by each - anarchy or self-government.

The essential feature of this regime, in both its varieties, is the division of power." (Proudhon 1979, 8ff.)

At that time Proudhon opposed supporters of the liberal representative government (here referred to as democrats), Conservatives (here identified with monarchy and patriarchy) and Socialists alike. With the socialist idea he agrees on the distributive dimension since he sees capitalist and corporate property as "theft". But the communitarian dimension separates the two egalitarian ideologies. Proudhon defines anarchy as „the government of each by himself“, which means „that political functions have been reduced to industrial functions, and that social order arises from nothing but transactions and exchanges.“ Here we find an early concept of the modern grassroots democracy. In his earlier work "Les confessions d'un révolutionnaire" (1849)² he already categorized anarchy as non-violent "order without leadership":

² Astonishingly, there is no entire English translation of this book.


"[...] puis mettez vous-même la main à l'oeuvre; entreprenez, agissez, et ne sollicitez ni n'attaquez le Gouvernement. C'est folie et injustice de batter les murailles de l'Autorité de votre belier démocratique et social; tournez-le plutôt contre l'intertie des masses, contre le préjugé gouvernemental qui arrête tout élan populaire, et laissez tomber, par son inutilité même, le despotisme. Suscitez cette action collective, sans laquelle la condition du peuple sera éternellement malheureuse, et ses efforts impuissants. Au lieu de pourchasser le pouvoir, priez-le seulement de ne se plus mêler de rien; et apprenez au peuple à faire lui-même, sans le secours du pouvoir, de la richesse et de l'ordre." (Proudhon 1849, 194)

Proudhon criticizes the "democratic and social battering ram" which the revolutionary socialist movement uses to attack the government. Instead, the people should turn the battering ram against their own phlegm deriving from their prejudiced belief in governments, a belief that restrains their vigor. Not religion but this 'government-faith' works as 'opium for the people' (Marx). That's why Proudhon wants the people to learn collective self-initiative to create wealth and order independently of traditional and new powers which shouldn't intervene anymore.

The probably first two-dimensional cleavage model including anarchism was developed as „rough-and-ready guide to political theory" by the two British anarchist activists and writers Stuart Christie and Albert Meltzer in 1969 (Christie & Meltzer 1970, 104).

Combining the convincing parts of the different models and avoiding the five classification problems I mentioned, I am suggesting the following version:

Fig. 2: The political compass: Four ideal-typical forms of democracy and their non-democratic extremes



(Petrik 2007, 200ff.)



Following Kitschelt, the four poles of the coordinate system refer to ultimate political values. As the terms equality and liberty are used in many different ways, the supplements "social" and "economic" seem necessary. Second, the terms "politically driven" versus "market-driven" economy should be added to make clear that the economic conflict is not only about redistribution but also about the role of the state to foster an ecological or a growth-oriented economic system. Self-determination is the logical opposite of authority in the sense of heteronomy. Self-determination can be a collective choice so the term "Individualism" isn't appropriate. Second, the term 'authority' is compatible with 'democracy' whereas the term 'totalitarianism' (that some compasses use) isn't. *The concepts of self-determination and authority cover at the same time antithetical decentralized and hierarchical political systems, and opposed emancipative and traditional socio-cultural norms of everyday life.*

The anarchist or left-libertarian idea represents a historical source of modern anti-authoritarian, socially just, post-materialist, feminist, multicultural, anti-militarist and ecological grassroots politics. This concept of a "strong democracy" envisions neighborhood assemblies, national initiatives and referendums on congressional legislation, experiments in workplace democracy, and public institutions as models for economic alternatives. In contrast to Barbers (1984, 68ff., 98ff.) misinterpretation, the basic anarchist idea based on Proudhon doesn't mean „anti-politics“ but instead "order without leadership". At the same time Barbers use of the term can be understood as the undemocratic extreme of left-libertarian thought: It can become purely hedonistic, conflict-denying, generating chaos and isolation through „individual self-sufficiency“ whenever self-determination is detached from equality and collective responsibility.

Democratic socialism consists of the idea that global and national deregulation as well as an increasing social inequality can only be overcome by a strong government, which would set new rules to control, reduce and occasionally expropriate big business, in order to redistribute incomes and to supply social welfare and at least a minimal income for every citizen. Enlightenment against traditional religious and other "prejudices" is seen as the central instrument to abolish injustice and exploitation. Other than in Stalinist communism, regulations are conducted by a democratic government within the legal frame of the constitution.

The liberal idea of the invisible hand is a free market system that guarantees common wealth by competition without major state invention. The truly understood liberalism doesn't distinguish between economic and personal freedom. Private life style, sexual or religious orientations should never become subject to political intervention unless it is used to harm some-

body. Private property and economic growth are the major sources of social, cultural and economic development. Pushed forward to its extreme we would get a Manchester-Liberalism as pure capitalist market system without any social protection, a system automatically excluding many people from political participation.

The conservative idea is strongly rooted in Hobbes' view of *Homo homini lupus* („man is a wolf to [his fellow] man“). People need strong directives by traditional authorities to establish a peaceful, stable and well-ordered society. The government should at the same time protect individual property rights as well as control individual behavior in public and private life. Important moral values are supported and represented by religious authorities. The natural human inequality and destructive urges need a hierarchical order, in order to maintain justice and safety. National Socialism and Fascism represent an extreme form of a socially unequal, hierarchical and nationalist society.

Kitschelt (2003) mentions the linguistic convention to label the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage also left-right conflict, but he sticks to the convention to reserve the two terms to the economic dimension. I for myself consider two dimensions of left and right. Nevertheless, I will continue, for practical reasons, like Kitschelt does, to talk about left-libertarian and right-authoritarian orientations etc. Thus, these adjectives clearly distinguish both dimensions.

3. Empirical approaches to the formation and change of value orientations

In this chapter I will give basic insights about the individual and collective formation of political value orientation. Kitschelt proposes a micro-logical "phenomenology of preference formation" within his coordinate system (Kitschelt 1994, ch. 1.3 and 2003). With good reason, he doubts Marx's belief that ideologies emerge mainly from social classes. The Marxist view short-circuits the complex multi-layered process between economic property and collective action. According to Kitschelt, every day experiences of markets, work organization, and the sphere of consumption profoundly affect citizens' political aspirations and preferences and influence their arrangement of political values.

Market experiences stimulate the self-attribution of success and failure. Hence, the location of income in the private or public sector becomes a crucial factor for the distributive dimension: People who are less exposed to the vagaries of international competitive pressure and productivity tend to prefer political redistribution. Private sector employees and wage earners in internationally competitive sectors tend to be opposed to redistributive policies that lower their profitability and capacity to invest by higher taxes.



Whereas domestic sector companies may compensate tax burdens by increasing prices to protect owners and workers. Here Kitschelt (2003) later adds professions in charge of the allocation of scarce resources. Those "wielders of authority" are more inclined to favor voluntary contracting that "sharpen individual incentives" than on centralized redistribution that baffles personal endeavor.

The second occupational experiences concerns people's control over their work environment and their participative opportunities. Occupations that directly deal with people or cultural symbols such as education, art, communication, health care, counseling and social work offer autonomy and involve communicative skills in non-routine work processes. They foster demands for social reciprocity, individual creativity and open dialogue as cultural conception of identity. Collective decision-making structures undermine authority relations. As those occupations are rarely located in the international competitive sector (only consultants, advertising agencies, mass media) they tend economically to the left pole. One important indicator for this group of people is education, because job autonomy and education are highly interrelated.


Towards the other end of the communitarian scale we find occupations with bureaucratic imperatives of costs and expediency urging employees to treat cli-

ents as standardized cases. This is the case in retail, finance, insurance, general public administration, police, and many legal services. A related tendency can be found in manufacturing, transportation, engineering design, and natural science research, where material commodities, objects or documents are processed. The standardized and objectifying work structure encourages people to prefer social compliance and unambiguous standards of behavior, to consider social action as monologue, adopted upon the commands of higher authorities. Kitschelt attributes the strongest authoritarian value orientation to the "petite bourgeoisie" of shopkeepers, craftsmen, independent salespersons, and farmers.

As women are mostly employed in people-processing, symbol-producing and client-interactive organizations and furthermore involved in reproductive activities claiming reciprocity, Kitschelt regards gender as a further indirect sign of libertarian orientations. He adds 2003 that women have a general preference for the welfare state because of their additional role as mother making it harder for them to invest in their career and making it more likely for them to fail on the market.

On the whole, Kitschelt identifies seven "political preference groups" and places them within his coordinate system:

Fig. 3: Ideology and occupational groups in advanced capitalist democracies



(Kitschelt 1994, 27)



1. Group I: Low to intermediate skill administrative and manual public service sector (mainly in the socialist quadrant)
2. Group II: High education symbol and client processing public service sector professionals (mainly in the left-libertarian quadrant)
3. Group III: Low-skilled wage earners in domestic private services and manufacturing (mainly on the authoritarian pole with tendency to economic liberty)
4. Group IV: Trade-exposed sector of high to intermediate skill wage earners (the middle with slight tendency to the market-liberal and the authoritarian pole)
5. Group V: High skill professionals and entrepreneurs in the symbol producing private sector (mainly in the market-liberal quadrant, partly in the left-libertarian quadrant)
6. Group VI: Corporate managers, owners and professionals in business services (mainly in the conservative quadrant, partly in the market-liberal quadrant)
7. Group VII: Small business without professional training, "petty bourgeoisie" (strongest market-liberal and authoritarian tendency)

In addition to the work sphere, people's values are affected by their socio-cultural experiences which they gain in their leisure time. New technologies allow


more physical and intellectual liberty. Personal styles of consumption and conduct become relatively independent forces, resulting in role conflicts between work life, traditional family values and education. But since access to knowledge is still very much linked to social classes, role conflicts between libertarian and authoritarian values are less probable in lower classes.

Kitschelt's model is far from being static. Conjunctural effects, ecological catastrophes and cultural conflicts can lead to at least temporarily different positions. The macro-logics of economic modernization promote, according to Kitschelt's own studies in 1994 and 2003, two general value-shifts in western societies. He identified five basic "party families" which in the long run have to adjust their programs according to societal value shifts:

1. Left-libertarian, mostly green parties (LL)
2. Social democratic and democratic socialist resp. communist (labour) parties (SD)
3. Market-liberal Parties (LIB)
4. Christian democrat and secular conservative parties (CD)
5. (New) right-authoritarian parties (NR)

The first value shift took place from the postwar decades until the 1970s and 1980s. The post-war decades were dominated by the cold war's distributive conflict (horizontal ellipse):

Fig. 4: Distribution of political preferences from the post-war decades to the 1970s and 1980s




(Kitschelt 2003, 7)

Kitschelt has never argued, as some of his readers proclaim, that the libertarian-authoritarian conflict didn't exist by then. This cleavage was simply less manifested and politically articulated. According to Kitschelt, the first shift towards left-libertarian and right-authoritarian tendencies until the 1980s (diagonal ellipse) had two major structural reasons: One reason was the decrease of manufacturing jobs in favor of the "post-fordist" production and new information technology that promoted a switch from socialist to liberal values. The decline of Stalinist socialism later contributed to this tendency as well. For another thing, the increasing financial and social

personal services financed by a comprising welfare state caused a change from authoritarian to libertarian values. Thus, the increasing left-libertarian, "new social" movements and Green parties of the 1970's and 1980's resulted in an authoritarian backlash in most western states via populist and nationalist right-wing parties. Particularly losers of economic modernization and less educated male workers in manufacturing sectors, clerks or small business owners proclaimed a new authoritarianism.

The second shift increased the tendencies of the first shift in the direction of (right-)libertarian and (left-)authoritarian values (vertical ellipse):

Fig. 5: Distribution of political preferences from the 1980s to the turn of the millennium



(Kitschelt 2003, 7)

Until the new millennium, left-libertarian positions reached a "support-ceiling" because of hard budget restraints in the public sector due to crises of welfare states. That's why highly educated people profited mostly from the job growth within the market-exposed sector. Consequently, left-libertarian parties are inclined to cautiously expand their electoral space towards the market-liberal segment. The decline in the birthrate increases the necessity of a reorientation towards rather right-libertarian young people. Especially the notion of intergenerational justice initiates left-libertarian parties to advocate retrenchments of pension benefits in favor of improved education and similar tasks. Social democratic parties profit less and less from the working class segment but rally instead better educated employees, moving towards "economic centrism". This in turn alienates their old manual working base which partly switches to left-authoritarian, e.g. communist parties, or right-authoritarian ones, or they join the non-voters. Conservative parties with increasing pressure to liberalize parts of the economy and to cut down on welfare are endangered to lose their strengths among the elderly. Market-liberal parties, according to Kitschelt, are (until 2003) the "great winners" of ongoing transformations. But they have to decide whether they combine their appeal to market-liberalism with socio-cultural libertarianism or rather with more authoritarian and nationalist appeals for keeping their petty-bourgeoisie constituencies. Radical right-winged parties tend to tone down their former market liberal rhetoric in favor of "welfare chauvinist" demands to limit welfare benefits to the indigenous population, corresponding to their raising success among the working class and clerical voters. Less educated workers are internally divided between social protectionists and market-liberal tendencies.

Kitschelt couldn't consider the financial crisis of 2008 which is about to add a new shift from liberal to socialist values, as more and more people call for social protection, subsidies and state control of financial and other economic transactions. In addition, the threat of global climate change could cause a renaissance among left-libertarian ecologists, not of the classical welfare state, but of public investments, redistribution and business control to benefit the ecosystem, of course with strong market-liberal backlashes. If these slight tendencies came true, we would witness a third shift of the main sphere of preference formation in the direction of its cold war horizontal position – but with new "eco-socialist" forms of a politically driven economy on the left side of the axis. The raise of a "socio-ecological" social milieu in Germany, the decline of the market-liberal Free Democrats' (FDP) poll ratings combined with a real boost of the Green Party's ratings may be signs for that tendency (see below).

Though Kitschelt's model has influenced many scholars, there is a serious critique to it (Duch, Strøm 2004). First, the authors criticize Kitschelt's mainly socio-demographic research with factors such as age, education, white collar/student and with personal dispositions such as religiosity, post-materialism, readiness to join the ecological, antinuclear or peace movement. Instead the authors favor using direct and simple questions about distributive and communitarian issues, just like the European Values Study and the World Values Survey do. Kitschelt (1994) himself mentions these studies as a possible additional approach.

Apart from criticizing his methods the authors also question Kitschelt's findings – even though without being very convincing. They misunderstand Kitschelt's first value shift (see fig. 4) as rigid statement that "the political left is libertarian and the right authoritarian". In consequence they come up with various examples to contradict their (falsely reproduced) claim. For example, they show that leftist parties such as communists are less libertarian than rightist (market-liberal) ones – which is evidently true, but can also be understood by Kitschelt's graphics. Furthermore, they claim that conservative partisans also advocate libertarian values since their participation in "conventional political acts" is as pronounced as within the political left. Conventional participation, though, is defined as "general interest in politics, party membership, lawful demonstrations, frequent political discussion". Kitschelt never suggested that left-libertarians were mainly striving for more conventional participation and that conservatives/ right-authoritarians were apolitical or generally opposed to democratic values. Duch and Strøm, on the other hand, find out that "unconventional" participation (occupying buildings, signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending unlawful demonstrations or strikes) correlates indeed with left-libertarian values – a fact that is completely compatible with the distinction between conservative and emancipative forms of participation. Finally, the two critics stress that the socio-cultural cleavage wasn't about libertarian versus authoritarian values but about libertarian versus communitarian ones. They found communitarian concerns of "social cohesion, integration and identity politics" both within the economic left and right. Yet, this finding isn't surprising at all and doesn't contradict Kitschelt's notion of "fraternity, paternalism and corporatism" (see fig. 1). The term 'authority' is nothing but a metaphor for orientations expecting individuals to adapt to a particular context. This is the case in left-winged trade union communities as well as in the petty bourgeoisie – of course with partly different contents of their "identity politics". Duch's and Strøm's critique misinterpret the value shift as if it was only a simple axis with a clear cut left-libertarian and right-authoritarian orientation. That's why they don't correctly reflect on



Kitschelt's seven occupational groups and five party families with their partly common and partly contrary values. In fact, Kitschelt is talking about the rotation of the „salient space“ of preference distributions, which means that political parties might under certain circumstances extend their political supply without completely abandoning the core of their values.

Though I mainly agree in favor of Kitschelt's socio-demographic research, I would like to compare it to approaches that are mainly based on interviews of individuals expressing their distributive and communitarian values. Since the European Values Study and the World Values Survey mainly concentrate on the comparison of countries I refer to the social milieu approach which distinguishes "value families" of like-minded people. A social milieu is defined to combine a certain social status with a certain value-orientation. The two different schools (stemming from two former partners who dissociated) Sigma Mannheim (www.sigma-online.com) and Sinus Sociovision Heidelberg (www.sinus-institut.de) use almost the same item-battery and have created almost similar results. Sinus Sociovision has created seven meta-milieus based on empirical surveys of most important Western countries and China (see Sinus Sociovision 2005, 2009; Hradil 2006). Below I outline their descriptions, adding differentiations according to the Sigma model for Germany (Ascheberg 2006) and the new 2010 Sinus model for Germany (www.sinus-institut.de/en):


1. *Traditional*: Security, status quo, tradition, duty, discipline and order. The Kitschelt- and the German Sigma-model distinguish here two traditional milieus: the right-wing "petit bourgeoisie" or traditional lower middle-class and the left-wing trade-union-oriented, tradition-bound worker's milieu.
2. *Established*: Commitment to achievement, claim to leadership, status awareness, requirement of exclusivity, conservative attitude.
3. *Intellectual*: Open mindedness, post-materialist ecological and participative values, pronounced

cultural and intellectual interests, striving for self-actualization and self-development.

4. *Modern mainstream*: Enjoyable and harmonious life, aspiration for material and social security, family. Here the Sigma model for Germany distinguishes a modern moderately conservative *middle-class milieu* from a slightly less traditional and more libertarian *milieu of employees* in the high-tech and service sector. The newest sinus model for Germany 2010 distinguishes the (more conservative) "mainstream middle class" from a "socio-ecological milieu" of political correctness and globalization critics.
5. *Consumer-materialistic*: Will to stick with the mainstream consumer standards, but often disadvantaged and disrooted precarious people.
6. *Sensation orientated*: Search for fun and action, new intensive experiences, life in the here and now, spontaneity and individualism, provocation and unconventionality. In the Sigma model referred to as *hedonistic milieu*, the newest Sinus model talks about the "escapist milieu".
7. *Modern performers*: Young, flexible, mobile, success- and action-orientated, highly qualified, committed, motivated, fascinated by multi-media. Here the Sigma model distinguishes well-educated urban *postmodern performers* from (partly more conservative) *high achievers* in highly competitive sectors stemming mostly from the lower middle-class.

If we take these seven Meta-Milieus and the distinctions following the German models we get eleven possible milieus and therefore a slightly more differentiated but rather similar group formation than Kitschelt (see fig. 3). We can place the eleven Milieus within the political compass to identify their potential basic orientation. The postmodern and the hedonistic milieu, going beyond Kitschelt's groups, represent prototypes of the idealistic and self-experimental parts of post-materialist thinking:

Fig. 6: Potential connection between social milieus and political value orientation



(Petrik 2007)


Neither Kitschelt nor the Milieu approach claim a simple connection between (often times latent) ideological preferences and voting. Many other factors such as the current personal and political situation, personalities of politicians, mass media and party propaganda shape one's actual party choice. The individual value preference mainly reveals the political identity as an important base for critical judgment.

Whereas the milieu-approach refers to politically significant values, the explicitly opposed "life-style"-approach (Dziemba, Pock, Steinle 2007) is an example of extreme de-politicization. Instead of the "fixed life patterns" that the so-called future researchers see within the milieu approach, their own research diagnoses mostly transitory lifestyles. Value types such as CommuniTeens, Latte Macchiato-Families, Super-Daddies, Tiger-Ladies and Greyhoppers lack in deep-rooted and therefore perennial values, all the above-discussed surveys are striving for. Moreover, the life style survey is obviously restricted to left-libertarian, market-liberal and modern conservative groups of people, ignoring losers of modernization who feel the necessity of an authoritarian backlash.

4. Closing the ideology gap in Civic Education: Individual positioning taught through fundamental issues and controversial debates

In this last chapter I will outline how teachers can use Kitschelt's model in the civic education classroom. It can become a basic tool to sharpen the student's political orientation by contrasting and analyzing ideologies, party platforms, social milieus, social movements, newspaper comments, textbook articles and so on. Second, it can be used to locate and develop individual political preferences. If we consider the axes as vectors, each individual can be represented by an average position showing the relative impact of ultimate political values and related issues. The four political compasses (see above) and the European Values Study as well as the World Values Survey each work with highly controversial questions that cause people to position themselves. Exemplarily, I would like to introduce the "smallest political quiz" as the simplest variation of all compasses in order to demonstrate their basic functioning. According to its explicitly right-libertarian authors, the quiz is used in many American schools and Civics textbooks (as to the imprecise term "statist" see chapter 2):

Fig. 7: The World's Smallest Political Quiz



(www.theadvocates.org)

You can find your own place in the chart by answering the following ten questions positively, negatively or indifferently (the latter risking of putting you into the center). Of course, the ID-question is only controversial in an US-American context; it would be consensual in Europe. The total of points for each answer shows an average political position:

PERSONAL ISSUES

1. Government should not censor speech, press, media or the Internet.
2. Military service should be voluntary. There should be no draft.
3. There should be no laws regarding sex between consenting adults.
4. Repeal laws prohibiting adult possession and use of drugs.
5. There should be no National ID card.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. End "corporate welfare." No government handouts to business.
2. End government barriers to international free trade.
3. Let people control their own retirement: privatize Social Security.
4. Replace government welfare with private charity.
5. Cut taxes and government spending by 50% or more.

At schools, political compasses are mostly used to help students to identify parties matching with their personal values. The "Electoral Compass" (www.electoralcompass.com), being the most scientific of the four, has been built for the US-presidential elections of 2008. It derived from the Kieskompas that scholars of the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam created in 1985 (<http://www.kieskompas.nl/>). Kieskompas was constructed as an alternative to the popular Stemwijzer voting adviser that has for his part influenced the German voting adviser "Wahl-O-Mat". Unfortunately, Stemwijzer and Wahl-O-Mat don't enable voters to determine their position within in the whole political landscape so that I would suggest replacing those models by the Kieskompas or by Kitschelt's model.

If we compare the questionnaires of the four compasses, including items of the European Values Study and the World Values Survey which are related to the distributive and the communitarian cleavage, we get a basic list of fundamentally controversial political questions:

1. Which persons and agencies should be in charge of decision-making and government?
2. How do we solve national and international conflicts and breaches of the rules?
3. What is the value base of our society? Which role should religion play?
4. How should we include strangers and social minorities in the mainstream culture?
5. How should politics influence private life styles, gender relations and sexual behavior?
6. What impact should the state have on economy and property rights?
7. How should people get endowed with resources?
8. Which are the leading economic principles and how do they impact on the educational system?
9. What role should ecology play for the economic system?

These questions represent a political key concept helping teachers to choose controversial topics that foster political judgment skills. The following table compares the essential controversial issues that the different approaches use:³

³ From the European and the World Values Survey, I mainly chose similar basic items for the two political dimensions (for a similar selection and differences between both questionnaires see Knutsen 2009, appendix). The whole item sets are available on the surveys' internet sites.

Fig. 8: Highly controversial issues used in questionnaires on individual value orientation


<i>Fundamental issues</i>	European & World Values Survey	Smallest Quiz	Political Compass	Electoral Compass	Moral Matrix
1. <i>Decision making & government</i>	Independence and deliberation vs. obedience in family and work, men's leadership, participation		Question authorities; one-party state; obeying and commanding		
2. <i>Conflict resolution and security</i>	Strong Defense, fighting crime, freedom of speech	Military service, censorship	Spank children, discipline, death penalty, rehabilitation, military action, civil rights and counter-terrorism	Gun control, Irak invasion; financial contribution to UN, Iran and world peace; Patriot act and civil liberties, defense spendings, death penalty, torture and security	Strong security & defense; respect of law versus causes of crime
3. <i>(Non-) religious value base</i>	Role of faith (God, Hell, Sin, Heaven...)		Religion in school, religion and morality	Creationism in science classes, stem cell research	God's existence & significance
4. <i>Inclusion and cultural identity</i>	Immigration; integration; strangers as neighbors	National ID card	Nationalism, race superiority, integration	UN, legalization of illegal immigrants	Patriotism, ethnic groups
5. <i>Private life styles</i>	Gender equality, drug abuse, homosexuality, abortion, imagination	Sexuality, use of drugs	Drug legalization, reproduction, gender roles, (same-sex) marriage, same-sex child adoption	Same-sex marriage, abortion	Equality of sexes, traditional & non-traditional life styles
6. <i>Property rights and economic leadership</i>	Private vs. government ownership	International free trade, government spendings	Corporate interests, privatization	Control of mortgage lenders, more public funding to public schools	Business benefit
7. <i>Resource allocation and redistribution</i>	Private vs. state responsibility; more equal vs. more different incomes; stable prices	Corporate welfare, private social security & charity; flat tax	Class division, welfare, charity	Tax raises vs. tax cuts for higher incomes, private retirement fund, medicare benefits, reduction of income equality, obligatory health care	Private or state-provided health care, charity
8. <i>Economic principles and educational system</i>	Competition fosters creativity vs. fosters bad features		Compulsory classroom attendance, job preparation as major aim of education	Higher wages for better teachers	Elite or equal education
9. <i>Ecology and economy</i>	Increased taxes, higher prices and/or less economic growth or jobs to protect environment		Regulations for environment protection	Exaggerated effects of global warming; carbon tax; climate change policies versus economic growth	Nature protection or exploitation

On the basis of these nine fundamental topics we can now specify the ultimate values of the Kitschelt-compass. The following version opens up the landscape of political controversy within democratic societies. The grey fields represent the corporate values of two adjacent ideologies while on the contrary the white ones refer mainly to one ideology that typically fills one quadrant (see fig. 2). This political map allows us at the same time to consider the possibilities of coalitions

and the contrasts between two ideologies sharing one ultimate value like authority, social equality, economic liberty or self-determination. It represents the important "value-bricks" of political ideology:



Fig. 9: The core curriculum of controversial distributive and socio-cultural values



Finally, I would like to summarize my "Found-a-Village-Project" (Petrik 2007; 2008; 2011). Its basic idea follows Adelson's (1971) island-scenario as a framework for political identity development. The interviewed adolescents were asked to imagine a thousand people venture to an island to form a new society. Adelson then presented hypothetical laws and potential conflicts within the community to the youth. Should a law be passed to prohibit smoking? Should a dissenting religious group be vaccinated? Beyond that, my simulation of a deserted Pyrenees mountain village offers a more concrete institutional setting with traces of the traditional class structure, as well as a market place, a town hall, a prison and a church. Those institutions animate students more likely to debate basic political issues than the "naturalist" island. In each of the three acts, Kitchelt's model plays an indirect or direct role:

Act one: "Discovery of controversial values": The students get together for several town meetings to develop their own economic, political and cultural system. Those meetings are mostly highly controversial, inducing the students to establish basic debating rules. Some of the fundamental issues such as decision-making and the distribution of incomes are raised automatically, without the teacher having to

introduce them (genetic approach in the tradition of Dewey and Wagenschein). Later the teacher confronts the students with potential village situations that systematically launch the nine fundamental issues (see fig. 8 and 9).

1. Government: Should we elect a strong leader to solve personal conflicts and our economical crisis?
2. Conflict resolution: What should we do with a villager who stole 1000 € out of the common cash box?
3. Value base: Might we transform the church into a secular cultural center?
4. Inclusion: Should we accommodate four traditional Moslems from Algeria?
5. Private life: Who should decide about a village girl's request to have an abortion?
6. Property rights: Do we accept an investor's offer to buy one of the houses, transforming it into a hotel, building a road out of the small path, a parking on the market place, a telephone and internet line to attract more tourists?
7. Redistribution: Should the whole village pay for the reparation of the rotten roof of one of the houses?
8. Economic principles: Should villagers who are economically successful by inventing new cultiva-

tion methods, computer games etc. pay a special wealth tax?

9. Ecology: Do we want to invest in a wind powered generation and ecological farming by neglecting other possible investments?

Act two: "From values to ideologies": Now the village inhabitants get to know the four founding fathers of liberalism, conservatism, socialism and anarchism (term used as an equivalent to left-libertarianism, see above) Smith, Burke, Marx and Proudhon by original text passages. The students engage in role-plays (how would a liberal, socialist etc. village look like?) in order to learn to perform their different argumentation patterns. Later they work on developing a political compass integrating the four ideologies. Afterwards they compare their own solutions with Kitschelt's model.

Act three: "From ideologies to current politics": Finally, the villagers discuss controversial macro-political questions, like homosexual marriage, national referendums, climate change or the decline of the welfare state. First, by taking the four ideological perspectives in a role discussion and second, by stating their own point of views. So they pass through a learning path from the discovery of their proper values to political ideologies, systems and recent political issues.

I am currently using the village scenario to do case studies on "politicization types" as heuristics to deal with differently motivated political learning problems. A politicization type shows a typical argumentative and conflict resolution behavior depending on his or her basic political value orientation: An example might be latent conservative student who refuses to justify her/his claims since he/she views them as "natural" or a latent left-libertarian student who insults "dissident" villagers because of their unexpected opposition to egalitarian policies (see Petrik 2010).

Conclusions

Following the „Pragmatologic Theory of Models“ (Stachowiak 1973) Kitschelt's model appears to be a functional combination between overly simple and very complex alternatives. The one-dimensional left-right scale has always been insufficient, as it couldn't clarify, for example, the differences between an authoritarian and a libertarian left orientation. Furthermore, the ambiguous nature of (market-)liberalism between his "left-wing" civil rights orientation and his "right-wing" distributive position wasn't explained correctly. A three- or four-dimensional model would be less practical and less "dynamical". Second, it is not by accident that many scholars and publicists have chosen almost exactly the same coordinate system – most of the times without knowing each other. Every political system needs to deal with decision-making

and conflict resolution, the creation and distribution of wealth, religion, life styles and value change and inclusion of outsiders. These fundamental topics can be modeled by two dimensions in so far as most individuals, movements and parties seek a certain "average" congruence between their different communitarian and distributive insights. Supporters of authoritarian governments, for example, very rarely promote anti-authoritarian education.

By and large, Kitschelt's model is a good example of what the 'Psychology of Concepts' calls the "prototype view" (Murphy 2002, 488ff.): Here ideologies are not "classically" perceived as precise definitions but as variable concepts with strong "family resemblance". Prototypes like socialism or liberalism are summary representations of an entire category that overlap with other members of the category, without having attributes that all members (individuals, movements, parties) share. The resulting flexible operability is the major outcome of this model:

Ideologies can be contrasted and related. Hybrids can be mapped as well, see social democracy, social liberalism, Christian democracy or socialist and conservative variations of Communitarianism. Especially the New Social and Green movements can be seen in a left-libertarian and non-violent anarchist tradition. Fascism and Stalinism get contoured as two economically quite different, but at the same time similarly totalitarian extremes.

New political parties and movements can be asked for their special value cocktail. Possible coalitions between parties or movements can be proved regarding their ideological chances. Single political problems like unemployment can be compared for contrasting scientific and political solutions (see Hippe 2010).

The model helps relating every day values, social milieus and latent political orientations. Collective values shifts and backlashes can be traced. Contradictions between party platforms and actual political decisions can be mapped and explained as well.

Individual orientations can be located, even when dealing with incongruent "patchwork-identities" such as a religious socialist. An actual individual position represents an average, summary spot. The value deviations caused by special topics can be mapped as well. Students can learn to better articulate or alter their position and at the same time better understand their political counterparts as well as political parties and movements (see the top of this article).

Civic education teachers can use the model to test and widen their material's controversy. At the same time, they can assist their students to develop a tolerant and self-reflected political identity such as in the "Found-a-Village"-Project.

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